Tag: Turkey

Peace picks November 2-7

  1. The Iran Deal and the Future of US-Iranian Relations | Monday, November 2nd| 4-5:30 | American University | Email USFP@american.edu for more information | Join the United States Foreign Policy Program to welcome Ambassador Pickering back to SIS. He will discuss the recent Iran accord and its implications for the future of US-Iranian relations. Speakers include: Ambassador Thomas Pickering, former U.S. diplomat and founder of the Iran Project.
  2. Blood, Oil, and Cast: Confronting Terror Finance in Today’s Middle East | Monday, November 2nd | 10:00-11:00 | Center for American Progress | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In the years since 9/11, the United States has built effective tools to disrupt funding for Al Qaeda. More than a decade later, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham and similar groups that extract resources from the land and people they control challenges the existing policy framework that focuses on safeguarding the formal international financial system. Meanwhile, Iran continues to destabilize the region through direct support to proxy groups such as Hezbollah. Although key U.S. partners in the region have taken action to crack down on terror financing, others have yet to take the necessary steps to counter terrorist fundraising in their own borders. Speakers include:  Juan Zarate, former Deputy National Security Adviser for Combating Terrorism, William F. Wechsler, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, and Hardin Lang, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress.
  3. Turkey’s snap elections: Resuscitation or relapse? | Monday, November 2nd | 3:00 – 4:30 | Brookings Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND |As Turkey prepares for highly-contested elections on November 1, concerns are growing about the country’s politics, economy, security, and foreign policy. Just a few years ago Turkey was recognized as a model of democracy and beacon of stability and economic growth in a challenging region. However, more recently, Turkey’s economy has lost its dynamism, its leaders’ commitment to democratic principles seems to be eroding, and doubts are emerging about the country’s interests and engagement in the region. Even more disturbing, as the conflicts in Syria and Iraq continue unabated and massive refugee flows spill over into Europe, violent Islamic extremism has now surfaced in Turkey. With the government and opposition trading accusations, the horrific, recent bombing attack in Ankara has further polarized an already deeply-divided and anxious country. Panelists will discuss how recent events might influence voters what the election results might portend for Turkey’s strategic orientation. Speakers include: Ömer Taşpınar, National War College and Brookings, Gönül Tol, Middle East Institute, Kadir Üstün, SETA Foundation; and Robert Wexler, S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace.
  4. A Conversation with Tunisian Nobel Prize Laureate Hussein Abassi | Wednesday, November 4th | 9:30-11:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | unisia has made tremendous efforts since its 2011 revolution to establish the institutions and practice of pluralistic democracy, and on October 9 the Norwegian Nobel Committee recognized Tunisia’s achievements. The committee awarded the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize to the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, a group of four civil society groups including the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT). The UGTT, led by Mr. Hussein Abassi, played a powerful leadership role in the National Dialogue and in making Tunisia a model country for the region. The Atlantic Council is pleased to invite you to a discussion with Mr. Abassi on the role of institutions in pluralistic democracies in the Middle East. Other speakers include: Ambassador Thomas Shannon, and former Slovenian President Danilo Türk.
  5. Syria webinar: Putin in Syria- does it change anything? | Wednesday, November 4th | 10:00-11:00 | Aegis Advisory | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On 30 September, Russia began its airstrikes in Syria ostensibly against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Aegis Advisory is offering a webinar which will provide a framework for understanding the ever more complex situation, offering a privileged understanding of the environment in country and the likely range of scenarios. Why did the Russians decide to intervene now in the Syrian conflict? Would their intervention help in “degrading and destroying” ISIL? Should we expect a breakthrough in the security and political stalemate that will result in a meaningful solution?
