Tag: Syria
“Il potere logora chi non ce l’ha”
As I am about to risk denunciation for drawing unreasonable parallels, let me state up front that Turkey is not Egypt, Egypt is not Libya, Libya is not Tunisia, Tunisia is not Syria, Syria is not Yemen, Yemen is not Morocco or Kuwait. If there is one thing we’ve learned from the Arab awakenings, it is that each finds its own course within a particular historical and cultural tradition. Distinct political, economic, social and religious conditions are like the soil and rocks through which a river finds its way to the sea. It is difficult to predict the water’s course as gravity pulls it in the inevitable direction.
That said, it seems to me we are seeing in the Middle East a common factor, perhaps a bit like the granite that forces water to find another difficult-to-predict direction. That common factor is the difficulty all of the “democratically elected” leaders are having in adjusting to politics with an opposition. Tunisia is struggling with a Salafist opposition that is stronger than many expected. Islamist militias in Libya have forced its parliament into a harder line on purging Qaddafi-era officials than its leadership found comfortable. Egypt is facing a summer of discontent as President Morsi runs into criticism and street demonstrations by his erstwhile non-Islamist allies.
Now it is Turkey’s turn, where protest against destruction of a park in Taksim square has turned into a much broader challenge because of overreaction from the security forces and Prime Minister Erdogan’s arrogant response. Now the theme is “everywhere is Taksim, resistance is everywhere.” I hardly need mention that in Syria Asad and his security forces managed by overreaction to turn a few teenage graffiti artists into a civil war.
Despite the differences in context, there is a common theme here: the inability of rulers, even democratically elected ones, to govern in an inclusive way that provides opposition with a legitimate role. The flip side of the coin is the inability of opposition forces to figure out how to influence those who govern them without resorting to violence, disruption and rebellion. There is an exception to the rule, but a limited one. Yemen, of all places, is proceeding with a national dialogue that appears for the moment serious, though it has failed to include the southern secessionists and may eventually fail on that score.
Widening our aperture a bit, I would submit that we are seeing something similar in Iraq, where Prime Minister Maliki has managed to keep a few Sunni elites in the tent but seems to have driven large numbers in Anbar and Ninewa into an increasingly disruptive opposition that extremists are exploiting to challenge the security forces and may lead to further division of the state. In Bahrain, the monarchy and its opposition have driven each other into mutual polarization. Only in Morocco, where the king has tried to get ahead of the reform curve, and in Kuwait, where parliament plays a modestly more serious role than in most other Arab monarchies, have we seen the opposition developing as a possible alternative governing elite: loyal but with its own program and leadership cadres.
So the common problem I see is the failure to develop in many places an opposition that is serious about presenting a governing alternative. In dictatorships of course the regimes don’t want such a thing to happen and do everything they can to prevent it. But even in newish democracies that instinct remains. And opposition behavior all too often confirms that there is no viable alternative, or that there are many, no one of which has enough political omph to merit gaining power in a relatively free and fair election. Knowing this, fragmented oppositions do little to gain credibility as governing forces but focus instead on gaining adherents and influence through street demonstrations.
It will take time to get past this stage of things. Maybe a decade. It is not easy to turn a street movement, even a successful one, into a political force with real governing potential. In Giulio Andreotti’s immortal words, “il potere logora chi non ce l’ha.” Power wears out those who haven’t got it.
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Not promising
With the strategically placed town of Qusayr about to fall to Syrian army and Lebanese Hizbollah forces, the Syrian opposition coalition (SOC) is saying it won’t attend “Geneva II” peace talks without an end to the siege of Qusayr and a guarantee that any political settlement will ensure Bashar al Asad steps down. Even if those things were to happen magically, it is unclear who would represent the opposition at peace talks, as the SOC has been meeting in Istanbul and struggling painfully to broaden its base even as revolutionaries inside Syria complain loudly about its ineffectiveness.
The regime, emboldened by success on the battlefield and Russia’s decision to provide advanced air defenses, will not agree to either SOC condition.
Where does this leave the US?
We are left holding the diplomatic bag, trying to deliver a political solution in conditions that are not ripe for a settlement. Moscow and Tehran, while claiming to want a political solution and criticizing the West and its Gulf allies (Saudi Arabia and Qatar) for support to the revolutionaries, have been busily bolstering the Asad regime on the battlefield. President Obama is said to have ordered up plans for a no-fly zone, but there is no sign he is serious about implementing them in the face of continued Russian and Chinese vetoes at the UN Security Council.
