Month: March 2012
This week’s peace picks
Maybe I’m getting more exigent. Just four events this week, though the first first one lasts three days:
1. Southeast European Economic Forum: SAIS, Day 1, 7-9 pm March 26
2. The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East, CNAS, 5:30-8:30 pm March 27
Location:The W Hotel
515 15th Street NW
(enter on F Street between 14th and 15th Streets)
Washington, DC 20004
The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) cordially invites you to the book launch for The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East by Dr. Marc Lynch, Non-Resident Senior Fellow at CNAS and Director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. On Tuesday, March 27, 2012 from 6:00 to 8:30 p.m., Dr. Lynch will discuss one of the most fundamental changes throughout the history of the modern Middle East: the empowerment of a new generation of Arabs who reject the world they inherited. Hisham Melhem, Washington Bureau Chief for al-Arabiya , will interview Dr. Lynch, followed by Q&A with the audience. Please RSVP online here or call (202) 457-9427.
The Arab Uprising will be on sale and Dr. Lynch will be available to sign copies during the book-signing cocktail reception from 7:15 to 8:30 p.m.
In The Arab Uprising, Dr. Lynch examines the emerging regional landscape in the Middle East, one in which, he argues, the old heavyweights – Iran, al Qaeda, even Israel – have all been disempowered, and nations like Saudi Arabia are powering a new cold war. Dr. Lynch highlights the new fault lines that are forming between forces of revolution and counter-revolution and shows what it all means for the future of U.S. foreign policy. Deeply informed by inside access to the Obama administration’s decisionmaking process and first-hand interviews with protestors, politicians, diplomats and journalists, The Arab Uprising is an unprecedented and indispensible guide to the changing lay of the land in the Middle East and North Africa.
Tuesday, March 27, 2012
5:30-6:00 p.m.: Guest registration and book sales
6:00-7:15 p.m.: Moderated discussion followed by Q&A
Hisham Melhem is the Washington bureau chief of Al-Arabiya, the Dubai based satellite channel. He is also the correspondent for Annahar, the leading Lebanese daily. For four years he hosted Across the Ocean, a weekly current affairs program on U.S.-Arab relations for Al-Arabiya. Mr. Melhem speaks regularly on U.S.-Arab relations, political Islam, intra-Arab relations, Arab-Israeli issues, media in the Arab world, Arab images in American media and U.S. public policies and the Arab world. Mr. Melhem has interviewed many American and international public figures, including Presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush.
3. Constitution-Making, Electoral Design, and the Arab Spring, NED, 12-2 pm March 29
a luncheon presentation featuring
Andrew Reynolds, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
John Carey, Dartmouth College
with comments by
Donald L. Horowitz, Duke University
Thursday, March 29, 2012
12 noon–2:00 p.m.
(Lunch served 12:00–12:30 p.m.)
1025 F. Street, N.W., Suite 800, Washington, D.C. 20004
Telephone: 202-378-9675
RSVP (acceptances only) with name and affiliation by Tuesday, March 27.
About the Event:
In December 2010, a Tunisian fruit vendor burned himself to death to protest his treatment by police, marking the start of what has become widely known as the “Arab Spring.” Mass popular protests spread throughout most of the region, and a little more than a year later violent conflict is still raging in Syria and Yemen. In Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, however, dictators have fallen, and these countries are currently engaged in the struggle to achieve successful transitions to democracy. Among the most difficult challenges that they face are those of drafting and approving new constitutions and of designing electoral systems that will foster both fairness and stability. Getting their new constitutions and electoral systems right will be of crucial importance to their efforts to build functioning and enduring democracies. Andrew Reynolds and John Carey will assess the various paths chosen by these would-be democratizers, drawing upon and updating their co-authored articles in the October 2011 and January 2012 issues of the Journal of Democracy. Donald L. Horowitz will provide comments.
About the Speakers:
Andrew Reynolds is associate professor of political science at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, where his research focuses on democratization, constitutional design, and electoral politics. He has advised a number of organizations including the UN, NDI, and the State Department. He is currently writing (with Jason Brownlee and Tarek Masoud) The Arab Spring: The Politics of Transformation in North Africa and the Middle East (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012).
