Tag: Ukraine
Peace Picks October 15-21
- Defusing the South China Sea Disputes: A Regional Blueprint | Monday, October 15, 2018 | 10 am – 12 pm | Center for Strategic and International Studies | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
Please join us for the launch of Defusing the South China Sea Disputes: A Regional Blueprint by the CSIS Expert Working Group on the South China Sea, which brings together prominent experts on maritime law, international relations, and the marine environment from China, Southeast Asia, and beyond. Members of the group gathered three times between July 2017 and July 2018 to discuss issues that they consider necessary for the successful management of the South China Sea disputes, and produced blueprints for a path forward on each. The members believe these three proposed agreements add up to a robust model for managing the South China Sea disputes, one which would be both legally and politically feasible for all parties.
The working group includes a diverse set of 27 experts from claimant states and interested countries, including the United States. It is chaired by Gregory Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS. All members take part in their personal capacities, not as representatives of their home institutions. They are invited to join the group based on their subject matter expertise and willingness to reach creative compromises.
Agenda
Summary of Blueprints
Gregory B. Poling, Director, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS
Panel Discussion with Members
Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia and Director, China Power Project, CSIS
Prashanth Parameswaran, Senior Editor, The Diplomat
Amy Searight, Senior Adviser and Director, Southeast Asia Program, CSIS
This report was made possible by general funding to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.
2. The Evolving Iranian Strategy in Syria: A Looming Conflict with Israel | Wednesday, October 17, 2018 | 9 am – 10:30 am | Atlantic Council | 1030 15th St. NW, 12th Floor Washington, DC 20005 | Register Here
Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the Iranian regime has spent considerable energy capitalizing on chaos in Syria to establish transit routes from Iran to the Mediterranean. Israel has followed the movements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its proxies in Syria warily, laying out clear red lines to deter Iranian overreach. The IRGC-Quds Force rocket attack on Israeli military posts in the Golan in May 2018 instigated Israeli retaliation against Iranian-backed ground forces. Although Iran did not respond in kind, tensions along Israel’s northwestern border and in southern Syria persist, and the potential for an Israeli-Iranian conflict looms.
Please join the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft and Rafik Hariri Centers on Wednesday, October 17 from 9:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. for the launch of nonresident senior fellow Nader Uskowi’s issue brief on Iran’s evolving strategy in Syria and the implications for regional security. This discussion will focus on the possibility for future conflict between Iran and Israel as the Syrian conflict enters its next phase, as well as how the United States can adapt its own policies to reflect the altered power structure in the region.
A conversation with:
Nader Uskowi
Nonresident Senior Fellow
Atlantic Council
Assaf Orion
Military Fellow
Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Jennifer Cafarella
Director of Intelligence Planning
Institute for the Study of War
3. Championing the Frontlines of Freedom: Erasing the “Grey Zone” | Thursday, October 18, 2018 | 9 am – 4:30 pm | Atlantic Council | 1030 15th St NW, 12th Floor, Washington, DC | Register Here
The countries of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine stand at a crossroads. Perched between Russia and the West, they have chosen a path of economic and political reform and closer relations with the West. They face substantial challenges dealing with the systemic legacy of the Soviet period as they pursue reform, while also confronting Kremlin interference in their affairs and occupation of their land. Once described as part of a geopolitical “grey zone,” these countries are working to instead be seen as states on the “frontlines of freedom” with futures as free, whole, and secure European states.
At this conference, the Atlantic Council will convene a group of experts to discuss topics such as the historical origins of the so-called “grey zone,” the Kremlin’s use of frozen conflicts, transatlantic policy toward the region, and democratic progress in these states.
This event will include a spotlight address from the Hon. A. Wess Mitchell, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, on US strategy in Central and Eastern Europe.
