Month: January 2013
Montenegro will need to do more
This is an interview I did for Samir Kajošević of the Montenegrin daily Vijesti more than two weeks ago. My English version may be a bit out of sync with the Montenegrin version, but I am hoping the content is identical. They published it Thursday under the headline “Brussels will expect more and more from Montenegro”:
The Montenegrin government must show willingness to deal with organized crime and corruption, because Brussels will insist on that issue more and more during the negotiations, said professor Daniel Serwer from Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins School.
“It will have to show willingness to deal with organized crime and corruption if it wants to make progress in the EU negotiations. Brussels has become much more exigent in insisting on rule of law as one of the first chapters to be opened,” says Serwer.
Q: How could Brussels affect Montenegro’s willingness to deal with organized crime and corruption? Is it possible that the EU can stop the process of negotiations if there are no “big trials”?
A: I don’t think Brussels has in mind a particular size or number of trials. The question is whether there is a concerted and effective effort against organized crime and corruption. Brussels will know it when it sees it, whether the trials are few or many, big or small. You will know it too, because there will be a lot to report on.
Q: How could internal problems in EU affect Montenegro’s integration process? Can Brussels afford to slow that process, because Montenegro is the only country in region which is in negotiations?
A: The EU is clearly suffering many fatigues: enlargement fatigue, euro fatigue, unemployment fatigue , immigration fatigue … But Montenegro is not a big pill for Europe to swallow. The important thing is to qualify for membership in every way and be ready when the political door opens. That won’t happen right away, but I do think it will happen. You would not want to miss the opportunity when it arises.
Q: How do you comment the fact that the Milo Đukanović party is constantly ruling in Montenegro for two decades? Such situations are not characteristic of democratic regimes.
A: It is unusual but not unheard of. There are other democratic regimes in which a single party has ruled for longer: Japan is one. Djukanovic is in power because he has the votes. I don’t really see anything wrong with that. The problem is with the opposition: why has it been unable to gain significant ground?
Q: After retiring in 2010, Đukanović again returned as a prime minister. What do you think are the main reasons of his return: fear of loosing power or stopping of reforms?
A: I haven’t seen him in recent years, so I really can’t say. There are precious few politicians who want to leave power, and even fewer who do it for two years, then return. If he came back to stop reforms, he did it at the wrong time: both NATO and the EU will insist on reforms.
Q: Soon as Đukanovic came back as prime minister this November, higher US officials sent a message that he is one of the main political figures in the Balkans. Why is Đukanovic so important to Washington despite charges of his criminal history and lack of democracy?
A: As prime minister of a Balkans country that helped in the fight against Milosevic and has embarked on what are taken here as serious efforts to join the EU and NATO, he will get some respect in Washington. As for criminality, I would be the first to denounce corruption or organized crime.
But I don’t accuse people who have not been formally charged, much less tried and convicted. The assumption of innocence needs to apply. If you have evidence to the contrary, best to publish it or provide it to the courts. More than one Balkans prime minister has landed in difficulty because of courageous journalists and courts , but you have to get the facts straight and provide evidence to support them.
Q: Part of the Montenegrin public claims that he is back to make Montenegro a part of a NATO. What do you think?
A: I hope it is true. Montenegro belongs in NATO, which will welcome it and benefit from its membership, as will Montenegro.
Q: Is he capable to do that, after his businesses connections with Russian tycoons such as Oleg Deripaska?
A: NATO is mainly concerned with the institutions of the state, not the business connections of its leaders. And Russia is no longer the enemy it once was. You may know much more than I do about his business connections. If you have evidence of wrong doing , publish it or give it to the courts. Innuendo is not what I would regard as good journalism.
Q: In Montenegro there are still fears of Serbian influence in domestic politics. Regarding their problems with Kosovo and internal affairs, is Belgrade capable to influence in the neighborhood countries or is it just a “ghost from the past”?
A: Serbia is still an important country in the region: geographically central, in population and economy relatively big, well-connected in the world, cosmopolitan and culturally important. Not everyone in the region wins so many tennis games. It does not dominate the region as it once did, but its neighbors, especially Kosovo, can’t ignore it. Nor can Montenegro.
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This isn’t pretty
My morning email brought me this:
I understand your obsession to see Serbia subdued will never wane, even if it means supporting Jihadists and organ extractors in the process……..but know that the Serbian diaspora (which represents about 45% of Serbs worldwide) will not let Kosovo i Metohija be occupied forever.