There is also no sign as yet that the regime can reassert its authority over all of Syria. Large parts of both the north and the south are in revolutionary hands. But the regime has a good chance of securing the route from Damascus to the Alawite heartland in the west and the port at Tartus. Homs is likely the next big battlefield. Government forces there have been making slow progress against rebels in the city center. It may well fall with a whimper rather than a bang.
Meanwhile sectarian conflict is spreading to Lebanon and Iraq, even as both those countries export fighters into Syria. The involvement of Lebanese Hizbollah has important military implications not only within Syria but also in Lebanon and vis-a-vis Israel. Turkey has long harbored the Syrian opposition forces and has suffered a number of military and terrorist attacks from Syria. The sad fact is that only a quick (and unlikely) end to the civil war in Syria will save its neighbors from refugee flows, terrorist bombs, sectarian conflict,and the risk that they too may end up embroiled in a regional Levantine war.
So what is to be done?
If, like me, you are of the school that says diplomacy is getting other people to do what you want them to do, you’ve got to have doubts whether convening peace talks at this point is going to produce a settlement, however much you might like that to happen. They could be useful in clarifying positions, unifying the opposition, establishing some principles, making some contacts and defining better what is at issue, but it is highly unlikely that you are going to get a settlement when both sides think, however unrealistically, they may gain from more fighting and worry that an agreement to lay down arms could lead to slaughter when the other side fails to abide.
There is no trust at this point between the Asad regime and the revolutionaries. Neither side believes the other is serious about negotiating or about implementing a negotiated agreement. Unless one side or the other manages a military breakout that today seems unlikely, we are a long way from the end in Syria, which means the region will be under serious strain for a long time to come.
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Schizoeurope
Britain and France have collaborated in getting the European Union to lift its arms embargo on Syria, opening the possibility of shipping arms to the opposition starting in July. But key European thinktanks are very much opposed to the idea: Julien Barnes-Dacey and Daniel Levy of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) wants de-escalation and Christopher Phillips of Chatham House criticizes what he regards as Britain’s flawed logic.
I have a hard time understanding their objections. Why would Syria’s arms suppliers (Russia and Iran principally) reduce the flow unless they see the real possibility that escalation will favor the opposition? Opening the possibility of future arms shipments will do more to give the Asad regime something to worry about than it will do to harden the opposition’s resistance to negotiation. It is far more likely that offering weapons conditional on their unified participation in negotiations (and being prepared to shut off the flow if they fail to participate seriously) will work.
Nor am I all that worried about weapons ending up in the wrong hands, so long as they are used to counter the regime. The neat distinction between jihadists and moderates is at least in part a figment of Western imaginations. However hard we try, some weapons will end up in the wrong places. Given the current political atmosphere in the US, better that happen to the Europeans than to us. We don’t need “fast and furious” on steroids.
Then there is the question of the Russia’s decision to export a new generation of air defenses to Syria, apparently decided in response to the European Union ending the embargo. If the Russians go ahead and if the Israelis fail to attack them before they are operational, they would presumably make it more difficult to impose a no-fly zone, if that were President Obama’s intention. But despite news reports, there is no real indication that the Americans are willing to patrol a no-fly zone, and the Israelis have good reasons to prevent the new air defenses from becoming operational, something that would take months if not years in the best of conditions. It is amusing to see people who oppose a no-fly zone worrying about the Russian move and premature to worry too much about an Israeli-Russian war, though the Israelis should certainly be concerned about how far Russia is prepared to go in arming Syria and Iran.
While in my view wrong about the impact of arming the revolutionaries, or more accurately opening up the future possibility of arming them, the ECFR offers a “strategy for de-escalation” worth looking at:
- a set of guiding principles
- a wide enough coalition committed to de-escalation, and
- a diplomatic strategy to get Geneva II off the ground.
The principles they draw from the Geneva I communique:
- All parties must recommit to a sustained cessation of armed violence
- No further further militarization of the conflict
- The sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic must be respected
- The establishment of a transitional governing body that can establish a neutral environment in which the transition can take place, with the transitional governing bodyexercising full executive powers. It could include membersof the present Government and the opposition and othergroups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent
- The Government must allow immediate and full humanitarian access by humanitarian organizations to all areas affected by the fighting
The most controversial is that fourth point, as it implies to the opposition and its supporters that Bashar al Asad will step aside while the regime and its supporters oppose that. Squaring that circle will be worth a Nobel Prize. But the Geneva I communique was not agreed by either the opposition or the regime, so getting them to sign up to something like these five points would be an important step forward.
