Tag: Saudi Arabia

Delay can be good

Posted in Daniel Serwer - April 12, 2018 - 0 Comment

Yesterday’s bravado has given way to today’s hesitation. President Trump tweeted this morning:

Never said when an attack on Syria would take place. Could be very soon or not so soon at all!

This kind of inconsistency creates confusion and uncertainty that can undermine US standing in the world and even contribute to crisis escalation. Flip-flops are no better in diplomacy than they are in domestic politics. In addition, the delay has given the Syrian government time to park its aircraft and other assets close by the Russians, whom the Americans will not want to hit.

But this particular delay could still be a good thing, if it gives Washington time to do three things:

  • Assemble unequivocal evidence that Syrian President Assad was responsible for the chemical attack last week on Douma;
  • Plan a serious combined military and diplomatic campaign to end at least the use of chemical weapons in Syria, if not the war itself;
  • Rally domestic as well as international support for that combined campaign.

I don’t see much sign that the US is working on any of these things, but it should.* This post is about what Washington should be doing now, before any military action.

First is to gather the evidence. Intelligence doesn’t flow instantaneously. Materials often have to be translated and analyzed, not the least for veracity. Many countries may have collected against Syrian targets. To put together an unclassified version of the evidence against the Syrian government, cleared by all those agencies and governments that have contributed something, takes time and concentration.

That material should then be presented publicly, first and foremost to the Congress. Members on both sides of the aisle are nervous about allowing the President to act without at least Congressional consultation, if not approval. They fear another exclusively presidential decision, like last year’s cruise missile attack on the Syrian base that had launched a sarin attack, would set an undesirable precedent for military action against North Korea and Iran. Some in Congress are also loathe to do anything that will get the US more involved in Syria, as the President has also been. Americans are not keen on taking on more responsibility for that devastated country.

Evidence against Bashar al Assad also needs to be presented internationally, both in classified and unclassified formats. France and the UK are thought to be considering participation in military action. Others, like Germany and Saudi Arabia, have good reason to be sympathetic with the US even if they are reluctant to participate. Russia de facto controls Syrian air defenses, which have mostly stood idly by while the US and especially Israel flies at will over and near Syria. If Moscow can be convinced to continue to hold its fire, Assad will be more chastened. It is not only cruise missiles that send a message.

A one-off strike, tightly targeted on those who launched the chemical attack on Douma, will do no more this year than last year. Assad is fighting not only to hold on to power, but also for his life. Only the prospect of a broad, sustained military campaign against his capabilities will affect his calculations about using chemical weapons, which are important to him because he is short of manpower after 7 years of war. The Administration needs to be asking whether targeting the presidential palace (with or without a warning) or the Syrian Air Force intelligence facilities that plan chemical attacks would send a stronger message than targeting just runways and aircraft.

The Administration also needs to consider what happens if Russians or Iranians or their proxies are killed, intentionally or unintentionally. Does the US have the capability to respond to escalation? Would it want to do so? Is it prepared for what Russia might do in Ukraine, the Baltics or the Balkans? Does it have the capability to respond to what Iran and its proxies might do in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, or even inside the US?

The Syrian conflict has widened from non-violent protests against autocracy to a civil war and now to a geopolitical contest between some of the most powerful states on earth. It behooves the US to think carefully about the many diplomatic, political, and military consequences that may follow from military action. Once it has carefully chosen a course of action, it needs to assemble as much support as possible and move decisively, not only in Syria but also defensively worldwide.

*Curt Mills at The National Interest attributes the hesitation to domestic, rightwing pressure. I suspect he is correct.

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Dare to dream

Posted in Daniel Serwer - April 6, 2018 - 1 Comment

Alexandros Mallias, former ambassador of the Hellenic Republic to the US and now a special adviser to Eliamep, writes (based on his presentation to the 5th Hellenic High  Strategy Conference, March 29 -30: 

A process that runs from Tehran to Helsinki via Jerusalem?  Madness,  or surrealism? Call it utopia, but tomorrow it may become necessity. Allow me to identify six major problems and offer six proposals:

Mismatch between threats, military interventions and their consequences

The so-called “Arab Spring” is not simply a lost opportunity for the Arabs but also a great occasion missed by Europe and the United States as well. For the first time since the rise of “Arab nationalism” in the 1950s, the origin of the revolts did not target Europe, the United States, and Israel. What happened next was due also to our action, miscalculations or inertia and affects our own security and stability.

