Tag: United Nations
Elucidating a tragic moment in the Balkans
I received this note from the Humanitarian Law Center in Belgrade this morning:
March 17, 2021 marks the 17th anniversary of the March violence in Kosovo. During two days, March 17 and 18, 2004, Albanian protesters attacked Serbs, Roma and Ashkali, their property and Orthodox religious buildings throughout Kosovo.
In the March violence, 23 people lost their lives, 954 people were injured, almost 900 houses were completely destroyed or severely damaged, 36 Orthodox religious buildings were demolished and burned, and about 4,000 people were displaced.
Attached was this report by Isidora Stakić, which I find enlightening:
The retreat of the Serbian army and police from Kosovo in June 1999 meant liberation for Kosovo Albanians from Serbian rule and repression, and for Kosovo Serbs it meant the beginning of a new reality marked by the unwillingness and inability of UNMIK and KFOR to protect the personal safety of Serbs, Montenegrins, Bosniaks and Roma people, but also by the prevailing conviction of Kosovo politicians and the public that the priority is independence, followed by solidarity with the Serbs who stayed in Kosovo.[1]
The post-war reality was not easy for Kosovo Albanians either; much of their expectations of liberation came under pressure from the difficult economic situation and faintly observable justice for the thousands of civilians killed and a large number of missing. The then-new government of the Republic of Serbia made a step forward by discovering mass graves in Serbia, but the right-wing political parties, that were part of the government, managed to marginalize the question of the responsibility of the Yugoslav Army and Ministry of Interior for war crimes and influence Kosovo Serbs not to take participation in building a new political system in Kosovo. The killings and disappearances of Serbs and Roma, frequent until the end of 2000, would take place in the presence of KFOR and UNMIK, leading both the remaining Serbs and most of the Albanians to a conclusion that post-war perpetrators had the tacit consent of the international community to create Kosovo without Serbs.[2]
What were the triggers?
The March violence (17 and 18 March 2004) was preceded by three events. The first occurred on the 15th of March in the village of Čaglavica/Çagllavicë, when 18-year-old Serb Jovica Ivić was shot at and wounded in the abdomen and arm. Ivić claimed that the attackers were Albanians.[3] In response to this attack, Serbs from Čaglavica/Çagllavicë blocked the Priština/Prishtinë-Skoplje/Shkup road, a vital route for Albanians, and threw stones at Albanians’ vehicles.[4] This provoked anger of the Albanian community and strong condemnation by its political leaders who accused Serbs of endangering freedom of movement, and UNMIK of being passive towards the blockade.
At about the same time, in several cities in Kosovo, the associations of KLA veterans organized protests over the arrest of former KLA commanders charged with war crimes. These protests were directed, above all, against UNMIK, whose representatives made the arrests. In speeches during the protest, UNMIK was described as a neo-colonial force that “supporting organized crime and continuing the same politics applied by Serbia“.[5]
The third event took place on the afternoon of March 16, when three Albanian boys drowned in the Ibar/Iber river in the Serb-majority municipality of Zubin Potok. Immediately after the accident, the Kosovo media reported on this tragic event as an ethnically-motivated crime, stating that the boys jumped into the river because they were being chased by Serbs with a dog. The media were appealing to the statements of the fourth, surviving boy and the only eyewitness of the accident, but it turned out that the boy talked about Serbs with a dog cursing at them from a nearby house – which scared him and his friends – and not about Serbs chasing them.[6] Later, after investigating the incident, the international prosecutor concluded that the offered evidence did not support the existence of a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed.[7]
Although there was a possibility, on the day of the accident, that it was an ethnically motivated crime, the media couldn’t know that beyond any doubt and they were obliged to report professionally, following the known facts. Instead, Kosovo media – and TV stations in particular – reported sensationally, recklessly, emotionally and biasedly.[8] As the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media noted in his report, the media did not intentionally incite the violence that would follow the strangulation of the boy, but “had it not been for the reckless and sensationalist reporting, events could have taken a different turn.“[9]
The March violence in numbers
The March riots began in the morning of 17 March with a gathering of Kosovo Albanians in the southern part of Mitrovica/Mitrovicë and soon spread to many other towns in Kosovo. On March 17 and 18, 2004, 50-60,000 Kosovo Albanians took part in the violence, targeting Serbs, Roma and Ashkali, their property and Orthodox religious buildings. The participants in riots would use rocks and Molotov cocktails, set fire to people’s property and shoot at buildings, expel, intimidate and beat people. During the riots, the protesters would clash with UNMIK police and KFOR soldiers, and in some places with Serbs. The violence involved mostly younger men who spontaneously took to the streets. Human Rights Watch (HRW) estimates that the riots were both spontaneous and organized: although most of the protesters joined the riots spontaneously, there is no doubt that Albanian extremists worked to organize and accelerate the spread of violence.[10]
