Tag: Syria
Sham will rise again!
Time for me to ‘fess up: I was away in Atlanta over the weekend and took the opportunity of a few days with elder son and daughter-in-law to neglect to blog for three days straight. This was my longest hiatus in 22 months or so of publishing www.peacefare.net It felt good. Atlanta also looked good:
This is not bad for a town that Union forces burned to the ground 150 years ago. The “rising up” poster was for a show of the Hale Woodruff murals from Talladega College, one set of which portray the African mutiny on the Amistad, subsequent trial and return to Africa. The other set portrays the founding of the college. Both were forms of “rising up.”
Some may consider my thinking convoluted, but Atlanta’s difficult path from the defeated confederacy to its current bustling self is the kind of thing I like to keep in mind when contemplating Syria. However profound, and profoundly wrong, its current travails are, they will pass and the historical forces that made Damascus one of the world’s oldest cities (if not the oldest) will have an opportunity to reassert themselves.
Civil war is anything but civil. We are now up around 200 Syrians per day killed. Many more are being maimed and injured. Hundreds of thousands have fled. Millions are displaced. How a ruler who claims to have the best interests of his people at heart can not only watch this happen but also cause it to happen is beyond me.
But as luck would have it, my airplane reading for the trip to and from Atlanta was Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson’s Why Nations Fail. They do a great job of explaining the phenomenon. Nations fail, they say, because failure serves the exploitative interests of their rulers. There is good reason why Atlanta’s renaissance occurred only after the fall of segregation and the establishment of inclusive, integrated institutions.
Bashar al Asad and his small coterie cannot survive in the kind of open, inclusive political competition his more democratically inclined opponents want to institute. Even if they could survive, they would not be able to exploit the country to enrich themselves and enable their continuing hold on power.
These are not just personal questions, but institutional ones. The institution of slavery, like the Asad regime, served the masters well. Neither served the bulk of people well. But the bulk of the people don’t count until they unite. The Talladega murals pointedly illustrate the cooperation between blacks and whites (in particular the abolitionist American Missionary Society) both in defending the Amistad mutineers and in founding Talladega.
The problem in Syria today is not only that Bashar al Asad is using homicidal methods to try to re-establish fear in the population, but also that the opposition is fracturing. I quote it too often, but Ben Franklin’s aphorism is apt:
We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.
Damascus has a long history of coups. The victory of one or another of Syria’s many armed factions is unlikely to establish inclusive democratic institutions. When Syrians unite, Asad is finished.
Dixie rose again because it was no longer exploitative, segregated Dixie. Ash-Sham [Damascus] will rise again when it is no longer al-Asad’s Sham.
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This week’s peace picks
The dog days of summer are over as far as DC events are concerned
1. A Conversation with Rudwan Dawod on his Incarceration in The Sudan, Tuesday September 4, 2:00pm-3:30pm
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20004, fifth floor conference room
Speakers: Rudwan Dawod, Tom Prichard, Michael Van Dusen
The Africa Program of the Woodrow Wilson Center would like to invite you to a presentation by Rudwan Dawod on Tuesday, September 4. Rudwan has been the facilitator for reconciliation and humanitarian projects with Sudan Sunrise since 2009, and is the project director for a reconciliation project in which Muslims from Sudan, South Sudan and the U.S. are rebuilding a Catholic Cathedral in Torit, South Sudan. In late May, Rudwan left his wife and home in Springfield, Oregon to travel to South Sudan to direct this inter-faith reconciliation project. During a lull in the project, Rudwan took a side trip to visit family in Sudan, and renew his Sudanese Passport. Concerned for the future of his country, and dedicated to peace and democracy, Rudwan attended a peaceful demonstration on July 3rd to protest the Sudanese government’s recent austerity policies, and ongoing violence in the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and Darfur. Subsequently, Rudwan was arrested, beaten until unconscious, tortured, charged with terrorism, and retained in prison for 44 days. With the help of the advocacy community, the US government, and the media, Rudwan was eventually acquitted and released. Please join us to welcome Rudwan home and hear him tell his remarkable story.