The ECFR description of a possible de-escalation coalition is reasonable. The diplomatic strategy beyond that is brief and vague, basically proposing that Russia and the US bring the rest of the P5 on board for a non-Chapter 7 UN Security Council resolution.
The ECFR paper offers one particularly interesting idea on cessation of armed violence: this might be done in specific geographic areas, “rolling and expanding pockets in which ceasefires hold.” This of course would enable both sides to concentrate their forces in areas where there are no such ceasefires, intensifying the conflict in some areas even while de-escalating in others. The idea could have the great virtue of opening up more of the country to humanitarian relief and beginning the re-introduction of international monitors, assuming there is someone out there ready to take on that role.
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Fight and talk
The date hasn’t even been set yet for next month’s “Geneva II” conference, but we are in full pre-negotiation mode in Syria. This means instensification of the fighting, ratcheting up of the assistance flowing from outside, and anxious efforts to get the opposition to hang together, lest they hang separately (in the immortal words of Benjamin Franklin).
For the moment, the fighting is still focused on the ill-fated town of Qusayr, which is one of the keys to controlling the highway that links Damascus to Tartus and Latakia on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. But the big news came Saturday from nearby Lebanon, where Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah announced publically his group’s undying commitment to keeping the Asad regime in power in Syria and fighting the Sunni “takfiris” there. A Shia neighborhood in Beirut was ineffectively rocketed in response.
Then Monday the European Union decided to let its self-imposed arms embargo on Syria lapse at the end of the month, opening the possibility of Britain and France deciding to arm the opposition. While Secretary Kerry seems to think this will help rebalance the military situation, it is far more likely the delayed prospect of European arms for the opposition will cause the Asad regime to accelerate its efforts to consolidate as much control as it can over the Damascus/Mediterranean corridor, which is vital both to the regime’s survival. The port at Tartus is where the Russians deliver their heavier arms to the regime, and the coastal area has a substantial concentration of Alawite supporters of the regime.
Meanwhile the opposition has been meeting in Istanbul. It needs to sort out its leadership mess. Moaz al Khatib, who has resigned as the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) president chaired at least part of the meeting, George Sabra is supposedly the temporary leader, and Michel Kilo is supposed to take over but was apparently blocked from doing so at a meeting that is continuing in Istanbul. The SOC also needs to broaden its base to include more people from inside Syria as well as representatives of Free Syrian Army units. It would help of course if the Saudis and Qataris, presumably the main suppliers of money and arms to the opposition, would sing from the same songsheet.
The regime, meanwhile, is making happy noises about participating in a dialogue that its Moscow patrons likely see as a way keeping Asad in power even if the Americans would like it to be the first step on the way to his removal. Moscow is using the time to beef up Syria’s air defenses, having already moved to strengthen its shore defenses and deploy the Russian navy to Syria’s coast. Those still arguing for “safe corridors” and the like need to take note. The Americans are uninterested in fighting a war in Syria, especially one that might show Russian military hardware off to good advantage and provide the Iranians with up-to-date data on American aerial performance.
None of this bodes well for Geneva II. There is no “mutually hurting stalemate” in Syria. Both sides are still willing to fight. The catastrophe they fear most would come from stopping the fighting, not continuing it. The regime figures that would expose the Alawites to mass murder. The opposition, while struggling for the moment, figures the setbacks are temporary and the right response is to redouble its efforts. Anyone who has seen what Asad is capable of would fear losing this war. If Geneva II happens, it is likely to happen in the context of heightened conflict, not the kind of mutual exhaustion that lends itself to political settlement.
That does not however mean that talking is a bad idea. “Ripeness” for a settlement sometimes happens suddenly. Best to be ready when it does. Being ready can mean many things: making the needed contacts between opposing forces, testing propositions, developing principles that can be applied when the situation warrants, gaining intelligence on the warring parties and their leadership structures, cultivating constituencies for peace on both sides.
“Fight and talk” is not new. The European Community (as it was then) convened many conferences on the wars in former Yugoslavia during the early 1990s, when war was in raging in Croatia and Bosnia and repression in Kosovo. The meetings never produced a peace agreement, or even a ceasefire that held. That was left to the Americans at Dayton. But they did produce the Community’s criteria for recognition of the separate republics as independent states as well as the state succession plans, both of which were used to what I would call good effect.
