Belgrade has to bite the bullet
I could quibble about details in the ICG’s latest report on Kosovo and Serbia. It minimizes Belgrade’s role in north Kosovo too much, it is too critical of the EU’s current posture on candidacy for Serbia, and it fails to take adequately into account the political pressure Albin Kurti is generating inside Kosovo. I disagree with ICG’s advocacy of “Ahtisaari plus,” a rubric guaranteed to face rejection in Pristina and lead eventually to partition. “Ahtisaari implementation” is a better approach.
But I won’t quibble. This is a good report full of interesting details and basically sound analysis, with some good policy conclusions. A little good will would go a long way, and good will is absolutely necessary. The problem in north Kosovo will not be solved until there is solid cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina as well as decent rapport between Pristina and the Serbs in the north. These are main messages of the report, and they are correct.
None of it is likely to happen any time soon. The referendum February 14-15 in the north on acceptance of the Pristina-based institutions will further poison an already toxic political environment. So too will Serbia’s spring parliamentary elections, especially (as ICG notes) the effort to hold them in Serb-majority areas of Kosovo. Albanian firebrand Albin Kurti will no doubt find a way to embarrass Prime Minister Hashim Thaci for not preventing the referendum and elections from happening. Northerners will continue to block routes and prevent implementation of the EU-sponsored customs agreement, unless Belgrade makes a truly concerted effort to cut them off.
ICG is at pains to suggest that Germany, the Netherlands and the UK should ease up a bit on their conditions for Serbia’s EU candidacy. My guess is that won’t happen. None of those countries is particularly anxious to proceed apace with EU enlargement. All have reasons to want to demonstrate to their domestic constituencies that they are prepared to play hard ball and not lower the bar for EU candidacy. And Serbia’s refusal to allow proper customs collection at its boundary/border with Kosovo is a serious disqualification for candidacy. A bit more consistency in the EU approach would be helpful, but I don’t think that is really the heart of the problem.
ICG has it right when it says the fundamental issue is sovereignty. This is the bullet Belgrade has to bite. It doesn’t have to recognize Kosovo or establish diplomatic relations, but it has to accept the fact that the Pristina institutions are the legitimate governing authority on the entire, undivided territory of Kosovo. As ICG quite rightly points out, Serbia cannot otherwise continue to appeal to Security Council resolution 1244, which has no provision for dividing authority and no provision for continuing the presence in Kosovo of Serbian institutions.
This does not mean that Pristina would or could govern the Serbs in the north, who under the Ahtisaari plan that Pristina has accepted have ample room for self-governance. No doubt there will be some need for additional implementation agreements to reassure the northerners that money will flow to them from Belgrade without interference and that they will get fair treatment in Pristina-based institutions, especially the courts. These are legitimate concerns that Pristina should be prepared to discuss, provided the sovereignty question is resolved.
Until Belgrade is prepared to acknowledge that it has lost the right to station security forces or other state institutions anywhere in Kosovo without Pristina’s permission, I fear we won’t see much good will or the good things it could produce. But I am glad ICG, which I have criticized sharply in the past for its reports on Bosnia, has given me good reason to offer props this time.
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6 thoughts on “Belgrade has to bite the bullet”
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Has the ICG hired some new analysts? Instead of asking what it’s going to take to make Serbia happy, it’s now asking how Serbia can come to terms with reality. While the report does say that some form of “Ahtisaari plus” would theoretically be the best solution, it also says it’s impossible and would lead to RS-type problems as the Northerners treat the new conditions as a starting point on the way to complete separation from Kosovo.
Old habits die hard, though – the ICG is still framing the current stumbling block as “the problem of Kosovo’s representation” at regional meetings, while it’s actually a problem of Serbia’s attendance – Kosovo’s representatives have participated in regional meetings, unchaperoned, for years now. In the past Serbia has refused to attend, or its representative has stalked out when Kosovo’s appeared. Attempting to force other countries to accept its interpretation of Kosovo’s status by insisting on their including a reference to Res. 1244 on Kosovo’s nameplate is going too far – if Serbia doesn’t want to attend, it can after all stay home. Self-isolation is always an option. Originally Kosovo’s negotiating team offered to use only the short form of their name, “Kosovo” rather than “Republic of Kosovo” in return for Serbia dropping its demand for a reference to Res. 1244, which they refused to do, but ever since Thaci returned from the Steering Group meeting where ending international supervision was discussed (and a resolution was passed in the Assembly), Prishtina’s negotiating position has hardened, and now they’re holding out for the “Republic.”
The report notes other occasions over the years where Serbia has overplayed its hand, rejecting solutions that it would gladly have accepted a few years later as the ground continued to shift in Kosovo’s favor and it became more self-confident in its actions. If Serbia continues as it has, there will be a new painting to hang in Belgrade next to the one of Patriarch Arsenije leading the Serbs out of Turkish-held Kosovo in 1690, with the Four Mayors at the head of an endless column of tractors. But with a different flag, and probably without the sheep.
“A little good will would go a long way” I agree. Starting with Balkan analysts. A good part of Belgrade’s frustration is, I venture, fanned by the sheer hypocrisy and gall of the major powers over this issue, that would never tolerate such a violation of their own sovereignty.
Therefore just as Belgrade should face reality, so should apologists like serwer, who should openly say that their government sided with one side in an ethnic conflict, that international law was broken with NATO intervention, that they openly advocate to refuse entry into the EU until they give up part of their sovereign territory.
Such analysts would still justify the current situation using other arguments, pragmatic and otherwise. good. We always talk about balkan politicians sensitizing their public – time the foreigners helped out by showing some balls and leadership rather than hypocritically sermonizing to balkan politicians and publics.
Mr. Serwer, when will you finally start to see the Serbs in Kosovo as human beings instead of pieces in some geopolitical chess game?
I won’t quibble either over whether or not 1244 forbids Serbian institutions in Kosovo any more than it might forbid Pristina institutions established outside UNMIK. And I agree that an “Ahtisaari implementation” approach could work. But the formula Mr. Serwer suggests – that Belgrade accept that “Pristina institutions are the legitimate governing authority on the entire, undivided territory of Kosovo” – seems to go further than necessary for a compromise solution on status. That Kosovo is a territorial entity and that everyone might participate in central institutions does not require acceptance that Pristina’s writ extends to the north in any practical sense. The “legitimate governing authority” might be better thought of as agreed central institutions of an integral territory about which there is yet no agreement on its sovereign status.
If that formulation is somehow more amenable, I’d have no objection: “agreed central institutions of an integral territory about which there is yet no agreement on its sovereign status.” But Pristina’s writ will definitely have to extend to the north in some practical senses, especially customs collection but likely also other functions, as provided for in Ahtisaari and as agreed in the Belgrade/Pristina talks.
That would require a formula for dealing with customs and customs fees, perhaps along the lines of what Belgrade and Pristina have already agreed plus something on revenue sharing. Should be possible. Other functions such as police and courts may need an international role to interface along lines of Ahtisaari. Depends on “good will” – especially from the Quint -, patience and compromise from all. Possible.