Register for this event here.
2. Organizing the U.S. Government to Counter Islamist Extremism, Wednesday September 5, 12:00pm-2:00pm
Venue: Hudson Institute, 1015 15th Street, N.W. 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005
Speakers: James Glassman, Will Marshall, Douglas J. Feith, William A. Galston, Abram N. Shulsky
Lunch will be served. For all the progress the United States has made in fighting terrorist networks, there has been a general failure to confront the terrorism problem’s ideological center of gravity. A new Hudson Institute study examines how the U.S. government could mount an effort to address this failure by working to change the ideological climate in the Muslim world. The study identifies which types of governmental and nongovernmental organizations should be created to conduct this effort. Produced by Douglas J. Feith and Abram N. Shulsky of Hudson Institute and William A. Galston of Brookings, the study argues that the various Islamist terrorist groups around the world are linked by ideology— common beliefs about their duties as Muslims that spawn and intensify hostility to the United States and to the West in general. You are invited to a panel discussion in which two distinguished commentators will discuss the report with its authors: Commentators: James Glassman, Executive Director of the George W. Bush Institute and former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in the George W. Bush Administration Will Marshall, Founder and President of the Progressive Policy Institute Authors: Douglas J. Feith, Hudson Institute Senior Fellow and former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the George W. Bush Administration William A. Galston, Brookings Institution Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in Governance Studies and former Deputy Assistant to President Clinton for Domestic Policy Abram N. Shulsky, Hudson Institute Senior Fellow and former Defense Department official.
Register for this event here.
3. An Egyptian Point of View about the Arab Uprisings, Wednesday September 5, 7:30pm-9:00pm
Venue: Al-Hewar Center, 120 Cherry Street, S.E., Vienna, VA 22180
Speakers: Ashraf Al-Bayoumi
A conversation with Dr. Ashraf Al-Bayoumi. Egyptian professor and activist, about “An Egyptian Point of View about the Arab Uprisings.” (in Arabic)
Register for this event here
4. Infrastructure and Business Opportunities in North Africa, Thursday September 6, 8:30am-11:ooam
Venue: City Club of Washington, DC, 555 13th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20004
Speakers: Carl Kress, Randa Fahmy Hudome, Steven Mayo, Deborah McCarthy, Cenk Sidar, Curtis Silvers, John Duke Anthony
A discussion on “Infrastructure and Business Opportunities in North Africa” featuring Mr. Carl Kress, Regional Director for the Middle East, North Africa and Europe Region, U.S. Trade and Development Agency; Ms. Randa Fahmy Hudome, President, Fahmy Hudome International; Mr. Steven Mayo, Business Development Officer, Project and Structured Finance, Export-Import Bank of the United States; Ms. Deborah McCarthy, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Mr. Cenk Sidar, Founder and Managing Director, Sidar Global Advisors; and Mr. Curtis Silvers, Executive Vice President, National U.S.-Arab Chamber of Commerce; moderated by Dr. John Duke Anthony, Founding President & CEO, National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations; Member, U.S. Department of State Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy and its subcommittees on Sanctions and Trade and Investment.
Register for this event here.
5. CISSM Forum: ‘The Future of Indo-Pak Relations,’ Thursday September 6, 12:15pm-1:3opm
Venue: University of Maryland, College Park, 7950 Baltimore Avenue, College Park, MD, 1203 Van Munching Hall
Speakers: Stephen P. Cohen
‘The Future of Indo-Pak Relations’, Stephen P. Cohen, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
Register for this event here.
