Tag: Saudi Arabia
Iran’s offensive defense
The International Institute for Strategic Studies hosted a panel of experts on Iran’s Regional Posture October 11. The panel consisted of Dina Esfandiary, fellow at the Century Foundation, Ambassador Barbara A. Leaf, former ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and visiting fellow at the Washington Institute, and Ali Vaez, Iran Project Director of the International Crisis Group.
Panelists revisited the nature and role of Iran today, dissecting Iran’s motivations, threats, and constraints, beyond traditional perspectives that privilege analyses based on American interests. With ethno-sectarian conflicts raging in Syria and Yemen as well as a tense political transition in Iraq, the Saudi-led Gulf states and Iran, the region’s major actors, have been embroiled in a competition of political and strategic influence.
But is it that simple? Esfandiary sought to move beyond polarity. She pointed out that Iran is not simply vying for power, but seeks to preserve its territorial integrity against Western and Gulf nations it views as aggressive. As a main center of Shi’a Islam, Iran sees itself as entitled to regional influence. Esfandiary elaborated that while religion was a foreign policy driver for the post-Revolution state’s early years, the Iranian government now leans towards nationalism as a better way to unify the nation’s people and frame its foreign policy endeavors. Elaborating on this point, Leaf said that Iran’s posture should be understood as an offensive defense, a response to the US presence and support of both the Israelis and the Saudis, which it sees as a threats to its territorial integrity and legitimate involvement in Arab affairs.
Iraq, Esfandiary said, is Iran’s highest regional priority. Tehran seeks a central government in Baghdad aligned with its interests. However, with the election of Barham Salih as Iraq’s new President, and his selection of Adel Abdul Mahdi as Prime Minister, many analysts have signaled a turn in Iraq away from the rigid ethno-sectarian politics that have dominated the post-invasion landscape. With many Iraqis disillusioned by dysfunctional governance resulting from proxy politics, Iran’s ability to sway the new government’s formation and the future of the nation’s politics are limited. Esfandiary further identified the Syrian civil conflict as Iran’s second priority, and the conflict in Yemen as its last priority, questioning whether Iran has a long-term strategic goal in Yemen at all. Leaf agreed, with Iraq as Iran’s greatest concern given the election year.
Invoking Iran’s Hezbollah model, Leaf listed the three major instruments in Iran’s toolbox:
- Creating and directing splintered proxy groups, preferably local actors, to shape civil conflicts as Tehran sees fit. In particular, supporting and directing Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq.
- Increasing its defense and intelligence architecture in Syria, part of its corridor to Israel and the Mediterranean.
- Exploiting disordered Arab states with sizeable Shi’a minorities.
Vaez added Iran’s nuclear program as another instrument of the state’s offensive defense strategy in the region: a deterrent to nuclear Israel and the aggressive Gulf states, all supported by the US.
Underscoring the constraints of current containment policies, Vaez underlined that Trump was misguided in withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal. While the goal is to deprive Iran of resources through sanctions, Iran’s regional proxy operations are not strongly correlated to sanctions, citing 2011 as a year in which Iran was able to expand its proxy operations while under increased pressure from multilateral sanctions.
With another round of harsher sanctions going into effect on November 4, Vaez fears that in the unlikely scenario of effective sanctions, Iran’s political system and elite will welcome a crisis, whipping up nationalist sentiment and acting in a less risk-averse manner throughout the region. Leaf, who submitted testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Subcomittee on Terrorism, Non-Proliferation, and Trade in support of sanctions, brought up this fear in encouraging the committee to avoid mistiming sanctions, lest they strengthen Iranian nationalism.
For Esfandiary, the Gulf Arab states’ insistence that Iran pull out as a precondition for negotiations is one of the biggest constraints in reducing conflicts in Yemen and Syria. She argued that Yemen could have been ideal for negotiations with Iran, which has made it clear it is willing to negotiate. Leaf echoed this sentiment, stating that while the fractured Gulf states have tried to bring the Houthis to the negotiating table via Oman, only Tehran can succeed. Iran has been reckless in supporting the Houthis, rapidly transferring military training and technology to them. But the Houthis are independent, often operating against Iranian wishes as in their capture of both Sa’ana and Aden. Their relationship to Iran is very different from that of Hezbollah or other proxies. Further recklessness on the part of the Houthis, such as attacks on commercial ships, could be problematic for Iran.