Agenda
Introduction
Mr. Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council
Keynote Remarks
The Hon. Roger Wicker, US Senator for Mississippi, US Senate
Address: The Historical Origins of the Frontlines of Freedom
Dr. Serhii Plokhii, Director, Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University
Address: “Grey Zone” Past and Future
The Hon. Kurt Volker, US Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations, US Department of State
Fireside Chat
Dr. Serhii Plokhii, Director, Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University
The Hon. Kurt Volker, US Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations, US Department of State
Moderated by: Mr. Mark Simakovsky, Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Panel I: Frozen Conflicts and the Kremlin’s Agenda
Mr. Denis Cenusa, Researcher, Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Justus-Liebig-Universität
Ambassador John Herbst, Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Minister Tinatin Khidasheli, Former Defense Minister, Republic of Georgia
Ms. Maria Snegovaya, Adjunct Fellow, Center for European Policy and Analysis; Research Associate, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland
Ambassador James Warlick, Partner and Senior Policy Adviser, Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners
Moderated by: Dr. Michael Carpenter, Senior Director, Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement; Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Spotlight Address: Strategy in Central and Eastern Europe
The Hon. A. Wess Mitchell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, US Department of State
Introduced by: Mr. Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council
Panel II: Transatlantic Policy Towards the Region
H.E. David Bakradze, Ambassador of Georgia to the United States
Mr. David Kramer, Senior Fellow, Vaclav Havel Program for Human Rights and Diplomacy, Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs, Florida International University
Mr. Alex Tiersky, Senior Policy Adviser, US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Mr. Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council
Moderated by: Ms. Melinda Haring, Editor, UkraineAlert, Atlantic Council
Panel III: Democratic Progress in the Frontlines of Freedom
Mr. Carl Gershman, President, National Endowment for Democracy
Dr. Laura Jewett, Senior Associate and Regional Director for Eurasia, National Democratic Institute
Mr. Stephen Nix, Regional Director, Eurasia, International Republican Institute
Moderated by: Ms. Eka Gigauri, Executive Director, Transparency International Georgia
4. Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing From Empires to the Global Era | Thursday, October 18, 2018 | 2 pm – 4 pm | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
Countering traditional notions of balance-of-power theory, smaller states have not joined together militarily to oppose the United States’ rising power at the end of the Cold War, Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, or Russian offensives along its Western border. Instead, balance-of-power politics has taken a different form.
In a new book, Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing from Empires to the Global Era, T.V. Paul argues that leading powers have engaged in “soft balancing,” which seeks to restrain threatening powers through the use of international institutions, informal alignments, and economic sanctions. Placing the evolution of balancing behavior in historical context, Paul examines how subtler forms of balance-of-power politics can help states achieve their goals against aggressive powers without wars or arms races. Paul will be joined in conversation by Richard Fontaine and Ellen Laipson. Carnegie’s Ashley J. Tellis will moderate. Copies of the book will be available for sale.
T.V. PAUL
T.V. Paul is James McGill Professor of International Relations in the department of Political Science at McGill University.
RICHARD FONTAINE
Richard Fontaine is the president of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).
ELLEN LAIPSON
Ellen Laipson is the director of the Master’s in International Security degree program and the Center for Security Policy Studies at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University.
ASHLEY J. TELLIS
Ashley J. Tellis holds the Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
5. Breaking Rules to Build Peace: The Role of Leadership and Accountability in Peacebuilding | Thursday, October 18, 2018 | 3 pm – 5 pm | US Institute of Peace | 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037 | Register Here
Why do peacebuilders sometimes succeed and sometimes fail, even within the same country? Why can organizations not guarantee the same results from the same policies? Peacebuilders struggle to answer these questions and create programs with consistently positive results. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace as we discuss policy recommendations drawn from new research highlighting unexpected solutions to a long-standing challenge.
Organizations that work to build peace in fragile states often fail to meet the stated goals of the programs they design to resolve violent conflict. In her newly published book, Global Governance and Local Peace: Accountability and Performance in International Peacebuilding, Susanna Campbell dives into why peacebuilding organizations often fail and presents one of the keys to success: local actors that force organizations to stay accountable to local peacebuilding goals. Join experts as they discuss Campbell’s findings and how country-based staff can sidestep normal accountability procedures and empower local actors to push for innovative solutions to local problems.
Speakers
Susanna Campbell
Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University
Michael Barnett
Professor, International Affairs and Political Science, The George Washington University
Mike Jobbins
Senior Director of Partnerships and Engagement, Search for Common Ground
Kate Somvongsiri
Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development
Leanne Erdberg, moderator
Director, Countering Violent Extremism, The U.S. Institute of Peace
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Partition has failed, prepare something else
Serbian President Vucic has announced that his efforts to get something in negotiations with Kosovo have failed. What could he mean, and what does the announcement portend? It is hard to tell, but my guess is that Vucic has come to realize that there will be no unilateral partition of Kosovo.