6. When ‘Ordinary People’ Join In: Understanding Moments of Mass Mobilization in Argentina (2001), Egypt (2011), and Ukraine (2004), Thursday September 6, 4:00pm-5:00pm
Venue: Elliot School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20052, Voesar Conference Room
Speakers: Olga Onuch
Olga Onuch, Newton Prize Fellow in Comparative Politics, University of Oxford This presentation examines the differences between moments of mass-mobilization and the long term process of activist mobilization that precedes them. Ukraine in 2004, Egypt in 2011, and Argentina in 2001 represent cases where a history of activist coordination was the basis for, and key instrument in, the mobilization of ‘ordinary’ people. The presenter will argue against the predominant focus on exogenous and economic factors and instead emphasize local actors and political variables in explaining the presence or absence of mass-mobilization. Part of IERES Petrach Program on Ukraine. Sponsored by the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies.
Register for this event here.
7. The Arab Awakening and its Implications, Thursday September 6, 6:oopm-7:oopm
Venue: Georgetown School of Foreign Service, 37 St NW and O St NW, Washington, DC, ICC Auditorium
Speaker: Dennis Ross
Returning PJC faculty member, Ambassador Dennis Ross, will present a lecture on ‘The Arab Awakening and its Implications’.
RSVP requested. A light reception will follow.
Register for this event here.
8. Will the Ongoing Nuclear Talks with Iran Yield Better Results than Past Efforts? Friday September 7, 10:00am-12:00pm
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20004
Speakers: Trita Parsi, Mustafa Kibaroglu, Monica Herz, Michael Adler, Robert S. Litwak
The pursuit of an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program remains at the top of the nonproliferation agenda. The unsuccessful mediation effort led by Brazil and Turkey in May 2010 was followed by the adoption of more economic sanctions by the international community. Last April, the government of Iran resumed negotiations with representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council, plus Turkey and Germany. Four meetings have taken place in Switzerland, Turkey, and Russia. Talks are expected to continue after the U.S. presidential elections. Five experts will take stock of the negotiations in comparison with earlier efforts. Experts who participated in a February 2011 seminar on the Brazilian-Turkish mediation will return to the Wilson Center to assess the ongoing negotiations and possible outcomes.
Register for this event here.
9. Road to a Free Syria: Should “Responsibility to Protect” Apply to the Syrian Conflict? Friday, September 7, 12:00-2:00
Venue: Hudson Institute, 15 15th Street, N.W. 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005
Speakers: Marah Bukai, Naser Khader, Nasser Rabbat, Kert Werthmuller
‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P)—a widely acknowledged principle of international relations—holds that the State carries the primary responsibility for the protection of its population from mass atrocities and, moreover, that the international community has a responsibility to assist States in fulfilling this responsibility. A panel of distinguished experts will discuss the applicability of R2P to the Syrian conflict while shedding light on current events inside Syria, international reactions to those events, and projections for securing a stable and prosperous post-Assad Syria. Panelists: Marah Bukai, Syrian poet, Consultant, U.S. Department of State, and political activist involved in the Syrian revolution
Naser Khader, Adjunct Fellow, Hudson Institute, and former Member of the Danish Parliament
Nasser Rabbat, Aga Khan Professor and the Director of the Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Moderator: Kurt Werthmuller, Research Fellow, Hudson Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom
Register for this event here.
10. Stabilizing the Sinai, Churches for International Peace, Friday September 7, 12:00pm-1:30pm
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Art Hughes, Geoffrey Aronson
Rising lawlessness and violence and an increasing death toll in the Sinai Peninsula by terrorist and criminal elements since the fall of the Mubarak regime threaten the security of Egypt, Israel, and their 1979 peace treaty. The unresolved competition over governance in Egypt between the Muslim Brotherhood government led by President Mohammed Morsi on one hand and the Egyptian army on the other are complicating factors, as is the continued Israeli closure of Gaza, whose Hamas government has strong ties to the Egyptian Brotherhood.
Ambassador (ret.) Art Hughes and Geoffrey Aronson will discuss the stakes for all the parties, including the U.S., and suggest what is needed to restore peace in the Sinai.
Register for this event here.
