Tag: Syria
An important beginning
“The Day After” study, published this week, is intended to support a democratic transition in Syria. The study was prepared by a “diverse group” of Syrian activists, including “Sunnis, Christians, Kurds, Alawites, and Druze; men and women; youth activists; and individuals with experience in the Free Syrian Army.” Some are identified; others are not for security reasons.
While claiming not to be a “blueprint,” this is by far the most in-depth effort I have seen to explicate what Syria would need to do to begin a transition to democracy. It breaks the issues down into six areas:
- Rule of law
- Transitional justice
- Security sector reform
- Electoral reform and forming a constituent assembly
- Constitutional design
- Economic restructuring and social policy
The approach is methodical: context, challenges, and detailed recommendations, broken down into what needs to be done prior to the start of transition, the immediate priorities once Bashar al Asad is gone, and the first few months. The underlying principles are unimpeachable: accountability, transparency, participation, inclusiveness, and consensus. Time lines and Gantt charts are included.
There are many good things about the approach. The emphasis on rule of law is appropriate. Establishing and maintaining order have been serious problems in most post-war situations. There is good reason to expect the same in Syria, where support for the Assad regime has been substantial and sectarian tensions high.
Plans to deal with regime abuses through transitional justice mechanisms and to re-organize and reform the security services will therefore also be key priorities. Some of the plans and organization suggested are obviously over-ambitious and too complex. It seems unlikely to me that the Syrians are going to be able to manage these tasks on their own, without an international force to keep the peace in the meanwhile, but that is what “The Day After” seems to envision.
The political piece is also important. The study foresees the election of a constituent assembly to write a new constitution. It discusses options for the electoral system and recommends mixed system of proportional representation and some single-member districts. It also considers options for closed (party) or open (individual preference votes) lists as well as mechanisms for ensuring women’s representation and inclusion of minorities. While the time line is ambiguous, elections are not foreseen for 10-18 months following the fall of Asad.
The report is already so lengthy (133 pages) and comprehensive it seems churlish to complain about what is missing. But that is precisely what I must do. I would cite the following as the most important gaps: the Syrian voice, the relationship of religion and politics, in-depth treatment of economic and social issues, and a clear idea of who would do all the many things recommended.
The report is written in the good contemporary American prose, bureaucratic variant. It is clear, concise and sometimes eloquent, but it lacks any hint of a Syrian voice. No doubt the Syrians involved discussed the issues and made the fundamental choices reflected in the document, but the technocratic tone and Western-style content is far too prominent to convince me this is a truly indigenous product. I read Syrian activists every day. No philologist would conclude that they wrote this paper. I can only imagine what a Free Syrian Army soldier in Homs is going to think, once this fine example of bureaucratese is rendered into Arabic.
“The Day After” has no discussion of the relationship between religion and the state or religion and politics. It puts forward as “supra-constitutional principles” two relevant ones:
- Syria is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual, multi-sectarian society that respects its diversity….
- The state is neutral toward religion, respects its values, and neither compels nor impedes religion among the people.
I’ll be delighted if it turns out that simple to deal with religion in Syria. I might even hope that, having seen how difficult and divisive the issue is everywhere else in the Arab uprisings, Syrians will resolve it in this eminently sensible and liberal fashion. But I suspect this facile veneer hides deep divisions, if not among the people writing this report then between them and the people carrying AKs in Aleppo.
Economic and social issues get short shrift, with recommendations that amount to “do the right thing”: establish macroeconomic stability, get displaced people and refugees back to their homes, create strong institutions. A lot more in-depth work will be needed on these issues. There is no serious treatment of the merchant class that was the backbone of the Assad regime and little sign of awareness of the desperate economic and financial situation in which Syria will likely find itself when Bashar al Assad falls. There is barely mention of civil society, which is simply assumed to exist in much of the rest of the report. Nor is there any mention of one of the most fundamental requirements of all post-war societies: getting people who have fought with each other talking and collaborating with each other. Transitional justice is just one aspect of reconciliation.
As for who is going to do all the hundreds of things recommended, the paper is vague. It talks about the need for a transitional regime, but it gives little hint where it would come from and how it might be constituted. French President Francois Hollande’s appeal for formation of a government-in-waiting even before Asad’s departs makes a good deal of sense, since much of what “The Day After” recommends needs to be started now.