All three panelists agreed that Iran’s image in the international sphere has improved significantly, regardless of its proxy activities. Esfandiary
and Vaez both pointed to the European Union’s effort to bypass US sanctions as well as the ICJ ruling in favor of Iran as indicators of a recovering international image. Despite the negative domestic impact of the war in Syria and Iraqi resistance to Iranian meddling, Iran appears uninterested in negotiating with the US in any capacity. Tehran instead is emphasizing its relationships with the EU, China, and Russia. Beijing and Moscow are especially important and have a higher level of familiarity with the Iranian economy than their Western counterparts.
Ultimately, Vaez warned of the need for a more inclusive security and intelligence architecture in the Middle East. The region needs a long-term strategy to escape the asymmetry and escalating armament in the region.
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Jamal’s fate
We still don’t know precisely what Jamal Khashoggi’s fate is: was he abducted in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul? Did he die there or elsewhere? Was he murdered or was his death unintentional?
What we know is that he has disappeared. The last sighting was his entry into the consulate. That makes his fate an issue for the Saudis to clarify. They haven’t bothered. Beyond denying responsibility for his disappearance, Riyadh has said almost nothing.
Others are saying a lot. President Trump, while declaring he will get to the bottom of the disappearance, initially emphasized that Jamal was not a US citizen and that his (grossly exaggerated) $110 billion in arms sales to Riyadh will have to go ahead no matter what. Under pressure, the President is now promising “severe punishment” if Saudi Arabia killed Khashoggi. The Congress is pressing the Administration for an investigation and threatening sanctions against Saudi Arabia.
Turkey is busily leaking videos of suspicious movements of Saudis into and out of Istanbul and the consulate, as well as letting on that they have audio and video of what happened inside the consulate. Jamal’s Washington Post employers and many other news outlets are devoting valuable space to insisting on clarification and expressing their dismay that it has not been forthcoming. Many Washington think-tank colleagues are publishing vociferous protests and testimonials to a courageous journalist.
The paucity of hard facts makes it difficult to say more. Ankara and Riyadh have agreed to a joint committee to pursue the investigation. But there is little likelihood it will come up with anything if the Saudis don’t want it to. That perhaps is the most damning signal at present. If Jamal were alive, or had left the consulate alive, why would Saudi Arabia not have demonstrated that already?
The brouhaha over Jamal’s disappearance is unlikely to amount to much more than verbal protest. Turkey can do little damage to Saudi Arabia, with which it is already at odds. The Trump Administration has wedded itself to the Kingdom, which it needs for the campaign against Iran. Washington still has lots of issues with Turkey, even after the release Friday of an American pastor arrested two years ago. Trump will stick with the Kingdom as his favored ally in the Gulf. He has no real alternative.
The larger significance of Jamal’s still undetermined fate is this: the spirit of open inquiry and freedom of expression that he practiced and championed is evaporating. Russia’s use of chemical weapons against “turncoats” in Britain, Duterte’s murderous rampage against drug dealers in the Philippines, Iran’s arming of Hizbollah, the Houthis, and Shia militias in Syria and Iraq, and Trump’s denunciations of the press as “enemies of the people” are creating new norms: states can violently attack their opponents whenever and wherever they like. Unless they are caught red-handed murdering innocents, the consequences are likely to be minimal. Maybe I should say even if they are caught red-handed.
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Video of the week
This somewhat skeptical Washington Post version of the Turkish-provided videos purporting relevance to Jamal Khashoggi’s disappearance is worth a look:
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Burden sharing is good, but…
The State Department announced Friday that it was canceling $200 million in assistance for “stabilization” in parts of Syria the US and its allies control and welcomed a contribution from Saudi Arabia and other countries that would amount to $300 million. What could be wrong with that? It sounds like the Administration has succeeded in getting others to share the burden. That’s good.
The devil of course is in the details. First, the money seems to be limited, like the US money that was originally programmed, to “stabilization,” which in the current Administration’s lexicon means things like water, electricity, demining, and the like. Everything short of governance, which is shunned as the much-despised “nation building” the President doesn’t want to do. But there is no way of preventing ISIS, Al Qaeda, or some other extremist group from returning unless the territory is secured and governed.