When conditions are favorable, Serbia will liberate its province. Your ‘expertise’ doesn’t get you far because you do not truly understand Serbian resolve. Luckily I am young so I will see the liberation happen, hopefully you will too before you die.
But before you do end up dying, you should really find Christ.
S’bogom,
Nikola
When I asked for permission to post, the response was this:
Post wherever you choose my friend. I would appreciate your permission to forward you to some mental health facilities to help cure your obsession you have over trying to subdue the Serbian people. I’m glad you’ve made a living off spreading Serbophobia. Hopefully your mental illness can be cured before it’s your time to go and you can find Christ before your number is called.
S’bogom,
Nikola
I had another bit of mail this morning (from an American born in Serbia) asking
Do you really think that Serbia as a whole wishes to return to the days of Milosevic…or are you strictly speaking on political agendas which now would be the work of current president Tomislav Nikolic?
I answered that I was talking only of the political agenda as reflected in the platform recently put forward by President Nikolic, who in my view won the presidential election fair and square and represents the views of the majority. But I know a lot of Serbs who would not agree with that platform, or with the sentiments Nikola expresses, even if they believe Kosovo belongs to Serbia and should not be taken away.
My Twitter feed has also not always been kind the last couple of days. Here’s a sample:
@ShannonPoe@DanielSerwer Hate mongers like Serwer don’t recognize Serbian victims, and prefer to support Hitler’s old allies in the Balkans
I’ll leave it to readers to decide who mongers hate.
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Sugar-coated Kosovostan
The European parliament rapporteur expects a “flexible” resolution on Kosovo from the Serbian parliament. What he’ll get is a sugar-coated resolution intended for European and American consumption and a hard-core “rationale” (OBRAZLOŽENJE) that betrays the inflexible core of Serbian policy.
The resolution itself rules out recognition of the “unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo.” That is Belgrade’s traditional position. In my view, it doesn’t mean much. As the International Court of Justice advised, the declaration of independence is an expression of political will that breached no international law. Sovereign states recognize other states as sovereign. So far as I know, Britain never “recognized” America’s July 4, 1776 declaration of independence (please correct that if I am wrong). The resolution also, quite properly, declares Belgrade’s intention to
discuss the creation of conditions that the Serbian community and other ethnic communities throughout Kosovo and Metohija are able to strengthen, grow and live in peace and security.
Declaring itself willing to implement agreements already reached (no great concession, but necessary since there is a new government in place), Belgrade then makes it clear it expects the EU to make any further progress worthwhile:
any agreement that is reached should contribute to Serbia’s EU integration.
Of course for this to happen Belgrade has to show flexibility:
The Republic of Serbia is willing to make further concessions in order to overcome the current state of relations between the Serbian and Albanian people.
But not too much:
At the same time, the Republic of Serbia is unwilling to make further concessions that could jeopardize its state and national interests.
The justification that follows continues the uncompromising approach of the initial draft, which we published here three weeks ago. Kosovo is treated as a province of Serbia. Belgrade will grant it autonomy, keeping the governance of all the Serbs (north and south of the Ibar river) under Serbia’s control to a very large degree. This formula would deny both sovereignty and territorial integrity to Kosovostan. If there are important differences between the current version and the previous draft, I haven’t found them yet and will be grateful to readers if they point them out.
Bad ideas of the Kosovostan sort are having a minor resurgence in today’s world: some in Israel would like the West Bank to have this sort of status. It isn’t going to work as a solution in Palestine, and its analogy won’t work as a solution in Kosovo.
Both the Palestinians and Kosovars have limited means to respond to propositions that would essentially make them non-citizens of a country that doesn’t want them (and in particular does not want them to vote). The authorities in Pristina will (and should) go to the next meeting with Belgrade (I understand scheduled for January 17). There they will presumably say a loud “no” to the proposition that their status be decided by Belgrade. More or less half the UN General Assembly has already recognized Kosovo as a sovereign state. But unless they are able to begin to bring something home that looks better than Kosovostan, they are going to face increasing radicalization of their domestic politics, where a substantial opposition party (Vetvendosje) would like to hold a referendum on union with Albania. Radicalization of Albanian nationalist sentiment within Serbia and Macedonia is also a likely outcome with potentially disastrous consequences.
Washington and Brussels would do well to realize that their pressure on Belgrade to ante up has not yet had the desired effect. They’ve been offered a sugar-coated but still bitter pill. They should make it clear this medicine will not cure what ails Belgrade’s European ambitions. Their other problems will make American and European diplomats try to low-key the Balkans portfolio, but they need to do better than Kosovostan.