That is what Vucic wanted: the northern majority-Serb municipalities in exchange for some sort of recognition of rump Kosovo. Kosovo President Thaci has made it clear he would only agree to some version of that proposal if Kosovo gets equivalent territory in southern Serbian municipalities that have Albanian majorities as well as UN membership.
The Serbian security services have no doubt told Vucic that is unacceptable. The land/people swap just isn’t going to work out, as it fails to protect vital interests of both Belgrade and Pristina: the former is concerned about its main route to the sea through southern Serbia and the latter with its main water supply in the north. Moreover, Serbia can no longer–if it ever could–commit to UN membership for Kosovo, which is blocked by a Russian veto in the Security Council.
The failure of this proposition is a relief, as it will avoid raising questions about borders in Macedonia, Bosnia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Vucic and Thaci may regret it, but the rest of the world should rejoice that Putin has not been handed a prize he would use to try to shift borders to accommodate Russians in what he regards as his “near abroad.” We should also be glad that Serbia itself, Spain, China, and other countries with ethnically diverse regions will not find ethnic secessionists re-empowered.
So far so good, but what about Kosovo? What are its prospects if the land/people swap is dead?
Again I’m guessing, but I think there are still deals to be had. They will not involve UN membership, because Russia now has its own interests in blocking that unless it gets satisfaction on South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Crimea, and Donbas. But Pristina still wants and needs bilateral recognition, or at least de facto acknowledgement of it authority on all the territory of Kosovo, not least so that it can join multilateral organizations as well as settle issues still outstanding with Belgrade: unpaid pensions, state property, border demarcation, Serbian efforts to prevent Serbs from joining its police and security forces, protection of Serbs and Serb religious sites throughout Kosovo, and creation of a Kosovo army.
Belgrade has wanted to use the creation of an Association of Serb Municipalities, something that has already been agreed, to create in Kosovo a de facto self-governing Serb “entity,” analogous to Republika Srpska (RS) in Bosnia, with veto powers in Pristina. Vucic is likely now to double down on that idea, but it is clearly something Thaci cannot deliver. The Kosovo constitutional court has already ruled out anything analogous to the RS, which has rendered governance in Bosnia dysfunctional. The votes for a constitutional amendment to enable creation of a Serb entity in Kosovo simply don’t exist in the Kosovo Assembly.
Nor do the votes exist in the Serbian parliament for changing its constitution, which claims Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia. Those votes are unlikely to emerge before EU accession is imminent. At that point, Serbia can expect to get nothing in return, since all the leverage will be with the EU, which will not accept Serbia until normalization with Kosovo is a done deal.
So whatever emerges now is likely to be messy. That is not unusual. Colleagues in KIPRED have done us all a favor by reviewing some available options that have proved feasible elsewhere. I’d suggest Vucic and Thaci read that fine paper. They’ve both got good thinkers available. Put them in the same room to come up with something viable for both parties. And in the meanwhile focus political efforts on preparing their electorates for the inevitable compromises.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Good enough for me
Those who favor a still ill-defined but all too real “border correction/land swap” between Serbia and Kosovo are justifying it on grounds that it would be legal. I think they are right: I don’t know of anything that prohibits sovereign states from exchanging territory and people, even if it has not been done a lot lately. But let’s be clear about two things:
- The swap would exchange human beings as well as the land they live on. That’s fine for the Serbs in northern Kosovo and the Albanians in southern Serbia. But there are also Albanians who live in the parts of northern Kosovo Serbia wants, and Serbs who live in the parts of southern Serbia that Kosovo wants. Tens of thousands are going to end up moving.
- Mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity would have to come before the exchange. A state not recognized as sovereign would be crazy to attempt a swap with a non-recognizer.
The arguments against the land swap are not legal. They are practical and realist.