In the March violence in Kosovo, 23 people lost their lives: Macedonian Jana Tučev, nine Serbs – Dragan Nedeljković, Slobodan Perić, Dušanka Petković, Borivoje Spasojević, Borko Stolić, Dobrivoje Stolić, Slobodan Tanjić, Zlatibor Trajković and Nenad Vesić, and thirteen Albanians – Fatmir Abdullahu, Ferid Çitaku, Bujar Elshani, Kastriot Elshani, Isak Ibrahimi, Alumuhamet Murseli, Agron Ramadani, Nexhat Rrahmani, Arben Shala, Gazmend Shala, Ajvaz Shatrolli, Esat Tahiraj and one Albanian from Priština/Prishtinë whose name the Humanitarian Law Center (HLC) failed to identify.[11]
Among the victims, there were two women: Jana Tučev, who was shot dead with a firearm in her apartment in northern Mitrovica, and Dušanka Petkovic from Uroševac, who was a heart patient and died in KFOR base the day after she was kicked out from her house. Four of the Serbs were killed by Albanians with firearms, two were burned in their homes, the cause of death of one of them is unknown, and one disappeared during the evacuation. Two of the Albanians were killed by KFOR members, three lost their lives in clashes with KFOR and Serbs, one was killed by a UNMIK policewoman when he attacked another person with a knife, one was killed by a sniper by Serbs, and the reason of the death of the other Albanians is unknown.[12]
The April 2004 report by the UN Secretary-General stated that 954 people had been injured in the March violence, including 65 international police officers, 61 KFOR members and 58 members of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS).[13]According to the data collected by the HLC in months after the March violence, about 170 Serbs were seriously injured, 150 of them by beatings at their homes, while 20 were attacked outdoor.[14] About 800 Serbian, 90 Ashkali and two Albanian houses were completely destroyed or severely damaged, and 36 Orthodox religious buildings were demolished and burned.[15]
After the March violence, about 4,000 people, having lost their homes, were displaced – some of them for the second time, since they had already been displaced in 1999.[16] Older people found themselves in a particularly difficult socio-economic situation, as well as the others who lost in these riots all the property they had been acquiring all their lives. Immediately after the violence, many people who lost their homes were accommodated in containers provided by the international community and where the living conditions were very poor.[17] The displaced Serbs were largely dissatisfied with the damage assessments made by Albanian institutions, pointing out that the material damage they suffered was much greater.[18] Also, they complained that the help they used to receive from the Government of Serbia was insufficient or that they were not getting it at all.[19]
In January 2006, 1,231 of approximately 4,000 displaced persons after the March violence still had the status of displaced persons.[20] By June 2007, 897 previously destroyed or damaged residential buildings had been rebuilt, out of the intended 993.[21]
Actions of security institutions: KFOR, UNMIK police and KPS
Kosovo’s security institutions – both international (KFOR and UNMIK police) and local (KPS) – have failed to protect people and their property. According to the HRW report, members of the international forces interviewed after the March riots showed a lack of self-criticism and unawareness of their mistakes, shifting the blame to each other, but also justifying themselves by lack of material and human resources, inexperience in suppressing protests, surprise factor, lack of coordination, etc.[22] Members of KFOR were unable to prevent the attacks, but mostly acted as rescue teams, helping Serbs evacuate. They would leave unsecured houses behind, and in the presence of KFOR, Serb and Ashkali houses in several municipalities throughout Kosovo were destroyed and looted.[23] UNMIK police have also shown that they cannot control the situation and have no authority.[24]
The Kosovo Police Service (KPS) acted without command and instruction, so the conduct of KPS members varied from place to place. Some police officers sided with the protesters and participated in the destruction of property or they would arrest Serbs and Ashkali who were trying to defend themselves, ignoring at the same time the Albanian violence. Most KPS members were passive observers and wouldn’t interfere even when Serbs were being beaten by the protesters. The third group includes police officers who acted professionally in an effort to facilitate a safe evacuation, which some Serbs see as indirect participation in the expulsion, while others point out that this saved their lives.[25]
Solidarity
Most Kosovo Albanians who did not take part in the riots passively watched what was happening. However, there were also bright examples where Albanians tried to help Serbs by providing shelter in their homes, calling the police, helping them reach KFOR bases and other safe places, but also standing in front of Serb houses preventing protesters from destroying them.[26] In some cases, however, not even the solidarity of the neighbors was able to stop the wave of violence.
