Month: February 2012
Bizarre, but the cracks are showing
That’s the only word for President Bashar al Assad’s announcement today that he intends to hold a referendum on a new constitution February 26. The draft reportedly dethrones the Ba’ath party from its leading position in Syria and opens the political system to some competition.
But only someone completely out of touch with what is going on in his own country could imagine that this initiative, prepared behind closed doors, would calm the situation so that a referendum could be held in less than two weeks. Even the two-(seven-year) term limit on a given individual’s tenure as president is hardly a concession, since Bashar was “re-elected” in 2007. The notion that Syrians are going to tolerate another two or three years of him is, well, bizarre.
That said, this is perhaps the first real sign that the regime is feeling pressure: from the Russians, from the Arab League and perhaps from internal dissent. To admit the possibility of actually leaving office–if only several years hence–is not going to satisfy anyone, but it goes farther than Bashar has been willing to go in the past.
The situation in Hama, Homs, parts of Damascus and many other parts of the country is one of open warfare by the Syrian army against the country’s own citizens. I don’t see this ending until Bashar steps aside. Syrians have already been through too much.
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Silence on the main issues
Sometimes the things that don’t happen are more important than the things that do. What did not happen last month were talks between the P5+1 (that’s the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, China + Germany) and Iran. Turkey announced repeatedly its willingness to host such talks, but the Iranians apparently never responded to a European Union letter stating that the talks would have to focus on access to all aspects of Iran’s nuclear program and demonstrating that it is exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Likewise, sometimes the things not said are more important than what is said. Hossein Mousavian, in a Foreign Affairs article last week proposes a grand bargain between Washington and Tehran:
The United States and Iran should also work together on establishing security and stability in Afghanistan and preventing the Taliban’s full return to power; securing and stabilizing Iraq; creating a Persian Gulf body to ensure regional stability; cooperating during accidents and emergencies at sea, ensuring freedom of navigation, and fighting piracy; encouraging development in Central Asia and the Caucasus; establishing a joint working group for combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism; and eliminating weapons of mass destruction and drug trafficking in the Middle East. Finally, the two countries could do much good by strengthening the ties between their people through tourism, promoting academic and cultural exchanges, and facilitating visas.
This is not new: it is well known that Iran and the U.S. have many common interests. But Mousavian, who has been associated with the Iranian nuclear program in the past but is on the outs with President Ahmedinejad and is now at Princeton, has only the vaguest things to say about it:
Together, the two countries should draft a “grand agenda,” which would include nuclear and all other bilateral, international, and regional issues to be discussed; outline what the ultimate goal will be; and describe what each side can gain by achieving it.
He nevertheless declares:
There is a peaceful path — one that will satisfy both Iranian and U.S. objectives while respecting Iran’s legitimate nuclear rights.
There may be such a peaceful path, but the only way of finding out is to open the Iranian nuclear program completely to international scrutiny, as the EU letter required. At this point, no one believes the Iranian claims. Silence on the issue does not bode well for an agreement.
Mousavian also calls for the U.S. to drop regime change as a goal. This is the issue on which the American Administration is silent. It is the primary issue for the Iranians, who no doubt see what is going on in Syria today as a proxy war fought with the U.S. If Bashar al Assad is forced to step down, it would not only hurt Iranian interests in Syria and in Lebanon but also, they fear, presage regime change in Tehran. In addition, they fear use of Iran’s many minority populations–Azeri, Kurdish, Baloch and others–to incite rebellion and weaken the regime.
It is not clear whether this or any American Administration can give up on regime change. Especially in the lead-up to the American presidential elections, all the political pressure is for a tougher stance on Iran, not a weaker one. The same is likely to be the case in Iran, where the political pressure will weigh heavily against opening the nuclear program to international inspection.