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Serbia resolves
A birdie tells me this is what the Serbian parliament will be asked to approve on Saturday (I’ll withhold comment until I’ve had a chance to study it more carefully, perforce in English):
‒ Imajući u vidu da Autonomna pokrajina Kosovo i Metohija zauzima centralno mesto u političkom, ekonomskom, bezbednosnom, kulturološkom, identitetskom i duhovnom smislu za Republiku Srbiju i njene građane,
‒ U želji da ostvari dugoročni državni i nacionalni cilj – očuvanje celovitosti državne teritorije, suvereniteta, ekonomski razvoj, zaštitu političkih, ekonomskih i bezbednosnih interesa Republike Srbije na području Kosova i Metohije, omogućavanje boljeg života za sve građane pristupanjem Evropskoj Uniji, demografski oporavak,
‒ Polazeći od toga da svako rešenje, bilo opšteg ili nekog posebnog pitanja, o privremenom, prelaznom ili konačnom statusu Kosova i Metohije, o položaju Srba u Pokrajini ili o zaštiti srpskog verskog i kulturnog nasleđa, mora da bude u skladu sa Ustavom Republike Srbije i Rezolucijom SB UN 1244,
‒ Potvrđujući stavove iz Rezolucije Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije o mandatu za političke razgovore o budućem statusu Kosova i Metohije od 21. novembra 2005. godine, Rezolucije Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije povodom „Predloga za sveobuhvatno rešenje statusa Kosova“ specijalnog izaslanika generalnog sekretara UN Martija Ahtisarija i nastavka pregovora o budućem statusu Kosova i Metohije od 14. februara 2007. godine, Rezolucije Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije o neophodnosti pravednog rešavanja pitanja Autonomne Pokrajine Kosovo i Metohija zasnovanog na međunarodnom pravu od 25. jula 2007. godine, Rezolucije Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije o zaštiti suvereniteta, teritorijalnog integriteta i ustavnog poretka Republike Srbije od 26. decembra 2007. godine i Odluke Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije o potvrđivanju Odluke Vlade Republike Srbije o poništavanju protivpravnih akata privremenih organa samouprave na Kosovu i Metohiji o proglašenju jednostrane nezavisnosti od 18. februara 2008. godine,
‒ Uviđajući neophodnost kontinuiranog i usaglašenog delovanja koje zahteva višegeneracijsku privrženost, ali i korišćenje celokupnog institucionalnog, naučno-akademskog i političkog iskustva stečenog tokom dva veka razvoja novovekovne srpske državnosti,
‒ Prepoznajući mogućnost da utvrđen, planski i sistematičan rad na ostvarivanju ovog državnog i nacionalnog cilja može da posluži kao centar postepenog ali postojanog okupljanja, dugoročnog jačanja društvene kohezije, dalje izgradnje i afirmacije nacionalnog identiteta ali i kao doprinos Republike Srbije globalnoj društvenoj i političkoj zajednici,
‒ Oslanjajući se na jedinstveni državni pristup pitanju Kosova i Metohije, kao na funkcionalni politički mehanizam u okviru koga sve institucije, ostvarujući aktivnosti iz svojih Ustavom i zakonima utvrđenih nadležnosti, usaglašeno deluju na ostvarivanju utvrđenih državnih i nacionalnih ciljeva, rešavanju otvorenih i tekućih političkih pitanja, i operativnom sprovođenju dogovora koji su postignuti i koji budu postignuti između predstavnika Republike Srbije i predstavnika privremenih institucija samouprave u Prištini,
Na osnovu člana 99. tačka 7. Ustava Republike Srbije i člana 8. stav 1. Zakona o Narodnoj skupštini („Službeni glasnik RS”, broj 9/10),
Narodna skupština Republike Srbije, na sednici …………….. zasedanja u 2013. godini, održanoj …………. 2013. godine, donela je
REZOLUCIJU
Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije o osnovnim principima za političke razgovore sa privremenim institucijama samouprave na Kosovu i Metohiji
1. Narodna skupština Republike Srbije, na osnovu Političke platforme za razgovore sa predstavnicima privremenih institucija samouprave u Prištini, utvrđuje osnovne principe za političke razgovore sa predstavnicima privremenih institucija samouprave (PIS) u Prištini:
a) Republika Srbija, u skladu sa međunarodnim pravom, Ustavom i voljom građana, ne priznaje i nikada neće priznati jednostrano proglašenu nezavisnost Kosova;
b) Cilj razgovora je stvaranje preduslova da srpska zajednica i druge nacionalne zajednice širom Kosova i Metohije budu u mogućnosti da jačaju, rastu i žive u miru i sigurnosti;
v) Vlada Republike Srbije se ovlašćuje da nastavi sa implementacijom već postignutih dogovora i sporazuma sa predstavnicima PIS u Prištini . Predstavnici Republike Srbije obavezuju se da u nastavku dijaloga o rešavanju tehničkih i političkih pitanja sa predstavnicima PIS u Prištini i predstavnicima međunarodne zajednice, sve buduće sporazume postižu u skladu sa stavovima i osnovnim ciljevima ove Rezolucije, nastojeći da se sa predstavnicima PIS postigne sveukupni dogovor;
g) Razgovori sa predstavnicima PIS u Prištini i svaki dogovor koji bude postignut treba da daju doprinos evropskim integracijama Srbije.
