Month: February 2012
Yes, nonviolence, even now
TheAtlantic.com published my call for a return to nonviolence in Syria this morning, under the infelicitous title “Why the Syrian Free Army Should Put Down Their Guns”:
Nonviolent organization has a better chance at unseating Assad’s regime than an armed uprising.
It is remarkable how quickly we’ve forgotten about nonviolence in Syria. Only a few months ago, the White House was testifying unequivocally in favor of nonviolent protest, rather than armed opposition, against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his regime’s awful crackdown. Even today, President Obama eschews military intervention. Yesterday, Yahoo News’ Laura Rozen offered the views of four experts on moving forward in Syria. While one doubted the efficacy of arming the opposition, none advocated nonviolence. When blogger Jasmin Ramsey wrote up a rundown of the debate over intervention in Syria, nonviolence wasn’t even mentioned.
There are reasons for this. No one is going to march around Homs singing kumbaya while the Syrian army shells the city. It is correct to believe that Syrians have the right to defend themselves from a state that is attacking them. Certainly international military intervention in Bosnia, Kosovo, and arguably Libya saved a lot of lives. Why should Syrians not be entitled to protection? Isn’t it our responsibility to meet that expectation?
First on protection: the responsibility belongs in the first instance to the Syrian government. The international community is not obligated to intervene. It may do so under particular circumstances, when the government has clearly failed to protect the population. I don’t see a stomach for overt intervention in the U.S. Nor do I think the Arab League or Turkey will do it without the U.S., as Anne-Marie Slaughter suggests.If the violence continues to spiral, the regime is going to win.
The Syrian government has not only failed to protect, it has in fact attacked its own citizens, indiscriminately and ferociously. Self-defense and intervention are justified. The question is whether they are possible or wise, which they do not appear to be.
The Free Syria Army, an informal collection of anti-regime insurgents, is nowhere near able to protect the population. Their activities provoke the government and its unfree Army to even worse violence. It would be far better if defected soldiers worked for strictly defensive purposes, accompanying street demonstrators and rooting out agents provocateurs rather than suicidally contesting forces that are clearly stronger and better armed. A few automatic weapon rounds fired in the general direction of the artillery regiments bombarding Homs are going to help the artillery with targeting and do little else.
Violence also reduces the likelihood of future defections from the security forces. For current Syrian soldiers weighing defection, it is one thing to refuse to fire on unarmed demonstrators. It is another to desert to join the people who are shooting at you. Defections are important — eventually, they may thin the regime’s support. But they aren’t going to happen as quickly or easily if rebels are shooting at the soldiers they want to see defect.
But if you can’t march around singing kumbaya, what are you going to do? There are a number of options, few of which have been tried. Banging pans at a fixed hour of the night is a tried and true protest technique that demonstrates and encourages opposition, but makes it hard for the authorities to figure out just who is opposing them. The Arab variation is Allahu akbar called out for 15 minutes every evening. A Libyan who helped organize the revolutionary takeover of Tripoli explained to me that their effort began with hundreds of empty mosques playing the call to prayer, recorded on CDs, at an odd hour over their loudspeakers. A general strike gives clear political signals and makes it hard for the authorities to punish all those involved. Coordinated graffiti, marking sidewalks with identical symbols, wearing of the national flag — consult Gene Sharp’s 198 methods for more.
The point is to demonstrate wide participation, mock the authorities, and deprive them of their capacity to generate fear. When I studied Arabic in Damascus a few years ago, I asked an experienced agitator friend about the efficacy of the security forces. She said they were lousy. “What keeps everyone in line?” I asked. “Fear,” she replied. If the oppositions resorts to violence, it helps the authorities: by responding with sometimes random violence, they hope to re-instill fear.