  6. Kirkuk: Iraqi Keystone and ISIS Target | Wednesday, November 4th | 12:00-1:15 | Middle East Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | While ISIS militants control the western reaches of Kirkuk, Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and local police have prevented the fall of Kirkuk city and most of the oil-rich province. Kirkuk hosts hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons who have fled ISIS aggression. With funding and support from the Baghdad government disrupted, the challenges facing Kirkuk are mounting. The Middle East Institute is pleased to host Dr. Najmaldin Karim, governor of Kirkuk province since 2011, for a discussion about the province’s precarious place at the center of the Iraq war against the Islamic State. Governor Karim will review the threat posed by ISIS and how local government is trying to deliver for Kirkuk’s Kurdish, Arab, Turkmen, and Christian citizens while in the grip of a security and humanitarian crisis. Gönül Tol, director of MEI’s Center for Turkish Studies, will moderate the audience discussion with Dr. Karim following the governor’s opening remarks.
  7. Roundtable with the Leadership & Advocacy for Women in Africa | Thursday, November 5th | 11:00 – 12:00| Georgetown University | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Leadership and Advocacy for Women in Africa (LAWA) Fellowship Program was founded in 1993 at the Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C., in order to train women’s human rights lawyers from Africa who are committed to returning home to their countries in order to advance the status of women and girls in their own countries throughout their careers.
  8. Afghanistan Today: Facing Challenges, Opening Opportunities | Thursday, November 5th | 5:00 – 7:00 | SAIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Speakers will provide in-depth knowledge of current developments, as well as prospects for the future in Afghanistan, as seen from the perspectives of the government, media, and the private sector. Speakers: TBA.
  9. The state of Africa’s Great Lakes region | Friday, November 6th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Brookings Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Great Lakes region of Africa is crucial to Africa’s general stability, yet it remains plagued by a number of ongoing security and development challenges. A broad question, among others, is how or if the United States should try to promote democracy and security in these key countries at this crucial juncture? Other concerns include how to ensure stability and continue to protect human rights. Speakers include: Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Co- Director, Center on 21st Century Security and Intelligence , The Brookings Institution, Anthony Gambino, Former USAID Mission Director in Congo, Kristin McKie, Assistant Professor of African Studies & Government, St. Lawrence University, The Honorable Thomas Perriello, Special Envoy, Africa Great Lakes Region, U.S. Department of State.
  10. Rising Tides: a simulation of regional crisis and territorial competition in the East China Sea | Saturday, November 7th | 11:30am – 6:00 pm | George Washington University | REGISTER TO ATTEND |  This simulation will examine the complex maze that actors must negotiate when dealing with the tense social, political, and military dilemmas currently occurring in the East China Sea. Participants will assume the roles of influential policymakers, and must work with both state and non-state regional actors to execute comprehensive and multilateral government responses to issues ranging from great power politics, piracy, and natural resource conflicts; to state bargaining dilemmas, humanitarian assistance, and collective action problems. Participants will have the unique opportunity to grapple with serious questions of national interest through the eyes of the government of the United States and the People’s Republic of China as they are divided into teams in order to develop their respective policies and agendas. Participants will need to develop strategies in line with their team’s objectives to manage a variety of crises and react to actions from other teams.
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Iran in the tent