The Defense Department is training the security forces. I’ve got serious doubts about that, since what is needed is not just counter-terrorism/insurgency, but rather policing, which has dramatically different requirements, including not only investigatory capabilities but also courts and prisons. But let’s assume the Pentagon has learned that and is somehow training a decent police force that will protect the population and not abuse it. If they arrest someone, where will he be tried? According to what procedures? And how will punishments be administered? If a civil case is brought, how will decisions be enforced?
There are other big issues: who will govern and how? Melissa Dalton of CSIS helpfully outlines the complexities of a serious stabilization effort, which would have to include security, greater citizen engagement, more inclusive governance, and a serious communications/outreach effort. There is not sign of any of these things in the Administration’s announcement. We can hope that mission creep will make them happen, but that is hardly a substitute for good planning.
The Kurds who constitute the heart of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the US allies in eastern Syria, are said to be in negotiations with the Assad regime to combine their forces: is the US really prepared to encourage the Saudis to provide hundreds of millions in eastern Syria if the forces that control it are in turn controlled by Damascus? Wouldn’t that be a contradiction of the announced policy of no aid beyond humanitarian assistance for areas under Assad’s control?
In addition, burden-sharing is not a simple matter, as Melissa also emphasizes. How will the money flow? To whom? To be effective, burden-sharing will require leadership and coordination within a coherent and over-arching strategic framework, as well as oversight to ensure that the impacts are positive. We don’t want to be funding warlords or Kurds attacking inside Turkey. There is no sign of any of this in Friday’s announcement, which mentions only a common list of projects. That is nowhere near what will be required to ensure synergy, effectiveness, and consistency with US policy goals.
Friday’s announcement included Jim Jeffrey’s appointment as the Secretary of State’s Representative for Syria Engagement. That’s good news, as he is eminently qualified from his previous positions as Ambassador to Albania, Turkey, and Iraq. His role is said to be focused on the UN-hosted Geneva talks aimed at ending the war with an irreversible political process. But leverage there will depend on how things are going in the part of eastern Syria that the US and its allies now control. What role will he play in the shared stabilization effort? How will US military and civilian presence be translated into US negotiating leverage? Will Jim have the kind of all-of-government authority required to have a decisive impact on the negotiations?
Yes, burden-sharing is good. But it is also complicated and difficult.
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Diplomacy for drawdown
Marc Lynch, after describing well the security dilemmas and state fragility that are driving Middle East conflicts, concludes:
US hegemony in the Middle East will never be restored because the region has fundamentally changed. Moving beyond the wars and political failures that followed the Arab uprisings will not be easy. The damage is too deep.
The question is: should Americans worry about that? Marc doesn’t answer that question, but Steven Metz does.
American interests in the Middle East are usually defined along these lines:
- Countering international terrorism
- Ensuring oil and gas can flow without hindrance to world markets
- Supporting friends and allies
- Preventing nuclear proliferation
Steven essentially says the threat of international terrorism is overblown, US energy vulnerability is vastly reduced (“Petroleum will not be weaponized”), and US friends and allies can (mostly) take of themselves. He doesn’t deal with the proliferation issue, but he really doesn’t have to, because he is talking mainly about military commitments. Military action has never been a good option for dealing with nuclear proliferation, since it would provide a very strong incentive for acquiring nuclear weapons.
Steven’s conclusion: the US should withdraw its military from the Middle East and rely instead on “off-shore balancing” to ensure that no rival hegemon is able to control the region and intervene only in the event that one threatens US interests. The savings could be gigantic: RAND estimated that in 2008 12-15% of the Pentagon budget was spent to securing oil from the Persian Gulf.
Washing our hands of the Middle East is an attractive proposition. Unfortunately it is one that President Obama tried, without a great deal of success. President Trump is tempted in the same direction. But withdrawal has left the many of the vacuums that Marc describes so well, generating security dilemmas and military responses that have left Syria, Yemen, and Libya in ruins and erstwhile American friends like Israel, Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates at odds and hedging.