“When a group of Albanians came in front of our house, they started setting it on fire, and I was hiding in a toilet hole. I heard two of my neighbors, Albanians, telling them that I was a good man, that I had done nothing wrong to anyone, but it didn’t help. An Albanian who works in the mosque came and chased the two away. After that, they started setting the fire,” said the Serb M.I. from Kosovo Polje/Fushë Kosovë.[27]
The behavior of Albanian political leaders did not help stop the violence. Even when they called for an end to the violence, those calls seemed insincere and forced.[28]
Violent reactions in Serbia
The events in Kosovo provoked protests in several cities in Serbia, which soon became violent. Protesters in Belgrade set fire to Belgrade’s Bajrakli mosque on the night between March 17 and 18, shouting “Kill Shiptar”, “Kill, slaughter, let Shiptar disappear” and “Let’s go to Kosovo”.[29] Until the protesters broke through the police cordon, the police had an order not to use force.[30] The Bajrakli mosque, thanks to its construction, was not completely burned, but its interior was largely destroyed, including the library and art objects. Protesters in Niš set fire to Islam-aga’s mosque and it was even more severely damaged than Belgrade’s mosque.
In Novi Sad, rioters broke shop windows, destroyed and set fire to bakeries owned by Albanians and other Muslims, and broke windows to the Islamic Center premises. The police were mostly passive, standing aside while the protesters stoned the houses in Roma and Ashkali communities,[31] although Roma and Ashkali were not in any way involved in violence against Kosovo Serbs, but they themselves were also victims of the violence.
Trials
According to the UNMIK statistics from 2008, 242 people have been charged for the March violence (206 before local and 36 before international prosecutors), and additionally, 157 people have been charged before courts for misdemeanors.[32] International judges and prosecutors dealt mainly with cases involving serious crimes such as murder, attempted murder, incitement to national hatred and causing general danger, while the most common offenses before domestic courts were: participation in a group that committed a criminal offense and aggravated theft.[33]
The trials of these indictments were accompanied by a number of problems and difficulties, including defaulting witnesses, changing the testimonies of witnesses, procrastination of the police in submitting reports, postponing the main hearing, disregarding ethnic motives, imposing minimum sentences or even sentences below the prescribed minimum, the too frequent imposition of suspended sentences, etc.[34]
Out of a total of 399 indictees, 301 were convicted by April 2008. According to the OSCE, 86 persons were sentenced to prison (including suspended sentences), and the maximum sentence was 16 years in prison.[35] The March violence never happened again in Kosovo, thanks in part to KFOR, UNMIK and the Kosovo police.
[1] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Communities in Kosovo 2003 and 2004, p. 6, available at http://hlc-rdc.org/wp-content/uploads/editor/file/Etnicke_zajednice2003-2004..pdf
[2] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo, p. 2, available at http://www.hlc-rdc.org/images/stories/pdf/izvestaji/FHP_izvestaj-Etnicko_nasilje_na_Kosovu-mart_2004-srpski.pdf
[3] Human Rights Watch (2004) Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, p. 16, available at https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/kosovo0704.pdf
[4] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo, p. 4.
[5] Human Rights Watch (2004), Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, p. 18.
[6] OSCE (2004) The Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo, p. 4-5, available at https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/8/30265.pdf
[7] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo, p. 5.
[8] OSCE (2004) The Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo, p. 3.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Human Rights Watch (2004), Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, p. 26-28.
[11] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Secretary-General of the United Nations (2004) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 30 April 2004, p. 1, available at https://unmik.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s-2004-348.pdf
[14] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo, p. 4.
[15] Ibid.
[16] OSCE (2007) Eight Years After: Minority Returns and Housing and Property Restitution in Kosovo, p. 33, available at https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/e/26324.pdf
[17] Many HLC interlocutors talk about poor living conditions in container settlements. For further details see: Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] OSCE (2007) Eight Years After: Minority Returns and Housing and Property Restitution in Kosovo, p. 34.
[21] Ibid., p. 33-34.
[22] Human Rights Watch (2004), Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, p. 22-26.
[23] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid., p. 2; See also: Human Rights Watch (2004), Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, p. 22.
[26] Many HLC interlocutors talk about Albanians who helped Serbs. For further details see Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo.
[27] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo, str. 21-22.
[28] Ibid., p. 3.
[29] BBC News in Serbian (2019) 15 Years After: Who is Responsible for the March Violence in Kosovo, 17 March 2019. Available at https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/balkan-47569978
[30] Human Rights Watch (2005) March 2004 Violence against Albanians and Muslims, available at https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/serbia1005/4.htm
[31] Ibid.
[32] OSCE (2008) Four Years Later: Follow up of March 2004 Riots Cases before the Kosovo Criminal Justice System, p. 3-4, available at https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/4/32701.pdf
[33] Ibid., p. 23.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
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Arms trafficking: more breach than observance
An event at the Atlantic Council on February 4 discussed the measures and mitigation techniques for illicit transfer of arms and weaponry around the world. The event was prompted by a report published by the Atlantic Council, authored by investigative journalist Tim Michetti, which followed materiel procurement by a network of militants operating in Bahrain, specifically activities carried out by Iran. The report can be read here. The prompting questions for the discussion were based on how to prevent and disrupt the flow of international illicit weapons flows as well as strengthening arms embargos. Further topics of discussion analyzed specific examples of illicit transfers of weapons in different regions, as well as the policy implications and a road map to alleviate these weapon flows.