Tomorrow’s meeting on Syria in Vienna will include Iran, until now excluded from multilateral efforts to negotiate a political solution to the multi-sided civil war. Some see this as an innovation that gives Tehran “legitimacy” and strengthens its diplomatic hand in the region.

To the contrary: Iran needs to be at the table because there can be no diplomatic solution in Syria without its contribution. Iran is Bashar al Assad’s mainstay. Tehran provides Damascus with arms, ground troops (mainly through Hizbollah), command and control as well as economic support (largely in the form of oil). Only recently have the Russians come out out of the shadows to provide air attacks, intelligence and some ground capabilities. For the previous four and a half years, Iranian enabled Bashar al Assad to hold Damascus and western Syria as well as a link between those critical areas.

The international community tried to negotiate a political settlement without Iran. The June 2012 Geneva communique’ was the product of a UN-sponsored meeting Tehran did not attend. The Geneva 2 meeting in 2014 likewise kept the Iranians at arms’ length, because Tehran was unwilling to endorse the 2012 communique’. Excluding Iran didn’t work. Neither Geneva conference led to serious progress in ending the Syrian wars, though the communique’ remains what diplomats call an important touchstone or point of reference.

Now Washington has concurred in allowing Tehran into the tent. Foreign Minister Zarif, who led its nuclear negotiating team, will participate. This is a mixed blessing. Zarif and his boss, President Rouhani, do not control Iran’s Syria policy. Supreme Leader Khamenei does. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), not the Foreign Ministry, is the executive agency. It is hard to picture how Zarif could agree to something the IRGC does not want, in particular any plan that involves the removal of Bashar al Assad from power.

The best that can be hoped for in Vienna is a discussion that initiates a struggle over Syria policy inside Iran. The Islamic Republic has long sought a leading role in the Islamic world, not just among Shia. The war in Syria is alienating Sunnis, who are by far the majority in the Islamic world. It is also decimating Hizbollah, killing thousands of Iranian troops and costing Tehran a fortune. While Americans worry that its engagement in Syria will increase Iran’s influence in the Middle East, Iranians worry that it is weakening the Islamic Republic and aligning it with a lost cause.

Iran will be on the spot in Vienna. It has already put forth a plan to end the Syrian wars with a ceasefire, a national unity government, constitutional changes and elections. This is broadly consistent with the 2012 Geneva communique.’ The Russians have reportedly fleshed this out in somewhat more detail. Iranian failure to support the purported Russian plan would risk a serious breach in Assad’s support. But the Russian plan includes an explicit provision for Assad not to run in any new election, raising a serious risk to Iran’s longer-term interests in Syria. This would be unacceptable to the IRGC and the Supreme Leader, if not also to President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif.

So the Vienna meeting is an opportunity for American diplomacy, which is presumably why Secretary of State Kerry has doggedly pursued it and agreed to inviting Iran to the table. It would be a mistake to expect any dramatic breakthroughs. But the meeting could initiate strains between Russia and Iran as well as within Iran that might ultimately produce positive results from Washington’s perspective.

Of course the meeting will also produce strains on the other side of the equation. The Syrian opposition, which is not invited to Vienna, will fear being sold out. Saudi Arabia and Turkey, who will attend, will insist that Iran and Russia abandon Assad. Failing that, they will want to continue and increase arms shipments to the rebels in Syria, shipments that have already proved effective in blocking regime advances on Idlib and Aleppo.

My sense is that at this point the US-led Coalition, despite its notoriously different objectives, has better alternatives to a negotiated solution than Russia, which has already doubled down on a bad bet and risks what President Obama terms “quagmire.” Iran may still be willing to throw good money, supplies and troops after bad, but only because it lacks a viable alternative. He who has a better alternative to a negotiated solution has leverage. The Americans need to use it, by threatening to increase further the quality and quantity of arms shipped to the Syrian opposition. They could also increase their own air engagement and begin to target Hizbollah, which is certainly as much a terrorist organization as its Sunni counterparts.

What is still missing is a way out. The Americans want one that displaces Bashar al Assad from power. The Iranians want one that keeps him in place. I’m not seeing a solution to that problem. Vienna at best will be the beginning of a process, not the end of one. At worst, it will fail and lead to further military escalation, with ever more dreadful consequences for ordinary Syrians until one side or the other “wins.”

Iran inside the tent is better than outside, but no guarantee of a negotiated solution.

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What the Russians are proposing

Friday’s meeting on Syria in Vienna will include everyone but the Syrians: the US, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. I’ll be surprised if the Europeans don’t edge their way in as well. The Egyptians will try too.

A Russian proposal, so far ignored by the English-language press, will be on the table for the occasion. A Syrian source has assured me it is real. I am hoping it is. With gratitude to MEI intern Bridget Gill for the translation from  الشرق الأوسط here it is:

  1. Determining a ‘bank of targets’ shared between the nations which are conducting strikes in Syrian territory, and putting the factions that do not accept a political solution in the ‘target bank.’
  2. Freezing fighting forces, whether the FSA or the regime forces.
  3. Putting in motion a conference for dialogue that includes the Syrian regime, the domestic and external opposition, and the FSA. This is a dialogue which must produce:
    • A general amnesty
    • Release of all prisoners
    • Parliamentary elections
    • Presidential elections
    • Formation of a national unity government in which all parties are represented.
    • Conducting constitutional amendments that transfers several of the president’s mandatory powers to the government as an assembly (along the lines of the Lebanese model).
  4. The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, personally promises that the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad will not stand as a candidate in these elections, but this does not prevent the candidacy of those close to him or other figures in the regime in these elections.
  5. The creation of a framework to integrate the brigades of the FSA with the regime army after the integration of the Syrian militias supporting the regime into the army.
  6. Russia assures that the amnesty will include all opposition figures domestically and abroad, even those who have picked up arms, and in exchange the opposition [must] commit not to pursue al-Assad and regime figures legally in the future, whether they choose to remain in Syria or to leave it.
  7. Breaking the siege in all besieged areas on the part of the regime, in exchange for [the opposition] lifting the siege on the regime’s besieged areas, and the opposition’s cessation of acts of aggression and nations’ freezing their arming of these parties.
  8. Russia preserves its military bases inside Syria, on the strength of a resolution from the Security Council.
  9. Russia has stipulated that some of the articles of the agreement be kept secret, among them the issue of al-Assad’s participation in the elections, out of fear of his losing control of the army and other armed forces.

I see lots of things wrong with this proposition, but it is certainly not one that should be dismissed out of hand. Assuming it is real, the Russians are essentially saying that they want out of their current bad bet on Bashar al Assad while preserving their military bases and influence in Syria. They don’t much care about the rest, though we can expect them to back someone in the elections who promises to do what Moscow wants.

The devil is of course in the other details. It wouldn’t be easy to get Moscow and Washington to agree on a target list. How would it be decided who accepts a political solution? Freezing areas of control would be difficult, as they are uncertain and often changing. Quid pro quo ending of sieges has been tried many times and hasn’t worked well so far. Amnesty for war crimes and crimes against humanity is not possible in the 21st century. Who conducts parliamentary and presidential elections? How is the transitional national unity government formed? How is this proposition related to ongoing United Nations-sponsored talks?

Too many people have seen the Russian intervention in Syria as a sign of Moscow’s strength. To the contrary: it was undertaken to prevent the Assad regime from losing vital territory in Latakia. Moscow is spending more than it can afford in blood and treasure on helping the Iranians preserve Assad’s hold on power. This proposal, while unacceptable in many respects, is a clear indication that the Russians are looking for a way out. While bargaining hard for improvements in this still unacceptable proposition, Washington will have to decide whether to give it to them.

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Still no end in sight

Syrian President Assad’s surprise visit to Moscow confirms several things:

  • The Russians are backing him fully;
  • They intend to use the influence they gain to dictate a political outcome;
  • That political outcome will be a Potemkin transition with little or no participation by the Syrian opposition the US and its friends are supporting.

Those of us who once hoped Moscow would eventually abandon Assad were wrong. What the Russians clearly intend is to keep Assad in place, as no one else would be able or willing to guarantee their continued naval presence at Tartus and new air and land base at Latakia. President Putin is also sending a clear message to Washington: Russia is back in the Middle East and intends to stay there, no matter what the Syrian people or the Americans think.

Some see President Obama as “hesitant” in response. I don’t. He decided a long time ago that Syria was not worth a candle. If he thought US interests were directly threatened there, he would have done more long ago, as he did in Yemen (with drones and special forces), Iraq (with air attacks) and now most recently in Afghanistan, where he intends to keep thousands of American troops. The American air attacks are strictly focused on the Islamic State; extreme care is being taken to avoid “collateral damage.” This president is extremely disciplined. What others see as indecision is in fact a determination not to get involved on the ground in a country that does not directly threaten US national security.

I think he has made a big mistake, because it has been clear from the first that continuation of the war in Syria would lead to sectarian polarization and easy recruitment for extremists, even if no one predicted the emergence of the Islamic State. Assad is its godfather. His brutal repression of a peaceful civilian rebellion has caused dissatisfaction to flow towards the jihadis, not away from them.