d) Svi eventualni dogovori sa predstavnicima PIS u Prištini treba da budu postignuti uz konstantan dijalog sa predstavnicima Srba sa Kosova i Metohije.
2. Republika Srbija će kroz pregovore težiti iznalaženju sporazumnog i sveobuhvatnog rešenja za Kosovo i Metohiju. To rešenje mora da bude čvrsta osnova za izgradnju trajnog mira i dostizanje pune bezbednosti za sve ljude koji žive na prostoru južne srpske pokrajine.
3. Republika Srbija spremna je da učini dodatne ustupke u cilju prevladavanja trenutnog stanja u odnosima između srpskog i albanskog naroda. Istovremeno, Republika Srbija nije spremna da čini dodatne ustupke koji bi mogli da dovedu do ugrožavanja njenih državnih i nacionalnih interesa.
4. Republika Srbija pristupa dijalogu sa PIS u Prištini svesna značaja koji bi postizanje obostrano prihvatljivog rešenja za Kosovo i Metohiju imalo u kontekstu dalje i ubrzane integracije čitavog regiona Zapadnog Balkana u Evropsku uniju.
5. Narodna skupština Republike Srbije zahteva od Vlade Republike Srbije da je redovno izveštava o razvoju događaja, toku razgovora sa predstavnicima PIS u Prištini u vezi sa Kosovom i Metohijom, kao i o sprovođenju ovde utvrđenih ciljeva, aktivnosti i mera za zaštitu suvereniteta, teritorijalnog integriteta i ustavnog uređenja Republike Srbije.
6. Ova Rezolucija i njome utvrđeni pravac, smernice i ciljevi državne politike obavezujući su za sve državne organe i organizacije i mogu biti izmenjeni jedino novom rezolucijom Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije.
7. Ovu rezoluciju objaviti u „Službenom glasniku Republike Srbije”.
RS broj:
U Beogradu, januar 2013. godine
Narodna skupština Republike Srbije
Predsednik
OBRAZLOŽENJE
I. USTAVNI OSNOV
Ustavni osnov za donošenje ove rezolucije sadržan je u članu 99. stav 1. tačka 7. i stav 2. Ustava Republike Srbije, kojim je propisano da Narodna skupština donosi zakone i druge opšte akte iz nadležnosti Republike Srbije i da vrši druge poslove određene Ustavom i zakonom, kao i u članu 8. stav 1. Zakona o Narodnoj skupštini („Službeni glasnik RS”, broj 9/10), kojim je, između ostalog, propisano da Narodna skupština donosi rezoluciju.
II. RAZLOZI ZA DONOŠENJE REZOLUCIJE
Razlozi za donošenje ove rezolucije sadržani su u potrebi da se očuva kontinuitet jedinstvene državne politike i da se utvrdi okvir delovanja državnih organa i drugih javnih činilaca u odbrani suvereniteta, teritorijalnog integriteta i ustavnog poretka Republike Srbije. Navedenom rezolucijom Narodna skupština Republike Srbije utvrđuje osnovne principe za političke pregovore sa predstavnicima privremenih institucija samouprave (PIS) u Prištini, imajući u vidu dugoročne državne i nacionalne ciljeve i interese utvrđene Političkom platformom za razgovore sa predstavnicima privremenih institucija samouprave u Prištini,.
Republika Srbija, u dobroj veri (bona fide), teži nastavku razgovora sa predstavnicima PIS u Prištini, ubeđena u to da je trajno i održivo rešenje za Kosovo i Metohiju moguće dostići kroz iskreni dijalog dve strane.