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An important beginning
“The Day After” study, published this week, is intended to support a democratic transition in Syria. The study was prepared by a “diverse group” of Syrian activists, including “Sunnis, Christians, Kurds, Alawites, and Druze; men and women; youth activists; and individuals with experience in the Free Syrian Army.” Some are identified; others are not for security reasons.
While claiming not to be a “blueprint,” this is by far the most in-depth effort I have seen to explicate what Syria would need to do to begin a transition to democracy. It breaks the issues down into six areas:
- Rule of law
- Transitional justice
- Security sector reform
- Electoral reform and forming a constituent assembly
- Constitutional design
- Economic restructuring and social policy
The approach is methodical: context, challenges, and detailed recommendations, broken down into what needs to be done prior to the start of transition, the immediate priorities once Bashar al Asad is gone, and the first few months. The underlying principles are unimpeachable: accountability, transparency, participation, inclusiveness, and consensus. Time lines and Gantt charts are included.
There are many good things about the approach. The emphasis on rule of law is appropriate. Establishing and maintaining order have been serious problems in most post-war situations. There is good reason to expect the same in Syria, where support for the Assad regime has been substantial and sectarian tensions high.
Plans to deal with regime abuses through transitional justice mechanisms and to re-organize and reform the security services will therefore also be key priorities. Some of the plans and organization suggested are obviously over-ambitious and too complex. It seems unlikely to me that the Syrians are going to be able to manage these tasks on their own, without an international force to keep the peace in the meanwhile, but that is what “The Day After” seems to envision.
The political piece is also important. The study foresees the election of a constituent assembly to write a new constitution. It discusses options for the electoral system and recommends mixed system of proportional representation and some single-member districts. It also considers options for closed (party) or open (individual preference votes) lists as well as mechanisms for ensuring women’s representation and inclusion of minorities. While the time line is ambiguous, elections are not foreseen for 10-18 months following the fall of Asad.
The report is already so lengthy (133 pages) and comprehensive it seems churlish to complain about what is missing. But that is precisely what I must do. I would cite the following as the most important gaps: the Syrian voice, the relationship of religion and politics, in-depth treatment of economic and social issues, and a clear idea of who would do all the many things recommended.
The report is written in the good contemporary American prose, bureaucratic variant. It is clear, concise and sometimes eloquent, but it lacks any hint of a Syrian voice. No doubt the Syrians involved discussed the issues and made the fundamental choices reflected in the document, but the technocratic tone and Western-style content is far too prominent to convince me this is a truly indigenous product. I read Syrian activists every day. No philologist would conclude that they wrote this paper. I can only imagine what a Free Syrian Army soldier in Homs is going to think, once this fine example of bureaucratese is rendered into Arabic.
“The Day After” has no discussion of the relationship between religion and the state or religion and politics. It puts forward as “supra-constitutional principles” two relevant ones:
- Syria is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual, multi-sectarian society that respects its diversity….
- The state is neutral toward religion, respects its values, and neither compels nor impedes religion among the people.
I’ll be delighted if it turns out that simple to deal with religion in Syria. I might even hope that, having seen how difficult and divisive the issue is everywhere else in the Arab uprisings, Syrians will resolve it in this eminently sensible and liberal fashion. But I suspect this facile veneer hides deep divisions, if not among the people writing this report then between them and the people carrying AKs in Aleppo.
Economic and social issues get short shrift, with recommendations that amount to “do the right thing”: establish macroeconomic stability, get displaced people and refugees back to their homes, create strong institutions. A lot more in-depth work will be needed on these issues. There is no serious treatment of the merchant class that was the backbone of the Assad regime and little sign of awareness of the desperate economic and financial situation in which Syria will likely find itself when Bashar al Assad falls. There is barely mention of civil society, which is simply assumed to exist in much of the rest of the report. Nor is there any mention of one of the most fundamental requirements of all post-war societies: getting people who have fought with each other talking and collaborating with each other. Transitional justice is just one aspect of reconciliation.