John Carey is the Wentworth Professor in the Social Sciences and the chair of the government department at Dartmouth College. He is co-editor of the Legislative Studies Quarterly, and his most recent book is Legislative Voting & Accountability (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
Donald Horowitz, the James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science at Duke University, is currently a Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute for Peace, where he is completing a project on “Constitutional Design for Severely Divided Societies.”
1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
In the months since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued its November 2011 report, which raised new questions about Iran’s nuclear program, the debate in Washington, D.C., over Iran has grown hotter. Policymakers, politicians, scholars, and pundits are now offering wildly divergent predictions and prescriptions.
While these open debates are an improvement over the Beltway groupthink that accompanied the run-up to the Iraq War, many questions remain about the Obama administration’s policy. This conference examines the two central questions surrounding U.S. policy toward Iran: Can diplomacy work? What are the options if diplomacy fails?
Please join us for a vigorous discussion of these critical issues.
| 8:30 a.m. | Registration |
| 9:00 a.m. – 10:30 a.m. | Panel 1: Can Diplomacy Work?Is the current policy — or any diplomatic offer — likely to work? Has the administration defined “diplomacy” as being limited to sanctions and pressure? Could a different approach hold a better chance of success? How is success defined?Michael Adler, Woodrow Wilson Center Justin Logan, Cato Institute Alireza Nader, RAND Corporation Barbara Slavin, Atlantic Council |
| 10:30 a.m. – 10:45 a.m. | Break |
| 10:45 a.m. – 12:15 p.m. | Panel 2: The Options if Diplomacy FailsIf diplomacy fails, what are the military and non-military options the U.S. administration would have? What are the prospects for success? What likely repercussions would follow from bombing Iran?Jamie Fly, Foreign Policy Initiative Matthew Kroenig, Georgetown University Nuno Monteiro, Yale University Joshua Rovner, U.S. Naval War College |
| 12:15 p.m. | Luncheon |
This Cato Conference is free of charge. To register for this event, please fill out the form below and click submit or email events@cato.org, fax (202) 371-0841, or call (202) 789-5229 by 9:00 a.m., Wednesday, March 28, 2012. Please arrive early. Seating is limited and not guaranteed. News media inquiries only (no registrations), please call (202) 789-5200.
The Cato Institute gratefully acknowledges the support of the Ploughshares Fund in helping make this event possible.
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The long shadow of European shoppers
If there is one thing I’ve learned in Rome over the past week, it’s that this morning’s headlines are correct: the Euro zone is headed for more trouble. While Rome’s streets are crowded and people are eating their fill, the cashiers are idle and the shopping bags empty.
That’s because of two factors: taxes and uncertainty. Prime Minister Mario Monti moved quickly once Silvio Berlusconi was out of the way to raise taxes and cut government expenditures. The big tax hit comes at the end of June, when real estate taxes have to be paid. People I am talking with claim they will double, but just as important is the uncertainty. The complicated way they are calculated, and their different application in different localities, means that no one really knows yet how much they are going to have to pay. The natural reaction is to cut back on expenditures until you are sure you can pay the piper.
Contrary to their image, Italians are big savers. The savings rate has dipped to around 11 per cent recently, a high level compared to the U.S. A lot of those savings have been plowed into real estate, which Italians generally buy mostly with cash. It is common for people to own three or four abodes–a house they live in, one in the country, and one or two rented out until the kids are old enough to occupy them. I don’t imagine it will be long before the costs of carrying all this real estate motivate a lot of Italians to sell, creating a bear market in real estate that hasn’t been seen since World War II. Buyers will be few: mortgage rates are rising in Europe, not low and sometimes falling as in the U.S.
The Italian government is trying to promote more growth, largely by loosening up what has been an extraordinarily rigid labor market: Italian firms don’t hire readily because they can’t fire readily, or at all. But there is still a lot of negotiating to do before the system begins to yield. And there is a serious risk of a two-tier labor market, with older workers holding on forever while younger ones never really get onto the first rung of the ladder.
