Tag: United Kingdom

The nightmare is over, now the hard work begins

I spent an hour this morning on Zoom with Italian colleagues at the Institute of International Affairs (IAI) talking about the American election and its consequences for foreign policy. Here are the points I prepared for them,
most of them all too obvious I’m afraid:

  1. While Biden is better informed and experienced on foreign policy than any president in decades, his most immediate priorities will be domestic: first and foremost stopping Covid-19 infections and moving as quickly as possible to revive the American economy, which is still in bad shape, and fix our social cleavages, which are severe.
  2. That said, he is putting in place a formidable foreign policy team: Tony Blinken, Jake Sullivan, Avril Haines and Linda Thomas-Greenfield are among our finest. Janet Yellen at Treasury will make an excellent counterpart on the economic side.
  3. Jake and Tony are both strongly committed to a revived domestic economy and solutions to America’s social challenges as prerequisites for a strong international role. You can expect them to be less transactional but just as aggressive as Trump on trade and investment issues, where America will need to satisfy more of the demands of its domestic producers.
  4. Missing so far from the Biden team is the Secretary of Defense. I’d still bet on Michele Fluornoy, but I admit I have little idea why she hasn’t been named yet. Defense industry ties may be the reason.
  5. Whoever gets Defense, Biden will seek to reinvigorate trans-Atlantic ties. He has a basically positive attitude towards NATO and America’s allies, whom he views as force multipliers whose basic values are aligned with ours.
  6. He is not opposed, as Trump was, to the European Union. I doubt he will prioritize a free trade agreement with the UK and might even try to revive the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with Europe, or something like it.
  7. Willingness of the US to return to the JCPOA will help his effort to renew the Alliance, but it will require reciprocal Iranian willingness to return to the status quo ante. I’m not convinced Tehran will be willing before the June presidential election, and maybe not even after.
  8. Biden will want to cooperate quickly with Europe in responding to Russia’s regional challenges in the Baltics, the Balkans, and especially Ukraine, though he will be hampered on Ukraine by the allegations against his son Hunter.
  9. The US will return, likely on Day 1, to the Paris Climate Change Agreement, which I trust will be a welcome move in Europe.
  10. The big looming problem for both the US and Europe is how to meet China’s global economic and political challenge. Biden will want to pursue both cooperation and competition with China.
  11. He is not interested in a new cold war, but he will be far more committed globally to democratic values and human rights than Trump has been. He will not be sword dancing in Riyadh, encouraging President Xi to imprison Uighurs, or staying silent about repression in Hong Kong.
  12. Renewed American support for human rights and democracy will unsettle relations not only with China but also with the Gulf, Israel, Brazil, and possibly with Hungary and Poland.
  13. Biden will not be able to restore everything to where things stood four years ago. He’ll need to prioritize.
  14. But I think all those who want to see American global leadership based on a rational assessment of both values and interests will feel a lot better about things on January 21 than they did on November 2. The nightmare is over, but the hard work is just beginning.

In addition to foreign policy, the Italians pressed me on the future of the Republican Party and reports that black men and Hispanics shifted towards Trump. I responded more or less this way:

  • The numbers are still iffy, but at least some of the shift among Hispanics was due to mostly white Venezuelans and Cubans who fled socialist countries and were frightened when Trump told them Biden was a socialist. Some Latinos in Texas appear to have shifted as well, possibly due to the employment impact of border wall construction.
  • The Republican Party now has a choice to make between continuing as a right-wing extremist and racist party or reverting to right-of-center social and economic conservatism. Trump will try to keep the party on the former track and can boast of an enormous turnout of voters, and relative victories in the House races, to help him. So far, only Senator Romney seems courageous enough to point in the direction of more conventional conservatism. We’ll have to wait and see which direction Republicans choose.

On the domestic side, I also emphasized the importance of the January 5 Senate run-off elections in Georgia, which will determine how far Biden can go on the legislative front.