Ova Rezolucija donosi se radi utvrđivanja osnovnih okvira za razgovore sa predstavnicima PIS u Prištini uzimajući u obzir sledeće elemente:
• Da osnovna polazna premisa za razgovore sa PIS u Prištini na visokom političkom nivou bude da Republika Srbija, u skladu sa međunarodnim pravom, Ustavom i voljom građana, ne priznaje i nikada neće priznati jednostrano proglašenu „nezavisnost“ Kosova;
o Sva prava i nadležnosti, koja kao rezultat pregovora budu priznata PIS u Prištini, biće preneta zakonom na organe A.P. KiM u skladu sa Ustavom, zakonima i drugim propisima Republike Srbije;
• Da osnovna težnja tokom nastavka razgovora sa predstavnicima PIS bude postizanje sveobuhvatnog rešenja a da svi pojedinačni dogovori budu u skladu sa ciljevima državne politike utvrđenim ovom Rezolucijom;
• Da polazeći od činjenice da je Srbija u dosadašnjem toku političkog procesa, uprkos i nakon nelegalne JPN Kosova, svojim postupcima pružila PIS u Prištini ograničeni pravni i međunarodni subjektivitet i legitimitet, razgovori na visokom političkom nivou budu vođeni o prevazilaženju institucionalnih paralelizama na području A.P. KiM, ne zadirući u pitanje međunarodnog i državno-pravnog statusa PIS u Prištini. Cilj je uspostavljanje organa vlasti na području pokrajine koji bi bili priznati od svih strana uključenih u proces, i uspostavljanje čvrstih pravnih i političkih garancija na nivou pokrajine i međunarodne zajednice, za politička, teritorijalna i druga prava nacionalnih zajednica na čitavom području pokrajine;
• Da Republika Srbija posebno insistira na:
A) Uspostavljanju Autonomne zajednice srpskih opština na KiM koju bi činile teritorijalna autonomija četiri opštine severa KiM i druge opštine sa većinskim srpskim i manjinskim stanovništvom (npr. Gračanica, Štrpce, Gora itd), zasnovane na posebnom Statutu o autonomiji Zajednice srpskih opština KiM i jemčene Ustavom pokrajine i javnom deklaracijom predstavnika međunarodne zajednice uključenih u proces;
-Izvorne nedležnosti i elementi unutrašnjeg uređenja Autonomne zajednice srpskih opština na KiM biće usaglašeni kroz politički dijalog.
-Republika Srbija smatra da ova autonomija podrazumeva postojanje izvornih nadležnosti u oblastima:
o Prosvete (osnovnog, srednjeg i visokog školstva),
o Zdravstva (svi nivoi zdravstvene zaštite),
o Sporta,
o Kulture,
o Javnog informisanja,
o Zaštite životne sredine,
Ø Kreiranje i sprovođenje politike zaštite životne sredine i održivog razvoja.
o Prostornog planiranja,
Ø Isključiva nadležnost u regulaciji prostornog planiranja i mehanizama za upravljanje čitavim procesom, kao i u procedurama za procesuiranje zahteva i njihovo odobravanje;
Ø Isključiva nadležnost u regulaciji sistema za razvoj javnog zemljišta, što uključuje određivanje kriterijuma za namenu različite vrste zemljišta i za korišćenje zemljišta;
Ø Isključiva nadležnost u upravljanju mehanizmom za utvrđivanje zakonitosti vlasništva nad zemljištem i nekretninama;
Ø Isključiva nadležnost u kreiranju politike razvoja zemljišta i stanogradnje, upravljanje javnim površinama uz postojanje sistema efikasne administrativne intervencije u procesu izgradnje, prostornog planiranja i korišćenja zemljišta.
o Poljoprivrede,
o Šumarstva,
o Vodoprivrede,
o Lova, ribolova,
o Pravosuđa (tužilaštva u prvom i sudstva u prvom i drugom stepenu, sudovi na području Autonomne zajednice srpskih opština KiM bili bi ustanovljeni zakonima na nivou pokrajine, ali bi sporazumom koji proistekne iz političkog procesa bilo utvrđeno da zakon mora da predvidi mehanizam putem koga građani Autonomne zajednice preko svojih predstavnika utiču na izbor i sastav sudova. Ovi sudovi bi imali ovlašćenje da na području Autonomne zajednice, u skladu sa propisima važećim u pokrajini, odlučuju u sporovima o osnovnim ličnim odnosima, pravima i obavezama građana, da izriču kazne i druge mere prema učiniocima krivičnih dela i drugih kažnjivih dela određenih zakonom; da odlučuju o zakonitosti pojedinačnih akata organa i organizacija koje vrše javna ovlašćenja; rešavaju sporove o imovinskim i radnim odnosima i odlučuju o drugim pitanjima u skladu sa važećim zakonima).