But Syrians are so divided and distrustful of each other that it is hard to see how such a government could be formed and gain the confidence of most of the population. Bashar al Asad has lost legitimacy, but it is not yet clear where and when it will reappear. The notion that we are going to get through the Syrian transition without a major international effort, including peacekeepers, I find unconvincing, even though I know how difficult it would be to mount that effort. But the alternative is a level of chaos and violence that we should want to avoid.
The usefulness of a report of this sort can lie in several directions: its ideas may get picked up and incorporated into more official plans, the people who participated may take the wisdom they have gained into their other activities, it may help donor governments and other institutions understand better how they can help, it may stimulate other contributions. “The Day After” is an important step forward. But we are still at the beginning of planning for post-war Syria, not at the end.
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The antidote to a “huge trend of lying”
There is so much bad news from Syria that it counts as good news when someone undertakes a serious effort to document what is happening. Mohammed al-Abdullah, a young Syrian living in Washington, is leading an effort to do just that at the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre. He briefed on the nascent Centre, which will be located in Lyon, France, this morning at Brookings, with Tamara Wittes in the chair.
For now, the data is collected by other organizations, Syrian and international, before being mapped on the SJAC website. Data sources are vetted and documented. It is the Centre’s intention to document all abuses, regardless of the perpetrators. Eighteen governments are supporting the initiative, which grew out of a Hillary Clinton commitment to accountability. There will be a donors conference in Morocco September 14. IREX, Public International Law and Policy Group and No Peace Without Justice are SJAC partners.
The data will not generally provide the kind of legal basis needed for individual prosecutions. But it will document what is going on, provide important leads and context, and will be useful in the future for memorialization.
It is also hoped that such documentation may reduce the likelihood of future revenge violence, in particular on a sectarian basis. I frankly doubt that: I don’t know of an instance in which documentation efforts have demonstrably reduced the likelihood of revenge, but if readers do I hope they will comment accordingly. There is no sign yet of Alawite or Druze community openness to this initiative, even though it would be welcomed.
A number of interesting comments were made during the presentation. One knowledgeable long-time observer of the Levant noted that there has been no documentation of the civil war or any serious reconciliation in Lebanon, but somehow everybody has agreed to forget, if not to forgive. That admittedly seems unlikely in Syria, where the conflict is taking on an increasingly sectarian character. It was noted that defectors from the Syrian army are more open to applying international humanitarian law once they join the revolution than civilians who take up arms, some of whom are bent on revenge.
Perhaps most tellingly it was noted that there is a “huge trend of lying” among Syrians, who may exaggerate what is going on, misrepresent their role in it, and even prevaricate about where they are located. This alone makes the SJAC effort worthwhile. The numbers are horrifying enough without exaggeration: more than 22,000 killed and more or less the same number wounded. And things are getting worse, not better.
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America should not play Asad’s game
David Rohde asks “Is Syria America’s Responsibility?” But he never really answers that question, which is a good one. Instead he answers another one:
We must embrace Syrian moderates and openly declare them our allies. Whether or not we should provide them with military aid is a separate debate. But if we are going to provide non-lethal aid we should do so wholeheartedly. We cannot say America is behind you — secretly.
Of course we can and have often said America is behind you secretly. The fundamental problem is not secrecy, it is whom to assist and how. There is a military opposition and a civilian one. I’d rather we pumped non-lethal support into the civilians, Islamist or not. They are organizing upwards of 100 peaceful demonstrations (often more than 150) each day in Syria. The military effort is scaring Allawites, Christians and others into supporting the regime. The day they go out into the streets to demonstrate–which they will not do so long as the Free Syria Army is attacking–is the day Bashar will be forced from power.
But let’s be clear: Syria is not America’s responsibility. What is happening there is Bashar al Asad’s responsibility. The “responsibility to protect” is in the first instance Syria’s. Russia and Iran, as Syria’s prime military allies, are also responsible for what is becoming an effort to frighten Syrians into submission through random, but sectarian, killing. This technique was used in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to establish the “republic of fear.”
I doubt it will work in Syria, because too many people have already lost their fear. But let’s be clear: there is a lot to be afraid of, as events in the past couple of days at Daraya, a community near Damascus, testify. Upwards of 200 people appear to have been murdered by regime forces. Don’t click on this video if you are even remotely squeamish:
It is of course difficult to suggest that people subjected to this treatment should not respond by defending themselves. They certainly have every right to do so. But it is not clear that revolutionary violence will win the day over a regime that is armed to the teeth and ready to kill. It is for Syrians to decide what the best strategy is. But those of us concerned to see the revolution come out on top and Syria eventually evolve into a democracy are rightly concerned when we see priority given to military assistance.