In the meanwhile, Italian industry is losing competitiveness fast. A stop in Deruta earlier this week suggested that the ceramics business is beyond rescue. Dozens of firms have closed and the remaining ones have prohibitively high labor costs. No one but the very rich is going to be able to afford the hand-decorated plates my wife and I bought 40 years ago.
Official projections for this year have the Italian economy shrinking one per cent. That looks likely to be over-optimistic. With the Euro still strong–easily 25% higher than its purchasing power parity with the dollar–I’d bet on a lot deeper recession than that.
This will have a serious impact beyond Europe’s borders. First, in my beloved Balkans: it is hard to find anyone here interested in seeing even Serbia become a European Union member. Second, in the Arab uprising countries. Libya is important to the Italians. They are pleased that oil and gas exports are rebounding. But Syria is ignored here. In a week of lots of conversation with internationally-minded Italians, no one has mentioned it before I did.
But most importantly: a big European recession could affect the recovery in the United States, crimping growth and increasing risks of another relapse, if not into recession then into very slow growth. Barack Obama’s reelection prospects depend on at least moderate growth continuing in the U.S. Republicans who see Barack Obama as a European socialist will think it only just if a recession in overly-regulated Europe leads to his defeat.
It is still far too early to count either Obama or the Europeans out. Even with empty shopping bags, the Italians are still living well and enjoying life. Barack Obama has a difficult seven months ahead: the Iran nuclear issue is likely to come to a head during that time, and he’ll have some tough choices to make on how fast to withdraw from Afghanistan and whether to intervene in Syria as well. But the presidency is still the best place to be running for president from. The consequences of a European recession will dim his prospects, but not rule him out.
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Arms and the man
My friends and colleagues are all over the lot on Syria. One suggests we consider going to war against Bashar al Assad, but then offers more, and more powerful, arguments against than in favor of the proposition. Some are criticizing the Obama administration for not supporting humanitarian safe zones and arming of the Syrian opposition, to be undertaken apparently by the Turks and Saudis respectively. Others view diplomatic and political support for the opposition combined with nonintervention as a strategically correct choice, one that undermines Iran and Russia and hurts their standing with the Sunni Arab world. Who is right?
It is of course difficult to say. I don’t doubt anyone’s sincerity in advocating one way or the other. But the arguments in favor of U.S. military intervention are simply not convincing: the Arab League hasn’t asked for it, the Security Council won’t approve it, and the consequences are wildly unpredictable. Besides, the U.S. needs to be ready in coming months to make a credible threat of the use of force against Iran’s nuclear program. Attacking Syria would undermine American readiness and reduce the credibility of the threat against Iran, which is arguably much more important for U.S. national security than Syria.
Humanitarian safe zones and arming the opposition don’t come out any better. Humanitarian zones are target-rich environments that will need protection from the Syrian army. They are not safe unless made safe. Doing so would be a major military undertaking, with all the disadvantages already cited. Arming the opposition would intensify the civil war, make a collapse of the Syrian state more likely, and spread sectarian and ethnic warfare to Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkey. That is precisely what the United States should be avoiding, not encouraging.
The diplomatic approach the Administration has chosen is not fast and not easy, but it is beginning to show results. Tom Pickering, who knows as much about these things as anyone on earth, sees the UNSC presidential statement as a step forward:
What we need now is a concerted effort to convince the Russians that Bashar is a bad bet. If they want to keep port access in Syria, and arms sales there, they will need to switch horses and back a transition. Bashar will not last long once they make that decision: the Russians can cut off financial and military resources without which he knows he cannot survive.
The question is whether a threat to arm the opposition might help with the diplomacy. This is arguable, it seems to me, and in any case it is what is happening. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have made a lot of noise about arming the opposition. It would be surprising if they weren’t already doing it, and preparing to do more. I don’t expect it to have much impact on the battlefield, where the Syrian army has a clear advantage, especially when it uses artillery against civilian population centers. But it could help to tilt the Russians against Bashar and create a sense of urgency about passing a UNSC resolution that begins the transition process.
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The view of Tehran from Rome
So, you might ask, how did the Italians react to my presentation today at the Institute of International Affairs (IAI) on the Iranian nuclear program?
