Who Rouhani isn’t
While the votes are still being counted, early returns suggest that Hassan Rouhani is running far ahead of the other five candidates in Iran’s presidential election. I can’t say I predicted this, but I did tweet several days ago:
#Iran experts: does the 5/1 split give Rowhani a chance to reach the 2nd round?
The latest I’ve seen is that he is polling just over 50%, which would put him within striking distance of winning in the first round. But rural returns normally come in slower than urban ones. And the margin over 50% is small enough so that ballot stuffing (or ballot disappearing) could force him into a second round.
As chief nuclear negotiator in 2003/5, Rouhani presided over temporary suspension of Iran’s enrichment and reprocessing efforts, in response to international pressure. That was a moment of maximum American power–after the successful invasion of Iraq and before its sectarian civil war of 2006/7. A former high-level Bush administrationofficial said to me once: “We were ten feet tall then.” Iraq was defeated and occupied, Muammar Qaddafi abandoned his nuclear program, and the Iranians feared we were coming next for them. During the election campaign, Rouhani advocated improved relations with the West, including on nuclear issues.
Lots of caveats apply. A cleric, Rouhani is not a wild-eyed rebel against the Islamic Republic, which he has served in many capacities, especially on the national security front. The president in Iran is a relatively weak figure compared to the Supreme Leader. Ayatollah Khamenei unquestionably controls the nuclear portfolio, as well as other security issues. There will be no negotiated outcome unless the Supreme Leader signs on. There won’t even be a serious negotiation without his nulla osta.
But more important than who Rouhani is is who he isn’t. He is not close to the Supreme Leader. He is not one of the principlists, who see compromise with the West as surrender. He is not a secularist. He is not friendly to the West. He is not even a fellow traveler of the Green Movement. He chose purple as his campaign color, in a transparent attempt to distinguish himself but at the same time echo the popular rebellion that roiled Iran four years ago.
A lot now depends on the election result and whether Iran’s citizens see it as legitimate or fraudulent. If the election goes to a second round after a strong Rouhani showing in the first, many will expect him to win unless the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps cheat, as many think they did last time around to ensure President Ahmedinejad’s second victory. But there is also a possibility still of a Rouhani victory in the first round. It is hard to imagine that the Supreme Leader would swallow that easily, but it is important to remember that the Guardian Council approved Rouhani’s candidacy even while nixing several other moderately reformist types.
Concerned about legitimacy, the Supreme Leader asked Iranians to turn out to vote in large numbers. This they appear to have done. If they gave Rouhani anything close to a majority, that will be hard to ignore. If the Supreme Leader mishandles the situation, it could precipitate another round of civil resistance and popular rebellion. Rouhani is not a revolutionary, but neither was Bouazizi.
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The issue of inconsistency in decision-making could be still a problem for both Iranians and 5+1 even during Rowhani’s administration. During the past, especially when Larijani, the current parliament speaker, was the head of the Iranian negotiation team, and the head of Iran’s Supreme Security Council, he made progress by possible achieving agreements with the west at least once. However, the Ahmadinejad government did not approve the deal (maybe because of the political rivalry with Larijani that Ahmadinejad wanted to conclude the deal under his name) so it came to naught. Rowhani as the future president should support whoever will be in charge of the negotiations with 5+1. As the article implies, the ultimate decision is up to the supreme leader. This should be used by the Iranian side as the ultimate and homogenizing power to make the process of negotiations and decision making consistent so that both Iran and 5+1 not to get confused and possibly the negotiations lead to constructive agreements.