In the best of all possible worlds, we are heading for fight and talk in Syria. Wisdom lies in using the opportunity well and trying to end a war that is clearly threatening state structures in the Levant and may collapse them in chaos.
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Peace Picks, May 28 to May 31
DC will be dark today for Memorial Day, but the rest of the week has ample and varied events:
1. Institutional Reform in Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia, Tuesday, May 28 / 1:00pm – 3:00pm , Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Marwan Muasher, Frederic Wehrey, Ellen Lust, Jakob Wichmann
As Arab political transitions stumble and parties clash over the pace and direction of reforms, analysts are largely focused on the differences between political actors-Islamists, Salafis, liberals, and others-and the implications for political development. But critics argue that this distracts attention from trying to understand the critical institutional changes underway in these countries.
Register for the event here:
http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/05/28/institutional-reform-in-libya-egypt-and-tunisia/g5xy
2. Nuclear Terrorism: What’s at Stake? Wednesday, May 29 / 8:00am – 9:30am , American Security Project
Venue: American Security Project, 1100 New York Avenue, NW · Suite 710W, Washington, DC
Speakers: Jay M. Cohen, David Waller, Stephen E. Flynn, Stanton D. Sloane, Stephen A. Cheney
The U.S. is a leader in global nonproliferation efforts, from preventing new nuclear states to securing nuclear materials and technology. However, preventing nuclear terror also requires efforts on a domestic front. U.S. ports present a potential vulnerability and securing these ports requires improvement in the capacity to detect and secure nuclear materials that could arrive in shipping containers.
Please RSVP to:
events@americansecurityproject.org
For more information see:
http://americansecurityproject.org/events/2013/event-nuclear-terrorism-whats-at-stake/
3. A Syrian No Fly Zone: Options and Constraints, Wednesday, May 29 / 10:00am – 12:00pm, US Institute of Peace
Venue: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, D.C.
Speakers: Steven Heydemann, Frederic C. Hof, David A. Deptula, Jon Alterman, Joseph Holliday
Now in its third year, with no end in sight, the Syrian uprising against the authoritarian government of Bashar al-Assad has brought devastation, death, and displacement to the country. Today, more than a quarter of Syrians have fled their homes. Some 250,000 Syrians have been killed, wounded, or are missing. By the end of 2013, half of all Syrians, more than 11 million people, could need assistance in what the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, has called the worst humanitarian crisis the U.N. has ever faced.
As violence deepens, with the Assad regime using ballistic missiles and, reportedly, nerve gas, against civilians, the U.S. and its allies continue to search for viable options to shorten the conflict, bring the regime and the opposition to the negotiating table, and place Syria on the path of political transition.
Few options have received as much attention as the idea of creating a no fly zone (NFZ) over part or all of Syria. The Syrian opposition has appealed to the international community to create a NFZ. Members of Congress have called on the Obama administration to embrace an NFZ as the most effective way to protect Syrian civilians and achieve a political solution.
While debate around the NFZ option intensifies, there has been far less attention to the military, diplomatic, and regional complexities that such a move would entail. To inform and deepen the debate over an NFZ for Syria, the U.S. Institute of Peace is convening a panel of distinguished experts to discuss the diplomatic, strategic, tactical, and political implications involved.
Webcast: This event will be webcast live beginning at 10:00am EST on May 29, 2013 at www.usip.org/webcast. Join the conversation and submit questions for the panel on Twitter with #SyriaNFZ.
RSVP for the event here:
http://www.usip.org/events/syrian-no-fly-zone-options-and-constraints
4. Serbia’s Challenges on Its Path to EU Accession, Wednesday, May 29 / 1:00pm – 2:00pm , Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20004
Speaker: Ljubica Vasic
Assistant Foreign Minister of Serbia Ljubica Vasic will discuss the challenges and opportunities that the Republic of Serbia faces on its path to European integration. Vasic will address key reforms that the country has introduced so far to advance its EU accession bid, and will explain why the European integration process is important for the overall development of the country. She will outline the steps that Serbia has taken to achieve one of its main foreign policy goals; EU membership.