Speakers:
Time Michetti: Investigative Researcher on Illicit Weapon Transfers
Rachel Stohl: Vice President for Conventional Defense, Stimson Center
Jay Bahadur: Investigator, Author and Former Coordinator of the UN Panel of Experts on Somalia
David Mortlock: Nonresident Fellow, Global Energy Center
Norman Roule (Moderator): Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Challenges:
Moderator Norman Roule opened the discussion noting that the major concern revolves around Iran’s transfer of illegal weaponry throughout the Middle East, while also noting the consequences for regional geopolitical relations, reaching East Africa as well. Iran has provided weapons to Syria, which provoked a sort of “forever war” with Israel, as well as provided precision weapons and missiles to the Houthi rebels in Yemen.
Tim Michetti’s report on Illicit Iranian Weapon’s Transfers analyzes the mode of entry, either by land or by maritime means. The report analyzed the weapons in comparison to those that were taken from regional conflicts in order to trace the materiel back to Iran. This work established a guide for how materiel from different regions could be traced back to actors based on their characteristics, which are unique to each country that they are manufactured in. Michetti’s report on Bahrain is one of many examples of the illicit weapons flows in the Middle East and sets the stage for future investigations on how the linkages between illicit weapons and where they end up can be made.
Jay Bahadur discussed an illicit weapons seizure by the Saudi Arabian navy in the Arabian Sea in June 2020 that discovered Chinese- made assault rifles and missiles, along with other weaponry that was believed to be manufactured in Iran. This seizure was not the first of this type, as the Saudis have intercepted multiple ships in the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea since 2015, many of which have been traced back to Iran, where the weapons originated. These weapon transfers have exacerbated the conflict in Yemen, while also potentially destabilizing East African countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea.
Historically, disrupting commercial trafficking of small arms and light weapons has been a secondary priority to counterterrorism, but according to Jay Bahadur this approach ignores the overlap that often exists between arms trafficking and terrorism.
International Regulation
According to Rachel Stohl, the Arms Trade Treaty and the Firearms Protocol form the international legal framework for weapons transfers. Several voluntary groups and committees exist as well, in the United Nations and elsewhere. Synergy among these groups and treaties can improve transparency and responsibility in the global arms trade. The treaty mechanisms are only meaningful if they are implemented and signatories held accountable. In the Middle East and Horn of Africa, fewer than than 20 percent of countries are parties to the international treaties. Stohl emphasized the need to hold countries and industry actors accountable, as the consequences of illicit weapons transfers coincide with other illicit activities such as terrorism, trafficking, and illegal trading of goods.
David Mortlock noted that the international systems in place to combat illicit weapons transfers depend on member-state governments to uphold them. Sanctions should be considered to hold governments accountable. They can increase the operational costs for groups transferring weapons illicitly, but the UN and European Union have not wanted to sanction Iran to the extent the United States has. As noted by Roule, the United States, particularly the Trump Administration, had a vastly different perspective on countering Iran compared to the rest of the international community.
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The problem no one really wants to solve
Ten years after its internal conflict started, Elizabeth Thompson of American University hosted a panel on what the the Biden Administration might be able to do about Syria. Conditions there are dire. US policy has been disappointing. What can a new president do to establish a legitimate government able to rebuild? Mustafa Gurbuz, also of American University, moderated.
Hadeel Oueis of BBC Arabic reminded what has gone wrong in Syria. The Assad regime responded brutally to protests, which pushed them in the the direction of militarization and Islamicization, as militia groups and Islamists had advantages in financing and organization. Peaceful change was quickly ruled out. Today, the best prospects are in the Northeast, where the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control security and the autonomous administration governs in a decentralized way, with strong participation by women as well as checks and balances.
Amy Austin Holmes of the Council on Foreign Relations suggested we don’t know what to expect from Biden about Syria specifically, a subject neither he nor his people have addressed except for humanitarian imperatives, but if he wants to reclaim US credibility and moral authority bold steps are needed on three issues concerning vulnerable people:
- ISIS still a big problem, especially at the Al Hol camp. Washington should take back its own citizens from there for trial in the US and establish a timeline for other countries to take back theirs.
- Christians and Yezidis still under threat. Hundreds of thousands have fled the Turkish intervention in northern Syria intervention and should be enabled to return home.
