Tag: United Arab Emirates
Stevenson’s army, August 20
The centenary of the 19th amendment is a good moment to reflect on the struggle for women’s suffrage. GZero has a great graphic. I liked to brag that my home state of Colorado gave women the right to vote in 1893, long before the 19th amendment and second only to Wyoming. But a few years ago I did some research and learned that the main reason the law was changed was to dilute the voting power of single miners. Right thing for the wrong reason.
The Air Force is even going to redesign its aircraft to allow more female pilots.
NYT doubts that a President Biden would be able to build bipartisan coalitions in Congress. I certainly favor bipartisanship in foreign policy and the “regular order” [like the NDAA] for major legislation. But maybe the hyperpartisanship is too strong. We can talk about this in class.
NYT says an intelligence community assessment in June disagreed with an earlier DHS intelligence report and concluded that low level officials in Wuhan withheld key coronavirus information from Beijing.
Politico says SecState Pompeo illegally sought military housing, though the army eventually provided lodging at Fort Myer.
NYT has more on F35 sale to UAE, including Netanyahu’s non-denial denial of the sales’ connection to the recognition deal.
I agree with Alice Hunt Friend’s article questioning the need for the SecDef to have military experience.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, August 18
– Bipartisan report from Senate Intelligence Committee details [966 pages!] Russian interference in 2016 elections. Here’s the document.
– Daily Beast says Trump secretly promised to sell F35s to UAE as part of agreement with Israel. Congress voted to block such sales in May, but Trump vetoed.
-WOTR details lots of foreign fighters in Sub-Saharan Africa.
– DHS official after 2 years under Trump details politicization of DHS.
-Is this an election year? Trump rejects proposed cuts in DOD health care.
– Future of JCPOA: Politico has explainer. FP says Europeans can keep agreement alive unti November.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Two issues portend
Yesterday, I welcomed the UAE/Israel normalization of relations. I have no regrets about that.
But, as in all announcements of agreements still to be formally drafted and signed, there are question marks:
- Where will the UAE Embassy be located?
- Will Israel’s territory be defined, either explicitly or implicitly, in the formal agreements?
Israel says Jerusalem is its capital, and the Trump Administration moved the US Embassy there from Tel Aviv. If the UAE follows suit, that would be bigger news than the normalization of relations. I doubt Abu Dhabi will do that, but Israel will likely insist. How will that circle be squared?
The official statement says Israel is suspending its annexation plans, not ending them. This implies that it can in the future again threaten annexation and even do it, or back off again in exchange for another Arab country normalizing relations.
I would expect the UAE to try to avoid that by incorporating somewhere in the many agreements to be signed implicit or explicit reference to Israel’s 1967 borders, which have been the widely accepted basis for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. That way the UAE could claim that it has not departed in principle from support for the Palestinians and the Arab Peace Initiative, which foresaw normalizing relations with Israel once the territorial issue with Palestine was resolved.
These are two of the final status issues that have to be solved before the Israel/Palestine conflict can be considered settled: the status of Jerusalem and the extent of Israel’s sovereign territory. They are among the issues that have stymied peace efforts in the past. It will be difficult to avoid them entirely in establishing normal relations between the UAE and Israel. How they are resolved could have a big impact on prospects for peace in the future.
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Friday stock taking
It’s Friday, so let’s take a look at how effectively the Trump Administration has dealt with world and domestic events this week while it obsesses over impeachment:
- The North Koreans continue to launch increasingly capable ballistic missiles.
- While suffering from reimposed sanctions, Iran is defying the US and increasing uranium enrichment beyond the limits specified the nuclear deal the US withdrew from.
- The Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia’s oil production facilities has elicited no visible response from the US or Saudi Arabia, which is joining the United Arab Emirates in playing footsie with Iran.
- While failing to remove from Syria all the troops Trump said would be withdrawn, the US has allowed Turkey to take over a buffer zone along its border with Syria, leading to large-scale displacement of people there. Russia has also gained a foothold in northeastern Syria, as has the Assad regime.
- The trade war with China drags on, with the US trade deficit ballooning and Asian partners and allies doubting US commitments in the region.
- Venezuelan autocrat Maduro has survived despite American pressure, as has the Communist regime in Cuba and Evo Morales’ rule in Bolivia.
- In Europe, French President Macron is describing NATO as “brain dead” because of Trump’s lack of commitment to it and Trump’s pal UK Prime Minister Johnson is being forced into an election to try to confirm his Brexit plan, which Trump has supported.
- In the Balkans, the Administration has confused everyone with the appointment of two special envoys whose relationship to each other and to US policy is opaque.
- That’s all without even mentioning Ukraine, where State Department officials have confirmed that President Trump tried to extort an investigation of his political rivals from newly elected President Zelensky in exchange for Congressionally approved military aid.
The home front is even worse:
- A New York State Court has forced Trump into a $2 million settlement in which he has admitted improper and fraudulent use of his family foundation.
- Republicans lost the governorship in Kentucky and control of both houses of the Virginia assembly in off-year elections earlier this week. Congressional Republicans are nervous.
- President Trump’s personal lawyer affirmed that everything he did in Ukraine was to serve his client’s personal interests, a statement that confirms public assets were used for private purposes.
- The Attorney General, a stalwart defender of his boss, has declined to make a public statement supporting Trump’s claim that he did nothing wrong in his infamous phone call with President Zelensky.
- The House Democrats are piling up subpoenas that the White House is ignoring, heightening the likelihood that obstruction of Congressional oversight will be added to the impeachment charges and limiting the news to the sharp critiques of non-White House officials.