Could the Syrians return to nonviolence after everything that’s happened? As long as they are hoping for foreign intervention or foreign arms, it’s not likely. Steve Heydemann, my former colleague at the United States Institute of Peace, recently suggested on PBS Newshour that we need a “framework” for arming the opposition that would establish civilian control over Free Syria Army. This is a bad idea if you have any hope of getting back to nonviolence, as it taints the civilians, making even the nonviolent complicit in the violence. It’s also unlikely to work: forming an army during a battle is not much easier than building your airplane as you head down the runway.
What is needed now is an effort to calm the situation in Homs, Hama, Deraa, and other conflict spots. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who is visiting Damascus, could help. The continuing assault on Homs and other population centers is a major diplomatic embarrassment to Moscow. The opposition should ask for a ceasefire and the return of the Arab League observers, who clearly had a moderating influence on the activities of the regime. And, this time around, they should be beefed up with UN human rights observers.
If the violence continues to spiral, the regime is going to win. They are better armed and better organized. The Syrian revolt could come to look like the Iranian street demonstrations of 2009, or more likely the bloody Shia revolt in Iraq in 1991, or the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Hama in 1982, which ended with the regime killing thousands. There is nothing inevitable about the fall of this or any other regime — that is little more than a White House talking point. What will make it inevitable is strategic thinking, careful planning, and nonviolent discipline. Yes, even now.
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You decide who was responsible
So far as I can tell, these materials are not readily available in English:
1. A press release from the the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies on the appointment of General Ljubiša Diković as Serbian armed forces chief of staff.
2. The related dossier from the Humanitarian Law Center.
I am making them generally available here. Read for yourself. Whatever you conclude about Diković’s personal responsibility, the dossier is a reminder of how Slobodan Milosevic conducted the war in Kosovo in 1999. The press release raises the question of whether those who commanded then should be given major responsibilities now:
CEAS hopes that representatives of the western international community, who formally expect from Serbia to actively participate in processes of regional reconciliation and cooperation will adopt positions consistent with these touchstones and make clear to President Tadić that Gen. Diković in the role of Serbia’s Chief of Staff would be problematic. If this does not happen, it will again illustrate their willingness to subvert their credibility for expediency, undermining their own long-term interest in Serbia’s full democratization.
Both organizations raising these questions are Belgrade-based. Their courage is an inspiration.
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The longer you wait, the higher the price
The 3.5 (sometimes called four) Serb-majority municipalities of northern Kosovo are under Belgrade’s control, not Pristina’s. Milan Marinković writes from Niš:
The February 14-15 referendum in four Serb-dominated municipalities in northern Kosovo is approaching. People will be asked whether they accept the state institutions of Kosovo, headquartered in Pristina and dominated by Albanians. An overwhelming “no” vote seems assured. Its potential implications may be damaging: it could alienate Belgrade further from Europe and make it more difficult for Pristina to establish even nominal authority in the north, strengthening Kosovar Albanian nationalists and reducing the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the disputed territory.
Political leaders of the northern Serbs fear the “parallel” institutions they control might be dismantled in response to German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s demand to Serbian authorities last summer. They see the referendum as a way to make these institutions more legitimate and thus fortify their own political position. The referendum could also block effective law enforcement in the north, where organized crime groups have exploited the situation to develop a highly profitable smuggling network.
With Serbia’s own spring parliamentary elections in sight and candidacy for the European Union still uncertain, the referendum could not come at a worse time for the Serbian government. Serb politicians in northern Kosovo who receive their salaries from Belgrade are now ignoring Belgrade’s appeals. On top of that, within the ruling coalition there are several factions with different approaches to how the problem of Kosovo should be dealt with. Serbian President Boris Tadić is expected to have the final word.
He and his Democratic Party (DS) are hoping Serbia will get EU candidacy so that they can win back credibility among the pro-Western part of the electorate. Somehow meeting Merkel’s demands, or nullifying them, is vital. But most of those who voted for Tadić and DS in the last elections because of their European agenda feel betrayed to such an extent that candidacy alone could hardly allay their disappointment.
At the same time, the ongoing crisis in the European Union gives rise to euro-skepticism, which the anti-European opposition parties in Serbia exploit. They insist that Serbia must give up on the European integration process, arguing that the EU sooner or later is going to dissolve. This anti-EU rhetoric is being increasingly met with approval in Serbia today.