Revolution and war are political struggles. Empowering those who will take Syria in a democratic direction is what America should worry about. Those are the civilian activists, who risk being pushed aside because Bashar al Asad prefers a military fight he thinks he can win. We should not be trapped into playing his game.
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A good idea
It is difficult to imagine a good reason for the persistence of the Nonaligned Movement, which will hold a summit meeting beginning tomorrow in Tehran. Its website does not appear to have been updated since the early years of the century, so it is hard to understand what it thinks it is doing. Hosted by Supreme Leader Khamenei, the week’s meeting will include distinguished representatives like Sudanese war crimes indictee President Bashir, Zimbabwean President Mugabe, Venezuelan President Chavez and North Korean President of the Supreme People’s Assembly Kim Yong Nam. It’s a wonder Bashar al Assad is not planning to attend.
Of course there are also other, far more reputable attendees: the Tunisian, Libyan and South African Foreign Ministers, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Australian UN ambassador (hard for me to understand what is non-aligned about Australia). And, most notably, newly elected Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi.
If anything good might come out of such a meeting, I imagine it would come from the interaction of these democratic and would-be democratic states with the startling array of autocrats. I can hope that there is at least a bit of private criticism, as in “Robert, do you think it is in the interest of Zimbabwe that you continue to hold on to power?” Or “Hugo, tell me how you are doing in the polls.” But there is a real risk that such a conclave will be seen in some parts of the world as validating the legitimacy of the autocrats and undermining the citizens who oppose them.
That’s where National Iranian American President Trita Parsi’s idea comes in. He tweeted today that Morsi should meet with Green Movement leaders in Tehran, those brave souls who contested the 2009 presidential election as not free and unfair only to find themselves outgunned, outmaneuvered, beaten and defeated in the streets. A call on Mir-Hossein Mousavi, just returned to house arrest from a stay in the hospital, is one possibility. Or a visit with younger activists. Morsi, the product of successful street protests and a serious (if not perfect) election, should want to hear from Iranian protesters, unless he has already switched to his predecessor’s mentality, as the New York Times suggests.
But why only Morsi? He will be reluctant to do it alone, as he will not want to offend the hosts and put at risk whatever improvement in relations with Tehran he hopes to initiate. Better if the whole lot of more serious democratic leaders announce their willingness to meet with the Green Movement and others who are not on good terms with the Iranian regime, which claims it is not repressive.
I am not at all sure whether any Iranians would dare accept the invitation, as the consequences for them could be dramatic (and some Green Movement leaders are under house arrest). But that doesn’t mean the idea is a bad one. It would at least signal to the host that its more democratic “non-aligned” friends know what is going on. And it would signal to the Green Movement that the democratic world knows their plight and sympathizes with it.
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No easy call
Having written Tuesday that President Obama should be considering a no-fly zone in Syria, I was surprised but pleased to read this tactical level account confirming my view that this is preferable to safe zones or humanitarian corridors. They wouldn’t make much difference at this point because the opposition already control wide swaths of territory. But of course a no-fly zone over all of Syria would need to be strategically as well as tactically good in order to convince a president.
Steven Lee Myers and Scott Shane of the New York Times summed up the argument against any Western military intervention this way:
American military operations against Syria, officials reiterated on Tuesday, would risk drawing in Syria’s patrons, principally Iran and Russia, at a much greater level than they already are involved. It would allow Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, to rally popular sentiment against the West and embolden Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups now fighting the Assad government to turn their attention to what they would see as another American crusade in the Arab world.
The risk is not only greater Russian and Iranian involvement in Syria, but also losing Russia’s cooperation on Afghanistan and on trying to restrain Iran’s nuclear program. These are serious risks involving important American interests.
But Iran and Russia are already heavily involved in Syria, and it is also an important American interest to prevent the war in Syria from “grinding on,” as Andrew Tabler puts it. That would increase the likelihood of Al Qaeda and other jihadi involvement. It will also increase the risk to Syria’s neighbors. Lebanon and Jordan are already in difficulty, the former from sectarian fighting provoked in part by the Syrian conflict and the latter from the burden of tens of thousands of refugees. Iraq could also be threatened. Kurdish extremists are increasing operations in Turkey, presumably egged on by the Syrian regime, but the Turks can counter that effort both diplomatically (by getting the Iraqi Kurds to restrain their Syrian brethren) and militarily.