The Russians will suffer the same backlash. The Islamic State has already threatened to take the fight inside Russia, where Putin’s repression of Chechnya and mistreatment of Crimean Tatars and other Russian Muslims will not doubt provide the jihadi cause with ample recruits. Russia has poked the hornets’ nest in Syria. Now the Sunni hornets will attack their antagonist. No doubt Putin will respond with repression that will help jihadi recruitment.

Obama has kept his distance from the Russian intervention. The Pentagon has negotiated an agreement intended to deconflict US and Russian air operations. That is necessary, even if it implies to some US acceptance of the Russian intervention. Any further moves to validate what the Russians are doing would embroil the US in a way guaranteed to offend America’s Gulf and other Sunni friends, especially Turkey (whose airspace Russia has repeatedly violated). Russia has made itself the spearhead of Shia influence in the Middle East. Washington will want to try to stay above the sectarian divide. It has no dog in the fight between Sunni and Shia extremists like the Islamic State and Hizbollah, which are both America’s enemies.

Intervention comes with obligations. Russia should now be expected to ante up for a substantial share of the international humanitarian assistance Syria requires. I think $1 billion per year would be appropriate. It should also be expected to pay for the lion’s share of the post-war reconstruction, as the US did in Iraq and Afghanistan. If you want to be treated as a major power, those are burdens that cannot be shirked.

The US is amping up its military supplies to the Syrian opposition forces, whose performance on the battlefield will now determine the outcome of this war. Both Moscow and Washington say there is no military solution in Syria, but both know that a political solution will be dramatically different if the regime can retake Aleppo and Idlib, which seem to be the main objectives of the current Russian-backed offensive by the Syrian army, its paramilitary partners, Hizbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The proxy war between the US and this alternate coalition has begun.

Poor Syria. Its people wanted freedom and got war. The Russian intervention is unlikely to end the fighting, because the Potemkin transition it intends won’t entice many to lay down their arms. There is still no end in sight.

 

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New Turkish elections

On Wednesday, the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research in DC (SETA) hosted a conversation, ‘Turkey Ahead of the November Elections’, featuring Kılıç Kanat, research director at SETA; Ömer Taşpınar, non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution; and Andrew Bowen, senior fellow and director of Middle East Studies at the Center for the National Interest. The executive director of SETA, Kadir Üstün, moderated the discussion. Kanat has just published an analysis paper on the new elections, which have been called for November 1 because of the failure to form a ruling coalition after the June polling.

The June elections were the first in 13 years when no single party won enough votes to create a ruling majority government. Kanat laid out the reasons this occurred and the issues for the upcoming elections. In his view, the causes behind the decline of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) include:

  • The ‘Kobani effect’: the battle for the northern Syrian town had a galvanizing effect on Kurds and non-Kurds who voted against Erdoğan, who was seen as wanting ISIS to win;
  • Mobilization by smaller parties to pass the 10% threshold for inclusion in parliament;
  • For the first time, diaspora Turkish nationalists were allowed to vote in general elections;
  • Tactical voting: voters were certain the AKP would win the most votes, but attempted to decrease the margin in order to force a coalition.

Kanat evaluates the shift as a turn to the nationalist parties, whether Turkish or Kurdish: the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the conservative Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and the Republican People’s Party (CHP). The HDP saw the biggest gains in support, from those dissatisfied with Erdoğan’s position vis-à-vis Kobani, and the Kurdish resolution process in general, as well as from diaspora voters.

The middle class has also been increasingly worried in a time of slowing economic growth, losing some confidence in the AKP. The AKP since the Gezi Park demonstrations has had to work hard to keep its support base, but the constant effort at mobiliztion may have resulted in election fatigue among some voters.

Going forward, Kanat stated, the upcoming elections will be determined by voters’ perception of who holds the responsibility for three things: resolving the Kurdish question, as well as dealing with PKK terrorism; maintaining public stability on a nation-wide level; and economic growth or decline.