As for who is going to do all the hundreds of things recommended, the paper is vague. It talks about the need for a transitional regime, but it gives little hint where it would come from and how it might be constituted. French President Francois Hollande’s appeal for formation of a government-in-waiting even before Asad’s departs makes a good deal of sense, since much of what “The Day After” recommends needs to be started now.
But Syrians are so divided and distrustful of each other that it is hard to see how such a government could be formed and gain the confidence of most of the population. Bashar al Asad has lost legitimacy, but it is not yet clear where and when it will reappear. The notion that we are going to get through the Syrian transition without a major international effort, including peacekeepers, I find unconvincing, even though I know how difficult it would be to mount that effort. But the alternative is a level of chaos and violence that we should want to avoid.
The usefulness of a report of this sort can lie in several directions: its ideas may get picked up and incorporated into more official plans, the people who participated may take the wisdom they have gained into their other activities, it may help donor governments and other institutions understand better how they can help, it may stimulate other contributions. “The Day After” is an important step forward. But we are still at the beginning of planning for post-war Syria, not at the end.
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The antidote to a “huge trend of lying”
There is so much bad news from Syria that it counts as good news when someone undertakes a serious effort to document what is happening. Mohammed al-Abdullah, a young Syrian living in Washington, is leading an effort to do just that at the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre. He briefed on the nascent Centre, which will be located in Lyon, France, this morning at Brookings, with Tamara Wittes in the chair.
For now, the data is collected by other organizations, Syrian and international, before being mapped on the SJAC website. Data sources are vetted and documented. It is the Centre’s intention to document all abuses, regardless of the perpetrators. Eighteen governments are supporting the initiative, which grew out of a Hillary Clinton commitment to accountability. There will be a donors conference in Morocco September 14. IREX, Public International Law and Policy Group and No Peace Without Justice are SJAC partners.
The data will not generally provide the kind of legal basis needed for individual prosecutions. But it will document what is going on, provide important leads and context, and will be useful in the future for memorialization.
It is also hoped that such documentation may reduce the likelihood of future revenge violence, in particular on a sectarian basis. I frankly doubt that: I don’t know of an instance in which documentation efforts have demonstrably reduced the likelihood of revenge, but if readers do I hope they will comment accordingly. There is no sign yet of Alawite or Druze community openness to this initiative, even though it would be welcomed.
A number of interesting comments were made during the presentation. One knowledgeable long-time observer of the Levant noted that there has been no documentation of the civil war or any serious reconciliation in Lebanon, but somehow everybody has agreed to forget, if not to forgive. That admittedly seems unlikely in Syria, where the conflict is taking on an increasingly sectarian character. It was noted that defectors from the Syrian army are more open to applying international humanitarian law once they join the revolution than civilians who take up arms, some of whom are bent on revenge.
Perhaps most tellingly it was noted that there is a “huge trend of lying” among Syrians, who may exaggerate what is going on, misrepresent their role in it, and even prevaricate about where they are located. This alone makes the SJAC effort worthwhile. The numbers are horrifying enough without exaggeration: more than 22,000 killed and more or less the same number wounded. And things are getting worse, not better.
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America should not play Asad’s game
David Rohde asks “Is Syria America’s Responsibility?” But he never really answers that question, which is a good one. Instead he answers another one:
We must embrace Syrian moderates and openly declare them our allies. Whether or not we should provide them with military aid is a separate debate. But if we are going to provide non-lethal aid we should do so wholeheartedly. We cannot say America is behind you — secretly.
Of course we can and have often said America is behind you secretly. The fundamental problem is not secrecy, it is whom to assist and how. There is a military opposition and a civilian one. I’d rather we pumped non-lethal support into the civilians, Islamist or not. They are organizing upwards of 100 peaceful demonstrations (often more than 150) each day in Syria. The military effort is scaring Allawites, Christians and others into supporting the regime. The day they go out into the streets to demonstrate–which they will not do so long as the Free Syria Army is attacking–is the day Bashar will be forced from power.