- Kurds, and in particular Kurdish women, have been excluded from diplomatic talks on Syria. They play strong roles in northeastern Syria in both the SDF forces and in the civilian autonomous administration. Biden has given women important roles in his own cabinet, and it has been demonstrated repeatedly that women’s participation in peace talks leads to improved outcomes.
US forces are likely to remain in northeastern Syria to work by, with, and through the SDF, which has demonstrated significant capacity to overcome Arab/Kurdish tensions.
Dafne McCurdy of CSIS underlined that Syria will not be a top priority for Biden but that its humanitarian crisis ranks high, especially with Samantha Power at USAID. The situation is dire, but the US can have a positive impact because it is the biggest donor. It will need to focus on two priorities:
- Renewal of cross-border assistance in western Syria: The UN Security Council will vote in July on whether to keep open the one remaining authorized border crossing for aid to Idlib. If it fails to do so, the US may still be able to use nongovernmental organizations to ship aid across the border, but not at the scale that the UN is capable of.
- Reform of aid to regime-controlled areas, which Assad has used to reward supporters.
Humanitarian aid is not political, but stabilization assistance is, especially in an area of geopolitical competition. The US needs to buttress local authorities who stand up to outside meddling. But US goals have not been clear, because they are limited to one part of Syria and therefore disconnected from a nation-wide strategy. President Trump’s erratic policy did not allow stabilization to play its proper role in geopolitical competition.
Aaron Stein of the Foreign Policy Research Institute agreed that Syria is not a high priority for the Biden administration. The Syrian opposition won’t be a strong factor in its decisionmaking. The main issues will be humanitarian assistance and counter-terrorism. Washington needs to be talking with the Russians, who are in a strong position in Syria. Sanctions work to impoverish the Syrian regime, but they have been ineffective in producing a sustained political outcome. Some eventual sanctions relief in exchange for release of political prisoners is a possibility. The proliferation of arms and the large numbers of fighters will be problems for many years.
Idlib is essentially a stalemate, with Russia and the regime on one side and Turkey on the other, along with the HTS al Qaeda offshoot who are trying to soften their image. The best outcome is the status quo from the US perspective, but it leaves the US dependent on designated terrorist groups in both northwestern (HTS) and northeastern Syria (the PKK, which is the core of the SDF). The US is stuck with bad options.
Joshua Landis, University of Oklahoma, views Assad as having won militarily, as he now controls 65-70% of Syria’s territory but he wants it all. Washington wants political change and has used aid as a tool to feed the opposition as much as regime has used it against the opposition. Assad will focus in the immediate future not on Idlib, which is hard, but on northeastern Syria, because it is a soft spot. He may go after Tanf, which is important to trade links with Iraq and Iran. The Syrian people are pawns in larger geopolitical struggle
Trump used Turkey against Iran and Russia, thus limiting what Assad could do in the north. Biden is likely to be less friendly to Turkey but won’t want to undermine the Turks in Syria. Some Americans are talking about a federal Syria, with Idlib and the northeast remaining outside Damascus’ control as the US presses for regime change there. But in the end the big issues for the Americans are pulling Turkey out of Russia’s orbit and dealing with Iran. Biden might toughen on Iran in Syria because of the nuclear deal, where he will need to soften.
Bottom line: Syria is not a problem Washington will focus on, as there are no good solutions. But they are likely to keep troops there. If the Americans were to withdraw, the Kurds would be sitting ducks and would have to make a deal with Damascus. Their civilian and military organizations would crumble. At least now in the northeast there is a military command under a civilian government. In the northwest, military and Islamist forces rule under Turkish control.
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Stevenson’s army, February 2
The past 11 months have been like one Groundhog Day after another, right? Or should we call it a year of Blursdays?
In the news, the Biden administration is arguing over how to respond to the coup in Myanmar. CNN says they might not officially call it a “coup” in order to avoid triggering the law that requires an immediate halt to US aid.
[Remember what the Obama administration did following the coup in Egypt? They didn’t want to halt aid, so they determined that the law had no requirement to acknowledge a coup, just a requirement to cut off aid if they did. So they didn’t.]
Equal time: I reported the study questioning the effectiveness of US hypersonic weapons programs. Here’s the DOD rebuttal.
Just Security has a summary of the nomination hearing for the new UN Ambassador.
Two academics have some ideas on how to change US overseas military basing
Harvard’s Steve Walt analyzes President Xi’s speech at virtual Davos.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Peace Picks | November 30 – December 4, 2020
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
1. France and Islam: Identity, Politics, and Geopolitics | November 30, 2020 | 4:00 – 5:15 PM ET | Brookings Institute | Register Here
France’s contentious policy on the public practice of Islam has struck multiple identity and political fault lines, not only in France or Europe, but also across the Muslim world. What was essentially a domestic French political debate has morphed into a global debate on relations between state and religion, liberalism and secularism, and the West and Islam/Muslim-majority countries. The intensifying controversy in France comes amid growing populist calls for limiting migration, especially from Muslim countries, and ongoing government initiatives that would deepen the securitization of Islam in the country. President Macron’s rhetoric has dovetailed with France’s foreign policy toward the Middle East’s ideological and geopolitical cleavages, ensuring the amplification of reactions abroad. While the public reaction in the Middle East has been largely uniform, official reactions have exposed existing divisions and conflicts on regional affairs.