The unprecedented flow of refugees and migrants to Europe is the unavoidable “collateral damage.” The refugee and migration flows undermined the European integration process and pushed xenophobia and nationalism into mainstream politics. The refugee issue was the catalyst for the Brexit referendum. The European Union is losing a global politico-military partner and capabilities. I earnestly hope this trend will be reversed.

The EU was inadequate, divided and slow to assess the threat, to react, and to act. The lack of a common and integrated foreign policy as a functional common denominator is at the heart of the problem.

Proposal: prevention of population movements should be at the center of political decision-making

The following conditions need to be fulfilled before giving the “green light” for military power:

  1. Defining the problem: what threat was Libya’ s dictator Muammar Gaddafi to Europe’s security? Is today’s Libya a security provider for Europe?
  2. A clear political goal: what do we want to achieve? What does success consist of?
  3. A clear line between wishful thinking and what is possible: no early “mission accomplished” fireworks.
  4. Political objectives matched by appropriate economic, political, and military means.

Conflicts of interest of the Middle East actors

The vital interests of regional players diverge. They are part of the problem as well as of the solution.

Proposal:  a new regional security system covering the Middle East and the Mediterranean

The proposed arrangement might include all MENA States, Iran included, the five Permanent Members of the UNSC and the EU. This idea was floating in the UN Security Council Resolutions (Iran-Iraq cease fire) in the late 80’s.

Without a minimum understanding between the Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia, there is no possibility of establishing balanced, interest-based security in the wider region of the Middle East and North Africa.

Saudi Arabia is changing. The modernization policies are essential for the Kingdom’s stability and security. Potentially aggressive behavior by Iran during the implementation of Saudi Arabia’s welcome reforms must be prevented. But the stabilization process of the wider Middle East is not achievable without Iran.

Logic dictates that long-term balance of power and interests should allow establishing the terms for the inclusion of Iran, Saudi Arabia and at a later stage Israel in a  regional security arrangement, no matter how  impossible this perspective looks today. However, logic rarely becomes a mainstream practice in international relations.

We should remember that the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 cemented the era of détente and cooperation, before the end of the Cold War. It included recognition that: “The participating states are convinced that security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole…”

We need to launch a process including the OSCE member-states and the MENA states. The participating states should undertake commitments similar to those adopted within the  Helsinki Process. China should also participate.

Nuclear proliferation

The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East is real. It will become unavoidable if Iran gets nuclear capabilities. Already, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and possibly Egypt are contemplating their own nuclear ambitions.

Egypt’s well-known proposal for the creation of a Nuclear-Free Zone in the Middle East sounds good.  However, Israel has its own reasons not to back the Egyptian plan.

Proposal: a phased multilateral treaty

First : The elaboration and adoption of a  binding multilateral  treaty for  the non-use of nuclear weapons in the greater Middle East (including Iran).

Second: the Treaty could include a clause that bans, within a defined time schedule (for example 20 years), nuclear weapons in the wider Middle East, establishing a nuclear-free zone. The Permanent Members (P5) of the UN Security Council and the European Union could also be contracting parties.

Ballistic missiles and conventional forces

Iranian ballistic missiles are a threat to Israel’s security. The anticipated improvements in their accuracy and delivery capacity will further increase Israel’s and others’ concern and need for security, deterrence and retaliation.

Proposal: a “Middle East Conventional Forces Control and Reduction Treaty”

This would require the proportional and simultaneous reduction of ballistic and other conventional armaments. It could take the shape of a legally binding instrument similar to the November 1990 Paris “Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.”

We could foresee an intermediate set of Confidence Building Measures, including international  inspections and observation of military exercises.

Anachronism and dysfunction of the global collective security system

The UN is unable to discharge its duties as the global collective security system. Unilateral actions by the P5 without foresight actions are well illustrated through their involvement in the Syrian chaos.