President Tadić has limited options. He can continue what he is already doing–calling publicly on the local Serb leaders to abstain from the referendum–but that presumably will not be enough to persuade leading EU countries to reward Serbia with candidate status, unless the northern Kosovo Serbs unexpectedly decide to acquiesce to his request.
Belgrade could also threaten to stop funding the parallel institutions in the north should the referendum be held. While this would be welcomed by the West, it is hard to imagine such a radical shift in Belgrade’s policy on a “national” issue amid a pre-election campaign given the political risks it would entail.
Judging by previous experiences, whatever President Tadić chooses to do, he will wait until the last minute. What he would like most is to somehow preserve the status quo until after the election, but that could well prove to be infeasible. Serbia has so far missed several opportunities to adjust its policy on Kosovo to reality. And the longer you hesitate to do the inevitable, the higher is the price you pay in the end.
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What doesn’t happen counts
Sometimes what matters in diplomacy is what doesn’t happen. That was certainly the case with Saturday’s defeat of the Arab League effort to get the UN Security Council to approve its plan for Bashar al Assad to begin a transition in Syria. Carne Ross, Independent Diplomat’s chief, suggested in a tweet that it was a non-event:
But in end it was non-event – no resolutn, just reaffirmation of division. Much talk; Effect on the ground, sadly, nil.
Far from it: the Syrian regime has taken it for what it was: a sign that the international community is not united in asking him to step down and he can therefore proceed for the moment to try to finish off his opposition using military force. The residents of Homs know what I mean.
The notion, purveyed most recently by Senator Lieberman, that Bashar al Assad’s end is “inevitable” is comprehensible only if you understand the peculiar American meaning of that word. Most dictionaries think it means that something will happen no matter what. But in the American diplomatic lexicon it means that we have to do something to make it happen. And Lieberman clearly intended the second meaning, as he immediately began talking about assistance to the Free Syria Army. Secreteary of State Clinton has been less clear, but she is talking about forming a multilateral contact group for support to the Syrian opposition. If the failure of the UNSC resolution triggers an intensified crackdown and military assistance to the Free Syria Army, it will certainly be an important event in the Syrian uprising.
Something else hasn’t happened lately, but no one has noticed: the P3 plus 1 (US, UK, France and Germany) meeting with Iran long rumored to take place in Turkey in late January seems not to have occurred, or if it did happen some place else no one reported it. This may be even more important than the non-resolution on Syria of the Security Council, but it is hard to know how to interpret it. President Obama in his Super Bowl interview yesterday seemed almost nonchalant in saying that Iran has to make it clear that it is not pursuing nuclear weapons. According to press reports of the recent International Atomic Energy Agency visit to Tehran, this they have not done, but another visit is scheduled for this month.
There was of course an implied “or else” to what the President said. He made it clear the military option is still on the table. But while sounding belligerent for the domestic American audience, it seems to me he was also offering an olive branch to the Iranians, essentially saying that they can keep their uranium enrichment and other technology so long as the world can reliably verify that they are not using it for weapons purposes. This is the deal many other countries have: anyone who thinks Sweden, Japan, Korea, Brazil, Argentina and a couple of dozen others don’t have the technology they require to build nuclear weapons within a year or two is living in a different world from mine.
The problem of course is that Iran is not one of those relatively reliable countries. There is ample evidence that it has begun to do high explosives research that is only useful in the context of a nuclear weapons program. If we get to summer without a clear and verifiable commitment on Iran’s part, that will be another non-event that matters. By then, talk of an Israeli attack will have quieted. That will be the clear signal that it is imminent. It’s not only what isn’t done that matters, it’s also what isn’t said.