Taşpınar zoomed out, examining two long-term trends that have contributed to the current political situation. First is the personalization of political power: political analysis and action stems from an understanding of Erdoğan’s plans. There are fewer enduring institutions in this post-Kemalist era, and no unified ideology undergirding the state.

Second, there is increasing polarization in Turkish politics. This has been driven by personalization, as well as the Kurdish question and the identity of Turkey as a country – will it be democratic or autocratic? The Gezi protest was a very real demonstration of this polarization, as was the failure after last weekend’s terrorist attack in Ankara for political leaders to produce a unified vocabulary to bring the nation together.

The theme of personalization ran through Bowen’s comments as well, in particular because of the personalistic nature of foreign policy decisions, for Obama as well as for Erdoğan. Theirs is a bad marriage. One of the key sticking points is the difference in the way they prioritize threats: for Erdoğan, the PKK takes pride of place, with ISIS far behind. Obama, on the other hand, urgently prioritizes defeating ISIS.

The Syrian crisis has drawn out many of the tensions in this relationship, which will be difficult to repair, even after the July agreement on air bases in Turkey. The US is perceived in Turkey as not standing by its allies, but new political leadership in both countries could change the situation, especially if the US focuses again on the Middle East.

According to polls, 15% of Turkish voters are still undecided about the November 1 elections. Only a few percentage points are required to re-cement the AKP’s position of power. The Ankara terror attack, depending on who is understood to be the perpetrator and how the government deals with the aftermath, could be decisive.