My co-presenter, Riccardo Alcaro, made a number of interesting points:
- A military attack would end International Atomic Energy Agency inspections and the information they provide, making uncertainty about it much greater and increasing the difficulty of repeated military action after the first effort.
- There is an important distinction between Israel’s concerns, which focus on the existential threat of Iranian nukes as well as the need to maintain Israeli strategic superiority, and American/European concerns that have more to do with an unstable Middle East.
- Europe has played a constructive role at several important moments in dealing diplomatically with Iran and will likely continue to do so, even if it cannot lead the effort.
Riccardo views Israel’s concern with the existential threat as exaggerated. He also notes that nuclear weapons have never really given any state enhanced regional capability to compel others to do as the nuclear state wants. I think he is basically correct about this. Nuclear weapons contribute to the frame in which power relations are determined, but they do not provide a practical diplomatic or military tool.
Questioning focused on the legal basis for military action, the significance of proposals for a nuclear-free (or WMD-free) zone in the Middle East, the reaction of Sunni Arabs to a military attack on Iran, and whether American aversion to containment might moderate after the U.S. election.
In response, I offered a few thoughts. Harold Koh (the State Department legal advisor) will surely write a good memo on the legal basis, but it is also possible it would be fixed after the fact, as the intervention in Kosovo was. The Americans simply don’t have the kind of prohibition on military action without UN approval that several European countries have in their constitutions. The nuclear free zone is a lovely idea with no practical impact; it will be a consequence of peace in the Middle East, not a cause of it. The Muslim Brotherhoods that have been the big political winners thus far in Tunisia and Egypt are still developing their relations with the United States. The Sunni street, which is admittedly more important after the Arab spring than before it, may not respond sympathetically to Iran. The successful use of force has its own logic.
On containment, the Americans will certainly turn to it if their efforts to prevent Iran getting nuclear weapons (including military action) fail. What other choice would they have? In that case several Sunni Arab states may decide to develop nuclear weapons, unless the Americans provide a credible nuclear umbrella. But that is precisely what the Americans do not want to do. I can’t say failure to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons is not an option, since it always is a possibility. But its consequences could be devastating to American hope of turning attention away from the Middle East to Asia and the Pacific.
The Iranian embassy official present, first counselor Ahmad Hajihosseini, averred that Iran is a victim in all this talk about nuclear weapons and complained that no Iranian was on the panel. I of course would welcome an Iranian speaker at Johns Hopkins, as IAI would in Rome. And I don’t think it was so bad an idea for Tehran to get a report on this discussion among Americans and Europeans.
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Blink, or else
I am speaking tomorrow at the Italian International Affairs Institute (IAI) on Iran, the United States and Europe. Here are the speaking notes I’ve prepared for myself.
1. This year’s biggest foreign policy puzzle is how to handle Iran and its nuclear program. The piece of this puzzle I would like to talk about is Washington. What have the Americans got in mind? What are they trying to achieve? What will they do to achieve it? What happens if they fail?
2. The objective is clear: President Obama aims to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. He rejects containment. He has broad support in the Congress and beyond for this position.
3. There should really be no doubt about American willingness to use force to achieve this goal. If diplomacy fails to stop Iran from moving toward nuclear weapons, the Americans will attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, and possibly much more.
4. This would not be a one-time decision. It would only set back the Iranian nuclear effort a year or two. We will have to repeat the attacks, likely at more frequent intervals. I don’t agree with Marvin Weinbaum that the Iranians will welcome military action, but it offers only a temporary and unsatisfactory solution. That may be enough for Israel, as Richard Cohen suggests, but it is not good enough for the U.S., which has other priorities in the world and needs to tend them.
5. Karl Bildt and Erkki Tuomioja, foreign ministers of Sweden and Finland, are also wrong to suggest diplomacy is the only option. But it is a preferred option. In a little noted passage in his interview with Jeffrey Goldberg earlier this month, the President outlined what his preference:
…the only way, historically, that a country has ultimately decided not to get nuclear weapons without constant military intervention has been when they themselves take [nuclear weapons] off the table. That’s what happened in Libya, that’s what happened in South Africa. And we think that, without in any way being under an illusion about Iranian intentions, without in any way being naive about the nature of that regime, they are self-interested. They recognize that they are in a bad, bad place right now. It is possible for them to make a strategic calculation that, at minimum, pushes much further to the right whatever potential breakout capacity they may have, and that may turn out to be the best decision for Israel’s security.