o Unutrašnjih poslova (Autonomna policija bila bi u formalnom smislu deo policijskih snaga Kosova, a funkcionisala bi pod autoritetom Izvršnog veća Autonomne zajednice srpskih opština KiM, na teritoriji Autonomije i u skladu sa ovlašćenjima koja su definisana zakonima u saglasju sa najvišim pravnim aktom A.P. KiM i Statutom Autonomne zajednice srpskih opština na KiM.)
o Rudarstva,
o Energetike,
o Telekomunikacija,
o Trgovine i ekonomske politike,
Ø Izvršno veće ima isključivu nadležnost u pitanjima trgovine i organizacije sajmova, uključujući administrativno planiranje trgovinskih aktivnosti kao i regulaciju sajamskih aktivnosti na teritoriji Autonomne zajednice srpskih opština KiM.
o Fiskalne politike i finansija,
o Posebna ovlašćenja Autonomne zajednice srpskih opština na KiM vezana za jedinstvene registre privrednih društava, društveno-političkih organizacija i verskih zajednica;
o Organi Autonomne zajednice srpskih opština na KiM trebalo bi da Ustavom A.P. KiM imaju, garantovanu mogućnost uspostavljanja neposredne saradnje sa organima Republike Srbije, kao i pravo na dopunsko finansiranje iz sredstava predviđenih budžetom Republike Srbije;
o Autonomna zajednica srpskih opština na KiM samostalno odlučuje o izgledu i upotrebi svojih simbola (grba, zastave, himne i dr), dok je zakonom na nivou pokrajine preciznije uređena upotreba simbola pokrajine kao i zajednička upotreba simbola pokrajine i teritorijalne autonomije;
Ø Autonomna zajednica srpskih opština KiM ima Skupštinu Autonomne zajednice i Izvršno veće Autonomne zajednice koji bi se starali o vršenju poslova iz delokruga ZSO KiM utvrđenih Statutom.
B) Uspostavljanju specijalnog statusa za seoske enklave u kojima Srbi i drugi nealbanci čine većinsko stanovništvo, eventualno i za područje opštine Gora (ovo poslednje je samo mogućnost, u slučaju da većina stanovništva u Gori ne želi da ova opština uđe u sastav Autonomne zajednice srpskih opština KiM);
o Područja obuhvaćena specijalnim statusom, naročito izvan gradskih sredina, treba gde god je to moguće da za polaznu osnovu prilikom određenja teritorije imaju etničku strukturu koja je postojala pre etničkog čišćenja, obzirom da i za međunarodnu zajednicu mora biti neprihvatljivo da rezultati etničkog čišćenja u 21. veku u Evropi budu polazna tačka za iznalaženje nekog političkog rešenja;
o Izvorne nadležnosti područja sa specijalnim statusom bi bile uže od nadležnosti Autonomne zajednice srpskih opština, ali bi nužno trebalo da obuhvate uticaj na izbor kadrova i strukturu organa unutrašnjih poslova za data područja, pravosuđe u prvoj instanci, prosvetu, zdravstvo kao i pitanja koja zadiru u oblast osnovnih političkih i ekonomskih prava;
o Sporazumom može biti utvrđeno da područja specijalnog statusa pojedine od ovih nadležnosti vrše u saradnji sa organima Autonomne zajednice srpskih opština, u skladu sa zakonima i drugim propisima koji važe u pokrajini.
V) Uspostavljanje posebnog ugovornog odnosa između Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve i PIS u Prištini;
o Ovim ugovorom, koji bi trebalo da uzme u obzir iskustva iz statusa Rimo-katoličke crkve u Italiji, trebalo bi da bude utvrđena međunarodno validna garancija za objekte SPC, crkvene posede i delovanje SPC na području pokrajine;
o Detalji vezani za pregovaračku poziciju po ovom pitanju moraju biti usaglašeni sa predstavnicima SPC.
G) Da u Ustavu A.P. KiM bude predviđena trajna garancija za proklamovani povratak lica raseljenih sa KiM i njihovih potomaka na osnovu političkog rešenja usvojenog pregovorima;
o Potrebno je usvajanje Zakona o povratku na nivou Pokrajine, kojim će biti utvrđene obaveze organa A.P. KiM, Autonomne zajednice srpskih opština, i jedinica lokalne samouprave u pogledu povratka izbeglih i interno raseljenih lica;
o Potrebno je, na teritoriji Autonomne zajednice srpskih opština KiM, obezbediti i garantovati pravo i uslove za održiv povratak za ona prognana lica sa KiM kojima je onemogućen povratak u njihove domove u drugim delovima A.P. KiM.