Defenders of the proposition on the Pristina side are saying it would also have to include UN membership. That is something Belgrade cannot guarantee. Only the permanent members of the Security Council could do so. I haven’t heard anything yet that suggests Russia or China is prepared to let Kosovo’s UN membership through the Security Council. Russia will seek a quid pro quo, most likely US recognition of the annexation of Crimea as well as the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Russian puppet states inside Georgia. China will hesitate because of what it perceives as Tibetan independence aspirations. The only thing worse than Kosovo independence for Beijing would be rearranging its territory on an ethnic basis.
There are also good reasons inside Serbia and Kosovo to doubt that this swap is viable. Kosovo’s main water supply is in the Serb-controlled north. Would it be prepared to see that transferred to Serbia? Serbia’s main outlet to the sea is the north/south road through southern Serbia to Thessaloniki. The Serbian army has always wanted to keep not only the road but as much territory surrounding it as possible. Are the generals suddenly willing to give in?
Any land/people swap would also raise questions about the Serb population in Kosovo south of the Ibar river, where the majority live close by the most important Serb religious sites. That population is already aging. A land swap would undermine any confidence the Kosovo Serbs south of the Ibar have in their future. It would also create temptations for radical nationalist Albanians, since they will see any land swap as prelude to union with Albania, which is what the political movement that got the second largest number of votes in the last Kosovo election wants. That movement has split, but a land swap will vastly increase the appeal of its more radical faction.
I hardly need rehearse again all the other arguments against the swap proposition: Russian President Putin would welcome it. The liberal democratic ideals of the EU and US would be weakened. Not to mention that it would put Bosnia and Herzegovina at serious risk: Republika Srpska President Dodik has made it clear he is prepared to declare independence if a land swap occurs. Serbia won’t recognize the RS as independent because that would destroy its EU ambition, but Dodik won’t care. He’ll be happy to rule a Russian-sponsored satrapy like South Ossetia and Abkhazia, so long as Moscow provides the needed rubles.
What is the alternative to a land swap? Kosovo and Serbia need to institute the political and economic reforms required for EU membership. That is far more urgent, and popular in both countries, than a land swap. The closer Serbia gets to EU membership, the greater the pressure it will feel to recognize Kosovo, without a land/people swap. That’s good enough for me.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Trials and tribulations
President Trump’s former campaign manager and his former personal attorney/fixer yesterday became convicted felons. Paul Manafort’s conviction on eight charges confirmed his financial crimes. He was not acquitted on any charges, but the jury failed to come to a conclusion on ten. Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to financial crimes as well as campaign finance violations associated with paying hush money, at Donald Trump’s direction, to women with whom Trump had had affairs. Nothing like this level of corrupt behavior has come so close to a president in at least 100 years, if not since the founding of the republic.
What significance does any of this have, in particular for foreign policy?
Manafort’s conviction brings enormous pressure on him to cooperate with the Special Counsel in the Russia investigation. Manafort, who seems to me to be a Russian agent, presumably knows a great deal about Trump’s dealings with the Russians. To avoid his spilling the beans, Trump may pardon him, but Manafort would remain vulnerable to state prosecution. That is presumably the reason the President has hesitated so far, though he signaled clearly in his reaction to the verdict (Manafort is a “good man” he said) that he might resort to a pardon. If Manafort talks, many of the details of Trump’s relationship with Moscow are likely to become public, with dramatic impacts: Trump may be soft on Russia, but the Congress has been tough and insisted on increasingly draconian sanctions.
Cohen’s conviction makes it virtually certain that he will cooperate with the Special Counsel to get a lightened sentence. He presumably knows the gory details of Russian investments in Trump real estate, which are manifold and the likely cause of much of Trump’s affection for Putin, in addition to Putin’s help in getting him elected. Trump is terrified Putin will block Russian investments in Trump properties. The day of reckoning on that score is near.
So these convictions, while not directly connected to the Russia investigation, do have implications for its future. I doubt Special Counsel Mueller will act decisively before the end of the month, when a pre-electoral moratorium on major judicial moves begins. The question, which won’t be answered until November 6, is whether Americans will be able to read the handwriting on the wall. Trump’s solid 35% or so is likely to stick with him, but 65% is a lot of potential voters. The big question is whether they will go to vote in sufficient numbers to begin to correct the mistake of 2016.
Many tribulations lie ahead. If the Republicans lose control of the House of Representatives, it will have grounds for impeachment (indictment). The Republicans are likely however to continue their control of the Senate, where conviction is unlikely so long as they remain solid in their support of Trump. The process of impeachment and trial will take months, distracting the Administration from other important issues, including foreign policy.
