Tilting the playing field

We tend to treat adversaries as monolithic, especially when they label themselves an Islamic republic and put at its apex a Supreme Leader.  So I was attracted to the launch today of the Washington Institute’s Leadership Divided by Nima Gerami, with Mehdi Khalaji commenting and Mike Eisenstadt moderating.  Germani maps out the factional differences among Iranian elites:

• those who unreservedly support Iran’s nuclear program and believe Iran has the right to develop nuclear weapons as a credible deterrent against perceived external threats (nuclear supporters)
• those who advocate permanently rolling back Iran’s nuclear program in favor of other national interests (nuclear detractors)
• those who are willing to accept temporary constraints on Iran’s uranium-enrichment-related and reprocessing activities—thereby lowering the degree of nuclear weapons latency—to end Iran’s international isolation (nuclear centrists)

He also maps their influence, based on past experience:

Nuclear centrists have traditionally exerted the greatest influence when Iran is faced with increased internal and external pressures, whereas nuclear supporters have ascended to power when these threat receded. Nuclear detractors have never enjoyed influence equal to the centrists and supporters, primarily because they have been cast out or marginalized from the system as a result of political infighting.

So what, I asked, should the US do and not do to increase the likelihood of a positive outcome to the comprehensive nuclear talks (defined as pushing back nuclear breakout to a year or more)?

Germani was reluctant to respond beyond saying that understanding elite views is useful, but under pressure offered that we should be cautious about letting up on sanctions, which are vital to pushing the Iranians in the right direction (presumably because the pressure strengthens the centrists).  Eisenstadt warned that efforts to game our adversaries’ internal fissures often don’t work out well but also added that the threat of military action should be clear and credible but private.  Putting it out in public doesn’t help.

Khalaji noted that nuclear supporters are feeling pressure to justify the nuclear program as a contribution to Iran’s energy requirements.  Patrick Clawson underlined that the more Iranians know about the nuclear program, including its very large costs and risks, the less likely they are to support it, especially after the Fukushima disaster.  Public pressure may not count for much, but it has some influence on what the Supreme Leader thinks possible and not.

On other factors affecting Iranian decision-making, it was noted that the Stuxnet computer virus and assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists have discouraged some technically competent people from working in the nuclear program, presumably slowing it.  The Supreme Leader’s fatwa against nuclear weapons has not been important, both because it is ambiguous (still never written down!) and because in the Islamic Republic government authorities can overrule any religious strictures and even constitutional provisions.

So no silver bullets here.  But the Iranian nuclear challenge is in many ways the most serious national security issue we face for the moment.  It could lead to war, or a nuclear arms race in the Gulf, or to Iranian hegemony in the region and an Iranian threat to Israel.  None of that is good from an American perspective.  Tilting the playing field away from the nuclear supporters and towards its centrists and detractors could help enable a comprehensive nuclear agreement that still, however, seems far off.