- The economy is slowing, especially in some “swing” districts vital to Trump’s hopes for a win in the electoral college in 2020, when he is sure to lose the popular vote once again, likely by a wider margin than in 2016.
I suppose it could get worse, and likely will. But it has been a long time since we’ve seen an American Administration in worse shape than this.
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More diplomacy, less force
A friend asked today what I thought of the current situation in Syria. I responded:
Predictable and predicted. The Syria commitment was not sustainable. The US needs to reduce its commitments to the Middle East to a level that serves vital interests and is sustainable. It should do that carefully, using diplomacy to ensure no vacuums are left. That can’t happen with this President.
I guess that puts me at least partly in Elizabeth Warren’s camp and opposed to Josh Rogin, who is a fine journalist but far more of an enthusiast for US engagement in the Middle East than I am.
Let me recount the reasons:
- The US is far less dependent on oil, including oil from the Middle East, than once it was.
- The spread of US unconventional production technology has made it difficult for oil prices to top $60/barrel for long. That is a price the US and world economy can and does tolerate easily.
- Other countries should, as Presidents Trump and Obama have suggested, bear more of the burden of protecting Middle East oil supplies, in particular the Chinese, Japanese, and South Koreans since they take most of the oil coming through the strait of Hormuz.
- Middle East producers should be doing more to build pipelines that circumvent Hormuz, and consumers (especially India and China) should be building strategic oil stocks for use in a supply disruption.
- American allies in the Middle East should, after many billions in US arms sales, mainly protect themselves. Israel does already. The Saudis and Emiratis as well as the Qataris should too. Needless to say, the Turks will have to after this latest brush with the US.
- Many American bases in the Middle East are too close to Iran to serve well in wartime. They will need to be evacuated if the balloon ever goes up. Better to get them out sooner rather than later.
- If you are still worried about Middle East terrorism, there is no reason to believe that the drone wars have done anything to reduce it. To the contrary, US presence in the region makes us a prime target.
- The right answer to terrorism is better governance, not drones. Find the people who are serious about improved governance and support them, not the thieves and oppressors who rule in much of the Middle East.
- If you want to counter Russian influence in the Middle East, clearly an unsustainable military presence is not the solution. Syria is going to be a big burden on Moscow. Let them deal with it.
- If you are worried about Iran, get back into the nuclear deal (aka JCPOA) as quickly as possible and try to negotiate an extension. The only serious complaint I am hearing from anyone about the JCPOA is that it expires.
The American drawdown from the Middle East should not be precipitous. It should be cautious and leave no power vacuums. That is what diplomacy is for: we need to be working on regional security arrangements that can guarantee that no one’s interests will be ignored and reasonable compromises will prevail. That effort will require serious attention to threat perceptions, regional trade and infrastructure, people-to-people relations, and traditional conflict management mechanisms in the region. Yes, more diplomacy, less force, and a lot of hard work and commonsense.
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How Libya might recover
Libya’s internationally recognized Prime Minister and Chair of the Presidential Council, Fayez al Sarraj, spoke today at SAIS, where I introduced him and my Foreign Policy Institute colleague Hafed al Ghwell moderated the Q and A. Sarraj leads the Government of National Accord (GNA) headquartered in Tripoli. This is my effort to summarize not what he said but my conclusions from it. I’ll post the video as soon as we have it.
Libya’s situation is dire. Former Qaddafi General Khalifa Haftar, having taken control of Benghazi and much of the east and south, launched an attack on Tripoli almost six months ago. His forces have bogged down fighting against an array of four or five militias defending the capital. In the meanwhile, Sarraj is trying to restore some sort of unified, democratic governance. He puts his hopes in political dialogue conducted in a National Conference. But political dialogue in Libya has failed more than once to resolve its conflicts, which are made worse by the substantial oil and gas resources at stake there. Oil production is up to 1.2 million barrels per day (from 150,000 when Sarraj took over three years ago).
Sarraj still insists on dialogue, approval of the draft constitution (or some variant of it), elections to decide who will govern, and a National Reconciliation Commission to manage transitional justice and accountability. Backed by Russian mercenaries, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, Haftar wants to take the country by force. He has repeatedly betrayed political agreements in favor of military efforts. Abu Dhabi and Cairo support Haftar with weapons and money (supposedly because they don’t like the Islamists who support Sarraj). Sarraj explicitly advocates a “secular” government and says his government continues contacts with the Emirates and Egypt.
Sarraj also says his government has a good relationship with the US, especially on fighting terrorism. The Americans conduct drone strikes in Libya and militias that support Sarraj fought the Islamic State in Sirte. But President Trump some months ago did take a phone call from Haftar and appeared to be leaning in his direction, until it became clear that the general was not going to succeed quickly. Sarraj hopes that good relations with the Americans at lower levels will prevail and suggests that the US could be more helpful in clearing away obstacles to the GNA’s success.
It was not clear how that success might be brought about, but there were hints. While now unwilling to continue to negotiate with Haftar, Sarraj sees some hope in talking with the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HOR), which once upon a time authorized Haftar’s forces. Some of its members already meet in Tripoli and more might be convinced to do so. Separating the HOR from Haftar would undermine his political legitimacy, if not his military capability.
But the key to success is likely also to require realigning the international forces at work in Libya. Haftar’s supporters need to realize that he will not succeed militarily. If they then decide to back the UN-recognized GNA, the odds for its success would increase sharply.
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