6. David Frum misinterprets this passage as meaning that the president is bluffing on the use of force. That is a mistake. But Obama is clearly saying he prefers a diplomatic solution, because it has the potential to be longer-lasting than the military one.
7. From the Washington perspective, Iran is in diplomatic, political and economic isolation. The P5+1 are united. Sanctions are biting. The Sunni Arab world has come to the realization that Iranian nuclear weapons will require a response, one that will make the Middle East a far more dangerous place than it has been even in the past several decades.
8. Many countries have made the commitment that the President is referring to. They usually do it by signing and ratifying the Non-Proliferation Treaty (or in Latin America the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and agreeing to strict International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. Brazil and Argentina made this commitment in the 1990s.
9. The trouble is that Iran, a state party to the NPT, has violated its commitments by undertaking uranium enrichment outside the inspection regime and also working on nuclear explosives. So President Obama will be looking for verifiable commitments reflecting a genuine decision not to pursue nuclear weapons, based on the calculation that Iran will be better off without them.
10. How could that be? Acquisition of nuclear weapons creates security dilemmas for Tehran. The United States will target a nuclear Iran (we have foresworn first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, but not against nuclear weapons states), Israel will not only target Iran but also launch on warning, and other countries in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Egypt?) are likely to begin seriously to pursue nuclear weapons, greatly complicating Iran’s situation.
11. Keeping its enrichment technology but giving up on nuclear weapons would provide Iran with a good deal of prestige without creating as many problems. U.S. intelligence leaks claim that Iran has not in fact made the decision to acquire nuclear weapons, leaving the door open to an agreement along the lines the President suggests.
12. Such a diplomatic solution would require Iran to agree to rigorous and comprehensive inspections as well as limit enrichment to well below weapons grade, which is 90% and above.
13. The question is whether the internal politics of the three countries most directly involved (United States, Iran and Israel) will allow an agreement along these lines. As Martin Indyk points out, they are currently engaged in a vicious cycle game of chicken: Israel threatens military action, the U.S. ratchets up sanctions to forestall it, Iran doubles down on the nuclear program, causing the Israelis to threaten even more….
14. Can Obama deliver on such a diplomatic solution? The Americans are hard to read. Best to listen to is Senator Mitch McConnell, who as Senate opposition leader represents the anti-Obama position. He declared earlier this month:
If Iran, at any time, begins to enrich uranium to weapons-grade level, or decides to go forward with a weapons program, then the United States will use overwhelming force to end that program.
15. This was generally read as a belligerent statement, since it makes explicit the American willingness to use military force if its red lines are crossed. But in fact it is consistent with the kind of diplomatic solution Obama has in mind.
16. But this Obama/McConnell proposition asks of Iran considerably less than Israel would like. Israel wants to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons capability. This means giving up the technology required to enrich uranium to weapons grade or reprocess plutonium.
17. No country I know of has given up uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing technology, once acquired. It isn’t even clear what it would mean to do so, since the know-how resides in scientists’ brains and not in any given physical plant.
18. If war is to be avoided, someone has to break the cycle Indyk refers to, putting a deal on the table. Daniel Levy suggests that Netanyahu is not really committed to Israeli military action but is trying to stiffen Obama’s spine. He is unlikely to blink. Obama is constrained because of the American elections from appearing soft on Iran. He has to appear ready and willing to use military force.
19. This leaves a possible initiative to Tehran, which is free to move now that its parliamentary elections have been held. They marked a defeat for President Ahmedinejad, who has appeared to be the Iranian official most willing to deal on the nuclear program. Supreme Leader Khamenei is more committed to the game of chicken. He may even think nuclear weapons necessary to his regime’s survival, a conclusion Indyk thinks rational in light of what has happened with North Korea on the one hand and Libya on the other.
20. It is really anyone’s guess what Khamenei will do. But at least he has an undivided polity behind him. My hope is that either he or Obama–better both–decide to blink and cut a deal that ends Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions definitively and avoids a military effort that will have to be repeated at shorter intervals for a long time to come.
