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Diplomacy doesn’t end with the communiqué

The final communiqué of the “action group” for Syria is a good one.  It goes further in defining next steps in the “Syrian-led” transition than the Annan plan did, in particular in insisting on the appointment of negotiators by the “parties” (presumably the government and opposition), establishment of a transitional governing body, preparation of a new “constitutional order” and holding thereafter of free and fair multiparty elections.  All well and good, but it leaves to the imagination that in order for all this to happen Bashar al Asad needs to step aside.

But that is the rub.  There is no indication that he is prepared to do that, and lots of indication that he thinks he is winning.  As Hassan Mneimneh puts it:

The Bashar al-Assad regime’s stated position is that the conspiracy to topple it has been contained, but will require some time to eradicate because of its concerns for civilian casualties. Western and regional co-conspirators have exhausted all means available to them because of the steadfastness of the regime’s bases of support — the armed forces, security apparatus, popular committees, and the population as a whole — as well as the robust support of international actors who resist Western hegemony:  the BRICS, Iran, and Asian and Latin American voices. The regime will prevail, and its enemies will return to an unshaken Damascus, once again seeking reconciliation. The regime’s international standing will also be restored:  the alleged atrocities, it would argue, were either committed by foreign-funded terrorists, were outright lies fabricated by outside media, or were unfortunate collateral damage in legitimate efforts to squash an illegal insurgency.

This may appear delusional to those of us who follow events in Syria mainly from the Western press.  The issue is how to puncture the delusion.

It is tempting to think that this can best be done using military force, in particular air attacks.  There is no reason to believe that this would work quickly.  Even in those cases where they have worked (Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan), air assaults have taken weeks and even months to convince opponents that they cannot hold on to territory or power.  Nor am I detecting even the slightest willingness to use military force on the part of the Americans, the Turks or the Arab League, who are the major potential contributors to such an effort.  The reasons are many but compelling:  for the Americans the need to keep Russia in the P5+1 and to continue to provide access to the northern distribution network for Afghanistan, for the Turks the Syrian capability of striking back by unleashing Kurdish terrorists, and for the Arab League an aversion to military risk unless someone else is out front.

In any event, nonviolent means have a much better track record.  Before you all send me notes about how unreasonable it is for Syrians to return to nonviolence, let me insist on this:  nonviolent methods have never shut down in Syria.  Every day sees protests, strikes, boycotts and more.  We are not hearing about this because the Western press doesn’t report it much.  If it bleeds it leads. It is the rare reporter who like Deb Amos makes her way to Hamadiya souk to interview merchants who closed down for a general strikes, as well as talking to people in the Christian Quarter who support the regime.

The quickest route to political transition in Syria is still an end to the violence and implementation of the Annan plan’s provision for freedom of assembly.  If Bashar al Asad can be convinced for even a week to shut down his military assaults on the population, Syrians will puncture his delusion, not by violence but by massing in unprecedented numbers in support of a democratic transition.

That’s Kofi Annan’s job:  to get Bashar to make the mistake of allowing freedom of association and the right to demonstrate.   Overconfident autocrats do make such mistakes:  Slobodan Milosevic famously called an election and lost it.  Ironically, forcing this mistake will require pressure from both Russia and Iran, neither of which is big on freedom of association or the right to demonstrate.  Threatening the use of force, as Hillary Clinton and Susan Rice would clearly like to do, might also be helpful, but it is awfully hard to make the threat credible without a major shift in attitudes in the U.S., Turkey and the Arab League.

Diplomacy doesn’t end with the communiqué.