Day: September 11, 2019
Bolton and Trump unleashed
John Bolton and Donald Trump were always an odd couple: the one a consistent hawkish interventionist and bureaucratic operator in mustachioed professorial guise, the other an erratic big-talking little-stick narcissistic braggart. They found common cause on withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) maximum pressure against Iran, thus trading the 10-year delay in Tehran’s ability to build a nuclear weapons for less than one year, but as soon as the President started looking for negotiated settlements with Tehran, Pyongyang, and the Taliban, Bolton resorted to undermining Trump’s efforts. Ironically, Bolton was fired only a few days after he won his battle against the Afghanistan agreement.
Zal Khalilzad was trying to do the right thing: exchange the withdrawal of US troops Trump wants before the November 2020 election in exchange for Taliban promises
a) to negotiate a political settlement with the Kabul government and
b) not to harbor international terrorists.
The reported deal involved withdrawal only to the number of Americans in Afghanistan at the end of the Obama Administration, and the Taliban promises would have been hard to enforce. But it was a start.
Bolton didn’t want the withdrawal at all. But that’s not what blew up the agreement. It was Trump: he apparently decided he wanted a meeting with the Taliban at Camp David, with the president himself trying for a better deal in the role of closer. This was a terrible idea, in particular a few days before 9/11. The Taliban however never agreed to come to the US, so Trump cancelled the non-existent meeting, supposedly because of the death of an American soldier. That isn’t credible, since more than a dozen Americans died during Zal’s negotiations without any dramatic American reaction. Negotiating in the absence of a ceasefire is always a dubious proposition.
Poor Zal is left holding the bag. We’ll know when he abandons hope: he’ll resign. In the meanwhile, Afghan President Ghani, who is competing in a presidential election September 27, is breathing a sigh of relief–he wants the US troops to stay–and Bolton has the satisfaction of watching the US re-escalate the air war, even as he looks for a tell-all book deal and a cushy spot in the private sector. Unleashed, he will also no doubt become a cheer leader for military action against Iran and support for Israel’s annexations.
The President is also unleashed. He is desperate for some sort of international triumph before the election only 14 months hence. The Chinese are holding their own in the tariff war, the Middle East “deal of the century” has evaporated, the North Koreans are thumbing their noses, and Iran is demanding sanctions relief in exchange for deigning to talk with Washington. Trump is left with little alternative in Afghanistan but escalation and unilateral withdrawal, unless Zal succeeds in putting Humpty Dumpty back together again.
Everyone wants to know how US foreign policy will change as a result of Bolton’s firing. I focus mainly on the Balkans and the Middle East. On the latter, it is clear enough that Trump will back the Jewish state to the hilt, no matter who the next national security adviser is. He will also likely try to complete the US withdrawal from Syria, over Pentagon objections. He’ll continue to support the war in Yemen, unless the UAE and Saudi Arabia fall out so catastrophically that there is nothing left to support.
The Balkans is a bit harder to predict, as the Administration has been less than clear about its approach. Bolton was open to a land swap between Serbia and Kosovo that would have destabilized the entire region, likely killing two Clinton birds with one stone: rump Kosovo might have become the eastern province of Albania and Bosnia might have descended into chaos as Republika Srpska tried to secede. But there is no guarantee Bolton’s successor won’t take a similar approach. Ethnonationalists of a feather flock together. An American serving a white nationalist president is always going to give Balkan nationalists a hearing.
Here is the podcast I did with Mark Goldberg shortly after writing this piece.
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Ends and means after the caliphate
On September 10 the Brookings Institution hosted a panel discussion entitled “The Counter-ISIS Coalition: Diplomacy and Security in Action.” The panel featured two former special presidential envoys to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL: General John Allen, current President of Brookings, and Brett McGurk, a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Lise Grande, who served as Deputy Special Representative of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq during the height of the campaign against ISIS, joined the panel through a video link from Amman. The New Yorker’s Susan B. Glasser moderated.