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High hopes for Biden in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Ismet Fatih Čančar gave this interview, originally published in Politicki.ba:

Q: Why are US presidential elections important for Bosnia and Herzegovina?
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the defeat of the Soviet Union, the global order was marked by American hegemony, which gained its greatest momentum during the 1990s. A good part of those nineties was marked by the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina, first through aggression against our country, and then in the post-Dayton period. The United States has historically been involved in these processes. First, they stopped the war through the Dayton Peace Agreement. In the post-Dayton period, a new process of “state-building” began, which has not yet been completed.

The upcoming US presidential election is an opportunity to continue this process for several reasons. First due to the fact that the Democratic presidential candidate Joseph Biden is one of the last active politicians in the United States who has a personal connection and experience with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Secondly, as early as in 1993, Biden has correctly identified, in his speech on “Face the Nation,” war criminals in Bosnia, clearly warned about genocide, and then, as he is today, was a strong advocate of a more proactive American role in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Biden’s vision of Bosnia and Herzegovina was too ambitious and too radical for the Clinton administration. For our country, that vision is far-sighted and far-reaching. It is still the same vision that Biden wholeheartedly defended behind the speaker podium of the Senate. Back then he explained it as a national interest and a moral obligation of the United States in the post-Dayton framework. Biden reaffirmed that vision in his recently published program. The founding idea of this program is to building a civil state based on the experiences of a multicultural and multiethnic democratic society.

And that is why the presidential elections in the United States are an opportunity for a turning point in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where we have been witnessing a general deterioration of conditions, both political, economic and social, for some period now.

Q: Biden has announced his vision which he intends to pursue when it comes to Bosnia and Herzegovina. What is good and what is bad in that document?

Biden’s vision that has been published is substantially positive. In any case, it is good that such document has come to life. This is perhaps the first concrete signal in the last decade of bureaucratic autopilot by both the US and the EU that the very top of the US leadership is putting the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the agenda, as well as the Balkans which have seen increased instability, growing appetite for redrawing borders, an increasing number of right-wing populist movements.

This document, of course, has its own political context. It is an expression of Biden’s own election campaign; promoting democracy as the most effective social order, but also restoring the credibility of American leadership in the world as a reliable partner that can constructively and successfully solve extremely complicated problems. The character of the Bosnian state – a sui generis state – is such that cosmetic changes cannot help this country, but which rather requires serious structural reforms, which first imply the reform of the Dayton Constitution, and then a strong step forward towards NATO and EU membership. Biden’s vision recognizes a more efficient approach and its engagement means including Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Atlantic Pact, protecting Bosnia from foreign malignant influences such as Russia and China, and preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The document itself would have had a much stronger appeal if it happened in some normal circumstances, when no political career is being auctioned and in the midst of the presidential campaign. Hence, there is some doubt as to how high Bosnia and Herzegovina will be on the list of American politics even after the presidential election.

However, there is one dimension that is rarely talked about. Biden’s document testifies that in the American heterogeneous society, the Bosnian community has become visible, for whose interest are fighting both sides of the political spectrum, the Democrats and the Republicans. I appreciate that this is a positive phenomenon. These are our great national resources and opportunities that exist in interstate relations, which we do not know how to use. Or at least not yet.

Q: What if Trump wins?

No need to dramatize. We already have four years of experience of Trump’s mandate behind us. Nothing radical has happened in the region, although attempts have been made from all directions to push through a new, much more dangerous and insidious plan to redraw the borders and exchange territories between Kosovo and Serbia; a plan which would have very bad consequences for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Under Trump’s mandate, US leadership in the world has weakened significantly. The image of democracy has been destroyed through the constant undermining of the basic principles of multilateralism, disregard for human rights, and the encouragement of autocrats and nationalist movements. In addition, the importance of the alliance and the historical partnership between the US and the EU has been weakened. The so-called “soft power” has been undermined and an unprecedented level of polarization is caused in all fields.

Regardless of the outcome, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to continue its work to improve the security framework for all its citizens and peoples, through the joint work of all relevant institutions and international partners. It is certain that Bosnia and Herzegovina will have the support of the US administration in this process.

