Month: February 2012
Wising up
Two weeks ago, I was getting ready to write a post suggesting that Bashar al Assad would likely win his current contest with Syrian protesters. It looked as if they had made a definitive choice in favor of a violent uprising, one that the Syrian security forces are capable of defeating. The net result would have been a low-level insurgency, aka civil war, one that would lead to increasing sectarian separation and destabilization of neighboring countries, including Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. That outcome–the worst of all possible worlds for the United States–is still possible.
But Friday’s 41 peaceful demonstrations in Damascus, a few of them large, suggest that the opposition has wised up. Rather than a force-on-force confrontation they are bound to lose, the protesters spread out their efforts and kept them non-violent. Such coordinated risings in the capital are far more important for gaining adherents and defying the regime than killing a few soldiers or even Shabiha (non-uniformed regime goons) would be. It has forced the regime today to rush its security forces into the capital to squelch the defiance and re-establish fear. With any luck, they’ll find nothing to repress, as the protesters will hopefully be ready to ignite efforts elsewhere.
This is smart revolution. Drawing lines around specific territory and trying to defend it would be dumb revolution, because it identifies precisely the territory that the regime has to attack to kill its enemies. It has shown no hesitancy to do that. Safe areas and humanitarian corridors are unsafe unless defended with adequate force, which no one has yet shown any sign of readiness to field.
Meanwhile on the diplomatic front, the Chinese are showing some signs of veto remorse, averring openly that they support the Arab League plan calling for Bashar al Assad to step aside and allow his vice president to take charge of a transition to democracy. I’d be the first to admit that a similar scheme is not looking so great in Yemen, where yesterday’s one-candidate election will presumably lead to Vice President Hadi’s takeover of power and initiation of some kind of transition. The problem in Yemen is that those sharing power do not include the protesters who initiated the revolution and who reject amnesty for former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
The situation in Syria is different. There really is no question of amnesty for Bashar. The best he can hope for is exile in Iran, which backs him to the hilt. But he could just as well end up dead like Muammar Qaddafi or on trial like Hosni Mubarak, prospects that are presumably inspiring his murderous attempts to repress the demonstrations.
“Friends of Syria,” the international coalition in favor of the revolution, plans to meet Friday in Tunisia. This is a good occasion to reiterate support for the Arab League plan, tighten sanctions, press for greater unity among the Syrian opposition and reiterate support for nonviolent protest. It may also be a good opportunity to strategize about bringing China and even Russia into the fold. The Chinese seem halfway there. The Russians will need some guarantees on access to port facilities in Syria before signing on.
Meanwhile, watch those Iranian warships that traversed the Suez Canal yesterday. They have now docked at Tartus. If they deliver weapons or personnel to Syria, it would be a good moment for someone to intervene. That’s not trivial, since there is no arms embargo, but that’s why we’ve got all those clever lawyers in the State Department. I hope they are busy scribbling the decision memos.
PS: The Iranians claimed the ships docked, but the Pentagon says they never did. Maybe someone in Tehran understood the risk.
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Own goal
I wrote a few weeks ago from Belgrade that “nationalism has the edge.” Milan Marinković, who lives in Niš, Serbia, writes that in Bosnia the situation is even more concerning, given its multi-ethnic/confessional fabric. Separation of religion and state there is an imperative:
Is secularism achievable in the Western Balkans? In former Yugoslavia it was. On paper, it still is. The constitutions of the states that emerged from Yugoslavia prescribe that religion should be kept separate from state affairs. But in real life the separation is difficult to put into effect.
A strong tendency of religious institutions in the Balkans to meddle in politics is understandable. For most of the region’s history, religion played a crucial role both in building and hardening ethnic (aka “national”) identities.
Since the fall of the Berlin wall, religion has significantly contributed to the upsurge of aggressive ethnic nationalism throughout the region. From the nationalist standpoint that prevails among South Slavs, in order to be recognized as a “true” member of a nation (aka ethnic group), one must belong to the relevant religious denomination. Accordingly, a Serb can be Serb only if he or she is Orthodox Christian; a Croat can be Croat only if she or he is Catholic; a Bosniak can be Bosniak only if he or she is Muslim.
This conception of national identity as rooted in religion served the purposes of political and religious elites during the wars of 1990s. There has been little change since then. Today it guarantees Serb parties votes from Serbs, Muslim parties votes from Muslims and Croat parties votes from Croats. There might be limited political competition within ethnic groups, but “nationalist” parties would prefer no competition between them.
The rigid ethno-religious concept is now a major obstacle to reconciliation among the formerly belligerent groups. The only apparent solution in a state like Bosnia, where there are three “constituent” peoples (Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs), is separation of religion and state: secularization, in a word.
