Iraq needs a shopping list

A couple of birdies have flown into Washington from Iraq recently.  They had interesting, but very different, things to say.

One thinks Iraq is doing all right but the United States is missing big opportunities, due to its failure to implement the Strategic Framework Agreement that now governs bilateral relations.  This has lots of potential for tying Baghdad more closely to the West, as does the export of more oil to the north and west rather than through the Gulf.  Washington, this birdie thought, is worrying too much about Iraq’s sometimes tense internal political situation.  It is only natural that the political forces that make up the current parliament are testing each other to see where the limits lie.  Erbil/Baghdad problems are solvable.  Things are settling down, problems are finding solutions and Washington should take a hint from the Iranians, who are actively projecting soft power. That is unavoidable, given their proximity, the long common border and the many Iranian pilgrims who visit Shia shrines in Iraq.

The other birdie thinks Iraq is severely handicapped in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal.  Despite dramatic improvements in the Iraqi security forces (more jointness, a stronger non-commissioned officer corps, and decentralization of authority), its many intelligence agencies are no longer sharing information, partly due to sectarian and ethnic divisions that the U.S. presence used to bridge.  Absent a clear national security strategy, Prime Minister Maliki is centralizing decisionmaking in ways that reward loyalty over professionalism and open the door to corruption, especially in military procurement.  Iraq lacks a strong national identity.  A return to sectarian war is unlikely, but the Sunni-majority provinces will insist on more decentralization.  Iran has influence on some politicians but not on the army.  Iraq would however oppose any U.S. raid on Iran and is unconcerned with Tehran getting nuclear weapons, since they won’t be targeted against Iraq.  As things stand today, Iraq lacks the capability to prevent Israel (or the U.S.) from overflying Iraq to attack Iran.

I suspect there is a lot of truth in both these perspectives, which makes it ironic that they should be carried to Washington separately.   The message from both–that Iraq still needs the United States to play a strong role–would make a deeper impression if carried jointly.  The Iraqis need to understand that the initiative is now theirs, not ours.  They need to create conditions in which Americans can train Iraqis, cooperate with them across a broad spectrum of activities, and invest in Iraq.  If it is too risky or unwelcome, the Americans will turn their efforts elsewhere.

At the policy level, the Americans have moved on to other issues, Iran and Syria for the moment but also North Korea and the Afghanistan withdrawal.   If Iraq wants U.S. help, it is going to need to plot out clearly what it needs and come shopping for it.