A no-fly zone could significantly shorten the conflict in Syria, but of course a great deal depends on how it is authorized and who engages in it. There seems no possibility of UN Security Council authorization. Moscow won’t allow it. The Arab League would need to ask for it. That seems within the realm of possibility. The Americans would have to undertake the major military operation needed to defeat Syria’s Russian air defense system, giving the Iranians a pretty good picture of how we would go about a similar attack on them. A continuing effort to patrol the skies and strike occasionally afterwards might rely on Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
The alternative, or possibly a supplement, to a no-fly zone is to supply the Syrian revolutionaries with shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles (MANPADs). The risk is that these would fall into the wrong hands, as they did in Afghanistan and Libya. Few however have been used effectively against Western targets. I imagine that our geniuses have managed to create MANPADs that don’t last long and are therefore useless after a few months, but I don’t actually know it (and Al Qaeda might be able to defeat any technological wizardry).
I don’t think a no-fly zone or giving the revolutionaries anti-aircraft capability is an easy call. But refusing to somehow redress the imbalance that Bashar’s air force is exploiting to kill civilians also has consequences. President Obama appears to have already made his decision not to intervene (I am less sure that we aren’t giving the revolutionaries some anti-aircraft capability), but the mounting toll, especially in Aleppo and Damascus, means that the issue will have to be revisited.
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Anything but
President Obama yesterday told the world–and Bashar al Asad–all too clearly what he plans to do about Syria: nothing, so long as Asad makes no move to use his chemical weapons. “At this point the likelihood of a soft landing seems pretty distant,” he said.
The contrast with the Barack Obama of May 2011 is stark:
The President still wants all those nice things: democratic transition, an end to shooting demonstrators, peaceful demonstrations, access for human rights monitors. But he signaled yesterday what most of us have already concluded from a year of inaction: he isn’t going to use American military power to get it done.
Why not? Russian opposition is one reason. He isn’t prepared to buck Moscow when he needs Russian support both for the northern supply network into Afghanistan (which may also be necessary for American withdrawal) and for the nuclear talks with Iran. President Putin is hard over about Syria. The smart money says that is more about domestic policy than international affairs.
Arab hesitation is another. The Arab League is not asking for military intervention, as it did in Libya. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are preferring to arm the Syrian opposition.
They likely know all too well that Europe, which in the end carried much of the military burden in Libya, is unwilling to repeat the experiment. Euro problems and the consequent financial burdens are weighing too heavily as the European Union heads into its double-dip recession.
The Administration is vaunting its cooperation with Turkey against Asad. Assistant Secretary of State Beth Jones is headed for Ankara to intensify the effort, though precisely what that means is unclear to me. The Turks, while providing safe haven for both refugees and the Free Syrian Army, have hesitated to intervene militarily. Some say the Americans have held them back, but I suspect they hesitate also because Asad can respond by encouraging Kurdish guerillas to attack inside Turkey.
Some in the Administration also think we are already doing a good job of bleeding Iran, which is more and more engaged on the ground in Syria. We can keep our powder dry for possible military action against Iran’s nuclear program but at the same time cost them a bundle in money and men fighting an insurgency in Syria. That may well be cost effective.
This approach leaves poor Syria out in the cold. The death toll is approaching 200 per day.* The regime has retaken Damascus but has not entirely succeeded in Aleppo. Large swaths of the country are out of Asad’s control but still far from peaceful. Someone at the UN has a keen sense of irony: the Secretary General’s report on “responsibility to protect” issued yesterday is entitled “timely and decisive response.” The response in Syria so far is anything but.
I have not favored in the past military action. “Safe areas” and “humanitarian corridors” would become target-rich environments. Large military operations would be needed to enforce them. They are bad ideas.
But Asad’s increasing use of aircraft (helicopters as well as fixed wing) merits some kind of international response. If it is too dangerous to give the opposition the shoulder-fired missiles (MANPADs) it wants, the President needs to consider a no-fly zone over all of Syria. Unless Asad responds by immediately grounding his air force, that would also require a major military operation to suppress the air defense system.
*PS, August 22: out of date already. The opposition reports 250 killed yesterday.
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