Often acting at the margins of their mandate (mainly the UN Charter’s Articles 23 and 24 ) their acts are justified by self-interest.  Their motivations are geopolitical; about prevailing and expanding or containing influence.

Proposal: The UN Charter to be revised and the Security Council updated

Τhe post-war composition and the abuse of veto power do not match the present global  risks, balance of power and capabilities.

Conclusion

We need to dare to dream. Today’s impossible is tomorrow’s achievement. Peace in the Middle East is not beyond our reach.

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An artful Saudi charm offensive

Posted in Adam Friend - April 2, 2018 - 1 Comment

Quite a bit has been written recently about the efforts of the Saudi state – and its de facto leader Mohammed bin Salman, in particular – to win influence in the White House. Little has been said, however, about the parallel track of Saudi public diplomacy aimed at shifting the opinion of the common American.

This charm offensive has ratcheted up in recent days since the announcement of Mohammed bin Salman’s multicity tour of the U.S., which began last Monday. Since then we’ve seen a rash of public-facing events featuring the ambitious Crown Prince: he’s meeting with Oprah; he’s getting a latte at Starbucks; his magazine is on sale at Rite-Aid.

One of the more illuminating events put on during bin Salman’s visit involved the Crown Prince only tangentially. On the night of March 21, the Saudi embassy in Washington teamed up with the Middle East Institute to organize a one-night-only exhibition of Saudi art at Foggy Bottom’s Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts. The event was sponsored by MBS’ personal philanthropic venture the Misk Foundation, with art curated by the associated Misk Art Institute. Despite that morning’s snow, the event saw hundreds of attendees until late into the evening.

Unless you’re among a select sliver of the world’s population, you probably have little familiarity with the world of contemporary Saudi art. Let me assure you, this is exactly what the event’s organizers expect of you. A newly-published overview of Saudi art summarizes the conversation they want you to have:

 

For the Kennedy Center, Misk chose to feature a variety of pieces from Saudi artists, ranging from modernist installations to more traditional paintings. There were quasi-political works such as Ahmad Angawi’s installation Street Pulse, whose microphones reflect a thirst for free expression, and Nugamshi’s video Mirage, in which the artist uses crude oil to write out the title. Both Amr Alnagmah’s photography piece Digital Spirituality and Ahmed Mater’s Magnetism to frame the Kaaba in a new light, while Angawi’s Wijha 2:148 (see below) depicts the massive development taking place in Mecca since the 1980s. Not everything is new, however – the event also featured a number of massive murals, painted by a team led by husband and wife Ali Moghawi and Fatimah Hassan in a style known as Al-Qatt Al-Asiri, recognized in 2017 on UNESCO’s list of Intangible Cultural Heritage.

As if to certify the importance of the event, the exhibit was visited by a number of Saudi dignitaries, including Minister of Culture and Information Awwad al-Awwad and royal family member (and noted art enthusiast) Prince Badr bin Abdullah. If the intent behind visits from these big names was to draw in more attendees, I can vouch for its success – many people I spoke confessed they had no knowledge the event was happening until they spotted the Saudi delegation moving through the Kennedy Center. The extra publicity attracted some unfriendly attention as well, with protesters from Code Pink arriving early to demonstrate against the Saudi war in Yemen.

Beyond the quality of the art, what does all this effort say about the Saudi state? The ruling clique in Riyadh is trying to sell themselves as ambitious reformers of their aging system. So far, the Saudi soft power initiative has been focused on personal outreach. This event, however, confirms Mohammed bin Salman’s ambitions for advancing not just his own image to a US audience, but also the image of a new Saudi nation that he intends to debut. If the Misk Foundation’s art initiative is any indication of a trend, MBS aims to convince even the average American that a dynamic, cultured Saudi Arabia is on the rise. So yes, art from Saudi Arabia. And undoubtedly a whole lot more to come.