I fear that it will only be in November that political conditions in the U.S. will permit a serious dialogue to take place. It should focus on what really counts for both sides:
- for the Americans, that means guarantees that Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons (even if it continues to have enrichment technology);
- for the Iranians, it means guarantees that the U.S. is not pursuing regime change.
How would the U.S. guarantee it is not pursuing regime change? I imagine mutual recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations would be involved, and there might need to be a bilateral agreement of some sort pledging mutual non-interference in internal affairs. That would be very difficult for the U.S. to swallow.
Of course November is a long time in the future–perhaps past the time Israel is willing to wait before taking military action.
In the meanwhile, it may be wise to reach out to elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, as Mehdi Khalaji suggests, though he is notably silent on how and where to do this. The symmetrical advice to the Iranians would be to reach out to the Republicans. It is not obvious that will be any easier.
For a far more detailed treatment of the nuclear issues, see Mark Hibbs: “Engage Iran”–What Does It Mean? He does not treat the regime change part of the equation, which so far as I can tell is left out of all Western writing on the subject of Iran.
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Boning up on China
As readers of this blog will know, I am not an Asia expert and hesitate to write about a part of the world with vast significance to the United States. But it is hard to ignore China when its heir apparent, Xi Jinping, comes to town. I thought it might be useful for me to list a few readings I am finding interesting:
1. Kenneth Lieberthal and J. Stapleton Roy in this morning’s Washington Post argue for restraint by both Beijing and Washington, hoping to avoid strategic rivalry turning ineviably to military confrontation. But this they suggest will require not only dialogue but a new set of agreements far more explicit and formal than the widely accepted American hegemony in the Pacific that has provided an unprecedented period of peace and stability there in recent decades.
2. Colleagues at CSIS have prepared a briefing specifically on Xi Jinping’s visit, which the Americans and Chinese are advertising as focused on “getting to know you,” even though he is in fact a fairly well-known figure here. But lots of issues will lurk just below the surface.
3. Americans are amply familiar with U.S./China issues like trade and monetary policy, but a relatively few Americans worry about the South China Sea, which according to Patrick Cronin and colleagues is vital to American interests in the Pacific. I may not be able to buy their proposed naval buildup, but the discussion of the issues is the best I’ve seen.
I’m sure there is a lot more good material out there and will welcome suggestions from readers. We are all going to have to bone up a bit on China.
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This week’s peace picks: better late than never!
I was ill last night and didn’t get the peace picks up until late today, but here are a few of the best items for the week, heavy on Iraq:
1. Recent Developments in Cyberwarfare
February 13, 2012, 12:00 – 1:30 PM – Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C. Headquarters
Please join Hudson Institute’s Center on Economics of the Internet for an address by Gen. James Cartwright (USMC, ret.), Harold Brown Chair in Defense Policy Studies at CSIS.
General Cartwright served as Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, before being nominated and appointed as the eighth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the nation’s second-highest military officer. During his four-year tenure as Vice Chairman, spanning two presidential administrations and overseeing constant military operations against diverse and evolving enemies, Cartwright became widely recognized for his technical acumen, vision of future national security concepts, and keen ability to integrate systems, organizations, and people in ways that encourage creativity and spark innovation in the areas of strategic deterrence, nuclear proliferation, missile defense, cyber security, and adaptive acquisition processes.
Senior Fellow and Director of the Center, Harold Furchtgott-Roth, will moderate the discussion.
2. The PLA Navy ‘Lobby’ and Its Influence Over China’s ‘National Sovereignty’ Policies, February 13, SAIS
08:30 AM – 05:30 PM
American University Washington College of Law, Room 603
4801 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DCThe revolutions throughout the Middle East and North Africa have captured the world’s attention. As a result, many questions have emerged including whether human rights and international laws have been violated, whether the use of force has been appropriate in certain domestic conflicts, and whether it is likely for similar movements to occur in other regions of the world. Through panel discussions with scholars and practitioners in the field, this symposium will facilitate substantive dialogues that address many of these complex legal and quasi-legal questions. Specifically, symposium participants will discuss how to build the rule of law within this region and the role of the international community in internal state disputes. Additionally, participants will dissect the relevant history and causes of the Arab Spring, and explore the future application of international law norms in light of the on-going civil unrest throughout this region.Presented by the International Law Review PROGRAM AGENDA
Ad Melkert, Joel Rayburn, Marina Ottaway Tuesday, February 14, 2012 – Washington, D.C.
