Tag: Saudi Arabia
Hard to know how to please the US
The Middle East Policy Council hosted a discussion January 25 assessing Trump Administration mid- term policy on the Middle East, with Philip Gordon, Fellow in US Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. He was joined by Michael Doran, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute and Jon B. Alterman, Senior Vice President and Director of the Middle East Program.
Gordon described Trump Administration policy in the Middle East as based on a core contradiction. On one hand, it sets out to constrain Iran from meddling in the region, to defeat ISIS, to achieve a Palestinian/Israeli peace, and show US leadership. On the other hand, the President regards the Middle East as only sand and death where the US has spent around $6 trillion without getting anything in return. The US thus wants to leave and make others pay for the expenses incurred.
Two years of trying to inflict pain on the Iranian economy did not make Iran change its behavior in the region. However costly and risky the mission might be, Gordon thinks the US should have maintained troops in Syria to prevent a Turkish invasion, giving the Kurds the leverage they need in negotiations with Damascus, and finishing the job against ISIS. Trump wants Gulf states to invest invest in the US, buy US weapons, and fight ISIS in return for backing them on countering Iran. This policy has signaled a green light to do what they want to boycott Qatar, continue the bombing campaign in Yemen, and repress dissidents.
Doran offered a different assessment of Trump Administration policy in the Middle East based on what the President promised during his election campaign: doing more with less. Trump’s approach is totally different from Obama’s of no enemies or friends, only stakeholders and problems. The US works to reach an agreement accepted by all friendly parties. Trump looks after US interests and seeks to save blood and treasure by working with allies who accept the US security umbrella in the region, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. This policy favors a coalition of allies to contain Iran. Doran claims this policy is much better than Obama’s.
Ultimately, it’s all about how you read the Iranians for Doran. Obama downplayed Iran’s aspirations. Trump thinks Iran wants to destroy the US alliance system and kick it out of the Gulf region and the Middle East.
Confused about US policy in the Middle East, Alterman pointed out what he sees as Trump’s contradictory policies in the region. John Bolton, National Security Adviser, stated the US is staying in Syria, while the president contradicted him by declaring the withdrawal. Trump said it would take thirty days to pull out and now it’s six months. In Gulf states, Trump disengaged on Yemen, embraced Saudi Arabia, and ignored the GCC conflict. The president is divorced from his government and has a poorly functioning staff. That said, Trump’s three main objectives are reasonably clear: building close ties with Saudi Arabia, countering Iran (and reversing Obama strategy of engaging it), and holding the Middle East at arm’s length.
But this strategy, Alterman argued, is not working. It is bizarre for Trump to make Iran the core of the Middle East strategy, since Tehran is weak. Its GDP is between the state of Maryland and Michigan. Mississippi, which has the lowest income per capita in the US, has seven times the income per capita of Iran. Iran has no allies in the Middle East. It can be a spoiler in the region but cannot be a winner.
For Alterman, the biggest mistake the US is making is an idiosyncratic embrace of some Middle Eastern states and the abandonment of many, rendering it hard for countries to understand how to please the US.
Riyadh impressions
I spent four days in Saudi Arabia last week, which is wholly insufficient to do anything but scratch the surface. But I’m not without those superficial impressions. The SAIS study trip was focused on the GCC conflict, but I won’t comment in detail on that today. Caveat emptor: I am not agreeing with the Saudi perspectives, only trying to render them faithfully.
Here are my more general impressions:
- Saudis in government and government-influenced institutions (which are the only ones I visited) sincerely support the domestic reforms the Crown Prince has undertaken and believe they will lead to profound and badly needed changes in opening up and modernizing the society.
- The Saudi elite is not prepared to question the Crown Prince on anything, including his foreign policy moves like the rift with Qatar and the war in Yemen. They emphasize forcefully the justice of the grievances against Qatar and humanitarian assistance provided to Yemen. They of course see Iran as a serious threat throughout the region.