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This week’s “peace picks”
Loads of interesting events this week:
1. Georgian-South Ossetian Confidence Building Processes, Woodrow Wilson Center, 6th floor, February 6, noon- 1pm
Dr. Susan Allen Nan will discuss the Georgian-South Ossetian relationship, including insights from the 14 Georgian-South Ossetian confidence building workshops she has convened over the past three years, the most recent of which was in January. The series of unofficial dialogues catalyze other confidence building measures and complement the Geneva Talks official process.
Please note that seating for this event is available on a first come, first served basis. Please call on the day of the event to confirm. Please bring an identification card with a photograph (e.g. driver’s license, work ID, or university ID) as part of the building’s security procedures.
The Kennan Institute speaker series is made possible through the generous support of the Title VIII Program of the U.S. Department of State.
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Associate Professor of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University
by
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Former National Security Adviser and CSIS Counselor and Trustee
Willard Room, Willard InterContinental Hotel
1401 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC
Introduction by
John Hamre, CSIS
Remarks by
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Interviewed by
David Ignatius, The Washington Post
Book Signing
from 4:00 to 4:30 p.m.
-Books will be available for purchase-
This invitation is non-transferable. Seating is limited.
To RSVP please e-mail externalrelations@csis.org by Wednesday, February 2.
This book seeks to answer 4 questions:
What are the implications of the changing distribution of global power from West to East, and how is it being affected by the new reality of a politically awakened humanity? Why is America’s global appeal waning, how ominous are the symptoms of America’s domestic and international decline, and how did America waste the unique global opportunity offered by the peaceful end of the Cold War? What would be the likely geopolitical consequences if America did decline by 2025, and could China then assume America’s central role in world affairs? What ought to be a resurgent America’s major long-term geopolitical goals in order to shape a more vital and larger West and to engage cooperatively the emerging and dynamic new East? America, Zbigniew Brzezinski argues, must define and pursue a comprehensive and long-term geopolitical vision, a vision that is responsive to the challenges of the changing historical context. This book seeks to provide the strategic blueprint for that vision.
5. The Unfinished February 14 Uprising: What Next for Bahrain? Dirksen, 9:30-11 am February
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Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 106
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POMED DC Events Calendar
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alex.russell@pomed.org
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As the February 14th anniversary of the start of mass protests in Bahrain approaches, now is a critical time to analyze events over the past few months and discuss expectations for the coming weeks. With the release of the BICI report in late November, which detailed systematic human rights abuses and a government crackdown against peaceful protesters, the Government of Bahrain was tasked with a long list of reforms and recommendations. At this juncture, nearly two months after the release of the report, it is essential for the United States to debate the Kingdom’s reforms and how to move Bahrain forward on a path of democratic progress. Human rights groups continue to raise significant human rights concerns with respect to the situation on the ground. What are some of these concerns? What are the current realities on the ground in Bahrain? What are the strategies of the country’s political opposition parties and revolutionary youth movement, and how is the monarchy reacting? What are some expectations and challenges regarding the palace-led reform process? And, importantly, what constructive roles can the U.S. play in encouraging meaningful reform at this time? Please join us for a discussion of these issues with: Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) Elliott Abrams Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations Joost Hiltermann Deputy Program Director, Middle East and North Africa, International Crisis Group Colin Kahl Associate Professor, Georgetown University; Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security Moderator: Stephen McInerney Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy To RSVP: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/viewform?formkey=dGFWVEU3dzBVNUtiTzFKYW5OVlZ3UXc6MQ This event is sponsored by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), the National Security Network, and the Foreign Policy Initiative. For more information, visit: http://pomed.org/the-unfinished-february-14-uprising-what-next-for-bahrain-2/
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6. An Assessment of Iran’s Upcoming Parliamentary Elections, Woodrow Wilson Center, 12-1:15 pm February 9
with
Hosein Ghazian
and
Geneive Abdo
Location:
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Geneive Abdo //Director, Iran Program, The Century Foundation
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Visiting Scholar, Syracuse University
This event requires a ticket or RSVP
The Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) and the Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding
invite you to
One Year Later:
Has the Arab Spring Lived Up to Expectations?
