Tag: Russia
Stevenson’s army, January 31
– WaPo says US likely to get new Philippine bases.
– NYT describes WH procedures for classified materials.
– In FT, Gideon Rachman says culture wars are now part of foreign policy
– FP notes Biden donors who have become ambassadors.
SAIS grad John Gans has a review of Chris Whipple’s book on the Biden administration in NYT Book review. I’m a little less enthusiastic because it’s mostly interview quotes with officials with little new information. Whipple did succeed in getting many attributed quotes compared to a Bob Woodward book. So, yes, read Whipple.
Avoid, however, the new Mike Pompeo memoir, an angry, nasty book, full of venom even for most of his Trump administration colleagues, but not the former president. He brags about firing CIA analysts who said good things about JCPOA; he calls State the “worst platoon,” meaning it needed substantial reforms; he calls FSO’s “overwhelmingly hard left;” he savages Nikki Haley and John Bolton; he says Jim Mattis “was not a sound fit” for the administration and criticizes his views on Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and China; he expresses gratitude that Hillary Clinton was willing to talk to him about the SecState job, but then blasts her for being “the center of the Russia Hoax.” Turn these pages only with protective gloves. Burn after reading.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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It’s all over but the fighting
Winter has mostly frozen the front lines this winter in Ukraine. But preparations for the spring are well under way.
Dozens of recent-model NATO tanks are heading for Ukraine. Its air defenses are already taking down most Russian missiles and drones. More and better are on their way. Ukraine still needs longer-range artillery and missiles, but the US is resisting sending those that could target Crimea or Russia proper. Ukrainian war aims are clear: to regain control of its entire sovereign territory.
In Russia, a second mobilization (read “draft”) is under way. This will increase Moscow’s manpower by perhaps 200,000 untrained personnel. Iran has been sending drones to Russia, but China is sending little. It is unlear whether the weekend attack on Iranian drone-production facilities will have a signifiant mipact. Signs of Putin’s desperation are apparent: changing commanders, recruiting prisoners for cannon fodder, attacks on civilian infrastructure rather than military targets, crackdowns on dissent and economic protest at home. Russia intends to outlast Ukraine and hold on to Crimea and as much of Donbas as possible.
On the merits
The military, legal, and moral merits of the case favor Ukraine. Its military has proven far more capable, far better led, and far better motivated than anticipated a year ago. Russia attacked Ukraine on the basis of demonstrably false claims that its Russian-identifying population was at risk. President Putin’s “special operation” is patently a war of aggression, whichis a war crime. Ukraine’s efforts to regain control over its entire sovereign territory are a legitimate exercise of force, so long as they are conducted in accordance with the well-established laws of war.
Russia’s forces have proven a shadow of their reputation. They are poorly equipped, supplied, motivated, and trained. Their manpower is low quality, including a substantial number of convicts released from prison in order to fight. Their leadership is divided and competitive. Russia has conducted its war of aggression without regard for civilian casualties. It denies Ukrainian identity and has plundered Ukrainian cultural artifacts, kidnapped Ukrainian children for adoption in Russia, and ethnically cleansed territory it seizes.
On the battlefield
This war’s outcome will not however be settled on the merits, but rather on the battlefield. Neither the Ukrainians nor the Russians have concluded it would be better to negotiate. The Ukrainians are now racing to master and absorb all the new kit they are receiving from NATO members. The Russians are racing to incorporate their new recruits.
Ukraine will likely allow Russia the first offensive move this spring, as fewer forces are needed to defend. Only after destroying part of the attacking Russian forces will Ukraine launch its own offensive. If I had to guess the spearhead would aim somewhere along the Sea of Azov coast between Mariupol and Crimea. Dividing the Russian forces along the coast would enable Ukraine to target either Donetsk or Crimea. Russia might even have to decide between defending one or the other.
The home front
Russia is simmering with discontent. While the Kremlin maintains its dominance of the information space, Russian citizens know the war is not going well. Military bloggers are focusing on ineptitude. Even television is rife with complaints about military performance. The economy is sputtering. Increasingly, non-Russian citizens are doubting why they should be involved in invading Ukraine. Many would prefer to seek more autonomy from Moscow for themselves.
Ukraine is in better shape on the home front. The economy is in smithereens, but morale is high. Ukrainians support President Zelensky’s anti-corruption campaign. They want to regain control over Ukraine’s entire sovereign territory, including Crimea. There is little appetite for compromise. Ukrainians know all too well that would leave them exposed to future aggression.
Our home front
Perhaps even more important is the home front in the US and in Europe. American and European support is vital to Ukraine’s prospects in this war. In Washington, some philo-Russian Republicans would like to cut or end American support for Ukraine. Their only real opportunity will be in the budgetary battles to come this year. The outcome is unpredictable, but the Demcrats remain united and the Republicans divided. That bodes well for aid Ukraine. In Europe, solidarity with Ukraine has remained strong, despite serious differences among the allies on whether and when to negotiate. Putin has long hoped the US and Europe would crack. They haven’t yet.
It won’t be over until it’s over
States fight wars because their outcome is uncertain. On the merits at home and abroad, this one should be a win for the Ukrainians. But we’ll have to wait until at least mid-summer to know whether the merits will prevail. It’s all over but the fighting.
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Stevenson’s army, January 29
– WaPo has a ticktock on the M-1 decision, giving credit to SecState Blinken.