Ljubica Vasic was appointed Assistant Foreign Minister of Serbia in January 2013. Previously, she served as a special adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and headed the Serb Parliamentary Delegation to the Council of Europe. Vasic began her political career in 2008, and has served as an adviser on European integration policies, and has been a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Serb National Assembly. Vasic holds two graduate degrees – in European Integration and in English Philology – from the University of Belgrade and the Unviersity of Kragujevac respectively, and is currently working on a doctoral degree at the University of Kragujevac. She is fluent in English, French, Italian, and Serb.
Register for the event here:
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/serbias-challenges-its-path-to-eu-accession
5. Protecting People with Technology: Modernizing U.N. Peacekeeping , Wednesday, May 29 / 2:00pm – 3:30pm, Stimson Center
Venue: Stimson Center, 1111 19th Street Northwest, 12th Floor, Washington D.C., DC 20036
Speakers: Walter Dorn, Sarah Williamson
Protect the People, the Stimson Center, the Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping and the Better World Campaign present: Protecting People with Technology: Modernizing U.N. Peacekeeping
A conversation with Dr. Walter Dorn, author of ‘Keeping Watch: Monitoring, Technology & Innovation in UN Peace Operations’
As U.N. peace operations are asked and expected to do more in increasingly complex and dangerous environments, this discussion with Dr. Dorn will explore the challenges and opportunities of leveraging a broad spectrum of technologies to enable U.N. peace operations to more effectively and safely protect civilians.
Dr. Walter Dorn has also taught at the Pearson Centre and as a visiting professional in the Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. He has served with the United Nations Mission in East Timor, the United Nations in Ethiopia, at U.N. headquarters as a training adviser and as a consultant with the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. His book ‘Keeping Watch: Monitoring, Technology, and Innovation in UN Peace Operations’ was published in 2011 by U.N. University Press. Copies of his book will be available for purchase and signing.
Register for the event here:
http://www.stimson.org/events/protecting-people-with-technology-modernizing-un-peacekeeping/
6. Editing (Out) the Occupation, Thursday, May 30 / 9:00am – 10:00am , New America Foundation
Venue: New America Foundation, 1899 L St., N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Linoy Bar-Geffen, Uri Misgav, Sarah Wildman
After nearly forty-six years of military occupation, two intifadas, a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and a stalled political process, the Israeli public seems to have lost whatever interest it had in the Palestinian issue. Public attention has turned inwards — looking at economic and social concerns. However a critical examination of these concerns, by necessity, requires an equally critical examination of the ongoing occupation.
New America Foundation’s Middle East Task Force will host visiting Israeli journalists Uri Misgav and Linoy Bar-Geffen on May 30 for a conversation examining why the occupation is edited out of mainstream Israeli media and exploring how mainstream and alternative media can bring the occupation more forcefully into the Israeli national conversation.
Register for the event here:
http://www.newamerica.net/events/2013/editing_out_the_occupation
7. The Water-Security Nexus in Pakistan, Thursday, May 30 / 10:00am – 11:30am , US Institute of Peace
Venue: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, D.C.
Speakers: Majed Akhter, Daanish Mustafa, Winston Yu
Because of overuse and misuse, Pakistan is headed toward a serious water crisis. The U.N. is expected to downgrade Pakistan from ‘water stressed’ to ‘water scarce’ by 2030. While issues between India and Pakistan often garner the most attention, water conflicts within Pakistan’s borders have the explosive potential to poison inter-ethnic and inter-provincial relations and turn simmering tension into violence. In a country where livelihoods depend heavily on reliable access to water, effectively managing water resources can transform a common lightning rod for conflict into an opportunity for building intra-communal cooperation and trust.
Please join the U.S. Institute of Peace on May 30, 2013 from 10:00 am until 11:30 am, for a panel discussion on USIP’s new PeaceWorks, ‘Understanding Pakistan’s Water-Security Nexus’, and the opportunities and pitfalls of peacebuilding through environmental policy in South Asia.
Register for the event here:
http://www.usip.org/events/pakistanwater
8. The Kaleidoscope Turns Again in a Crisis-Challenged Iran, Thursday, May 30 / 12:00pm – 1:30pm, Atlantic Council
Venue: Atlantic Council of the United States, 1101 15th Street, NW, 11th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005
Speakers: Yasmin Alem, Suzanne Maloney, Barbara Slavin
Please join the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center for the release of a new issue brief, “The Kaleidoscope Turns Again in a Crisis-Challenged Iran,” a discussion of Iran’s upcoming presidential elections. While the elections will not be free, fair, or competitive in a Western sense, they will be a barometer of the stability and durability of the Islamic Republic at a time of unprecedented external pressures and rising domestic discontent. Political factions will break down and regroup as a shrinking elite competes for diminishing spoils. The outcome of the elections and the manner in which they are conducted could also have important implications for Iranian policy going forward, including on the nuclear issue.