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Peace picks this week
I’m late with this week’s top items. Missed two good ones today: on Syria option at Brookings and on war with Iran at Georgetown. I hope you caught them. Here is the rest of the week, with most of the interesting stuff on Wednesday:
1. The Human Rights Situation in Syria: An Assessment by the United Nations Independent Commission of Inquiry, Brookings, 4:30-6 pm March 20
For the past year, the international community has been largely paralyzed in responding to Bashar al-Assad’s violent repression of protests in Syria. Though the United Nations Security Council has failed to pass a condemnatory resolution, the UN Human Rights Council swiftly established an independent international Commission of Inquiry in September 2011 to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law since the beginning of the uprising. After extensive interviews with victims and witnesses, the commission’s report presented this month concluded that the Syrian military and security forces have been committing gross violations of human rights since the onset of the protests.
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC
Map
RELATED CONTENT
On March 20, Managing Global Order and the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host the members of the commission to discuss the findings of this recently released report. Paulo Pinhiero, chairman of the commission, along with commissioners Yakin Ertürk and Karen AbuZayd will provide an overview of their investigation and describe the current human rights situation in Syria. Senior Fellow Ted Piccone, deputy director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.After the program, panelists will take audience questions.
Participants
Panelists
Karen AbuZayd
Commissioner, Commission of Inquiry for Syria
Former Commissioner General, UN Relief and Works Agency
Yakin Ertürk
Commissioner, Commission of Inquiry for Syria
Former UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women
Paulo Pinheiro
Chairperson, Commission of Inquiry for Syria
Former UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar
2. Challenging the Axis of Resistance: Syria, Iran and the Strategic Balance in the Middle East, Reserve Officers Association, One Constitution Avenue, NE 7:30-9 am March 21
The Iran-Syria alliance poses significant challenges for U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East. Iran’s support for Syria has helped the Assad regime sustain a brutal campaign of repression against the Syrian people, insulating it from the full effect of international and Arab sanctions. Syria’s support for Iran has enhanced Tehran’s regional influence, promoted Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon, and helped to consolidate an “axis of resistance” that has reshaped the strategic balance in the Middle East.
Please join Jay Solomon, foreign affairs correspondent of the Wall Street Journal, and Daniel Brumberg, USIP’s senior adviser in the Center for Conflict Management, as they examine two of the most significant challenges for the Middle East, Iran and Syria, and the ramifications that their interplay has for U.S. regional strategy. The discussion will be moderated by Steven Heydemann, senior adviser for Middle East Initiatives at the U.S. Institute of Peace.
This is the third in a series of breakfast briefings titled, “A Year of Turmoil: The Arab Awakening and the Path Ahead.” The briefings are organized by the United States Institute of Peace in partnership with the Defense Education Forum of the Reserve Officers Association.
Speakers
- Jay Solomon, Discussant
Foreign Affairs Correspondent
Wall Street Journal - Daniel Brumberg, Discussant
Senior Adviser, Center for Conflict Management
U.S. Institute of Peace - Steven Heydemann, Moderator
Senior Adviser for Middle East Initiatives
U.S. Institute of Peace
Breakfast will be available at 7:30am, followed by the moderated discussion from 8-9am.
3. Iran and the West at a Crossroad: Will Recent Elections Make or Break a Deal on Iran’s Nuclear Program? Middle East Institute, 12-13:15 pm March 21
Location:
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has described upcoming talks with Iran over its nuclear program as “the last chance to resolve the crisis.” Yet as the final hour approaches for an opportunity to avert a military attack, there are few apparent signs Iran will make compromises. Recent parliamentary elections have only strengthened the power of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the hardliners in his inner circle who aspire to make the Islamic republic a regional superpower. Join us for a discussion with Geneive Abdo and Syed Aliakbar Mousavi on the impact of the elections on the future of Iran’s nuclear program, and the outlook for the forthcoming negotiations aimed at de-escalating U.S.-Iranian tensions.
