Tag: Somalia

What threatens the United States?

The Council on Foreign Relations published its Preventive Priorities Survey for 2012 last week.  What does it tell us about the threats the United States faces in this second decade of the 21st century?

Looking at the ten Tier 1 contingencies “that directly threaten the U.S. homeland, are likely to trigger U.S. military involvement because of treaty commitments, or threaten the supplies of critical U.S. strategic resources,” only three are defined as military threats:

  • a major military incident with China involving U.S. or allied forces
  • an Iranian nuclear crisis (e.g., surprise advances in nuclear weapons/delivery capability, Israeli response)
  • a U.S.-Pakistan military confrontation, triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations

Two others might also involve a military threat, though the first is more likely from a terrorist source:

  • a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
  • a severe North Korean crisis (e.g., armed provocations, internal political instability, advances in nuclear weapons/ICBM capability)

The remaining five involve mainly non-military contingencies:

  • a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, electrical power, gas and oil, water supply, banking and finance, transportation, and emergency services)
  • a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
  • severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attacks
  • political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
  • intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis that leads to the collapse of the euro, triggering a double-dip U.S. recession and further limiting budgetary resources

Five of the Tier 2 contingencies “that affect countries of strategic importance to the United States but that do not involve a mutual-defense treaty commitment” are also at least partly military in character, though they don’t necessarily involve U.S. forces:

  • a severe Indo-Pak crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by major terror attack
  • rising tension/naval incident in the eastern Mediterranean Sea between Turkey and Israel
  • a major erosion of security and governance gains in Afghanistan with intensification of insurgency or terror attacks
  • a South China Sea armed confrontation over competing territorial claims
  • a mass casualty attack on Israel

But Tier 2 also involves predominantly non-military threats to U.S. interests, albeit with potential for military consequences:

  • political instability in Egypt with wider regional implications
  • an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Syria, with potential outside intervention
  • an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Yemen
  • rising sectarian tensions and renewed violence in Iraq
  • growing instability in Bahrain that spurs further Saudi and/or Iranian military action

Likewise Tier 3 contingencies “that could have severe/widespread humanitarian consequences but in countries of limited strategic importance to the United States” include military threats to U.S. interests:

  • military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
  • increased conflict in Somalia, with continued outside intervention
  • renewed military conflict between Russia and Georgia
  • an outbreak of military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, possibly over Nagorno Karabakh

And some non-military threats:

  • heightened political instability and sectarian violence in Nigeria
  • political instability in Venezuela surrounding the October 2012 elections or post-Chavez succession
  • political instability in Kenya surrounding the August 2012 elections
  • an intensification of political instability and violence in Libya
  • violent election-related instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
  • political instability/resurgent ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan

I don’t mean to suggest in any way that the military is irrelevant to these “non-military” threats.  But it is not the only tool needed to meet these contingencies, or even to meet the military ones.  And if you begin thinking about preventive action, which is what the CFR unit that publishes this material does, there are clearly major non-military dimensions to what is needed to meet even the threats that take primarily military form.

And for those who read this blog because it publishes sometimes on the Balkans, please note:  the region are nowhere to be seen on this list of 30 priorities for the United States.

 

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This week’s “peace picks”

A few recommended events for those interested in the world beyond our borders:
1.  The National Conversation–Afghanistan:  Is There A Regional Endgame? Woodrow Wilson Center, November 1, 12 — 2pm: event full but webcast
  • Deputy Special Representative, Department of State
  • Former U.S. Secretary of State
  • Public Policy Scholar
    “International Reporting Project Journalist-in-Residence” at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies
  • USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Scholar
  • Journalist and Author of seven books, most recently “Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion Across the Islamic World”
  • Professor of International Politics, Tufts University
2.  China’s Role in Africa:  Implications, 419 Dirksen, November 1, 2:15 pm

U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

The Honorable David Shinn
Adjunct Professor
George Washington University
Washington, DC
Dr. Deborah Brautigam
Senior Research Fellow
International Food Policy Research Institute
Washington, DC
Mr. Stephen Hayes
President and CEO
The Corporate Council on Africa
Washington, DC
3.  “How to End the Stalemate in Somalia,” SAIS, 500 Bernstein-Offitt, November 1, 4:30-6 pm

J. Peter Pham, director of the Michael S. Ansari Africa Center at the Atlantic Council, and Bronwyn Bruton, deputy director of the Ansari Africa Center. For more information, contact itolber1@jhu.edu or 202.663.5676.

