peacefare.net

Stay, but not for long

March 29 President Trump declared:

We’re coming out of Syria, like, very soon. Let the other people take care of it now. Very soon—very soon we’re coming out.

He reiterated that sentiment Tuesday. Yesterday the White House confirmed that the troops will stay, at least for now. Apart from the question of who is really commander-in-chief, and whether President Trump has any idea what he is talking about, this ambiguity (or is it vacillation?) leaves us with important questions: should the troops stay or go? What should their goals be?

The only valid purposes for staying should be US national interests, in particular vital ones. Staying only if Saudi Arabia agrees to pay–a proposition the President has floated–violates this first principle. Foreign governments do sometimes pay part of the costs of deployed American forces, but only when the deployment (to Japan, South Korea, Germany, Italy, or Qatar for example) meets the criterion of being in the US national interest. American troops should not be for sale.

What American interests can be served by extending the US presence in Syria, now that the Islamic State has lost almost all of the territory under its control? I think there are three possibilities:

1. Prevent resurgence of ISIS, which will continue its insurgency despite its loss of territory.
2. Counter Iran’s presence and influence.
3. Prevent allied Syrian Kurdish forces from aiding the insurgency inside Turkey.*

A continuing American presence in eastern Syria is not going to bring down President Assad or otherwise hinder his depredation of the Syrian people. It will not expel the Iranians or the Russians. The US hasn’t even been willing to counter Assad’s use of chemical weapons against civilians, never mind the extensive bombing of civilian targets and abuse of those who surrender to “reconciliation” agreements.

Weighing against the continued US presence are many factors: the risks to the small numbers of Americans (2000 or so) spread out over the large territory east of the Euphrates, the dubious legality and legitimacy of the operation (especially once ISIS has been pulverized), the likelihood that our presence will lead to mission creep in either military or civilian directions, and the costs and domestic political sustainability of the operation. The US troops have shown they are capable of defending themselves, having fended off a Russian mercenary attack weeks ago. But sooner or later, dozens or maybe hundreds will be killed or wounded. How long will an impatient president who promised to bring American troops home from the Middle East persist in keeping them there once that happens?

The troops will at some point be withdrawn. The question is what conditions can be created to allow that to happen without imperiling vital US interests.

First and foremost is some minimal stabilization before withdrawal, so that local people will have the means and the will to resist any ISIS resurgence. That is what is going on now. The key is not physical reconstruction, which will take years, but rather clearing mines and rubble as well as establishing a modicum of legitimate governance by and for local people. Here is a lengthy discussion of the issues involved in stabilization of both Iraq and Syria Monday at USIP:

If President Trump, as some have suggested, was talking about Saudi money for the stabilization process, that would make a whole lot more sense than selling our troop presence.

Countering Iran’s presence and influence is not going to be easy. They are on the winning side in this war. They don’t really have to come through the part of Syria US and allied forces control to be present and influential there. It seems to me the best we can do is try to negotiate withdrawal of the Shia militia forces Iran has deployed inside Syria, in exchange for US withdrawal of its ground forces. It might not work of course, especially as the President has already tipped them off as to what he wants. I thought he said he wasn’t going to do stupid things like that. But it might be worth a try.

It will be difficult, to say the least, to sever the tie between the Syrian Kurdish forces (PYD) with which the US has collaborated to defeat ISIS and the Kurds rebelling inside Turkey (PKK). The two organizations are closely tied ideologically and loyal to the same leader. But if the US wants to restore its relations with NATO ally Turkey, that is what it needs to try to do. The first step should be getting the PYD out of Manbij, a mostly Arab town west of the Euphrates, as Vice President Biden promised in the summer of 2016. The US Central Command is dead set against fulfilling that commitment, as it doesn’t want to abandon its Kurdish allies. But that’s why we have civilian control of the military.

The Turks should be able to live with PYD, or at least Kurdish, dominance of the area east of the Euphrates, but the Kurds as well as their Arab allies south will need at least continuation of US air support to prevent the area east of the Euphrates from falling to a revived extremist group, the Syrian armed forces, or Shia militias. As a former colleague pointed out to me yesterday, that is precisely what the US did in Iraq for more than a decade: it enforced a no-fly zone that effectively protected Iraqi Kurdistan from Saddam Hussein. During that time, Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds found a modus vivendi, at least until the Kurdistan referendum last year. The air support would most effectively be provided from Turkey, as it is today. Turkey would expect to receive from the PYD at the very least a verifiable pledge of non-assistance to the PKK, as well as assurances about allowing pluralism in their part of Syria.

The good options in Syria evaporated long ago. The best the US can do now is use its position there to meet limited but important national interests that will endure past the troops withdrawal. That will mean staying, but not for long.

*For those keeping score, here are Secretary of State Tillerson’s deadletter objectives:

1) ISIS and al-Qaeda must suffer an “enduring defeat” and Syria must never again become a platform for transnational terror organization that targets U.S. citizens;

2) Syria’s seven year-long civil war must draw to a close through a brokered diplomatic settlement;

3) Iran’s influence in Syria must be “diminished” and its “dreams of a northern arch…denied;”

4) The conditions should be created to allow Syrian refugees and internally displaced people to return to their homes;

5) Syria must be “free” of weapons of mass destruction.

I’ve watered down 1), eliminated 2), kept much of 3), eliminated 4) eliminated 5), and added Turkey and the Kurds.