Bio:
Geneive Abdo is the director of the Iran Program at The Century Foundation, a Washington and New York-based think tank. Her current research focuses on contemporary Iran and political Islam. She is the creator and editor of the newly-launched website: www.insideIRAN.org She was formerly the Liaison Officer for the Alliance of Civilizations, a U.N. initiative under Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Before joining the United Nations, Abdo was a foreign correspondent. Her 20-year career focused on coverage of the Middle East and the Muslim world. From 1998-2001, Abdo was the Iran correspondent for the Guardian and a regular contributor to the Economist and the International Herald Tribune. Abdo is the author of No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam (Oxford University Press, 2000), and Mecca and Main Street (Oxford University Press, 2006). Abdo’s commentaries and essays on Islam have appeared in Foreign Policy, the New York Times, and the Washington Post, among other outlets. She has been a commentator on NPR the BBC, the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, CNN, and al-Jazeera,
Seyed Aliakbar Mousavi is a visiting fellow at the University of Maryland and a digital freedom & human rights activist. From 2000 to 2004, Mousavi served as a member of the 6th Parliament of Iran, where he held several positions including Deputy of the Parliamentary ICT Committee, Secretary of the Tehran District, and Head of Inspecting and Supervising of Prisons. Currently, he advises the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, an advocacy group based in the United States, and was a visiting fellow in the Iranian Studies program at Stanford University. He is the founder and former general secretary of the Iranian Graduates Organization and was a member of the Central Council of the Iranian Students Union. Mousavi was also a participant in the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), and an founder of the Prisoners Rights Defense Association.
4. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Looking for the Arab Spring, Georgetown University, 12:30-2 pm March 21
This event requires a ticket or RSVP
The Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding
invites you to:
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Looking for the Arab Spring
________________________
featuring:
Natana J. DeLong-Bas
________________________
Wednesday, March 21
12:30pm – ICC 270
________________________
In the midst of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia alone seems to have escaped public protests over corruption, authoritarianism and the quest for more equitable sharing of benefits. This impression masks the realities of life and reform within the Kingdom. This presentation explores some of the ways in which Saudi Arabia is working to address the challenges of the Arab Spring from a long-term perspective, offering analysis of areas of both stability and uncertainty for the future.
________________________
Dr. Natana J. DeLong-Bas is the author of Jihad for Islam: The Struggle for the Future of Saudi Arabia (forthcoming, Oxford, 2012), Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (rev. ed., Oxford, 2008 – named “1 of the 5 best books for understanding Islam” by the Wall Street Journal), and Notable Muslims: Muslim Builders of World Civilization and Culture (OneWorld, 2006), and co-author of Women in Muslim Family Law (with John L. Esposito, rev. ed., Syracuse, 2001). She is Editor-in-Chief of [The Oxford] Encylopedia of Islam and Women (forthcoming, Oxford, 2012) and Deputy Editor of The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World and Oxford Islamic Studies Online (Oxford, 2008), as well as serving on the Advisory Board for Oxford Bibliographies Online – Islamic Studies. She serves as a consultant to the media, the US and international governments and corporations and is a member of The British Council’s Our Shared Future Opinion Leaders Network. Her Op-Ed pieces on contemporary issues in Islam have been published in the US, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. She teaches comparative theology (Islam and Christianity) at Boston College.
___________________________________________________________
Please RSVP here:
http://gulfarabspring.eventbrite.com/
Seating is limited.
Lunch will be served.
5. Halting the Descent:U.S. Policy toward the Deteriorating Situation in Iraq, 2172 Rayburn, 1:30 pm March 21
You are respectfully requested to attend the following open hearing of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building.
General Jack Keane, USA, Retired
(Former Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army)
Lieutenant General James Dubik, USA, Retired
Senior Fellow
Institute for the Study of War
Kimberly Kagan, Ph.D.
President
Institute for the Study of War
Colin H. Kahl, Ph.D.
Senior Fellow
Center for a New American Security
6. Ahmed Rashid – Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, Politics and Prose, 7 pm March 21
Four years after his Descent into Chaos, the Lahore-based Pakistani journalist reassesses the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan and offers suggestions for American foreign policy in the region. He pays particular attention to the role of the Taliban and the reliability of American allies.
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