A public panel featuring:
John L. Esposito
University Professor & Founding Director
ACMCU, Georgetown University
Heba Raouf
Associate Professor
Cairo University
Radwan Ziadeh
Fellow, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding
Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace
Moderated by:
Farid Senzai
Director of Research
Institute for Social Policy and Understanding
February 9, 2012 – 4:00-6:00 pm
Georgetown University Hotel & Conference Center | Salon H
One year has passed since protestors took to the streets across the Arab World. Join the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding and the Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding for an engaging panel on what progress has been made on the ground and where the revolution will go from here.
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John L. Esposito is University Professor, Professor of Religion and International Affairs and of Islamic Studies and Founding Director of the Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. Esposito specializes in Islam, political Islam from North Africa to Southeast Asia, and Religion and International Affairs. He is Editor-in-Chief of Oxford Islamic Studies Online and Series Editor: Oxford Library of Islamic Studies, Editor-in-Chief of the six-volume The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, The Oxford History of Islam (a Book-of-the-Month Club selection), The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, The Islamic World: Past and Present, and Oxford Islamic Studies Online. His more than forty five books include Islamophobia and the Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century, The Future of Islam, Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think (with Dalia Mogahed), Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (a Washington Post and Boston Globe best seller), The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, Islam and Politics, Political Islam: Radicalism, Revolution or Reform?, Islam and Democracy (with J. Voll). His writings have been translated into more than 35 languages, including Arabic, Turkish, Persian, Bahasa Indonesia, Urdu, European languages, Japanese and Chinese. A former President of the Middle East Studies Association of North America and of the American Council for the Study of Islamic Societies, Vice Chair of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, and member of the World Economic Forum’s Council of 100 Leaders, he is currently Vice President (2012) and President Elect (2013) of the American Academy of Religion, a member of the E. C. European Network of Experts on De-Radicalisation and the board of C-1 World Dialogue and an ambassador for the UN Alliance of Civilizations. Esposito is recipient of the American Academy of Religion’s Martin E. Marty Award for the Public Understanding of Religion and of Pakistan’s Quaid-i-Azzam Award for Outstanding Contributions in Islamic Studies and the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University Award for Outstanding Teaching.
Heba Raouf Ezzat holds a Ph.D in political theory and has been teaching at Cairo University since 1987, and is also an affiliate professor the American University in Cairo (since 2006). She currently serves as Visiting Senior Fellow at the Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding. Her research, publications and activism is focused on comparative political theory, women in Islam, global civil society, new social movements and sociology of the virtual space. She is also a cofounder of Islamonline.net which is now Onislam.net, an academic advisor of many youth civil initiatives, the member of the Board of Trustees of Alexandria Trust for Education – London, and the Head of the Board of Trustees of the Republican Consent Foundation – Cairo. She was a research fellow at the University of Westminster (UK) (1995-1996), the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies (1998 and 2012), and the Center for Middle East Studies, University of California-Berkeley (2010). She recently participated in establishing the House of Wisdom, the first independent Egyptian Think Tank founded after the Egyptian revolution 2011.
Radwan Ziadeh is a Fellow at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU), a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, and a Dubai Initiative associate at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is the founder and director of the Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies in Syria and co-founder and executive director of the Syrian Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Washington, D.C.
Farid Senzai is Director of Research at ISPU and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Santa Clara University. Dr. Senzai was previously a research associate at the Brookings Institution, where he studied U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East, and a research analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he worked on the Muslim Politics project. He served as a consultant for Oxford Analytica and the World Bank. Dr. Senzai is currently on the advisory board of The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life where he has contributed to several national and global surveys on Muslim attitudes. His recent co-authored book is Educating the Muslims of America (Oxford University Press, 2009). Dr. Senzai received a M.A. in international affairs from Columbia University and a Ph.D. in politics and international relations from Oxford University.