If the Democrats do not gain control of the House or Senate, impeachment is not possible and they will continue in opposition while the Special Counsel pursues his investigation and decides whether to charge the President. That is unlikely as it contradicts Justice Department policy. Mueller will however file a report that could state boldly what laws the President has violated.
That will happen only if Trump doesn’t fire him or neuter the investigation by taking away its staff’s security clearances. Both are possible, but the political risks involved are significant. It would amount to a presidential guilty plea and would not stop state-level prosecutions that could detail presidential malfeasance and lead to prosecution after Trump leaves office.
So no, we are nowhere near the end of the Trump scandals and their consequences. We face at least two more years of painful revelations and judicial maneuvers, while the Russians, Iranians, Chinese, and others test our mettle in cyberspace, on the high seas, and on land in Syria, Ukraine, Turkey, and elsewhere. Our traditional allies in both Europe and Asia are all hedging their bets, because of Trump’s erratic behavior, his attack on NATO, and his cozying up to Kim Jong-un. And the lengthy Obama recovery is showing signs of aging, in part due to Trump’s tariffs, an inflationary budget, and a giant tax cut for the wealthy.
Neither the trials nor the tribulations are over.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
You don’t need to know a lot of history
I tweeted to Kosovo President Thaci on Friday:
.
@HashimThaciRKS: do you really want to open for renegotiation the deal with the US and most of the EU that got your state recognition? This could end very badly.
He responded:
Dear
@DanielSerwer, I’m committed deeply to obtain#Kosovo‘s membership in@NATO and EU. Based on values we share. Based on need to ensure safety of our children. We need to close a chapter that brings about reciprocal recognition & good neighborly relations between RKS & SRB.I’m against partition. I’m against swaps. I’m against status quo. I’m against making a Republica Srpska in
#Kosovo. But I’m in favor to peaceful demarcation and settling the 400km long border between Kosovo and Serbia. Balanced agreement is in all our interests, incl US & EU.
I prefer to respond here rather than on Twitter, which doesn’t work well for complex issues. This one is complex.
I share the President’s goals: NATO and EU membership, recognition, and good neighborly relations between Kosovo and Serbia. I am also against partition and land swaps, and a Republika Srpska (RS) in Kosovo (that is part of Kosovo that de facto escapes Pristina’s sovereignty, like the RS in Bosnia). Peaceful demarcation of the border is vital. You can look long and hard for two countries with good relations that have not agreed on and demarcated their border.
So what’s the problem? Just this: President Thaci has responded to Serbian President Vucic’s constant harping on partition of Kosovo with the suggestion that Kosovo would like to absorb at least some of the Albanian-populated communities in southern Serbia. Never mind that Serbia’s main route to the sea is adjacent to those Albanian communities and that Kosovo’s main water supply is the Serb-controlled north. The tit-for-tat presidential speculation on partition opens what diplomats call Pandora’s box: border changes throughout the Balkans that would necessarily involve significant populations and land areas.
Calling it “border correction” and associating it with demarcation does nothing to lessen the broad and dramatic impact an attempt to redraw borders along ethnic lines would entail. Consider this from Father Sava on his Facebook page today:
Acceptance of ethnic partition between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo by territorial division, forcing 70.000 Serbs south of the partition line to an imminent exodus and leaving their holy sites in peril would mean that EU accepts the idea of an AGREED ETHNIC CLEANSING as a legitimate solution.
This would be a dangerous precedent with unforeseeable consequences which would inevitably encourage replication of such a model throughout the continent. EU member states are before a critical historical responsibility if this scenario is politically supported. This will bring us back to the tragic years of the ex-Yu wars in the 90ies.
Meanwhile, Republika Srpska President Dodik is declaring:
I think that BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina] will not survive and that it will peacefully dissolve.
He knows that there is no possibility of a peaceful dissolution and has been arming his police with weapons from Russia to ensure that RS is ready to defend its secession when the time comes. That would of course lead to the expulsion of the (relatively few) Croats and Bosniaks who have returned to RS and might imperil the Serbs in the Bosnian Federation as well. The net result would likely be a non-viable Islamic Republic in central Bosnia that could readily become an extremist safe haven.