In Bosnian elementary schools, as well as in Serbian and Croatian ones, religious education is a voluntary subject, but the grades children receive are calculated into their overall score at the end of a school year together with the grades in compulsory subjects. The former education minister of Sarajevo canton, Emir Suljagić, found this practice to be unjust to the children who did not attend religious education.
Not surprisingly, Suljagić is a member of Bosnia’s Social Democratic Party, which prides itself on multiethnic appeal, even if the bulk of its votes come from people who regard themselves as Bosniaks. More surprisingly, he lost thirteen family members murdered at Srebrenica in 1995, when Serb forces overwhelmed the Eastern Bosnia town and killed thousands of Bosniak men and boys.
Suljagić ’s intention was not to eliminate religious education from the schools, though he certainly could have attempted that. He only tried to establish a rule that would have put an end to unequal treatment of non-religious students, who do not attend religious instruction. But the wrath of Bosnia’s Islamic community leadership and radical Islamists forced Suljagić to resign and leave the country following a series of death threats to him and his family.
What happened to Emir Suljagić demonstrates how strong resistance to secularization is in Bosnia. Worse than that, it shows the inability – some even believe unwillingness – of Bosnian police to protect the safety of a state official – let alone an ordinary person.
In an attempt to justify his secessionist ambitions, the president of the Serb-dominated half of Bosnia, Milorad Dodik, often accuses Bosniaks of trying to make Bosnia an Islamic state. Top clerics of the Islamic community of Bosnia, led by Reis Effendi Mustafa Cerić, like to portray themselves as the “ultimate guardians” of the Bosnian state. Unfortunately, this tends to prove Dodik’s point, as does hounding Suljagić from office.
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The state of Iraq
Corey Gannon, one of my Johns Hopkins/SAIS master’s students this term, offers the following account of a Carnegie Endowment discussion earlier this week on “The State of Iraq.” Speakers included Ad Melkert, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Marina Ottaway, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Lt. Col. Joel Rayburn, Senior Military Fellow at the National Defense University. The focus was on current governance issues in Iraq and on political prospects over the next several years.
Melkert stressed the need to be humble in predicting the political future of Iraq. Open competition for office has not been a feature of Iraqi politics since 1958. The country is still defining its policies and asserting its constitutional sovereignty. There is reason for cautious optimistism, as the current political situation in Iraq is a “fragmented reality” without the cover of unified authoritarianism. The central question is whether the constitution will hold. Despite ongoing Sunni-Shia, intra-Sunni, and intra-Shia tensions, Iraqi politicians still view “sticking to the rules of the game” as advantageous. More people, he said, are invested in the state, financially and otherwise. In the regional context, Turkey is increasingly important and is beginning to feel the tension of being a regional broker. The situation in Syria will provide reduced opportunities for spoilers from that country to disrupt the Iraqi political process.
Marina Ottaway is “cautiously pessimistic.” She thinks Iraq is likely headed toward heightened sectarian violence. The problem is an “unhealthy pluralism.” Democratic institutions are possible partially because people can change their minds, but unchanging ethnic and religious identities dominate Iraqi politics. Despite their claims, all Iraqi political parties are sectarian. It is questionable whether there is time for the rules to develop before the country returns to conflict, including rules regarding the degree of autonomy of parts of Iraq. Top leaders are not known for their democratic tendencies and historically leaders have held power for long periods of time. Syria and other countries in relative disarray in the region are likely to exacerbate the problems in Iraq, in contrast to Melkert’s prediction.
Lt. Col. Rayburn is pessimistic in the short term, but optimistic over the long-term, which he described as roughly fifteen years. He anticipates a “painful” five to seven-year period after which Iraq may achieve a stable political outcome. The Iraqi economy could grow three to four times its current size. In the meanwhile, Maliki is neutralizing checks and balances in government, co-opting the Dawa party and establishing “anti-coup” forces in the police and military. Government posts are filled with family, close associates, former Baathists, and “Dawa orphans” all dependent on Maliki remaining in power. Maliki can seize the state but not the country. In a worst-case scenario, the trend would be an Iraqi society increasingly alienated from the state, partially because the latter fails to provide services, and the eventual use of violence by the Maliki regime to keep the country in line. Despite the views of many in the region, Iraq distrusts Iran. While generally agreeing with Iran on foreign policy, Maliki’s is not a puppet government.
Questions from the audience raised additional points. Melkert mentioned that during the 2014 national elections, Iraqi politicians will have to show what they have done for their constituencies, perhaps for the first time. The UN role is already shifting to monitoring human rights, assisting the central government, and helping to resolve border issues with Kuwait. Ottaway said that “after sectarian identities are out of the bag, it’s difficult to put them back in.” She sees only a small chance for nationalism to transcend sectarian and ethnic identities. Rayburn commented that the public sector still dwarfs the private sector economically. He also mentioned that the US role was different than previously planned. Poor security means US officials will rarely be able to leave the embassy.