It is difficult to see how the United States can withdraw from the Middle East without a focused diplomatic effort to ensure that the region can restore a modicum of stability,or at least remove some of the drivers of instability. Offshore balancing won’t work if there is no balance but only chaos. The Trump Administration is said to be preparing for a Summit to restore some coherence to GCC next month. That makes sense: there will be no serious effort to counter Iran’s behavior in the region so long as Qatar is feuding with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
But the Administration also needs to end its own feuding with Turkey and restore some balance to its policy on Palestine to make it more palatable to Sunni Arab friends. And it needs to reconsider its position on the Iran deal, which threatens to seriously undermine relations with Europe.
So yes, I agree that we should draw down, if not completely out, from the the Middle East. But there is a lot of diplomatic homework required to make that possible. And a very real possibility that the Administration will focus instead on countering Iran, leading it to increase rather than decrease its military commitments in the region.
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Israel’s “center”
On Monday, the Brookings Institution hosted M.K. Yair Lapid, founder of the centrist Yesh Atid party, the largest opposition party in the Knesset. Lapid shared his views about current Israeli domestic and foreign policy, including its relationship with the US, as well as his vision for the country’s future. John R. Allen, president of the Brookings Institution, gave introductory remarks, and Tamara Coffman Wittes, senior foreign policy fellow at Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, moderated the discussion. Below, I discuss key takeaways from Lapid‘s remarks.
Foreign Policy Flashpoints
At a time when regional conflict threatens Israel’s relative stability, Lapid described how his country and the international community should approach Israel’s main foreign policy challenges to ensure future Israeli security. On the Palestinian front, Lapid stressed the importance of breaking the silence that has stalled negotiations on a two state solution since the Trump embassy move. A return to dialogue represents the only road to peace. A Palestinian Jerusalem, however, is off the table. Lapid stated that “Jerusalem is a capital; if someone came to DC and asked [the US] to share it with Mexico, they would refuse.” Lapid also criticized UNRWA, arguing that having a refugee agency solely for Palestinians allows Arab countries to maintain a false moral high ground in the conflict.
Lapid blamed Hamas for the recent killing of hundreds of protestors in Gaza by Israeli snipers, saying that the violent protests threatened national security. Although it is not at fault for the violence, Israel must work quickly to solve the humanitarian crisis; after all, Gazan sewage contaminates Israeli water. However, any Israeli efforts to solve the crisis must be predicated by Hamas’ fall from power, clearing the way for humanitarian aid to reach Gazan hands without funding terrorist activities.
Lapid also used national security to defend his country’s controversial position in the Golan Heights. In addition to their strategic importance in fending off the rising Iranian and Hizbollah threat, giving the Golan Heights back to Assad is simply not an option, as it would put 22,000 Jewish lives at risk. Similarly, opening the northeastern border to Syrian Arab refugees also represents an unacceptable security risk. Instead, Lapid called on the US to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Heights, arguing that this move would allow the US to send the message that it does not tolerate Assad’s human rights abuses.
Israeli-US Relations: Troubling Times Ahead?
While Lapid lauded the Trump administration’s goodwill towards Israel, he expressed concern that positive relations on the executive level are papering over fissures that will emerge after Trump leaves office. Chief among these is American Jewry’s increasing disinterest in Israel. Orthodox Jews in Israel have criticized American Reform Jews too much, causing them to feel alienated. Increasing anti-Israel discourse on US college campuses has prevailed over American Jews’ ties to their ancestral homeland. Lapid also linked heightened partisanship under Trump to the erosion of the bipartisan support Israel has enjoyed in the past. As a consequence, bilateral relations could deteriorate during the next democratic administration, leaving Israel more exposed than ever to national security threats from within the Arab world.
Careful Optimism: A Winning Call?
As he discussed his chances for beating Netanyahu in the next parliamentary elections, Lapid emphasized that Israelis are more hesitant about large political shifts than US voters. For that reason, Lapid argued that emphasizing satisfaction with the status quo while calling for gradual crackdowns on corruption and moving towards a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict will be a winning call in 2019. In addition, Lapid advocated for a move away from using empty rhetoric to avoid confronting issues head-on, saying that “we need a government that actually does stuff, not [one] that just eloquently describes the problem.” While his strategy of emphasizing continuation and subtle changes might mean that Yesh Atid does not differentiate itself enough from Likud enough to win in 2019, Lapid hopes that centrist success in Germany and France might bode well for Israel.
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