Allen emphasized that ISIS remains a threat through its residual forces in Syria, the presence of its affiliates in countries like Nigeria, Libya, and the Philippines, and its online influence. McGurk also pointed to the danger of the next generation of jihadi fighters coming from Syria’s al-Hol camp, where 73,000 ISIS women and children are held. Neither the Syrian Democratic Forces who administer the camp nor the US have sufficient resources to manage the threat.
America’s objectives in Syria have broadened under the Trump administration to include countering the remaining ISIS threat, promoting regime change, and removing Iranian forces from the country. Simultaneously, America has reduced the number US troops to around 1000. McGurk stressed that this widening gap between America’s goals in Syria and the resources it has in the country will make it hard to respond to the next crisis. The Turkish-US joint patrols of the safe zone in northern Syria that began last weekend will further draw these limited resources away from managing critical threats like al-Hol.
Both McGurk and Allen attributed the coalition’s successes to three factors: strong American leadership, commitment from an unusually large number of allies, and working by, with, and through local partners that America had previously developed in Iraq. Both argued that in the event of a crisis it would be harder to create a coalition now due to some allies’ loss of trust in American leadership. McGurk also speculated that John Bolton’s departure from the White House will not change these conditions, stating that the Trump administration lacked a functional communication process between the President and the national security adviser prior to Bolton’s tenure.
Grande noted that while UN stabilization usually begins by trying to fixing entire systems, in Iraq they took a bottom-up approach to repairing electricity, water, and sanitation grids. During the stabilization of Ramadi, UN workers coordinated with Iraqi forces to enter cities as soon as they were liberated and set up mobile electricity grids consisting of generators on trucks. They hired local engineers to connect each house to the generators as families returned to them. While past stabilization programs have taken 2 years to reconnect electricity grids, in Ramadi families had power within 2 hours of returning home. Grande described this as both the largest and most successful stabilization effort in the UN’s history, which she said was possible due to the strength of the Iraqi government’s commitment, an Iraqi private sector with great engineering capabilities, and support from the coalition and the United States.
Grande also credits the success the UN had in stabilizing these cities to the premium Iraqi forces placed on protecting civilians and keeping them in their homes when possible. Each morning during the liberation of Mosul, the UN sent the number of empty beds available in their camps to the Iraqi commanders, who structured their battle plan to ensure only that number of civilians were evacuated from their homes. The Iraqi security forces escorted these families across the front lines, checked them for weapons, and delivered them to aid workers, who got them into temporary housing by nightfall.
Grande contrasted this to the average of four weeks it takes civilians to get humanitarian assistance in most active conflict zones. The Iraqi security forces were also able to protect 90% of the residents of East Mosul in their homes, limiting the number of evacuees needing immediate assistance. She concluded that the commitment of the Iraqi government to protecting civilians, support from the Iraqi private sector, and the strength of America’s coalition leadership were critical to the UN’s success in stabilizing newly liberated cities. Without those conditions the UN will not be able to recreate this success in stabilizing future conflict zones.
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Stevenson’s army, September 11
John Bolton is out. The consensus of major reporting is that, despite numerous disagreements between the adviser and the president, the impetus for his firing was the suspicion of self-serving leaks about the Afghanistan talks.
Several questions come to mind: Does this mean that Trump will run as the peace candidate? Will America be spared major conflict until after the 2020 elections? That’s my guess. Will Bolton’s successor revive the moribund interagency process? [Even if the president doesn’t want it — “I consulted myself” — the rest of the government does.] Will Bolton’s acolytes already placed throughout the government as a kind of neocon deep state be empowered or fired? Will this really make a difference in American foreign policy? {Dubious. It’s still Trump’s whims] Will congressional Republicans with Boltonesque views rise up or mute their views? [I bet they continue to be what Jim Fallows calls Vichy Republicans.]
Could you guess that Israel has elections next week? Netanyahu promises annexations of most of the West Bank settlements, says his views were “coordinated” with the Trump administration.
On this anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, Amy Zegart, who wrote a scathing study of the bureaucratic failures of the US government, says even more reforms are needed in the intelligence community.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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