The Iran Task Force seeks to perform a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s internal political landscape, its role in the region and globally, and any basis for an improved relationship with the West.
RSVP with name and affiliation to:
southasia@acus.org.
9. Reviving U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case for Putting America‘s House in Order, Thursday, May 30 / 3:30pm – 5:00pm , Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution,1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Falk Auditorium
Speakers: Martin S. Indyk, Richard N. Haass, Robert Kagan
A rising China, climate change, terrorism, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, a tumultuous Middle East, and a defiant North Korea all present serious challenges for U.S. foreign policy, but could internal factors actually pose the biggest threat to the United States, its security, and its position as a global leader? In his new book, Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America’s House in Order (Basic Books, 2013), Richard Haass argues that U.S. national security depends on the United States addressing significant internal issues: repairing its crumbling infrastructure, improving education, reforming its immigration policies and reducing its burgeoning debt. Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, contends that these shortcomings directly threaten America’s ability to project power and exert influence overseas; to compete in the global marketplace; to generate the resources needed to promote the full range of U.S. interests abroad; and to set a compelling example that can influence the thinking and behavior of other nations.
On May 30, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host Haass for a discussion on the challenging issues facing the United States at home and their impact on the successful pursuit of U.S. foreign and security policies abroad. Brookings Senior Fellow Robert Kagan will join the discussion. Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the conversation.
After the program, the speakers will take audience questions.
Register for the event here:
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2013/05/30-us-foreign-policy-haass?rssid=UpcomingEvents&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+BrookingsRSS%2Ftopfeeds%2FUpcomingEvents+%28Brookings+Upcoming+Events%29
10. Varieties of Democracy: Global Standards, Local Knowledge, Thursday, May 30 / 4:00pm – 5:45pm, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Michael Coppedge, Staffan Lindberg, Massimo Tommasoli, Richard Youngs
The global diversity of democracy continues to grow, providing practical and analytic challenges to national policymakers and the international community. Varieties of Democracy, a new collaborative of fifteen social scientists, seeks to provide the first comprehensive approach to the conceptualization and measurement of democracy. Two of the principal investigators, Michael Coppedge and Staffan Lindberg, from the Varieties of Democracy Project, will demonstrate how innovative, freely available data make new kinds of democracy research and project assessment possible for the first time. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance’s Massimo Tommasoli will comment, and Richard Youngs will moderate.
Register for the event here:
http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/05/30/varieties-of-democracy-global-standards-local-knowledge/g46e
11. Tunisia’s Democratic Future: An Address by Rached Ghannouchi, Friday, May 31 / 10:00am – 11:30am, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Falk Auditorium
Speakers: Martin S. Indyk, Tamara Cofman Wittes, Rached Ghannouchi
In Tunisia, where the Arab awakening began, the move toward a more open society is experiencing growing pains. Economic pressures exacerbated by the revolution and the war next door in Libya, extremist violence, and the country’s deep divisions over drafting its new constitution all present pressing challenges to Tunisia’s democratic transition. Will the country that kicked off the Arab revolutions continue to inspire the region’s drive toward democracy? What can Tunisian approaches to resolving political conflicts and reconciling Islamism and democracy teach us about the prospects for successful transitions elsewhere in the Arab world?
On May 31, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host Rached Ghannouchi, co-founder and president of Tunisia’s Nahda Party, for a special address on the future of Tunisian democracy. Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy, will provide introductory remarks. Following Ghannouchi’s remarks, Saban Center Director and Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes will moderate the discussion and include audience questions.
Join the conversation on Twitter using #FPTunisia.
Register for the event here:
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2013/05/31-tunisia-democracy-ghannouchi?rssid=UpcomingEvents&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+BrookingsRSS%2Ftopfeeds%2FUpcomingEvents+%28Brookings+Upcoming+Events%29
12. The Good Muslim and Religious Freedom, Friday, May 31 / 12:00pm – 2:00pm , Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs
Venue: Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs, 3307 M Street, Suite 200, Washington, D.C. 20007, 3rd Floor Conference Room
Speaker: Mona Siddiqui
The complexities and challenges of religious freedom in contemporary Islam find many of their roots in the development of Islamic law and theology during the Middle Ages, a fact largely unknown to the general public. In a new book, The Good Muslim: Reflections on Classical Islamic Law and Theology, Mona Siddiqui, professor of Islamic and Interreligious Studies at the University of Edinburgh and associate scholar at the Religious Freedom Project, attempts to fill this void. The book explores a wide range of topics from divorce, slavery, and perspectives on evil, to virtue and friendship within both Shari’a and medieval Islamic philosophy.