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A not so luminary 57
Colleagues over at the Foreign Policy Initiative and the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies have lined up 57 luminaries to advocate the following policy prescriptions on Syria:
- Immediately establish safe zones within Syrian territory, as well as no-go zones for the Assad regime’s military and security forces, around Homs, Idlib, and other threatened areas, in order to protect Syrian civilians. To the extent possible, the United States should work with like-minded countries like Turkey and members of the Arab League in these efforts.
- Establish contacts with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and, in conjunction with allies in the Middle East and Europe, provide a full range of direct assistance, including self-defense aid to the FSA.
- Improve U.S. coordination with political opposition groups and provide them with secure communications technologies and other assistance that will help to improve their ability to prepare for a post-Assad Syria.
- Work with Congress to impose crippling U.S. and multilateral sanctions on the Syrian government, especially on Syria’s energy, banking, and shipping sectors.
Does this approach have merit? Let’s look at the components one by one.
Safe zones would require a major U.S. military operation to take down Syria’s air defenses and a major military ground operation, presumably by Turkey and the Arab League, to push back the Syrian army armor and artillery from the safe areas. This would still leave Damascus and Aleppo in Bashar al Assad’s hands. It would also divide the country in a way likely to exacerbate sectarian tensions: Sunnis would likely flee to the safe areas, if in fact they are safe, and Alawis and Christians away from them to Damascus, Aleppo and other areas. Some of this of course is already happening, but it could get worse.
“Full range of direct assistance” presumably means arms to the Free Syria Army (FSA). This will reinforce the drift toward civil war, but it is unlikely to give the FSA means sufficient to win on the battlefield. A prolonged, increasingly sectarian armed conflict in Syria is among the worst outcomes from the U.S. perspective. It could destabilize Lebanon, Iraq and other countries in the Middle East.
I can only agree with the improving coordination with the political opposition and provision of more secure communications technology. But I’d be surprised if the Administration didn’t claim it was already doing the former and more surprised if it hasn’t begun to do the latter.
Crippling sanctions seem to me a good idea–at least as crippling as what we are already imposing on Syria’s sponsor Iran. The war, as the 57 point out, is already a proxy war–we may as well treat everyone on the other side equally.
So I’m with the luminaries half way: the non-military half. They are correct that more than humanitarian considerations are at stake, but they have failed to show how the military action they recommend would improve the situation.
If they really believe military action is possible and desirable, they should come up with a better proposition: destroy the command, control, communications and intelligence centers of the Syrian state and you will see a quick and decisive end to the killing of civilians by the Syrian army as an organized force. The trouble is you won’t know what will eventually take over, and in the interim you could trigger sectarian bloodletting that would make the current situation look like child’s play.
I remain convinced that
- the U.S. and Europe are not interested in intervening militarily;
- diplomatic and political means have not been exhausted, even if they so far have been ineffectual.
I am every bit as appalled as the 57 luminaries by what Bashar al Assad is doing in Syria. But before we do something big and expensive, best to make reasonably sure that it will improve the situation, not make it worse.
“Friends of Syria” will meet at the ministerial level in Tunisia next Friday. That is a good time and place to consider an amplified diplomatic and political effort. I’m sure the military options will be discussed as well, but I’ll be surprised if anyone is ready and willing.
P.S.: Here is what will bring down Bashar al Assad faster than “safe zones” and arming the FSA. This is one of a claimed 41 mini-protests staged in Damascus today:
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More thunder, no lightning
The UN General Assembly today passed a resolution supporting the Arab League plan for Syria, which would have Bashar al Assad step aside from his presidency and turn over power to his vice president, who would form a broad coalition government and initiate a democratic transition. The vote was 137 to 12, which is pretty lopsided even in the UNGA, where lopsided votes are common.
The opponents were: Belarus, Bolivia, China, Cuba, DPRK, Ecuador, Iran, Nicaragua, Russia, Syria, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. This is a crew that needs a name: something like the antidemocrats, but snappier.
So what practical effect will this have? Hard to say, but the legal effect is nil. UNGA resolutions are like preseason football: the games may be well played and show off talent, but they have no direct impact on the standings. Only UN Security Council resolutions have legal effect.
But legal effect isn’t everything and doesn’t guarantee implementation either. The important thing is that the “international community” has made an appropriate noise in response to Bashar al Assad’s military assault on Syria’s citizens. This will weaken Bashar’s position both internationally and within Syria and give inspiration to his opponents, who will also bemoan international community ineffectiveness.