But let’s be clear: Syria is not America’s responsibility. What is happening there is Bashar al Asad’s responsibility. The “responsibility to protect” is in the first instance Syria’s. Russia and Iran, as Syria’s prime military allies, are also responsible for what is becoming an effort to frighten Syrians into submission through random, but sectarian, killing. This technique was used in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to establish the “republic of fear.”
I doubt it will work in Syria, because too many people have already lost their fear. But let’s be clear: there is a lot to be afraid of, as events in the past couple of days at Daraya, a community near Damascus, testify. Upwards of 200 people appear to have been murdered by regime forces. Don’t click on this video if you are even remotely squeamish:
It is of course difficult to suggest that people subjected to this treatment should not respond by defending themselves. They certainly have every right to do so. But it is not clear that revolutionary violence will win the day over a regime that is armed to the teeth and ready to kill. It is for Syrians to decide what the best strategy is. But those of us concerned to see the revolution come out on top and Syria eventually evolve into a democracy are rightly concerned when we see priority given to military assistance.
Revolution and war are political struggles. Empowering those who will take Syria in a democratic direction is what America should worry about. Those are the civilian activists, who risk being pushed aside because Bashar al Asad prefers a military fight he thinks he can win. We should not be trapped into playing his game.
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A good idea
It is difficult to imagine a good reason for the persistence of the Nonaligned Movement, which will hold a summit meeting beginning tomorrow in Tehran. Its website does not appear to have been updated since the early years of the century, so it is hard to understand what it thinks it is doing. Hosted by Supreme Leader Khamenei, the week’s meeting will include distinguished representatives like Sudanese war crimes indictee President Bashir, Zimbabwean President Mugabe, Venezuelan President Chavez and North Korean President of the Supreme People’s Assembly Kim Yong Nam. It’s a wonder Bashar al Assad is not planning to attend.
Of course there are also other, far more reputable attendees: the Tunisian, Libyan and South African Foreign Ministers, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Australian UN ambassador (hard for me to understand what is non-aligned about Australia). And, most notably, newly elected Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi.
If anything good might come out of such a meeting, I imagine it would come from the interaction of these democratic and would-be democratic states with the startling array of autocrats. I can hope that there is at least a bit of private criticism, as in “Robert, do you think it is in the interest of Zimbabwe that you continue to hold on to power?” Or “Hugo, tell me how you are doing in the polls.” But there is a real risk that such a conclave will be seen in some parts of the world as validating the legitimacy of the autocrats and undermining the citizens who oppose them.
That’s where National Iranian American President Trita Parsi’s idea comes in. He tweeted today that Morsi should meet with Green Movement leaders in Tehran, those brave souls who contested the 2009 presidential election as not free and unfair only to find themselves outgunned, outmaneuvered, beaten and defeated in the streets. A call on Mir-Hossein Mousavi, just returned to house arrest from a stay in the hospital, is one possibility. Or a visit with younger activists. Morsi, the product of successful street protests and a serious (if not perfect) election, should want to hear from Iranian protesters, unless he has already switched to his predecessor’s mentality, as the New York Times suggests.
But why only Morsi? He will be reluctant to do it alone, as he will not want to offend the hosts and put at risk whatever improvement in relations with Tehran he hopes to initiate. Better if the whole lot of more serious democratic leaders announce their willingness to meet with the Green Movement and others who are not on good terms with the Iranian regime, which claims it is not repressive.
I am not at all sure whether any Iranians would dare accept the invitation, as the consequences for them could be dramatic (and some Green Movement leaders are under house arrest). But that doesn’t mean the idea is a bad one. It would at least signal to the host that its more democratic “non-aligned” friends know what is going on. And it would signal to the Green Movement that the democratic world knows their plight and sympathizes with it.
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