D) Rezultat pregovora mora da bude i stvaranje efikasnog pravnog i organizacionog mehanizma koji bi omogućio uključivanje predstavnika srpskog i drugog nealbanskog stanovništva u rad i odlučivanje svih institucija i organa vlasti A.P. KiM, a na način da se onemogući bilo koji oblik majorizacije od strane albanskih predstavnika u tim institucijama i organima vlasti;
o Srpska strana predlaže podelu A.P. KiM na nekoliko regiona, od kojih bi jedan zaseban predstavljala Autonomna zajednica srpskih opština KiM;
o Srpska strana predlaže formiranje dvodome Skupštine A.P. KiM, u kojoj bi gornji dom predstavljao Dom regiona i verskih zajednica, a donji dom bi bio Dom građana;
Ø U skladu sa ovim predlogom, u Domu regiona i verskih zajednica bi svi regioni i glavne verske zajednice bili ravnopravno zastupljeni, a u Domu građana bi srpsko i nealbansko stanovništvo bilo zastupljeno u skladu sa garantovanim kvotama i izbornim rezultatima;
Ø Predsedavajući jednog od dva Doma, kao i potpredsednik drugog od dva Doma, bi trebalo da budu predstavnici srpskog i nealbanskog stanovništva za koje se izjasni većina predstavnika izabranih iz redova srpskog i nealbanskog stanovinštva u tom Domu;
Ø Moraju postojati efikasni proceduralni mehanizmi koji bi onemogućili donošenje odluka preglasavanjem u pitanjima koja direktno zadiru u nadležnosti Autonomne zajednice srpskih opština KiM i prava srpskog i drugog nealbanskog stanovništva u A.P. KiM.
Đ) Imovinska pitanja moraju da budu trajno rešena u skladu sa važećim međunarodnim konvencijama, opšteprihvaćenim pravnim principima i standardima, a svakako u cilju uspostavljanja pravne sigurnosti i stabilnog poslovnog i ivesticionog okruženja na teritoriji A.P. KiM.
III. FINANSIJSKA SREDSTVA
Za sprovođenje ove rezolucije nisu potrebna dodatna finansijska sredstva.
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Light where we can, heavy when we must
Today’s New York Times declares victory for those in the Obama Administration who favor a light footprint abroad. The members of the new national security team–Hagel, Kerry and Brennan–each leans in that direction. Though Hagel voted as a senator for the Iraq war, he later became a doubter. His Vietnam experience and Kerry’s make both new cabinet members hesitant about the use of American military force abroad. Brennan, while always talking a good line in favor of a more comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism in Yemen, is the brains behind the canonical light footprint drone war there against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
The light footprint approach is also getting a boost in Afghanistan, where the White House is leaning towards leaving fewer troops after 2014 than some would like. Zero is even a possibility. The leaks to this effect are all too clearly intended to get President Karzai, who is visiting Washington this week, to stop his mouthing off against the American presence and to convince the Taliban that they can get half a loaf if they come to the negotiating table. But feints in diplomacy have a way of becoming reality. America’s parlous fiscal situation will make many members of Congress look benignly on cutting back the U.S. presence in Afghanistan.
I need hardly mention that the Administration has already taken a light footprint approach to Syria–maybe more like a no footprint approach. It provides humanitarian assistance through nongovernmental organizations and as well as political support to the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, now recognized as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, and other Syrian opposition organizations. It is also setting up Patriot batteries in Turkey and turning a blind eye to arms flowing from Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The results so far have fallen well short of the goal of ending the Asad regime and risk letting Syria fall into the hands of Sunni extremists. But the burden on the United States is mainly diplomacy and foreign assistance, not the far more expensive military.
I find it hard to fault the Administration for trying to limit commitments and save money at a time of serious fiscal strain. But it is a mistake to think we will always want to avoid the heavier footprint: troops and civilians on the ground to establish a safe and secure environment and plant the seeds for governance in states that may fail in ways that endanger vital American interests. The problem I see so far is not so much the President’s preference for the light footprint, but rather the assumption that it will ever be thus. Each and every president since the end of the Cold War has tried to avoid state-building efforts abroad. Each and every one has concluded that they were needed in one place or the other. This includes President Obama, who has quietly and correctly (if not alway successfully) indulged in civilian statebuilding to prevent violence in South Sudan since independence (the troops are cheap since they come from the UN). Obama also tried statebuilding in Afghanistan, where it was not a brilliant success.