- While appreciating the ample support of the Trump Administration and good citizen-to-citizen feelings (due mainly to the many Saudis who study in the US), Saudis have doubts about the Administration’s reliability that were not much alleviated by Secretary of State Pompeo’s visit last week. Many people in Riyadh view American withdrawal from the region as highly likely if not inevitable.
The inclination in Riyadh to accept top/down decisions on reform is palpable and often attributed to tribal attitudes: consultation and discussion are welcomed, but in the end it is the sheikh’s responsibility to decide and everyone else’s to obey. Constraints on executive power by an independent judiciary or other regulatory bodies, separation of powers, or a press free of government pressure are ideas that have little resonance.
Saudi Arabia’s justice system is viewed as fair, though many are aware that it is subject to scathing international criticism. The Saudi teenager who escaped to Thailand and has found refuge in Canada is viewed as someone who failed to take advantage of existing human rights mechanisms in the Kingdom. The murder of Jamal Khashoggi is viewed as a matter for the courts, which will decide whether the accused are guilty in open hearings with adequate defense attorneys. The women activists who protested the driving ban stand accused, it is said, of other crimes having to do with passing information to foreign governments or accepting foreign assistance (no one seems clear about which). Protection for foreign workers, all hired under contracts approved by their own governments, has been enhanced.
There are discontents. The conservative religious establishment comes in for frequent criticism (again, by people associated with the government). The Muslim Brotherhood looms menacingly. Fear of youth radicalization is palpable. Anxiety about terrorism and disorder, both in the Kingdom and in the region, is high. Sectarianism is bad. The government is sponsoring active efforts to counter extremism and promote dialogue among Saudis of different stripes.
There are good things as well. Pluralism, even if more apparent in ancient ruins we visited in Al Ula than in Riyadh, is good. Islam and Sharia law are good, when properly understood. The solidarity of the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt in the Gulf conflict is good, as is the Gulf Cooperation Council, especially its military cooperation (which still includes Qatar, Saudis claim). Moderation, often defined as allowing everyone to modernize at their own pace, is good. Israel might be okay, but only if it does right by the Palestinians and accepts the Arab Peace Plan.
But above all, stability is good and worth sacrificing for. The nearby examples of Syria and Yemen are glaring. Even the one success of the Arab spring, Tunisia, is tottering. It is critical to counter the big de-stabilizing factor–Iran–and to avoid any new sources of Middle East strife. That Crown Prince is the key to stability as well as reform in the Kingdom and merits, the Saudis I talked with think, the wholehearted support he is getting, the internationals be damned.
The Democratic House and foreign policy
The new US House of Representatives that was elected November 6 met for the first time yesterday. The Democratic majority re-installed Nancy Pelosi as Speaker, a job she held 2007-11.
The world asks: what does this mean for us?
The short answer is not much right away. Washington is preoccupied for now with reopening a big slice of the government, which is shut down due to an impasse over funding for border security. President Trump wants $5 billion for his border wall, which he is now sometimes calling a barrier or fence. He has betrayed his promise to get Mexico to pay for it, but still insists on building it to meet what he terms a crisis of unauthorized immigrants. The Democrats think there are better ways to protect the border from unauthorized immigration, which is generally down.
Until that gets resolved, the Congress isn’t going to do much on foreign policy. The President has almost absolute power in dealing with other countries, except when (as on the border wall) the Congress uses the budget, a war powers resolution, or sanctions to shape US relations with other countries. That usually requires legislation, which needs to pass in both Houses. Ambassadors and other presidential appointees need only be approved in the Senate, which confirmed a slew of them last week. The Democratic-controlled House will focus initially on the manifold scandals in the Trump Administration, including the President’s own financial affairs and the malfeasance of multiple cabinet members.
But eventually the House Democrats will get a shot at foreign policy. Using the subpoena power of the majority, they will certainly hold hearings on Russian and other interference in US elections. They will await the results of the Special Counsel investigation before deciding on whether to impeach the President for “high crimes and misdemeanors” related to Russia, but even if they do conviction and removal from office requires a two-thirds majority in the Senate that is nowhere to be seen, yet. Impeaching without convicting is not a winning political maneuver.