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Peace picks, October 12-16

  1. JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War | Tuesday, October 13th | 2-3:30 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In the fall of 1962, President John F. Kennedy faced two great crises: the Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-Indian War. While Kennedy’s role in the missile crisis has been thoroughly examined, his critical role in the Sino-Indian War – and the crisis itself – have been largely ignored. In his new book, JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War (Brookings Institution Press, 2015), CIA veteran and Director of the Brookings Intelligence Project Bruce Riedel details several facets of the October 1962 crisis: the invasion of Indian-held territory by well-armed and equipped Chinese troops; Prime Minister Nehru’s urgent request for direct American Air Force intervention in the war; Kennedy’s deft diplomatic success in convincing neighboring Pakistan to remain neutral during the affair; and the ultimate unilateral Chinese cease-fire that brought an end to the conflict. Riedel also analyzes the CIA’s clandestine support of the Tibetan people in their resistance to Chinese occupation, a matter that had partially precipitated the Sino-Indian War. Finally, Riedel highlights the intriguing role First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy played in her husband’s South Asian diplomacy. On October 13, the Brookings Intelligence Project will launch Riedel’s new book with a conversation about this crisis, how it played an important role in forming Asia’s current balance of power, and the resultant regional arms race that still prevails to this day. Brookings Institution Nonresident Senior Fellow Marvin Kalb will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion. Following their remarks, Kalb and Riedel will take questions from the audience.
  2. Addressing Crisis, Supporting Recovery: The Central African Republic at a Crossroads | Tuesday, October 13th | 3-4:30 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The citizens of the Central African Republic (CAR) have endured political instability and episodes of extreme violence since the country’s independence in 1960. Recent clashes between sectarian militia in the country’s capital of Bangui have displaced at least 30,000 residents from their homes and prompted renewed concern about the CAR’s peace process and transition back to democratic rule. The CAR’s recovery efforts hinge on the success of immediate stabilization and peacebuilding priorities, including national elections—which were recently postponed due to the ongoing violence and overwhelming logistical challenges—as well as the need to promote long-term civic inclusion and inclusive economic growth. The Brookings Africa Growth Initiative will host a discussion on immediate efforts to stabilize the CAR and long-term strategies for the country’s economic recovery. His Excellency Ambassador Stanislas Moussa-Kembe, the CAR Ambassador to the US, will give remarks, followed by a moderated panel discussion with the experts Ambassador W. Stuart Symington, US special representative to the CAR; Sandra Melone, executive vice president at the Search for Common Ground; and Madeline Rose, senior policy advisor at Mercy Corps. After the discussion, panelists will take audience questions. Amadou Sy, Director of the Africa Growth Initiative, will moderate.
  3. Is U.S. Missile Defense Aimed at China? | Thursday, October 15th | 2-3:30 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The United States has been pressing South Korea to accept a very powerful radar that is allegedly intended for South Korea’s defense against North Korean ballistic missiles. However, North Korea is likely years away from building an intercontinental ballistic missile, and the radar is much more powerful than necessary for such a purpose. Is U.S. missile defense policy actually intended to defend against threats from China, rather than North Korea? Join us as Theodore A. Postol explains his research findings in answer to this question, joined by Tong Zhao as a discussant. Carnegie’s Toby Dalton will moderate.
  4. Turkey Ahead of the November Elections | Wednesday, October 14th | 10:30-11:30 | SETA Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After negotiations to form a governing coalition produced no results following the June 7 elections, Turkey will return to the polls on November 1. Heading to this snap election, Turkey confronts renewed violence in its southeast and challenges as a member of the U.S. led anti-ISIL coalition. Uncertainty remains as to whether this new round of balloting will result in an AK Party single government, or lead to a fresh round of coalition negotiations. Please join us for a panel discussion on Turkey’s current domestic and foreign policy challenges ahead of the November 1 elections. Speakers include: Andrew Bowen, Senior Fellow and Director of Middle East Studies, Center for the National Interest; Omer Taspinar, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; and Kilic B. Kanat, Research Director, the SETA Foundation at Washington D.C.. The discussion will be moderated by Kadir Ustun, Executive Director, the SETA Foundation at Washington D.C.
  5. Is the Bear Back? Russian Foreign Policy and the Conflicts in Ukraine and Syria | Wednesday, October 14th | 12:30-1:45 | Johns Hopkins SAIS, Rome Building | REGISTER TO ATTEND  | The Russia-Eurasia Forum invites you to a lecture by Dr. Jeffrey Mankoff of the Center for Strategic International Studies on “Is the Bear Back? Russian Foreign Policy and the Conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.” The Russia-Eurasia Forum is moderated by Professor Bruce Parrott. Guests may bring their lunch to this brown bag series.
  6. Attribution and Accountability for Chemical Weapons Use in Syria | Wednesday, October 14th | 1-3 | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Two years after the dismantlement of Syria’s declared chemical weapons stockpile, there is mounting evidence that chemicals continue to be used as weapons of war with over 30 allegations of use in Syria. In September the United Nations Security Council established a Joint Investigative Mechanism to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Please join us for a discussion on the Joint Investigative Mechanism, the international response to continued use of chemical weapons in Syria, and the effort to hold perpetrators accountable and uphold the norm against chemical weapons use. Speakers include: Wa’el Alzayat, Senior Policy Advisor to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations; and Mallory Stewart, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Emerging Security Challenges and Defense Policy, Bureau for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, U.S. Department of State. The discussion will be moderated by Rebecca Hersman, Director, Project on Nuclear Issues, and Senior Adviser, International Security Program, CSIS.