12:15 PM – 2:00 PM EST
5. Is Hamas Changing?
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Foundation to Defend Democracy
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POMED DC Events Calendar
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john.simon@pomed.org
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Hamas and Fatah signed a reconciliation agreement; Hamas leaders are exiting Syria, and Hamas’ funding from Iran may be drying up. Are these events prompting Hamas to consider a change in strategy? To assess this question, FDD is pleased to host a breakfast conversation on Wednesday, February 15 at 9:30 am with Nathan Brown, Hussein Ibish and Jonathan Schanzer. Breakfast and registration will begin at 9:15 am. If you haven’t already, we encourage you to register here. Please RSVP by February 13 to ensure your spot. If you have other colleagues who might be interested in attending, please feel free to share this invitation. For questions, contact Annie at annie@defenddemocracy.org or 202-250-6144.
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6. Post-Occupation Iraq: The Brittleness of Political Institutions
with
Adeed Dawisha
Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center and
Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Miami University, Ohio
The hope during the American occupation of Iraq was to actively encourage the creation of functioning democratic institutions, so that by the time Iraq attained full sovereignty it would be well on the way toward democratic consolidation. While the democratic structure seems to be in place, its performance leaves much to be desired. Political parties are defined more by ethno-sectarianism than ideology; Parliament is weak; the prime minister exhibits a clear propensity for authoritarianism; and the issue of federalism has been turned into a recipe for the division of the country. Still, politics so far is conducted within the corridors of political institutions. And while violence persists, to date it has not replaced dialogue and discussion as the avenues for settling differences and disputes. Dawisha will discuss how long this delicate balance could persist and whether it could withstand major crises.
The Institute for the Study of War presents
Iraq After the U.S. Withdrawal
ISW cordially invites you to an on-the-record panel discussion on the evolving political crisis in Iraq and its implications for Iraqi stability and U.S. national interests. The departure of all American troops from Iraq in mid-December 2011 removed constraints on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s political behavior, increased his fears of survival, and accelerated his efforts to consolidate power. Sectarian politics is becoming the norm in the Iraqi government, and violence is increasing. Immediately following Maliki’s visit to Washington days before the last troops left, Iraqi Security Forces issued a warrant for the arrest of Sunni Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi, sparking a political crisis that continues today. This panel will analyze the unfolding political crisis, deteriorating security trends, and prospects for renewed insurgency and civil war in Iraq. The panel will also discuss the ramifications of this crisis for U.S. policy towards Iraq and the Middle East.
Thursday, February 16, 2012
Noon to 2 p.m.
Lobby Conference Center
1400 16th Street NW
Washington, DC 20036
A light lunch will be provided.
Please RSVP no later than Tuesday, February 14.
For more information, contact Tricia Miller at
tmiller@understandingwar.org or 202-293-5550 ext. 210.
Panelists:
Dr. Kenneth M. Pollack, the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, is an expert on national security, military affairs and the Persian Gulf.
Dr. Laith Kubba is the senior director for the Middle East and North Africa program at the National Endowment for Democracy. He was born in Baghdad, Iraq, and served as a government spokesman and senior advisor to Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Al-Jaafari in 2005.
Marisa Cochrane Sullivan is the deputy director at ISW, where she supervises the Iraq and Afghanistan Projects. Sullivan also conducts research on Iraqi political dynamics and the security environment in central and southern Iraq.