Siddiqui will discuss these themes with Charles Butterworth, renowned Islamic Studies scholar and professor emeritus of Political Philosophy at the University of Maryland. Karen Rupprecht, Religious
Freedom Project program assistant, will moderate.
Register for the event here:
http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/events/rsvp?id=the-good-muslim-and-religious-freedom
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180 miles from disaster
Yesterday’s Friends of Syria meeting occurred in Amman, just 180 miles from the battle for Qusayr, a Syrian town located just off the road from Damascus through Homs to Alawite-populated areas of the west. If the opposition can hold Qusayr and Homs, it will split Damascus from the west. If it can’t, Bashar al Asad will have what he needs to maintain a regime axis that splits the liberated areas of the south from the liberated areas of the north. Either way, the outcome is likely to be a disaster for someone.
The Qusayr fighting involves Lebanese Hizbollah fighting with the Syrian army against mostly Sunni rebels, including Jabhat al Nusra. It naturally has echoes inside Lebanon, where Alawites and Sunnis have clashed in Tripoli. There is a real risk of spillover. While some in Washington may wonder why we should worry about Hizbollah and Sunni extremists associated with Jabhat al Nusra kill each other, it is important to widen the aperture a bit: state structures in Levant are at risk. Were they to collapse, the chaos could be widespread. Syria never has been comfortable with Lebanon as a separate state and established diplomatic relations with it only in the last few years.
It is hard to be optimistic about the preparations for next month’s Syria peace conference. Apart from the parlous military situation in Qusayr, Moscow is insisting not only that Iran be present but that the Syrian opposition come to the table without preconditions (in particular that Bashar al Asad step aside before any political transition). Then and only then is Moscow willing to set a date for the conference.
Iran’s presence is certainly necessary if the conference is going to produce anything like a political solution. The Russians are not wrong about that. Its fighters, and Hizbollah fighters it supports, are very much engaged in Syria. As for Moscow’s pre-condition that there not be pre-conditions, I suppose George Sabra–the current, interim head of the Syrian Opposition Coalition–will figure out a way to fudge that, perhaps by noting the Coalition’s acceptance of the formula already accepted last year at the Geneva conference: a transitional governing body that would exercise full executive powers “formed on the basis of mutual consent.”
More problematic is the Russian transfer of major new weapons systems to Syria and its deployment of warships off the coast. Russian thinktankers claim
non-intervention is now a basic Russian principle…
but that is neither true nor new. Russia is certainly intervening in the Syria conflict on the side of the regime it considers the legitimate sovereign. And it intervened on behalf of rebel forces in Georgia, when that suited its preferences. Russian policy might better be stated as preventing Western intervention in areas it regards as within its sphere of influence. We would no doubt return the favor if they were to muck in the Gulf.
The most sensible comment yesterday comes from Salim Idris, titular head of the Free Syrian Army. He is quoted as saying in a letter to Secretary Kerry:
For the negotiations to be of any substance, we must reach a strategic military balance, without which the regime will feel empowered to dictate … while fully sustained logistically and militarily by Russia and Iran…Such untenable situation requires that the Unites States, as the leader of the free world, provide the Free Syrian Army forces under the Supreme Military Council with the requisite advanced weapons to sustain defensive military capabilities in the face of the Assad forces.
He is said to be seeking anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. He is correct that a mutually hurting stalemate, which the opposition has not so far been able to reach, is needed before the Syrian regime will negotiate seriously. If Bashar thinks he can do better by continuing the fighting, he will.
Secretary Kerry has limited himself so far to feints: he said yesterday Friends of Syria would consider arming the opposition and supported an effort to lift the European Union arms embargo. He is a man used to the niceties of the US Senate, where sparring is a verbal activity. The Russians, Iranians and Syrians certainly understand what he is threatening, but they doubt he is willing to do it or that his doing it will be effective in the time frame available.
President Obama is fond of saying he doesn’t bluff. It is time for him to play a stronger hand, one way or another.
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