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It’s the region, stupid

Posted in Sebastian Gerlach - March 12, 2018 - 0 Comment

The Middle East suffers from a whole range of problems. War and conflict are besetting wide parts of the region and have caused massive destruction as well as displacement in several countries, including Syria and Yemen. Climate change has brought about enormous environmental degradation such as desertification and water scarcity. At the same time, stressed domestic economies are increasingly unable to provide job opportunities for the region’s disenchanted youth. The Middle East faces enormous challenges that transcend borders and hence require answers that narrow-minded national policy making is no longer able to provide. Indeed, the region is today in dire need of regional responses.

On March 7, the Middle East Institute presented a roadmap of how future cooperation should look like in the Middle East. Resulting from Track 1.5 initiative involving current and former officials and senior experts from across the Middle East as well as from China, Europe, Russia, and the United States, the so-called Baghdad Declaration outlines 12 good neighborhood principles for the region. The discussion featured three major participants in the Middle East Dialogue. Naufel al-Hassan, deputy chief of staff to Prime Minister Haider al Abadi of Iraq, Abdullah al-Dardari, who serves as a senior advisor on reconstruction at The World Bank, and MEI’s senior vice president for policy research and programs Paul Salem provided their perspective on the Baghdad Declaration and the Middle East’s future. A full recording of the event is here:

Regional integration is already prevalent in the Middle East. Abdullah al-Dardari stresses that, excluding oil and gas, intraregional trade accounts for some 40% of total trade in the Middle East; taking the informal economy into consideration, this figure might even reach 60%. Moreover, the Middle East has the world’s highest level of intraregional level of remittances. Paul Salem underlines this observation and adds that only because of the high level of existing regional interdependence and interaction conflicts were able to spread that easily across the Middle East. However, the integration of today is neither well-structured nor reflected in the political relationships between Middle Eastern states.

The core Middle East. Source: CIA World Factbook, Wikimedia Commons

The region is still in dire need of better cooperation among its members. Al-Dardari argues that the model of country-based economic growth has reached its apex in the Middle East. Self-sustained economic development is no longer possible as national labor markets, productive bases, and consumption levels have become too narrow. Instead, only regional economic integration and the resulting creation of an open regional market can attract extensive investment and the money needed to rebuild war-ravaged countries: an estimated one trillion dollar of assets has been destroyed since 2011. Naufel al-Hassan also points out that political and environmental challenges such as transnational terrorist networks and water scarcity go beyond the problem-solving capacities of single states and require common answers. In the same vein, the region’s governments can only bring back hope to the Middle East’s youth when they collaborate on providing decent job opportunities. A new regional framework is hence not an option, but a necessity.

Although the contemporary conflicts in the Middle East seem to make increased regional cooperation almost impossible to achieve, change is possible. Salem stresses that other regions of the world were able to transition from a conflict system to a stable order. Not even a century ago, Europe suffered from two wars which much exceeded the level violence that has beset the contemporary Middle East. Yet Europe has been able to overcome its international divisions and conflicts and has established a strong system of cooperation, the European Union. At the same time, the Middle East has proven to be able to move beyond regional standoffs, as the surmounting of rivalry between Egypt and Saudi Arabia of the 1950s has demonstrated. We can thus be hopeful whereby al-Hassan emphasizes that a new stage of integration has already begun. To defeat ISIS, the region has displayed a new level of cooperation, which can serve as a blueprint for future efforts to unite in face of political, economic, and environmental challenges.

A better future is hence possible for the Middle East. The Baghdad Declaration offers a distinct vision that can show the path towards deeper integration in the region. When this transition will materialize will however depend on the readiness of the region’s current leadership to cease hostilities and acknowledge that small-minded national agendas cannot act as a remedy. For the sake of the Middle East and its people, this change of mentality and political outlook should occur soon.

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A weakened America

Posted in Daniel Serwer - December 26, 2017 - 1 Comment

Is America stronger after 11 months of Donald Trump or not?