The Brookings Doha Center invites you to attend a webinar on France’s evolving policy on the public and political manifestations of Islam. Among other topics, the webinar will address the following questions: What are the domestic and foreign policy drivers of France’s new policy on Islam and Islamism? How is this policy shaping identity debates on Islam and Muslims in the West? What does this policy tell us about populism, nativism, and multiculturalism in France in particular and the West in general? And what will be the geopolitical implications of this new policy in the Middle East and the Muslim world?
Speakers:
Galip Dalay, moderator: Nonresident Fellow – Brookings Doha CenterRichard von Weizsäcker Fellow, Robert Bosch Academy
François Burgat: Senior Research Fellow – French National Centre for Scientific Research
Jocelyne Cesari: Visiting Professor of Religion, Violence, and Peacebuilding – Harvard Divinity School
Rim-Sarah Alouane: Ph.D candidate in Comparative Law – Université Toulouse
2. Taking Stock: Five Years of Russia’s Intervention in Syria | November 30, 2020 | 10:30 – 11:30 PM EST | Carnegie Endowment for Peace | Register Here
Russia’s military intervention in Syria in October 2015 changed the course of the civil war, saving the regime of President Bashar al-Assad.
Five years on, al-Assad is still in power and the country remains unstable. Turkey’s incursion into northeastern Syria and the United States’ withdrawal of troops in late 2019 have redesigned the geography of the conflict, while the EU has been largely absent from the diplomatic efforts to halt the war.
Speakers:
Marc Pierini: visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe, where his research focuses on developments in the Middle East and Turkey from a European perspective.
Jomana Qaddour: nonresident senior fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Program of the Atlantic Council, where she leads the Syria portfolio.
Dmitri Trenin: director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Also chairs the research council and the Foreign and Security Policy Program.
Frances Z. Brown: senior fellow with Carnegie’s Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program
3. Contested Waters: Flashpoints for Conflict in Asia | December 1, 2020 | 9:00 – 10:30 AM ET | United States Institute for Peace | Register Here
No modern states have ever declared war over water. In fact, nations dependent on shared water sources have collaborated far more frequently than they have clashed. Nevertheless, global surveys have counted over 40 hostile or militarized international actions over water—from riots to border skirmishes to larger battles—in the first six decades after World War II.
Join USIP for a virtual discussion on the future of water conflict and water diplomacy. Environmental peacebuilding experts and activists from Burma, India, and Pakistan will discuss the strategies they use to mitigate water conflict risks in their countries, as well as examine insights from a new USIP report, “Water Conflict Pathways and Peacebuilding Strategies,” that may help develop early warning indicators for emerging water-based conflicts.
Speakers:
Tegan Blaine: Senior Advisor on Environment and Conflict, U.S. Institute of Peace
David Michel: Senior Researcher, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; Author, “Water Conflict Pathways and Peacebuilding Strategies”
Abdul Aijaz: Doctoral Candidate, Indiana University Bloomington
Amit Ranjan: Research Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore
Z Nang Raw: Director of Policy and Strategy, Nyein Foundation
Jumaina Siddiqui, moderator: Senior Program Officer for South Asia, U.S. Institute of Peace
4. U.S.-China Relations Under Biden: A Look Ahead | December 1, 2020 | 9:00 – 10:00 AM ET | Carnegie Endowment for Peace | Register Here
While the recent election of Joe Biden likely signals a raft of domestic political changes, its impact on U.S.-China relations remains unclear. The Trump administration has remolded the relationship, which is now defined by confrontations over economic practices, emerging technologies, and security. There is also growing bipartisan support for pursuing a tougher approach to China, and the Justice, State, and Defense departments are increasingly prioritizing new initiatives to push back on Beijing. Will Biden maintain the confrontational tone and policies of his predecessor? Or will he devise an entirely different posture toward Beijing? The answers to these questions will not only have critical consequences for the two countries in question, but for the broader international community as well.
One month after the U.S. election, Paul Haenle will moderate a discussion with American and Chinese experts on how the Biden administration will approach China, as well as how Beijing is gearing up for the new U.S. president.
