Belgrade has to bite the bullet

I could quibble about details in the ICG’s latest report on Kosovo and Serbia.  It minimizes Belgrade’s role in north Kosovo too much, it is too critical of the EU’s current posture on candidacy for Serbia, and it fails to take adequately into account the political pressure Albin Kurti is generating inside Kosovo.  I disagree with ICG’s advocacy of “Ahtisaari plus,” a rubric guaranteed to face rejection in Pristina and lead eventually to partition.  “Ahtisaari implementation” is a better approach.

But I won’t quibble.  This is a good report full of interesting details and basically sound analysis, with some good policy conclusions.   A little good will would go a long way, and good will is absolutely necessary.  The problem in north Kosovo will not be solved until there is solid cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina as well as decent rapport between Pristina and the Serbs in the north.  These are main messages of the report, and they are correct.

None of it is likely to happen any time soon.  The referendum February 14-15 in the north on acceptance of the Pristina-based institutions will further poison an already toxic political environment.  So too will Serbia’s spring parliamentary elections, especially (as ICG notes) the effort to hold them in Serb-majority areas of Kosovo.  Albanian firebrand Albin Kurti will no doubt find a way to embarrass Prime Minister Hashim Thaci for not preventing the referendum and elections from happening.  Northerners will continue to block routes and prevent implementation of the EU-sponsored customs agreement, unless Belgrade makes a truly concerted effort to cut them off.

ICG is at pains to suggest that Germany, the Netherlands and the UK should ease up a bit on their conditions for Serbia’s EU candidacy.  My guess is that won’t happen.  None of those countries is particularly anxious to proceed apace with EU enlargement.  All have reasons to want to demonstrate to their domestic constituencies that they are prepared to play hard ball and not lower the bar for EU candidacy.  And Serbia’s refusal to allow proper customs collection at its boundary/border with Kosovo is a serious disqualification for candidacy.  A bit more consistency in the EU approach would be helpful, but I don’t think that is really the heart of the problem.

ICG has it right when it says the fundamental issue is sovereignty.  This is the bullet Belgrade has to bite.  It doesn’t have to recognize Kosovo or establish diplomatic relations, but it has to accept the fact that the Pristina institutions are the legitimate governing authority on the entire, undivided territory of Kosovo.  As ICG quite rightly points out, Serbia cannot otherwise continue to appeal to Security Council resolution 1244, which has no provision for dividing authority and no provision for continuing the presence in Kosovo of Serbian institutions.

This does not mean that Pristina would or could govern the Serbs in the north, who under the Ahtisaari plan that Pristina has accepted have ample room for self-governance.  No doubt there will be some need for additional implementation agreements to reassure the northerners that money will flow to them from Belgrade without interference and that they will get fair treatment in Pristina-based institutions, especially the courts.  These are legitimate concerns that Pristina should be prepared to discuss, provided the sovereignty question is resolved.

Until Belgrade is prepared to acknowledge that it has lost the right to station security forces or other state institutions anywhere in Kosovo without Pristina’s permission, I fear we won’t see much good will or the good things it could produce.  But I am glad ICG, which I have criticized sharply in the past for its reports on Bosnia, has given me good reason to offer props this time.