It is demonstrably weaker, mainly because of his diplomatic moves and non-moves, but also because Trump has done nothing to reduce American military commitments and a good deal to expand them. Let me enumerate:

The diplomatic front:

  • Trump withdrew from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) early in the game. The remaining negotiating partners have X-ed out the provisions the US wanted on labor and environmental protection and are preparing to proceed, without American participation. TPP was America’s ace in the Asia Pacific.
  • He is withdrawing as well from the Paris Climate Change accord. That is also proceeding without the US, which will be unable to affect international deliberations on climate change unless and until it rejoins.
  • He has withdrawn from UNESCO, which excludes the US from participation in a lot of cultural, scientific and educational endeavors.
  • He hasn’t announced withdrawal from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but the negotiations on revising it are thought to be going very badly, mainly because of excessive US demands.
  • He has refused to certify that the Iran nuclear deal is in the US interest, which is so patently obvious that the Republican-controlled Congress is making no moves to withdraw from it.
  • His ill-framed appeal to the Saudis to halt financing of terrorists has precipitated a dramatic split among US allies within the Gulf Cooperation Council.
  • Through his son-in-law he encouraged the Saudis to try to try to depose Lebanon’s prime minister and embargo Qatar, making the prime minister more popular than ever and shifting Doha’s allegiance to Iran.
  • He has continued American support for the Saudi/Emirati war effort in Yemen, while at the same time the State Department has called for an end to the Saudi/Emirati blockade due to the humanitarian crisis there.
  • His decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem heightened tensions between Israel and the Palestinians, undermined his own peace initiative, and obstructed the rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia he hoped for.
  • He has done nothing to counter Iran’s growing influence in Iraq and Syria, or Russia’s position in Syria and Ukraine.
  • He initially embraced Turkey’s now President Erdogan but has watched helplessly while Turkey tarnishes its democratic credentials and drifts into the Russian orbit.
  • He has also embraced other autocrats: Philippine President Duterte, China’s President Xi, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, to name only three.
  • He has failed to carry the banner of American values and preferred instead transactional relationships that have so far produced nothing substantial for the US.

The military front:

  • Use of drones is way up.
  • So is deployment of US troops in Europe, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, not to mention ships and planes in the Asia Pacific.
  • The Islamic State, while retreating in Syria and Iraq, is advancing in Afghanistan, where the Taliban and Al Qaeda are also holding their own.
  • Allies are hesitating to pitch in, because the president is erratic. Japan, South Korea, and the Europeans are hedging because the US can no longer be relied on.
  • The US continues to back the Saudi and Emirati campaign against the Houthis in Yemen, precipitating a massive humanitarian crisis.
  • Cyberthreats to the US, including its elections, have increased, without any counter from the administration.
  • Promises that North Korea would not be allowed to develop a missile that could strike the US have gone unfulfilled, and Trump did nothing effective once it accomplished that goal.
  • Military options against North Korea, which are all that Trump seems to be interested in, will bring catastrophic results not only for Koreans but also for US forces stationed there and in the region.
  • Russia continues to occupy part of Ukraine, with no effective military or diplomatic response by the US, and Moscow continues its aggressive stance near the Baltics, in the North Sea, in the Arctic, and in the Pacific.

The diplomatic record is one of almost unmitigated failure and ineffectiveness, apart from new UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea. The military record is more mixed: ISIS is defeated on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria, but that is a victory well foreshadowed in the previous administration. It is also far from reassuring, since ISIS will now go underground and re-initiate its terrorist efforts. None of the other military pushes has done more than hold the line. Anyone who expected Trump to withdraw from excessive military commitments should be very disappointed. Anyone who expects him to be successful diplomatically without a fully staffed and empowered State Department is deluded.

The US is more absent diplomatically than present, and more present militarily than effective. We are punching well below our weight. This should be no surprise: the State Department is eviscerated and the Pentagon is exhausted. Allies are puzzled. Adversaries are taking advantage.

Where will we be after another three years of this?

 

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It may not last

Posted in Daniel Serwer - December 20, 2017 - 0 Comment

I spent three days last week in Baghdad: two talking with people from all over the Middle East (with the important exception of Turkey) about the current situation and one talking with Iraqis.

First Baghdad: It is looking and sounding far more peaceful than it did six years ago, when I last visited. No detonations, lots of trees and other plants, heavy traffic, and bustling sidewalks. I didn’t get out of the Green Zone a lot, but we did stop in Kadhimia and Adhamiyah to see the main mosques. Apart from the all too evident sectarian character of both (the former Shia and the latter Sunni), there was nothing remarkable: just people going about normal life shopping, chatting, praying, strolling, and honking. What a change from 2004-2011, when I visited a couple of times per year. Adhamiyah during part of that time had to be surrounded with T-walls and checkpoints to protect its population from slaughter.