Q: All polling shows that Biden is the winner and the next resident of the White House. What preparatory work should Bosnia and Herzegovina do?

First of all, we should wait for the election results. All polling showed Hilary Clinton’s victory in 2016 and we received a surprise instead.

However, it is true that our country has a unique opportunity to capitalize on this moment that could come from the Biden administration. Pro-Bosnian patriotic forces should take the initiative, in terms of creating a program and a roadmap for the radical changes identified in Biden’s document.

One should not be deceived that Bosnia and Herzegovina will so easily and so quickly position itself within the priorities of American foreign policy. From our side, it is necessary to purposefully engage all our resources that are available in American academic and business circles. This also requires a sophisticated diplomatic way of involving our traditional friends and partners in the project. A mitigating circumstance for achieving these goals is that Biden was personally and heavily involved in the Bosnian case and that his political influence and image in the world were partly built on it.

All this together requires the creation of a diplomatic orchestra that could meet these demanding tasks.

It is important to note that the foundations already exist. Through the actions of the US Embassy so far (previous and current Ambassadors) we could sense the possible development of the political concept of reforms. A civil democratic state, modeled on the example of dozens of modern European states, is the only possible solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Western Balkans. Bosnia and Herzegovina must uncompromisingly insist on such principles.

Q: Trump has two special envoys for the Balkans. Does Biden need (at least) one? Is the Embassy enough?

The fact is that the outcome and effectiveness of a program or initiative does not largely depend on how many actors are involved. Especially in this case, efficiency is based on commitment, determination, and strength of material, political and diplomatic support put into the project.

During his visits, Special Envoy Matthew Palmer has on several occasions expressed a clear position on the indivisibility of Bosnia and Herzegovina, US support for our country’s Euro-Atlantic path, and the continuation and development of the partnership between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the United States. The goal is to raise this relationship to a higher level.

I still think that the two envoys for the small Balkans are a little too much. If we go back to the history of the 1990s and compare it with the mission of Holbrooke and the Clinton administration, who managed to create the Dayton Peace Agreement in a relatively short time, but in much more difficult war conditions, we can conclude that quantity is not crucial in these processes.

In addition, the question of both the Peace Implementation Council and its role in all of this arises. We are witnesses that the mandate of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been derogated for a long time and that it is at a very low level. Perhaps it would be more economical, politically profitable for the US administration to focus on the function of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina instead of creating new initiatives. I am deeply convinced that resolving the Bosnian issue opens the way for the complete integration of the Balkans into the Western currents of the advanced democratic world.

Q: Given that Biden will work closely with the EU, how much will that prevent him from implementing this plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina?

It is clear that Biden has identified the EU as a necessary partner in this process, with a desire for the Western bloc to act in a coordinated manner. At the same time, I think that will be the biggest challenge for Biden. How to successfully bring partners together in a Europe that, although there has been increased rhetoric about European independence, suffers from even larger internal lines of division. There is also the United Kingdom, which, as the most loyal partner in the transatlantic alliance, is looking for its place in the post-Brexit space and I believe that they can play a very important role in key processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina together with the United States.

Under the Obama administration, transatlantic ties have been successful or very successful through a number of joint programs in Europe. With the arrival of Biden, the caliber of people who would return to leading foreign policy positions would be consistent with that alliance. The US and the EU need each other, and the current experience of the Trump administration is an exception. To Democrats, this is proof of the value of the alliance. Hence, we can expect that Biden will work on renewing that alliance, but also on restoring American leadership on the European continent. This means reaffirming NATO’s role as the most effective security umbrella in the world, a closer relationship with Brussels for a coordinated approach, a tougher stance towards Russia and further investment in democratic processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU-led “structural dialogue” in Bosnia has shown all the shortcomings in its actions. American leadership is therefore a necessary corrective factor.

In addition, it is important to point out that the main motivator of US cooperation with the EU is not Cold War nostalgia, but rather the understanding in Washington that – America alone – is a weak America, and that in a more competitive world we face, Europeans are still the most important American allies.