Speakers:
Paul Haenle: Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center based at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China
Evan A. Feigenbaum: Vice President for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Xie Tao: Professor of Political Science and Dean of the School of International Relations and Diplomacy, Beijing Foreign Studies University
5. Hinge of History: Governance in an Emerging New World | December 2, 2020 | 2:00 – 3:30 PM ET | United States Institute for Peace | Register Here
With rapid technological change, shifting global demographics, and tectonic geopolitical shifts, the world faces an inflection point—where the choices that leaders make in the coming years will have profound implications for generations. In response to this moment, former Secretary of State George P. Shultz has organized a project at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution called Hinge of History: Governance in an Emerging World to explore what these shifts mean for global democracy, economies, and security.
Join USIP and Stanford’s Hoover Institution for a timely conversation on the project’s findings and its implications for U.S. and international policy. The panel discussion will evaluate the major demographic, technological, and economic trends that are creating tectonic shifts in our geopolitical landscape and forcing a strategic rethink of governance strategies in the 21st century. In light of the challenges identified, panelists will also consider how the United States and others can harness these changes to usher in greater security and prosperity.
Agenda
2:00pm – 2:20pm | A Conversation with Secretary George P. Shultz
The Honorable Stephen J. Hadley: Chair, Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace
Secretary George P. Shultz: Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University
2:20pm – 3:20pm | Panel Discussion: Governance Strategies for the Emerging New World
Dr. Chester A. Crocker, moderator: James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, Georgetown University
Dr. Lucy Shapiro: Virginia and D. K. Ludwig Professor of Developmental Biology, Stanford University
Ambassador George Moose: Vice Chair, Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace
Dr. James P. Timbie: Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University
Dr. Silvia Giorguli-Saucedo: President, El Colegio de México
3:20pm – 3:30pm | Closing Remarks
Ambassador George Moose: Vice Chair, Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace
6. Venezuela’s Assembly Elections | December 3, 2020 | 11:30 AM – 12:45 PM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
On Sunday, December 6, 2020, Venezuela will hold elections to choose members of the National Assembly for five-year terms. Since 2015, Venezuela’s political opposition has held a majority in the Assembly, the body from which Juan Guaidó emerged as interim President in January 2019.
This December’s Assembly elections take place against a backdrop of acute restrictions on political freedoms under the regime of Nicolás Maduro. For example, to limit and undermine the National Assembly’s authority, the regime convened elections in 2017 for a parallel Constituent Assembly, elections condemned by over 40 countries in Latin America and around the world. In recent years, leading opposition figures have been summarily prohibited from offering their candidacy, and in 2020, the Venezuelan Supreme Court arbitrarily removed the leadership of opposition parties, substituting others appointed by the government.
Amidst these growing restrictions on democratic space, the opposition has decided not to participate in the December 6 elections, a decision supported by scores of countries who have recognized the interim presidency of Juan Guaidó.
What, then, do these elections mean for the political future of Venezuela? What future strategies are available to the opposition? Will citizens, exhausted by chronic shortages of basic goods and in the midst of a raging pandemic, show up to vote? What will a new Assembly mean for the political future of Juan Guaidó?
Speakers:
Michael Penfold: Abraham F. Lowenthal Public Policy Fellow; Professor of Political Science, Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA) Business and Public Policy School, Venezuela
Margarita Lopez Maya: Professor, Center for Development Studies (CENDES), Universidad Central de Venezuela
Beatriz Borges: Director, Center for Justice and Peace (CEPAZ)
Phil Gunson: Senior Analyst, Andes, International Crisis Group
Cynthia J. Arnson, moderator: Director, Latin American Program
7. What Challenges will the UN Pose for the Joe Biden Administration? | December 3, 2020 | 3:30 – 5:00 pM ET | American Enterprise Institute | Register Here
The incoming administration will confront a United Nations that increasingly serves as a theater for great-power competition, rather than the forum for global peace and understanding that its founders hoped to achieve. In addition, some of the greatest violators of human rights are on the UN’s Human Rights Council, while the World Health Organization stands accused of hampering the international COVID-19 response due to political pressures.
Please join AEI for an in-depth discussion on the key challenges the UN faces in an era of competition among the US, China, and Russia and how the Biden administration can strengthen the UN-US relationship.
Speakers:
Ivana Stradner, opening remarks: Jeane Kirkpatrick Fellow, AEI
Sam Daws: Director, Project on UN Governance and Reform, University of Oxford
Hillel Neuer: Executive Director, UN Watch
Stewart M. Patrick: Director, International Institutions and Global Governance Program, Council on Foreign Relations
Danielle Pletka: Senior Fellow, AEI
John Yoo: Visiting Scholar, AEI
Kori Schake, moderator: Director, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, AEI
8. Pakistan’s Internal Dynamics and Changing Role in the World | December 4, 2020 | 10:00 – 11:00 AM ET | Brookings Institute | Register Here
For the last two decades, discussions on Pakistan have centered around the U.S. war in Afghanistan and on Pakistan’s struggle with extremism, while its rich history, complex internal dynamics, and the aspirations of its citizens were largely excluded from the narrative. Nearly 20 years after 9/11, it is time for the United States to reexamine its relationship with, and understanding of, this complicated country.