Moderator:
Dr. Kimberly Kagan, the founder and president of ISW, conducted many regular battlefield circulations of Iraq between May 2007 and April 2010. She participated formally on the Joint Campaign Plan Assessment Team for MNF-I and U.S. Mission-Iraq in October 2008 and October 2009 and on the Civilian Advisory Team for the CENTCOM strategic review in January 2009.
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A rose is a rose
Gertrude Stein might just as well have said “Macedonia is Macedonia.” The trouble is, the Greeks don’t like to hear it.
This is one of the least interesting problems resulting from the breakup of former Yugoslavia. Its “Republic of Macedonia,” one of six republics that constituted Socialist Yugoslavia, became independent in 1991. But Greece, its neighbor to the south, objected to the use of “Macedonia,” claiming that appellation belongs exclusively to Greece and its use by the northern neighbor implied territorial claims to Greek territory. The newly independent country entered the United Nations as The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (last time I was there it was alphabetized under “T” on the voting board at the UN General Assembly).
Athens and Skopje signed an “interim accord” in 1995 supposedly regulating the issue, but Greece claims Macedonia (oops, The FYROM) has violated it while the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided last December that Greece had definitely violated it by blocking The FYROM’s entry into NATO at the Bucharest Summit in 2008. There is an opportunity to correct this injustice at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May. Efforts to resolve the issue have been ongoing since the early 1990s in UN-sponsored talks, mediated since 1994 by New York lawyer Matt Nimetz.
Macedonia already has a pretty good deal on the name issue. Just about everyone calls the country by the name Skopje prefers, and many countries (including the U.S.) have formally recognized it as the “Republic of Macedonia.” Greece does not, but why should anyone care about that?
The unfortunate answer is that Athens can veto Skopje’s membership in NATO as well as any further progress towards membership in the EU. Macedonia is already a candidate for EU membership but hasn’t got a date for the start of negotiations, which is an important milestone that Athens is holding hostage.
NATO membership is also important to Macedonia, which counts itself as part of the West and has deployed troops to Afghanistan under NATO command. Alliance membership is a goal sought by both Albanians (who constitute about one-quarter of the population) and Macedonians. It also, by the way, should end any lingering Greek fears of irredentist claims to its territory by Skopje.
The problem for Macedonia is the veto, not the name. While there is virtue in continuing the effort to resolve the name issue, it might be wise for Skopje to stop pounding on Matt Nimetz’s door this spring for a solution to a problem Athens has but Skopje does not. Skopje needs to go directly to Athens and mount a serious effort to convince Greece to allow it into NATO under the interim accord as The FYROM. The ICJ decision requires nothing less.
A Macedonian joked with me recently that he would personally push a statue of Alexander the Great that has offended Greek sensibilities from Skopje to the Greek border if Athens would allow Macedonia into NATO in Chicago. I doubt Athens is interested in the statue, but the joke points in the right direction. Skopje needs to find out what Athens needs that Macedonia can provide. If the government won’t discuss the issue of NATO membership, then Macedonia should find thinktanks and academics in Greece who will.
At the same time Skopje should be working with the Macedonian and Albanian American communities to make sure that the mayor of Chicago, once right hand to President Obama, raises this issue with the White House. So far it is studiously avowing support for Skopje but doing nothing to pry open the NATO door. Vice President Biden, when he was a senator, opposed use of “Macedonia,” which is too bad since he holds the Balkans portfolio.
Greece is vulnerable at the moment because of its parlous financial situation, but no one in Brussels or Washington wants to kick Athens while it is down. Greek Americans are well-organized and an important voting constituency. Macedonia has a “stick” it can’t really use. It needs to find some other way to put the squeeze on, or “carrots” that are attractive enough in Athens to open the NATO door. Then they can go back to not resolving the name issue at the UN for another 15 years or so, by which time everyone will have forgotten why it once seemed important.
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Nonviolence in Syria revisited
Yesterday was busy on peacefare.net, with some vigorous comments and tweets about my post on Syria. I thought I might review the bidding this morning.