4.  U.S. Policy Toward Zimbabwe, 2200 Rayburn, November 2, 3 pm

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights

Panel I
The Honorable Johnnie Carson
Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of African Affairs
U.S. Department of StateMs. Sharon Cromer
Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Africa
U.S. Agency for International Development
Panel II
Mr. Mark Schneider
Senior Vice President
International Crisis GroupMr. Paul Fagan
Regional Director for Africa
International Republican InstituteMr. Dewa Mavhinga
Regional Coordinator
Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition
5.  The State of U.S.-Pakistan Relations, USIP, November 3, 2-3:30 pm (also webcast)
  • Ambassador Riaz Muhammad Khan, panelist
    former Foreign Secretary, Islamic Republic of Pakistan
    Author, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism and Resistance to Modernity
  • Pamela Constable, panelist
    Staff Writer, The Washington Post
    Author, Playing with Fire: Pakistan at War with Itself
  • Zahid Hussain, panelist
    2011-2012 Pakistan Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
    Author, The Scorpion’s Tail: The Relentless Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan – and How it Threatens America
  • Andrew Wilder, moderator
    Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Programs
    United States Institute of Peace

 

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An orthodox approach to heresy

In today’s news: the Kenyan army is going after El Shabab, the Somali extremist group.  The United States is deploying 100 troops to search for Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) leader Joseph Kony.  It is a good time to have a look at how to deal with non-state armed groups (NSAGs in governmentese), the subject of a new report from the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).

Of course there are many other examples besides these two most recent ones of armed groups that present big problems in today’s world, even though they belong to no state.  Think Taliban, Hizbollah, Al Qaeda in its several franchises, and Hamas (at least before it took over governance in Gaza).  Think Mexican drug cartels, Burmese insurgents, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, the Irish Republican Army, Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group, Afghan mujahideen, Maoist insurgents in Nepal, Naxalites in India…

How should states deal with this alphabet soup of armed groups pursuing through violence freedom, justice, dignity, equity, utopia, money, power, God’s kingdom on earth?  Those we like we call freedom fighters (Kosovo Liberation Army, Libyan National Transitional Council) and provide weapons and other assistance.  The conventional American approach to those we don’t like is to declare them outside the pale, refuse to talk with them (especially if they are labeled terrorist) and go after them with military and police forces.  That’s what the Kenyans and Americans are doing today with al Shabab and the LRA.  Sometimes this works, at least partially.  More often, there is eventually a political settlement.

Political settlements require dialogue, talks, negotiations.  That’s where the CFR report comes in.  It makes an effort to define why, when and how the United States should “engage” with NSAGs.  Let’s be clear:  though the report is prepared by an active-duty Foreign Service officer, it is courageously proposing something that has heretofore generally been regarded as heresy, except in specific instances.

That said, Payton Knopf takes an orthodox approach:

  • Analyze:  leadership, military effectiveness, constituency, territorial control, platform, sponsors, needs.
  • Define the U.S. objective:  conflict prevention, humanitarian access, intel collection, regime change, reform, weakening the NSAG, encourage moderation, reach a peace agreement, block spoilers.
  • Weigh costs and benefits.

The benefits may include preventing, helping an NSAG or a sponsor we like, bolstering the U.S. image, facilitating peace negotiations, gaining intelligence, mitigating violence, empowering more pragmatic factions.  Costs can include conferring legitimacy where we prefer not to, undermining a state, taking sides in a conflict, encouraging violence, providing time for an NSAG to prepare for more violence, and triggering domestic U.S. opposition.

This kind of rational, long-term approach to dealing with NSAGs is not, however, what we generally do today, as Knopf points out.  Instead we jump on opportunities in the short term when there is no viable alternative, not too much domestic resistance and some reason to hope that things might work out.

Nor are we well-organized or well-staffed for this kind of work.  Knopf goes easy on the State Department but makes it clear that its staff is not trained to engage with NSAGs or to do conflict management work in general.  He is correct.  Nor are the regional bureaus, whose embassies must necessarily regard government officials in the host countries as their primary interlocutors, likely to take up engagement with NSAGs, except in rare instances.  The responsibility might appropriately fall to nongovernmental groups, but legal restrictions and a Supreme Court decision have made that problematic.

This leaves us with international organizations–the UN, the International Red Cross, some regional organizations–as vital players in engaging NSAGs.  The CFR report does not address this option, but it has done a great service in calmly raising the issues in the American context and placing the heresy of engaging with NSAGs in an orthodox cost/benefit framework.

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