On December 4, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host a panel discussion taking a multifaceted look at this nation of 220 million people. The event will include a discussion on domestic issues, ranging from the human and women’s rights situation to Islamist politics and ethnic and religious insurgencies within the country. In addition, the conversation will focus on the implications of a Biden presidency for Pakistan, as well as the country’s changing role in the Greater Middle East and South Asia.
Speakers:
Madiha Afzal: David M. Rubenstein Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
Bruce Riedel: Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and TechnologyDirector – The Intelligence Project
Declan Walsh: Cairo Bureau Chief – New York Times
9. The U.S.-India Partnership: Looking Forward | December 4, 2020 | 8:30 – 9:30 AM ET | Carnegie Endowment for Peace | Register Here
The growth of the U.S.-India strategic partnership has been a significant achievement both in Washington and in New Delhi over the last two decades. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Laura Stone and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Reed Werner will review recent successes and identify future goals for the relationship. Carnegie’s Ashley J. Tellis will moderate.
Speakers:
Laura Stone: deputy assistant secretary of state for India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, and Bhutan.
Reed Werner: deputy assistant secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia.
Ashley J. Tellis: Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security and U.S. foreign and defense policy with a special focus on Asia and the Indian subcontinent.
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Forty-five years is too long to wait for a referendum
Bouela Lehbib, who was a Middle East Institute research intern with me in 2019 during his time as the first Fulbrighter from Western Sahara, writes:
The 29-year UN-brokered ceasefire that had been in place since September 1991 between the Polisario Front and Morocco has collapsed. Morocco’s military incursion on November 13 in the Guergarat’s buffer-strip — a UN- designated demilitarized zone in the south-western corner of Western Sahara — prompted the Polisario Front, a liberation movement seeking independence, to resume armed struggle.
Morocco claims its operation comes as a response to “restoring free circulation and commercial traffic” towards sub-Saharan Africa. It had been blocked since October 21 by dozens of Saharawi civilians protesting peacefully against what they consider Moroccan occupation of their land and plundering of their natural resources.
The Polisario Front sees Morocco’s move as a violation of the ceasefire and a bid to alter the status quo in its favor. Both parties had agreed according to the UN peace plan of 1991 to keep maintain the status quo until the final status of the territory is decided.
Tensions have been on the rise in Guergarat since 2016, when Morocco tried to asphalt an approximately 5-km road in Western Sahara, across the buffer strip and into Mauritania near Nouadhibou. The Polisario interfered with the work, claiming it was illegal. The military agreement No.1, signed in the late 1990s, forbids any military presence in the buffer strip. It allows, though, Saharawi civilian circulation under Polisario Front control.
There was no crossing point at the time of the ceasefire agreement. It was introduced by Morocco on March 2001. Although MINURSO, the UN mission for the referendum in Western Sahara, warned Morocco the road construction and change of the status quo “raised sensitive issues and involve activities that could be in violation of the ceasefire agreement,” the latter went ahead with the work.
For Rabat, ensuring a crossing point and an asphalted road in Guergarat is strategically and economically significant. Since 2010, Morocco has invested widely in West African countries, becoming the first investor in the region and the third in all Africa, with its communication, construction, and bank enterprises leading the market. In 2017, it had officially requested to become a member of ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States. Though admission was blocked, Morocco still has political and economic clout in the region and seeks to neutralize the Saharawi Republic in the African Union, which it joined on January 2017. An asphalted road in Guergarat would link Morocco to ECOWAS economically but, most importantly, it contests the Polisario Front in the 20% territory it considers liberated.
Pundits blame the UN for the region slipping into tension. MINURSO has not fulfilled its mandate of holding a self-determination referendum according to Security Council resolution 690. Nor has it maintained a neutral position as an independent entity. Its vehicles carry Moroccan plates and its staff passports carry Moroccan stamps. The UN is playing a waiting game.
Security Council members, including the US, bear some of the blame. Its do-nothing policy and effort to ignore 45 years of low-intensity conflict have allowed the return of war. Joe Biden’s victory has raised the possibility that a shift in US policy towards Western Sahara could fix past mistakes. A self-determination referendum that both Morocco and the Polisario Front accept and the UNSC ratifies remains by far the best way out of this long-standing dispute.
With war in Libya and chaos in Mali, the new conflict in Western Sahara is likely to expose the region to much more instability. But it can also be an opportunity for the new Administration, as the moment looks ripe to bring a just solution to what many see as the last colony in Africa.
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