  7. Human Rights in Iran after the Nuclear Deal Wednesday, October 14th 2-3:30 Project on Middle East Democracy REGISTER TO ATTEND With the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed upon, the international community has begun to focus on the implementation of the nuclear deal. During the course of negotiations, the human rights situation inside Iran failed to improve, and it remains unclear how such issues may be affected by the signing of the nuclear agreement. It also remains to be seen whether the nuclear agreement will now create any additional space for the international community to address its human rights concerns. What changes can we expect to see in Iran’s domestic politics as sanctions are relieved and attention moves beyond nuclear negotiations? What role can the international community play in addressing human rights concerns in Iran? What changes might we expect in U.S. policy toward Iran post-nuclear deal, and how—if at all—can the United States play a constructive role in helping open space for domestic activists? Join us for a conversation with: Nazila Fathi, Author, The Lonely War: One Woman’s Account of the Struggle for Modern Iran; Dokhi Fassihian, Senior Program Manager, Freedom House; and Suzanne Maloney, Deputy Director, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution and Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution. The conversation will be moderated by Stephen McInerney, Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED). This event is held at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  8. Understanding Iran Beyond the Deal | Thursday, October 15th | 4-5 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After surviving a review by a bitterly divided Congress, the Iran nuclear agreement is now a done deal. And yet, with regional conflict intensifying, the question of Iran continues to loom large in the American foreign policy debate. As Iran gears up for elections in early 2016, and as world leaders – in business and in politics – flock to Tehran, understanding Iran after the deal becomes an increasingly complex and urgent task. On October 15, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host a conversation with Suzanne Maloney, deputy director of the Brookings Foreign Policy program, and author of the recently released book, Iran’s Political Economy since the Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2015). Maloney will be joined by Javier Solana, a Brookings distinguished fellow and former EU high representative for the common foreign and security policy; and Vali Nasr, dean of Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a nonresident senior fellow at Brookings. The three experts will discuss Iran today, the implications of the nuclear agreement, and more. Bruce Jones, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, will give introductory remarks. After the program, we will welcome questions from the audience.
  9. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Region | Friday, October 16th | 9:30-11 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The complex relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan is an ongoing source of instability in the South Asia region. Only this past spring, the first round of discussions between representatives of the Afghan government and the Taliban leadership gave even skeptics some reason to hope that President Ghani’s efforts to open talks with the Taliban on peace might come to fruition. After a period of improved contacts and rhetoric, relations between the Afghan and Pakistani governments have again become strained under the burden of high profile Taliban attacks under the new leader, Mullah Mansour. A lasting substantial dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan remains difficult to achieve, but necessary for stability and for both countries. With the arrival of Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif in Washington later this month, the panelists will explore the challenges faced by the Pakistani leadership, the prospects for its relationship with the Afghan National Unity Government, and the implications for the US- Pakistan relationship. Join us for a conversation with Mr. Shuja Nawaz, Distinguished Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council; and Dr. Vali Nasr, Dean, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. The conversation will be moderated by the Honorable James B. Cunningham, Senior Fellow and Khalilzad Chair, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council.
  10. Erased from Space and Consciousness: Israel and the Depopulated Palestinian Villages of 1948 | Friday, October 16th | 1-2 | Palestine Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | A dramatic transformation took place in the landscape and demography of Israel after the 1948 war, as hundreds of Palestinian villages throughout the country were depopulated, and for the most part physically erased. How has this transformation been perceived by Israelis? Author Noga Kadman suggests some answers, based on a research that systematically explores Israeli attitudes concerning the depopulated Palestinian villages. She focuses on the most ordinary, everyday encounters of Israelis with the memory of the villages, their representations and their physical remains, exploring the naming and mapping of village sites, and the ways depopulated villages are dealt with in tourist sites and Jewish communities established on their remains. Aided by statistics, original quotes, photos and maps, she will discuss her findings, which reveal a consistent pattern of marginalization of the depopulated Palestinian villages in the Israeli discourse, in the context of the formation of collective memory and of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A light lunch will be served from 12:30.
  11. Understanding ISIS | Friday, October 16th | 3-4 | Center for American Progress | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, has shaken the foundations of an already fragile Middle East. The potency of the ISIS threat has galvanized one of the largest global coalitions in warfare history. More than one year into the anti-ISIS campaign, the results have been mixed, and ISIS has demonstrated surprising resilience. How do we understand ISIS as an organization, and what are its main strengths and weaknesses? Please join the Center for American Progress and the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy for a discussion with Will McCants, Director at the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World and Fellow at Brookings’ Center for Middle East Policy, and Hassan Hassan, Nonresident Fellow at Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, on the emergence and proliferation of ISIS. Will McCants’ recently published book The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State draws extensively on primary Arabic language sources and letters from Al Qaeda and ISIS. It is a comprehensive investigation of the group’s religious grounding, motives, strategy, and leadership. Hassan Hassan’s book ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, written with The Daily Beast’s Michael Weiss, traces the evolution of ISIS from its origins on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan through interviews with intelligence and military officials, as well as religious figures and fighters, explaining why the group will remain with us for a long time. Opening Remarks will be given by William Wechsler, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress.
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