We need to maintain the capacity to do heavier footprints, civilian as well as military, even as we try to avoid situations in which they are likely to be needed. This is the equivalent of asking the U.S. government to walk and chew gum at the same time. It has a hard time doing that. It is much more inclined to dismantle the extensive apparatus and experience built up during more than 10 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan than to husband and sustain it. The Civilian Response Corps President George W. Bush established, after declaring as a candidate his disdain for “a nation-building corps,” is already gutted. We’ll be reinventing that wheel if ever there is intervention in Syria, Mali, Iran or half a dozen other places where it might be needed in the next decade. This is not wise or economical.
Our mantra should be: light where we can, heavy where we must.
PS: David Rothkopf hopes what he calls the “disengagers” will redouble diplomatic efforts. Would that it be so.
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I feel nothing
Balkan-watchers here in DC are getting inquiries about “the monument,” a substantial, seemingly stone object erected in November to honor fighters of the Liberation Army of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja (usually UCPMB, I think) in downtown Presevo, a majority-Albanian area in southern Serbia. UCPMB was a guerrilla group that fought Serbian security forces, 1999-2001. Belgrade regards it as a terrorist organization. According to Balkan Insight:
It was disarmed in 2001 following an internationally brokered peace deal, after which the Yugoslav Army re-entered the demilitarized area near the border with Kosovo with the approval of NATO.
After the conflict ended in South Serbia, the authorities signed the Amnesty Law, which freed all armed men who had participated in the conflict from the threat of prosecution.
The law applies to all those accused of terrorism or joint criminal enterprises in the municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja in relation to acts carried out between January 1999 and May 2001.
So the monument is apparently to honor dead people whose living comrades in arms were amnestied years ago.
Along with complaints about the monument come complaints about Albanian flags flying in the Albanian-majority areas of southern Serbia. Interior Minister Dacic has pledged to remove the monument by January 17.
What do I feel about all this? Like Morales in Chorus Line, I feel nothing:. I need more details. Are the flags flying on private property or public buildings? Are there laws in Serbia regulating what flags can be flown? Is the monument on private or public property? Who put it up? To whom does it belong? Is there also a monument to Serbs?
Dacic seems very sure the flags represent the Republic of Albania. Perhaps they do, but the flag in question is also the flag of ethnic Albanians, wherever they live. In many democratic societies, the display of such symbols would be regarded as freedom of speech, though in some places (Nazi symbols in Germany, for example) specific items might be prohibited. Certainly in the United States the flags of other countries are routinely displayed on private property, and quite often on public property as well, presumably based on a decision of a properly constituted authority. The Ohrid framework agreement, which stopped a war not far from Presevo, allows explicitly for the flying of flags of the local majority community, along with the Macedonian flag, on local public buildings:
With respect to emblems, next to the emblem of the Republic of Macedonia, local authorities will be free to place on front of local public buildings emblems marking the identity of the community in the majority in the municipality, respecting international rules and usages [my bolding].
But Macedonia is not Serbia, and I don’t know the laws in Serbia. Nor do I hear the Interior Minister citing laws, but maybe that reflects more on the journalism than on him.
As for the monument, the same questions arise. Is it on private or public property? Who put it up? On what authority? What laws exist against it? What authority is there to destroy it? What is likely to be the reaction if it is destroyed?
Some will answer: UCPMB were terrorists who killed police and army officers. How can they be commemorated this way?
I ask much the same question every time I travel past the Potomac river, which lies just a couple of miles to the west. In Virginia and other states that joined the rebellion of 1861-65, they routinely fly the Confederate flag, which I regard as a symbol not only of traitorous behavior but also of slavery, segregation and brutal human rights violations. I don’t like the Confederate flag, but there isn’t much I can do about.
One more thing: when I passed through Strpce, a majority-Serb community in southern Kosovo, last summer not only was the state flag of Serbia flying but there was a big sign painted on a rock-face: “Kosovo is Serbia,” it read, in English.
Would monuments and flags of this sort cause problems in the United States? You bet they would. Building an Islamic community center blocks from “ground zero” caused a big debate in this country, one that so far as I know is still unresolved. But no one would appeal to Presevo for advice.
Sometimes, it is best to feel nothing. It’s a trick Mr. Dacic might also want to learn.
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