In Macedonia, there is a real risk that more extreme ethnic nationalists of both the Albanian and Macedonian varieties will benefit from the atmosphere that these partition fantasies are creating. That could lead to defeat of the September 30 referendum on the agreement that would end the more than 25-year dispute with Greece over the country’s name. NATO and EU membership would then become impossible and agitation in favor of an infeasible partition would become inevitable.
The implications for the secessionist regions of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine are all too obvious. President Putin couldn’t hope for more.
Why is this happening? In part because the US has an ethnic nationalist administration whose erstwhile chief strategist, Steve Bannon, is running around pushing ethnic partition while former Trump campaign officials sign up lobbying clients like Dodik and Vucic. The lobbyists don’t care how much trouble their schemes may cause, but those who are actually governing in Washington, European capitals, and Brussels should. You don’t need to know a lot of history to know how easily conflicting ethnic territorial claims in the Balkans can lead to instability, and instability to much worse.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Three* months hence
The main conclusion to be drawn so far from the current trial of Trump campaign chair Paul Manafort is just this: the President of the United States has extraordinarily poor judgment about the people he surrounds himself with. Manafort defrauded banks, failed to report income and foreign accounts to the IRS, and accepted a lot of money from a Putin-linked oligarch.
Manafort’s sidekick Rick Gates, who worked for Trump throughout the campaign and until the Inauguration, has confessed to helping the illegal shenanigans as well as embezzling money from Manafort by means of fraudulent expense claims. Both men have the unenviable distinction of having worked for Viktor Yanukovych, the pro-Russian former president of Ukraine, whose corrupt behavior is legendary.
I admit that anyone can be victim of fraud. I suffered such an instance once in my career, when an employee took a kickback in connection with renting an office. He was caught, charged, and plea-bargained. But Trump’s record is incredible: he has lost at least half a dozen more or less cabinet-level officials to scandals, not counting firings of people he regarded as disloyal, like Sally Yates and James Comey. The list of offenses by Trump Administration officials would be far too long to enumerate, but it includes blatant abuse of government funds and employees, in addition to wife and alcohol abuse.
This is not bad luck. It is the result low moral standards at the top, combined with failure to properly vet appointees. More than one has been dropped before even assuming the posts for which they were already named. This does not happen to everyone. It happens to bosses who themselves display abusive behavior and tolerate it in those close to them. In my view, the President himself is fleecing taxpayers by frequenting his own golf clubs with a large entourage and encouraging use of his hotels by foreign governments. I have little doubt but that we will eventually learn of illicit expenditures and abuse of employees for private purposes, as Trump makes no distinction between his personal and official activities.
Nor does he show any compunction about marital infidelity, which no longer seems to offend anyone. Do we really think he has stopped courting porn stars?
All the misbehavior by and surrounding the president opens him and his minions not just to accusations of abuse but also to blackmail. The Russians have demonstrated how capable they are of gathering data from US institutions. They and the Chinese no doubt know all about malfeasance in the Trump Administration and will be using it already to intimidate officials into doing their bidding. Trump’s poor judgment thus creates multiple national security vulnerabilities. American intelligence collection capabilities will guarantee that the Chinese and Russians are not the only ones who are in the know. Our own intel will show up traces of whatever the foreigners discover.
That I suppose is the silver lining. Trump can’t hope to hide malfeasance forever. He has now admitted that his son’s meeting with Russian operatives was intended to gather dirt on Hillary Clinton, after many months of denials and false claims that it was to discuss Moscow’s bar on adoption by Americans to retaliate for sanctions levied on Russia. He says what his son did was not illegal. I’ll be delighted to let a court decide that.
Admittedly the bar has been raised, so that just a little abuse–say a flirtation with a White House intern–would not attract much attention, as we’ve all been inured to far worse. But every once in a while America still proves capable of recoiling. Trump’s failure to stand up to Putin in Helsinki unquestionably hurt him outside his still substantial base. But when and how will the country finally react to a grossly incompetent and corrupt administration? I don’t know, but I hope it happens before November 6, just three* months hence.
*I managed somehow to publish this initially as “Two months hence.” My readers know better. Apologies.
RSS - Posts