All this is a complex process. I appreciate that in the efforts to implement fundamental reforms and build lasting peace and prosperity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, partnership and close cooperation between the United States and the EU is desirable for the realization of this project.

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The emerging tetrapolar mad world

Pantelis Ikonomou, former nuclear IAEA inspector, writes:

Nuclear weapons are a vital but latent dimension of the growing geopolitical competition. Nuclear capabilities continue to constitute a prime source of power in shaping global power relations amid dangerous non-nuclear conflicts and military confrontations. New power balances are forming.

The main emerging poles are two well-established ones, the United States and Russia, and two emerging ones, China and Europe (led by France as the EU’s last remaining nuclear power post-Brexit). The US and Russia have failed in efforts to engage China in new nuclear and ballistic missile agreements. France is trying to exercise leadership in Europe and the Mediterranean. French President Emmanuel Macron has offered to open a “strategic dialogue” with willing European states prepared to accept the central role of France.  He pointed out that “Europe should reinforce its strategic autonomy in the face of growing global threats and stop relying solely on the United States and the Transtlantic Alliance for its defense

Any excited system will sooner or later reach a state of equilibrium. A tetrapolar structure is emerging around the leading nuclear weapon states: the US, Russia, China and France. These four nuclear powers are flanked by others based on criteria of pragmatism and strategic necessity. The whole process is guided more by bilateral agreements than existing treaties and international institutions. The new tetrapolar world order appears as follows:

  1. Around the US superpower stand nuclear UK as well as Israel, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada, and several European NATO states.  The connecting force within this pole is American geopolitical primacy and its ambition to strategically control East and South Asia.
  2. Around Russia will stand India, several former Soviet states, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, and sometimes Turkey and Egypt. This pole’s source of cohesion is nuclear deterrence against the Chinese threat, as well as geopolitical influence in the Middle East region.
  3. Around China are Pakistan, North Korea and the majority of the developing countries in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In this nuclear pole the predominant parameter is China’s nuclear deterrence of its US, Russian, and Indian adversaries as well as Chinese economic, military and political assistance.
  4. France would be flanked by several southern European, Middle East and African states (and occasionally by Israel).  The prevailing link in this alliance, besides historical and cultural references, is strategic influence on the wider region and security against a rising adversary, Islamic extremism.

Once a stable equilibrium is achieved, this new tetrapolar nuclear world order might allow the leading nuclear powers to realize the vast global threat they pose to humankind through their bilateral standoffs. Nuclear disarmament as requested by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, Art. VI) and emphatically repeated by the international community in the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty of July 2017 should be a top priority. De-escalation of the current nuclear race and terminating weapons “modernization” ought to be the initial objectives of the world powers aiming eventually to complete and irreversible global nuclear disarmament.

The current nuclear threat to humanity arises from the suicidal so-called MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) nuclear strategy, It ought to be abolished. The threat of a nuclear apocalypse, whether by intent, accident, or miscalculation, will be at its highest level ever so long as MAD prevails in this tetrapolar world.

* This article draws on the author’s bookGlobal Nuclear Developments – Insights of a former IAEA nuclear inspector,” Springer, May 2020.

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Stevenson’s army, July 25

– Intelligence warning yesterday — Russia, China, & Iran are trying to interfere in US elections this year.

Here’s the brief text.

– There’s the British parliamentary committee’s report on Russian interference in the UK
– In order to sell drones, US is evading the Missile Technology Control Regime. Here’s background on MTCR.
– Here are two assessments of Pompeo’s China speech — Fred Kaplan and James Palmer.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Nuclear reminders

Former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Pantelis Ikonomou writes occasionally for peacefare.net. We have never met in person, or even spoken on the phone, but his unequivocal commitment to containing and reducing nuclear risks, combined with his technical expertise, has been more than enough reason for me to open the blog to his always welcome contributions.