Hearings on other foreign policy issues will come as well. The Middle East and China are likely subjects. A lot of Democrats are unhappy with the withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and with Trump’s support for Saudi Arabia. Some, including two new Muslim members, are unhappy with unconditional US support for Israel and neglect of relations with the Palestinians. The now global military and economic challenge from China will interest both Democrats and Republicans. The House will scrutinize the continued US military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan.
These hearings and many public pronouncements from House members will attract lots of attention abroad, but it is difficult to parse out of the cacophony of voices in Washington where American policy is headed. For the moment, the best assumption is that there will be no big changes as a result of the Democratic takeover of the House, even if the tone changes: less unequivocal towards Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel, more nuanced with respect to Iran, more friendly towards NATO and the European Union, and more skeptical towards North Korea.
China is another question. Right now, Americans are discovering the obvious: they have more to fear from Chinese economic failure than from its success. The slowdown in Chinese growth, partly caused by American tariffs and Chinese retaliation, is causing major losses in stock markets worldwide, which are anticipating both declining corporate profits and high US interest rates. A lot will depend on the outcome of trade negotiations with Beijing, which are due to reach a conclusion in March. If they don’t, expect slowing growth, also due to the US government shutdown and the Federal Reserve’s concerns about inflation.
President Trump had a halcyon first two years. Republicans controlled both Houses of Congress, the Senate moved rapidly to approve their preferred judges, lessening the burden of environmental and other regulations on business faced no serious opposition in Congress, and the Obama expansion was still powering decent economic growth. The next two years are likely to be far more difficult, with the economy slowing if not declining, the Special Counsel reporting on his findings, and the House Democrats conducting in-depth investigations. The party is over, even if Trump continues to sing the same tunes.
The Middle East wants reform
On Tuesday the Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted the presentation of the latest Middle East Public Opinion poll by James Zogby. Polling was conducted in 10 countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey and Iran. Zogby, Co-founder and President of the Arab American Institute and Director of Zogby Research Services, presented a summary of the data and key points before a panel discussion that featured Paul Salem, President of MEI, Kate Seelye, Vice President of MEI, Alex Vatanka, an MEI Senior Fellow, and Steven Cook, Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Throughout the Middle East citizens expressed discontent with the policies of their governments. Only in the UAE did a majority of respondents indicate that their country was on the right track. This discontent spanned the rough divide opened by the Arab spring. Egypt and Tunisia both followed the “democratic track” after successful revolutions in 2011, but a majority of respondents there believe their countries to be on the wrong track, joining Iraq and Palestine as states with majority disapproval. In Egypt the drop included the military, whose confidence levels have fallen 50 points since 2013. Government reform was ranked 3rd overall in the list of political priorities, topping extremism, foreign enemies, health care, and personal rights. This contradicts a common narrative, which justified the failure of the Arab Spring by claiming that the people desired only improved economic and security conditions and cared little for political reform as long as those conditions were met. Downplaying the desire for reform may have been simply wishful thinking by authoritarian leaders in the region. The survey conveyed a sense of foreign policy pragmatism. Regarding Syria there was growing support for a national unity government with participation of Bashar al Assad. Regarding Iran, while majorities supported the Trump administration’s move to pull out of the nuclear deal, in every country except Tunisia and Egypt the majority believe that peace between Iran and the Arab world is “very possible” or “somewhat possible.” Eight out of ten countries, including Iran, held the majority view that it is important to bring Iran into a regional security arrangement with the Arab countries to help bring peace to the region. One exception to this pragmatism is the the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A growing majority in 5 out of 7 Arab states were opposed to a partnership with Israel, even if Israel returns occupied Palestinian lands and fulfills the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative. Palestinians themselves remained overwhelmingly prepared for peace with Israel if the refugee issue is solved and Israel returns to its pre-1967 borders, but a growing number believe the Israelis would never agree to those terms. Given the growing struggle between Saudi Arabia and Turkey for regional influence, the polling reflected just how close the competition is. Turkey surpasses the Saudis for favorability in Tunisia, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and Iraq, and tightened the gap in Egypt. A majority of Arab countries view Turkey as playing a more positive role than Saudi Arabia in both Iraq and Syria. Public opinion of America has fallen in the region. The EU, Russia and China all fared better than America. The panel believed that this drop in opinion was largely due to the perception of the American government as inept. The polling indicates a continued sense of unrest in the region. With little faith in their own institutions, the people of the Middle East remain largely uninspired by the jingoistic foreign policies of their governments and continue to seek an end to costly civil wars, in order to focus on domestic reforms and economic improvement.Trump is right
Donald Trump said earlier this week about the Middle East:
Now, are we going to stay in that part of the world? One reason is Israel. Oil is becoming less and less of a reason because we’re producing more oil now than we’ve ever produced. So, you know, all of a sudden it gets to a point where you don’t have to stay there.