– WSJ warns of European concerns that time may favor Russia.
– Brookings’ Michael O’Hanlon, drawing on his new book, warns that most leaders underestimate war duration and deaths.
– CRS has some good new reference materials — on the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, the State/Foreign Ops appropriations for FY 2023, and where to look in the Constitution to satisfy the new House rule requiring a Constitutional basis for each bill.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stephenson’s army, January 27
– Politico notes Biden’s “supercharged Africa policy”
– Historian reminds us of Russia’s 18th century military adventures
– In NY Review, Fred Kaplan reviews new book on Putin
– Ben Wittes says the Jan 6 committee report has very valuable footnotes
-FP analyzes France’s withdrawal from Burkino Faso
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, January 26
– Several insider stories about the tanks for Ukraine deal reveal bureaucratic politics at work. DOD did not want to send M1s for many reasons. Biden overruled the Pentagon to meet German demands. But DOD will contract to build the tanks, not send them from current stocks. Politico has the diplomatic angle. Fred Kaplan explains DOD. NYT has the Biden perspective, and NYT also details the broader Ukraine arms issue.
Ross Douthat has a powerful insight, that Washington and Moscow are both escalating to reach a peace settlement that is likely just to ensure stalemate.
BU study sees China changing its overseas development approach.
DOD”s Defense Innovation Unit brags in its annual report.
USNews explains America’s broken classification system.
CFR has a bunch of historical resources.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Rising hopes can be realized or dashed
Here is the latest version I’ve seen of the German-French plan for normalization between Kosovo and Serbia. It is a step in the right direction, if fully implemented, but with some dubious additions and important missing elements.
What’s new
This latest text has a bit more detail on arrangements for the Serbian community in Kosovo than I have seen previously, especially in Article 7 (the glitch [sic] is in the original):
Both sides advocate for the achievement of concrete arrangements, in accordance with the relevant instruments of the Council of Europe and using existing European experiences, in order to ensure an appropriate level of self-government for the Serbian community in Kosovo and the possibility of providing services in Kosovo. Kosovo.[sic] some specific areas, including the possibility of financial assistance from Serbia and direct channels of communication between the Serbian community and the Government of Kosovo.
The parties will formalize the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and ensure a high level of protection of Serbian religious and cultural heritage, in accordance with existing European models.
The first of these paragraphs isn’t great. It fails to make reference to the Kosovo constitution as the basis for these “concrete arrangements.” It also fails to require reciprocity inside Serbia for the Albanian community there. What conditions would govern “the possibility of financial assistance from Serbia”? Nor is it clear what “direct channels of communication” with the Kosovo government means. There is already a Council of Communities that provides such communication with the Kosovo President, as well as Serb and other community representation in parliament and in the government ministries.
As for the Church, the text lacks reference to the longstanding issue of the Decan/i monastery’s property. It should reference implementation of the relevant Kosovo Constitutional Court decision.
What’s missing
Most important is what is missing. There is no apparent reference to recognition of Kosovo by the five EU members that do not recognize it.
The failure to get recognition by the five nonrecognizers is a deal breaker. It might not have to be in this text, but it would have to happen in order for Kosovo to be convinced that normalization was real. Even with those five recognitions, this agreement would not come close to the German/German Basic Treaty it is supposedly modeled after. That entailed the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic both becoming members of the United Nations. There is no such possibility here, as Russia would require an unacceptable price.
EU negotiator Lajcak is said to have met with the five nonrecognizers this week in Brussels. That’s good, but more is going to be needed. Each one will have to be convinced that the time has come to drop their opposition to Kosovo’s European prospects. Washington and EU capitals, not just Lajcak, will need to engage.
The rest of the iceberg
They will also need to engage on pressuring both Belgrade and Pristina to make the necessary compromises. Pressure on Kosovo has long been apparent. It is relatively easy to pressure a country that has no other option than bandwagoning with NATO and the EU. Pressure on Serbia is far less so. President Vucic has played a successful hedging game, balancing Russia and China against the EU and US.
That game may now be up. The Europeans have delivered a tough ultimatum to Serbia, one whose specific content is uncertain but easy to imagine. Branko Milanovic does:
threats must range from the suspension of EU negotiations, elimination of EU support funds (that Serbia gets as a candidate member), reintroduction of visas, discouragement of EU investors, to possibly additional financial sanctions (say, no access to short-term commercial loans), ban on long-term lending by the European banks, EBRD and possibly the World Bank and the IMF, and for the very end elements of a true embargo and perhaps seizure of assets.
@Demush Shasha thinks this has caused a notable change in President Vucic’s tone:
Have been following many of these conferences. This was the most realistic by far. Vucic spoke about need for Serbia to stop “lying to itself” and “open its eyes” and understand the consequences of rejecting French-German proposal.
He noted that Serbia can not stop Kosovo membership into NATO, CoE, etc. He underlined that if Serbia rejects French-Gerrman proposal: (1) EU accession process will be stoped, incl visa ban, (2) withdrawal of EU investments, (3) overall economic sanctions.
I think what we saw tonight is a first clear step in prepping the the ground for agreement with Kosovo.
Let me echo Demush. Something is beginning to move. Branko, a keen observer of the Balkans even if he mostly focuses on inequity worldwide, is opting for taking the agreement rather than suffering the consequences. It is not however yet clear whether the push will be sufficient. We’ll have to wait and see whether hopes are realized or dashed.
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