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Please RSVP here: http://arabspringispu.eventbrite.com/
For a map and directions to the GU Conference Center, please visit: http://www.acc-guhotelandconferencecenter.com/map-directions/
mem297@georgetown.edu
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Dr. John Hamre
President and CEO, CSISModerated by
Dr. Bulent Aliriza
Director and Senior Associate, CSIS Turkey ProjectCenter for Strategic and International Studies
B1 Conference Room
1800 K. St. NW, Washington, DC 20006
9. China, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Security and Trade, 12:30-2 pm, Rome Auditorium, SAIS
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Plan B
Yesterday a treasured Twitter follower described me as optimistic on Syria, because I saw some promise of a serious transition in the current draft UN Security Council resolution. The caveats did not fit in 140 characters: I was optimistic if the draft resolution were to pass and if the Americans, Europeans and Arab League continued to insist that Bashar al Assad step aside and allow the transition to begin.
Today it is clear that the first of my caveats has not been realized: the Russians and Chinese have both voted against, with 13 other members of the Security Council voting in favor. This is a real setback, heading us into scenarios 2 or 4 of my previous post on how bad things could get: the regime wins or civil war. We’d be lucky now to get into scenario 1: divided sovereignty, with some areas held by the opposition.
Moscow and Beijing will no doubt sell the vetoes back home as necessary to defy the U.S. and stop Western imperialism of the sort that took down Muammar Qaddafi in Libya. In fact what they have done is to protect Bashar al Assad at a moment when he is killing more of his own people than ever. Over 200 are reported to have lost their lives in overnight shelling of a neighborhood in Homs, an epicenter of the uprising. Yesterday’s commemoration of the father’s slaughter of people in Hama thirty years ago has sadly led to ferocious confirmation that the son is struck from the same mold.
What is to be done now? Some will propose military intervention without Security Council approval. That was done in Kosovo, where the UN blessed the outcome in Security Council resolution 1244 even if had not blessed the intervention before it happened. I doubt the U.S., NATO or the Arab League have the stomach or resources for that. If they had wanted to do that, they would not have allowed a vote at the Security Council.
They are much more likely to feed the violent opposition to the regime by arming and perhaps training the Syrian Free Army, which appears to have liberated parts of the country but is unable to hold them if the unfree Syrian army strikes back. Encouraging the Syrian Free Army will unfortunately put the country on the path to civil war, with frightening consequences for minorities and secularism if the rebels win and even worse consequences for the Muslim Brotherhood if they lose. And terrible consequences for everyone if the fighting is prolonged.
Far preferable in my view would be a return to nonviolent protest, with Arab League observers once more deployed in an effort to protect demonstrators from the worst abuses. Certainly the situation has deteriorated badly since the Arab League monitors were confined to quarters. Getting them out into the main contested areas as soon as possible would at least provide the eyes and ears required to communicate what is going on to the rest of the world, even if Bashar al Assad now seems unlikely to accept restraints.
President Obama this morning issued a statement that includes this:
The Syrian regime’s policy of maintaining power by terrorizing its people only indicates its inherent weakness and inevitable collapse. Assad has no right to lead Syria, and has lost all legitimacy with his people and the international community.
I agree that Assad has no right to lead Syria and has lost legitimacy, but unfortunately it does not follow that the regime’s collapse is inevitable. No doubt even a defeated UNSC resolution, when the vote is 13 to 2, confirms a loss of international legitimacy. But the father also lost legitimacy and nevertheless survived for many years thereafter, successfully passing power to the son.
What the United States, Europe and the Arab League need to do now is to keep up the pressure by maintaining and tightening sanctions, redeploying the observers if it is safe enough to do so and encouraging continued nonviolent protest in forms (boycotts in particular) that do not expose large numbers of people to the regime’s violence. They also need to consider new measures: blockade of arms shipments? extension of the financial sanctions used against Iran to Syria? Reinforcement of the Arab League observers?
Yesterday’s worldwide demonstrations focused on Syria’s embassies abroad. The next round should focus on Russia’s and China’s.
Some of the bodies from the massacre in Homs that the regime says didn’t happen:
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