Plan B options
The Administration is considering plan B for Syria. In order to be effective, it has to somehow rebalance the military situation to enable the non-extremist Syrian opposition to resist effectively the Russian/Iranian/Syrian government/Shia militia onslaught and to fight the Islamic State.
I take as a given two limits: 1) Washington does not want to directly engage Russian forces and 2) it does not want to put significant numbers of troops on the ground in Syria. Nor do I think it will be possible for the President to gain Congressional approval for an expanded Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF).
Here is a summary of options, all of which I think I have previously discussed on peacefare.net:
1. Encourage Congress to pass and sign the pending sanctions bill. This would have broad political significance, but mainly affect helicopter and airplane parts, if we are prepared to enforce third party prohibitions (i.e. threaten suspension of business with US companies if foreign companies ship parts to Syria).
2. End the impunity of the Syrian air force by destroying helicopters that drop barrel bombs on civilian targets. This can be done with stand-off weapons and does not require US aircraft over Syrian territory. It would likely have to be done as covert action in order to get around the AUMF, which covers only Al Qaeda (and via a stretch Al Qaeda-descended organizations like the Islamic State).
3. Tell the Russians and Iranians we are no longer going to turn a blind eye to Hizbollah engagement in Syria. If they don’t leave, we would need to target them (again as covert action with standoff weapons).
4. Create safe areas inside Syria we are prepared to protect from the air. The opposition, or Turkey, would have to provide ground forces in order to govern there without fear of regime and Islamic State violence. This option would also entail financial and technical assistance to the civilian opposition on a scale not yet attempted.
5. Provide (or allow others to provide) anti-aircraft and other more advanced weapons to vetted opposition groups. Possible use of these weapons against civilian aircraft either in Syria or in the region is the obvious downside. Remember Malaysia Air flight 17.
None of these ideas is a slam dunk. All could generate unintended consequences, in particular Russian and Iranian escalation. It is not clear that Washington would be willing to meet and exceed their responses. Nor is it guaranteed that the non-extremist opposition would be able to take advantage of the opportunities Washington generates.
But without something that changes the military equation, Aleppo is lost and the Syrian/Russian/Iranian alliance will continue its depredations against civilians in Idlib and other opposition strongholds. This would strengthen extremist recruitment and postpone the prospect of any political settlement.
I don’t envy this president, or the next one, in facing the choice among these options, or doing nothing.
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