The real question is what should be done now. Some will want to resort to military intervention or arming the Syrian Free Army. This is a serious error in my book. The worst outcome for the U.S. is a prolonged civil war in Syria, which could have a destabilizing impact on Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and more widely. “Safe areas” and “humanitarian corridors” would, in the absence of Syrian government cooperation, require major military intervention.
As Mona Yacoubian, Randa Slim and Aram Nerguizian were at pains to make clear this morning at a Stimson/Middle East Institute Event, there are diplomatic and political courses of action that still need to be played out:
- The U.S. should lead on getting a “Friends of Syria” group up and running;
- The Arab League and Turkey should lead on pressing the Syrian opposition to unify;
- Sanctions implementation needs to be tightened, especially by the Arab League;
- The U.S. and Turkey need to court Russian support, on grounds that their interests require a good relationship with whatever comes after Bashar;
- The Syrian opposition has to work on peeling away Sunni and Christian merchant, as well as military, support for the regime.
As Randa Slim noted, what helps the regime is fear of instability on the one hand and Islamism on the other. These fears would get worse with military intervention, not better. We need more thunder, no lightning.
PS: Somehow this “Dancing and chanting around an independence flag in Qudaysa, Damascus” tweeted by @LeShaque and retweeted by Robert Mackey grabs me this morning. It is a lot more expressive than the important, if dull, session of the UNGA yesterday and reminds us of what the resolution is really about:
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Hard choices
My friends at Reuters published today my reaction to Dennis Ross’ New York Times piece yesterday on negotiating with Iran under the heading “What does Iran want?”:
Dennis Ross, until recently in charge of Iran in the Obama White House, has outlined why he thinks strengthened sanctions have created an environment in which diplomacy may now work to block Tehran’s development of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it is being reported that Iran has finally responded to a European Union letter requiring that renewed talks focus specifically on ensuring that the Iranian nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.
These are important developments, but they leave out half the equation. What can Iran hope to get from nuclear talks with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council — the U.S., U.K., France, Russia and China — plus Germany? Iran will certainly seek relief from sanctions, which have become truly punishing. But they will want more.
It is clear that Tehran’s first priority is an end to American efforts at regime change. This is not an issue Americans know or think much about, but it obsesses the Iranians. They believe that Washington has tried to bring about regime change in Tehran for decades. Iranian officials can entertain you for hours with stories about American (and Israeli) assistance to Azeri, Baloch and Kurdish rebels. The Arab Spring uprisings took their inspiration in part from Iran’s own “Green Movement,” which protested fraud in the 2009 presidential elections before being brutally repressed. While some in Congress view President Obama as insufficiently supportive of the Greens, the regime in Tehran thought the Americans were behind the whole movement.
The nuclear program, in addition to beefing up Iran’s military muscle and regional prestige, is also intended to end attempts at regime change, as it is thought in Tehran that the U.S. will not attack a nuclear weapons state for fear of the consequences. To those looking for it, there is ample supporting evidence: Witness the contrast between North Korea, a severely repressive regime that has obtained nuclear weapons, and Libya, which gave up its nuclear efforts and suffered a NATO air war that brought about regime change.
So the question becomes this: will the Americans be prepared to take regime change off the table if the Iranians are prepared to give ironclad and verifiable assurances that their nuclear program is entirely peaceful? The answer to that question is not obvious. While it is barely possible to picture Washington recognizing Tehran and re-establishing diplomatic relations after a 32-year hiatus, it is far harder to picture a bilateral agreement promising mutual noninterference in internal affairs. Certainly an agreement of that sort would not find ready approval in Congress.
Another key question is whether the U.S. is prepared to accept Iran holding on to sensitive nuclear technology, in particular, uranium enrichment, even if Tehran can use that technology only under tight international controls. Many countries have this arrangement: No one took uranium enrichment or reprocessing technology away from Argentina and Brazil when they mutually agreed to back off the development of nuclear weapons. Japan, South Korea, Sweden and many others are presumably no more than a couple of years (and probably far less) away from being able to produce a nuclear weapon.
Iran, however, is not Sweden. It isn’t even North Korea, a country far more readily sanctioned and bribed back into line and unable to produce more than a few relatively primitive atomic bombs. Iran, once it has the capacity to enrich uranium to bomb grade (90 percent or more), will be no more than a few years from getting an arsenal of nuclear weapons. In the meanwhile, it will presumably continue to develop and deploy longer-range missiles that could target Israel and Europe, if not the U.S. Can the United States, and Israel, live with that short a fuse?
The hard choices in dealing with Iran on nuclear issues are not only up to the Iranians. There are hard choices for the U.S. as well.
P.S. Anyone who doubt that the U.S. will have trouble signing on to a diplomatic solution should read this from Jennifer Rubin at the Washington Post.
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