The Iraqi leadership: We of course only met a few people in high places, including the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of parliament, and one minister, in addition to a member of parliament and some of the prime minister’s staff. All are happy to see the Islamic State defeated on the battlefield and all are concerned not to allow it to revive. All are also looking to make cross-sectarian or cross-ethnic alliances in advance of next year’s May 12 election. None were waving sectarian or ethnic identity as their main calling card. This data suggests why (sorry for the size–Wordpress won’t scale it up):

In the general population, sectarian and ethnic identities are still terribly important. While Ayatollah Sistani’s call for volunteers roused some Sunnis to the cause of fighting ISIS, the Popular Mobilization Units he spawned are mostly aggressively Shia and believed to harbor political ambitions. Nor has the Kurdish retreat from pursuing independence reduced popular Kurdish enthusiasm for their own, independent state.

But the leadership has come to understand that gaining a majority in parliament and thereby control of the state requires, under the somewhat ramshackle 2005 constitution, coalitions. Besides, most Iraqis are looking for civil or secular technocrats to run the country. That reduces the relevance of ethnic and sectarian identity, of which Iraqis seem to have had their fill, at least as qualifications for governing.

None of this means the competition among the elite is finished, or even attenuated. To the contrary: all the main sectarian and ethnic blocks are fragmenting. The Kurds are no longer as united as once they were, among the Shia both the Dawa party and what used to be the Supreme Council are split, and there is no clearly dominant figure among the Sunnis. This should make cross-ethnic and cross-sectarian alliances a far more important factor than they have been in the past.

The other Middle Easterners: The mood among the other Middle Easterners attending this session of the Middle East Institute’s Dialogue was likewise more sanguine and friendly than I would have anticipated. All, like the Iraqis, are glad to see the Islamic State dealt defeat in Iraq and Syria, even if they anticipate that it will go underground and re-emerge as an insurgency. All disapproved but seemed more puzzled than angry about President Trump’s announcement on moving the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. All were happy to see Iraq in a better place.

There the commonalities seemed to end. The Iranians, who in the past have sometimes appeared irascible, were calm and analytical as well as concerned that their victory in Syria brought responsibilities they would rather avoid and anxious for a political solution in Yemen. They also seemed concerned that Iran’s effort to defend itself by supporting Shia proxy forces in the region was at its limit.

The Saudis and Emiratis were enthused about the new direction Riyadh is taking not only in Iraq but also in Yemen and in domestic Saudi policy. Others from Arab countries (Egypt and Jordan) were more reflective and a bit unsure what to make of the “new” Saudi Arabia. Several were concerned that the war is not really over: an Israeli or American attack on the Iranians or Hizbollah there could renew hostilities, not to mention the risk of an American clash with the Russians.

Unfortunately there were neither Turks nor Kurds in these group discussions. Had there been, the atmosphere and substance would have been more contentious. The uncertainty about American policy towards the Syrian Kurds is still big: will the Americans restrain them from attacking inside Turkey, or helping the Kurdish insurgents there? Will the Americans try to take back the heavier weapons they provided? Will the Americans withdraw precipitously? There are a lot of known unknowns that could affect the situation in Syria dramatically.

The extra-regional great powers: While a Moscow-based participant was quick to suggest that Russia had defeated ISIS, the Russians and Chinese were concerned, not happy, that post-ISIS Syria is their responsibility. They want the US involved, for both political and financial reasons. The Americans are showing no such inclination. Their assumption is that the Astana/Sochi process run by the Russians with cooperation from Iran and Turkey has superseded the Geneva process run by the UN to resolve the political conflict in Syria. They see no reason beyond defeating ISIS and possibly countering Iran for the American presence in Syria.

Bottom line: Despite the war in Yemen and the uncertainties surrounding how the war is ending in Syria, there is more reason to be sanguine about the region than people in Washington perceive. The bad news is it may not last.

 

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