This is more sensible than 99% of what the man says, even if I think Israel can more than take care of itself. But the main reason for US military deployments in the Middle East is oil, which is far less important than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. That is what prompted President Carter’s 1980 pledge to defend the flow of oil from the Gulf:
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.
President Carter’s Doctrine was a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which he feared presaged a thrust towards the Gulf. The Soviet Union is gone, Afghanistan is a mess, and the US economy is now far less dependent on oil imports and energy of all sorts than it was in 1980. The Gulf oil producers, especially Saudi Arabia, are far more dependent on oil exports, which they send predominantly to Asia, especially China, Japan, India, and South Korea.
The US nevertheless spends about 12% of the Pentagon budget on protecting the flow of oil from the Gulf and holds a Strategic Petroleum Reserve of well over 100 days of imports, thus protecting our principal economic competitors from the effects of an oil supply disruption while they free ride on our preparations. It is true of course that an oil supply disruption would also affect the US economy, since oil prices are set in a global market and US consumers would feel the price hike in imports of goods of all sorts. But changed circumstances should affect burden-sharing: we need to do less and other oil consumers need to do more.
There are other ways in which the Middle East merits lower priority for American foreign policy. Middle East terrorism now has little impact on Americans both at home, where right-wing attackers are far more common than Islamic ones, and abroad, where relatively few Americans have suffered harm, most of them either by sheer accident or by travel into known danger zones. Nuclear proliferation is still an issue, but mainly a self-inflicted one due to American withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran, which is far from the giant threat the Administration is portraying it as. Even if that were not true, American deployments in the Gulf are far too close to Iran for war-fighting purposes. We would need to move them farther away in order to use them in an attack.
The problem is that withdrawal from the Middle East is as problematic as intervention there. That is what President Obama demonstrated. His restraint in Libya, Syria, and Yemen left vacuums filled by jihadis, Iranians, and Gulfies. The results have been catastrophic for each of the states in question. Intervention by middling powers without multilateral authorization and on one side or the other in a civil war is known to have little chance of success and to prolong conflicts. Where the US re-committed its forces in Iraq, whose state was in far better shape than those in Libya, Syria, or Yemen, the results were far more salutary, even if not completely satisfactory.
Part of the problem for the US is lack of diplomatic capacity. American diplomacy has become far too dependent, both physically and strategically, on military presence. Military withdrawal requires a diplomatic posture that can be sustained without the troops. Many other countries by necessity have learned the trick of hitting above their military weight with diplomatic capacity. Witness an extreme example like Norway, or a less dramatic one like Germany. These are countries that lead with their diplomatic and economic clout, not with their troops, ships and planes.
There has been to my knowledge no serious discussion of the difficulties of withdrawal and how they can be met. Part of solution lies in beefing up the political, economic, and cultural capacities of American diplomacy. But withdrawal will remain perilous anyplace a legitimate, inclusive, well-functioning state does not exist. Statebuilding has gotten a really bad name from the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it remains a vital component of any effort to reduce US commitments abroad. About that, both Trump and Obama have been wrong.