First my own error: I meant the first line to say that TheAtlantic.com‘s headline on my piece, “Why the Syrian Free Army should put down their guns,” was infelicitous, not felicitous (and I’ve made that change in the post). The piece never calls for them to put down anything. What I said was this:
It would be far better if defected soldiers worked for strictly defensive purposes, accompanying street demonstrators and rooting out agents provocateurs rather than suicidally contesting forces that are clearly stronger and better armed.
Taking guns away from people in the midst of war just doesn’t work, in Syria or anyplace else. Only when Syrians feel secure will they give up their weapons.
That day I fear is a long way off. One of my critics writes:
Assad will not go until there is a gun to his head, period.
That may be correct, but there is no telling when some brave soul will do the necessary. I believe the odds of that happening increase if the protesters can maximize the numbers of people demonstrably joining their effort. Violence by the regime is intended to keep their numbers down. But violence by the FSA does too.
One tweet yesterday asked if I would send my children off to a demonstration in Syria given the behavior of the regime. The answer is no, I would not. Nor would any responsible parent. That is why I suggested less dangerous forms of protest. If all the ones I have mentioned have been tried, maybe it is time to try some new ones.
Another commenter says:
Nonviolence may work where the government either worries about its international reputation (the British in India, the U.S. South, So. Africa), or where it has decided in advance to retreat (Russians from Eastern Europe), or where the power structures are willing to give up an unpopular ruler to preserve their own position (Romania, Serbia, Egypt).
I don’t think this accurately describes the situations cited, or exhausts the possiblities. All governments, even autocratic ones, depend on the consent of the governed. In autocracies, that consent is compelled through fear. Bashar al Assad is trying–with considerable success–to re-instil fear in the Syrian population. That is what the protesters need to counter: not the use of force, but the fear it engenders. Thinking strategically about how that can be accomplished–something I admit only Syrians can seriously do–is vital.
That is what I am not seeing, though of course it may be happening behind the scenes. It would require careful analysis of the regime’s main pillars of support (some minorities, middle class, army, intelligence services, police, Iran, Russia?) and definition of courses of action to undermine them. Some will of course prove “softer” targets than others, but all have a stake in the regime and need to be weaned from providing it support. I don’t see how the little violence of which the FSA is capable today contributes to the strategic objective.
Nor do I think the constant refrain of those calling for “safe areas” is wise. Safe areas aren’t safe. They have to be made safe. They did not succeed in Bosnia. They utterly failed to protect the people who were in them and exposed them to the worst genocidal behavior of the war. The failure brought international intervention, which I suppose is what some advocates of a safe areas in Syria hope will happen. I’m convinced it won’t. Eliminating Syria’s air defenses and destroying its artillery would be a major military operation conducted against a Russian ally a few weeks before Putin’s re-election. It isn’t going to happen, before the elections or thereafter.
A word about covert support to the FSA, which is what people I have a lot of respect for over at the Washington Institute for Near East Affairs are touting as a “least worst” military option. Presumably the Turks, who apparently have “lost” some military officers on the wrong side of the border, are already engaged in this. Without air support (NATO’s contribution in Libya), I have little confidence that supplying weapons will do much for the FSA, which seems to have quite a few already. Organization and discipline count for a lot in war, and that is what the FSA lacks (and will find hard to obtain under current conditions).
Even if they manage somehow to get organized and under more centralized control, the best the FSA is going to be able to manage is a military contest that amounts to civil war, which from the American perspective is the worst of all possible worlds. Far better to support a ceasefire, withdrawal of the Syrian army from population centers, and return of the Arab League observers in far larger numbers than before, preferably with UN support. That won’t put Homs back to the status quo ante, but it will give Syrian citizens another chance at demonstrating nonviolently that they have withdrawn their consent from the murderous regime of Bashar al Assad.
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