He has now written and published with Springer a wonderful comprehensive volume modestly titled Global Nuclear Developments: Insights from a Former IAEA Inspector. It is a first-rate primer on:

  1. the technology required to make a nuclear weapon,
  2. how the current international regime to control nuclear weapons evolved and how it functions,
  3. how major nonproliferation crises have been handled in North Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya, Romania, and the former Soviet Union,
  4. possible future proliferators, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Japan, and South Korea,
  5. nuclear incidents/accidents, and
  6. the nuclear weapons states, both within the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty–US, Russia, China, UK, and France–and outside it–India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa.

Throughout, Pantelis demonstrates his excellent and dispassionate command of the details while also offering practical and well-founded guidance for the future. North Korea, he thinks, will not be giving up nuclear weapons but its program might be frozen, given the right incentives. The US, he thinks, made a colossal error in withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal (the JCPOA) and thereby shortening the time required for Tehran to obtain the material needed to build a nuclear weapon. He understands that the deal in which Libya gave up its military nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief was a good one, but Qadaffi’s ultimate end will have strengthened North Korean resolve not to do likewise. I found his discussion of the South African and Israeli pursuit of nuclear weapons particularly interesting.

Pantelis is proud of the work of the IAEA, but blunt about the shortcomings of the regime it administers. He regards its Additional Protocol as adequate to limiting the possibility of hiding a military nuclear program within a civilian one, but he also notes that it is not universally and unconditionally accepted, most notably by Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran (which accepts it only within the context of JCPOA) as well as Israel, which remains outside the NPT. He also underlines the tensions between nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states over the reluctance of the former to deliver on nuclear disarmament, which contributed to the failure of the 2015 review conference and what he feared would be the likely failure of the 2020 edition before it was postponed this spring.

In the end, Pantelis speculates on the emergence of a new “tetra”-polar equilibrium among nuclear weapons states:

  1. US and UK;
  2. Russia and India;
  3. China, Pakistan, and North Korea;
  4. Israel and France.

I am not sure how he comes to this conclusion. Even if 1. and 3. are historically well-rooted, I’m not convinced that India will ally with Russia or that today’s France is interested in allying with Israel, even if Pantelis is correct that France helped Israel develop its nuclear weapons in the past. Nor do I see why this configuration should be stable. It seems to me that two-party nuclear standoffs (US/USSR, India/Pakistan, US/China) are far more likely to be stable than anything with four corners to it.

Pantelis reserves his final enthusiasm for an epilogue in which he pleads with the world’s scientific community to convince the nuclear weapons states, especially the US and Russia, to engage seriously in nuclear disarmament rather than their current race to modernize and proliferate nuclear weapons, which is intensifying. I wouldn’t fault him there at all. The craziness of pursuing weapons that can never be used without sealing your own country’s destruction has not been lost on most of the world’s states. Lowering the level of mutual assured destruction could free up a lot of resources for more useful things. It is fortunate we have well-informed observer/participants like Pantelis to remind us of what we should be doing.

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Stevenson’s army, June 17

– WSJ says Trump administration is still working with WHO despite announced US withdrawal.[ Teaching point: throughout Trump’s presidency, he and the WH staff have made announcements that were not followed up with action. They seemed to think that a press release was sufficient. Or a so-called executive order that really only called for an action to be studied. Process matters.]

– Britain is merging its development office with the Foreign Office. [Teaching point: the US has the same longtime tension between USAID, which wants to give aid for developmental goals, and State, which usually wants to add political goals. No easy answers. As JFK said, “To govern is to choose.”]
CIA hackers got hacked, with enormous damage. [Teaching Point: Hubris is a powerful force in elite organizations. We also have prioritized cyber attack over cyber defense and resilience.]
– Here’s good background on the China-India clash and on the Line of Actual Control.  BTW, the deadly fighting was with barbed wire clubs, since firearms aren’t authorized by either side.
– Speaker Pelosi mandates masks in committees.
– My local library system, PG County in Maryland, sent a message yesterday saying that major newspapers and many magazines are now freely accessible online via the library. Your local library might do the same. Check it out.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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