The longer you wait, the higher the price

The 3.5 (sometimes called four) Serb-majority municipalities of northern Kosovo are under Belgrade’s control, not Pristina’s.  Milan Marinković writes from Niš:

The February 14-15 referendum in four Serb-dominated municipalities in northern Kosovo is approaching. People will be asked whether they accept the state institutions of Kosovo, headquartered in Pristina and dominated by Albanians. An overwhelming “no” vote seems assured.  Its potential implications may be damaging:  it could alienate Belgrade further from Europe and make it more difficult for Pristina to establish even nominal authority in the north, strengthening Kosovar Albanian  nationalists and reducing the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the disputed territory.

Political leaders of the northern Serbs fear the “parallel” institutions they control might be dismantled in response to German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s demand to Serbian authorities last summer.  They see the referendum as a way to make these institutions more legitimate and thus fortify their own political position.  The referendum could also block effective law enforcement in the north, where organized crime groups have exploited the situation to develop a highly profitable smuggling network.

With Serbia’s own spring parliamentary elections in sight and candidacy for the European Union still uncertain, the referendum could not come at a worse time for the Serbian government. Serb politicians in northern Kosovo who receive their salaries from Belgrade are now ignoring Belgrade’s appeals. On top of that, within the ruling coalition there are several factions with different approaches to how the problem of Kosovo should be dealt with.  Serbian President Boris Tadić is expected to have the final word.

He and his Democratic Party (DS) are hoping Serbia will get EU candidacy so that they can win back credibility among the pro-Western part of the electorate. Somehow meeting Merkel’s demands, or nullifying them, is vital.  But most of those who voted for Tadić and DS in the last elections because of their European agenda feel betrayed to such an extent that candidacy alone could hardly allay their disappointment.

At the same time, the ongoing crisis in the European Union gives rise to euro-skepticism, which the anti-European opposition parties in Serbia exploit. They insist that Serbia must give up on the European integration process, arguing that the EU sooner or later is going to dissolve. This anti-EU rhetoric is being increasingly met with approval in Serbia today.

President Tadić has limited options. He can continue what he is already doing–calling publicly on the local Serb leaders to abstain from the referendum–but that presumably will not be enough to persuade leading EU countries to reward Serbia with candidate status, unless the northern Kosovo Serbs unexpectedly decide to acquiesce to his request.

Belgrade could also threaten to stop funding the parallel institutions in the north should the referendum be held. While this would be welcomed by the West, it is hard to imagine such a radical shift in Belgrade’s policy on a “national” issue amid a pre-election campaign given the political risks it would entail.

Judging by previous experiences, whatever President Tadić chooses to do, he will wait until the last minute. What he would like most is to somehow preserve the status quo until after the election, but that could well prove to be infeasible. Serbia has so far missed several opportunities to adjust its policy on Kosovo to reality. And the longer you hesitate to do the inevitable, the higher is the price you pay in the end.

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3 thoughts on “The longer you wait, the higher the price”

  1. The northerners called their “referendum” – more a poll – to make clear that resistance to rule by Pristina – and presence on the barricades – is not due to the influence of “criminals” and “radicals” but is a popular manifestation. Since they announced it, most internationals (aside from Pieter Feith) have stopped referring to them that way and KFOR says it does not consider local leaders “parallel.” So one might consider that it has had the desired effect already so why hold it? But there is also a political dimension, i.e., the upcoming Serbian elections. The Tadic opposition probably enjoys putting him in this situation.

    All in all, it might be best for everyone to stop making a big thing of this poll and focus on the real issues of achieving a peaceful approach to the north.

    1. It is true that most of Serbs in the north oppose any idea of being integrated into the independent state of Kosovo not because they are intimitaded by local criminals, but because they generally do not trust the Albanians. Interethnic violence in Kosovo lasts much longer than ten years of Slobodan Milosevic’s rule. It only culminated in 1990s, but had actually existed ever since the 1st Balkan war (1912), when Serbia re-occupied the territory, taking it back from the former Ottoman empire. Given that ethnic Albanians at that time were already an overwhelming majority there, Serbian state was using various forms of repression and violence in attempt to expel them from Kosovo and populate it with as many Serbs as possible in order to completely change its ethno-demographic structure in Serbia’s favor. Over time this naturally led to an increasing resistance from Albanians, more militant among whom resorted to retaliation. In both cases of violence – i.e. Serbia’s state repression and the Albanian retaliation – majority of the victims were innocent people, rather than the perpetrators. The outcome, as we can see, is a huge mutual distrust between the two ethnic communities. The ensuing feeling of hostility is today being widely exploited both by the criminal clans which operate in Kosovo and its neighborhood and nationalist political parties.

      1. Milan wrote: “but had actually existed ever since the 1st Balkan war (1912)”
        Actually it goes back to 1878 when Serbia conquered its Southern part (Nis-Vranje) and drove out a number of Albanians. This resulted in retaliatory expulsions of Serbs from Kosovo.

        If you read Edith Durham’s book High Albania (free on the internet) you will see that it contains two chapters on her visit to Kosovo in 1908 and describes the position of the Serbs in Kosovo as quite problematic. This was related to an uprising in Macedonia for which the Ottoman Empire had been forced to accept Western peacekeepers.

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