Day: January 6, 2020

How Soleimani’s death affects Syria

Bassam Barabandi writes:

First: Let us not forget that Soleimani’s project was to drive away American forces from Iraq and Syria. He was in no hurry in Syria because he was busy building the foundations to enhance the Iranian political, military, security, economic, popular, and militia influence in Syria, and he surely achieved quite a lot in this field.

Second: Bashar al-Assad is closer to the Iranian axis than the Russian within the Syrian regime. The new IRGC commander may be forced to compel Assad to take decisions in the coming days to prove his loyalty to Iran and to demonstrate that the new commander is in control. This is one of the things that we should monitor in the coming days.

Third: The Assad regime is split, as never before, into two very distinct wings: pro-Iran and pro-Russia. The Iranian wing is led by Bashar al-Assad, who received his advice/ instructions directly from Qassem Soleimani, This was evident in Bashar’s visit to Tehran. Iran also has its own influence in the military and many officers are affiliated with it, but the most dangerous thing is the almost absolute influence of Iran in the countryside of Deir Ezzor Governorate on the West Bank of the Euphrates, in some areas surrounding Damascus, and local and non-local militias located in separate areas inside Syria.

The vacuum and confusion in Iranian decision-making will be very bad for the pro-Iranian wing within the Assad regime, as this wing contains Bashar al-Assad, the major weakness of the Assad regime as a whole.

We do not know how the newly appointed commander Ismail Qaani will look at Bashar Al-Assad, but if he is to lead a more institutionalized position, Assad’s position will be weaker and weaker, and it will not be unlikely with time to get rid of him in a settlement with the rest of the parties.

If Qaani adopts a more centralized policy, he will ask for more concessions from the pro-Iran wing in the regime, which will make Assad look more miserable and ridiculous than previously as part of Iranian messages to Russia and other countries that its influence remains strong in Syria.

Fourth: Russia may take advantage of this opportunity, as the conflict with the Iranian axis looks like a cold war, which is marked by some fierce confrontations that have not yet been resolved. Despite the relative stability in sharing influence between them, the instability of Syria makes the game of influence. Its redistribution always possible, just as was the case of influence between America and Turkey and between Turkey and Russia.

Soleimani’s viciousness will add to Russia’s influence in Syria, and it has to move quickly in several areas. It will ultimately lead to Iranian losses and Russian gains that cannot be appreciated now, but Russia will inevitably try to expand its gains as much as possible. Today, Hizbollah withdrew its forces from some areas in Zabadani, and pro-Russian forces took over.

Neither the Iranian administration nor Qaani and his aides are oblivious to Russia’s aspirations to reduce their influence. They know they must increase their support for the local and non-local militias that they finance. In order for them to achieve this as quickly as possible, Lebanese Hezbollah’s influence on other militia should increase to rectify the central decision vacuum.

Fifth: Iran’s focus on maintaining its influence in the areas under the Assad regime’s control will give comfort to the American spheres of influence, which will reduce the risk of fighting with Iranian militias in eastern Syria for now. If clashes take place, it will not be that Iran wants to expand its presence as much as it will be part of revenge propaganda for Qassem Soleimani. Consequently, the project of military resistance that the Iranian wing in the Assad regime is trying to activate against the American forces in the northeast will not be completed in the planned way in the short term.

Sixth: Turkey is the least affected by Soleimani’s absence in Syria, as opposed to its impact on its interests in Iraq and near-open intelligence cooperation in its struggle against Kurdish forces and political projects.

Seventh: The changes of Iran’s influence in Syria will not be visible in the short run, but rather, the real changes will be in the long-term erosion of Iran’s influence in Syria for the benefit of the other parties. Qaani will need demonstrate more power and influence over media and local coverage to proactively cover the losses.

Eighth: The Iranian project has been benefiting from the American presence in Iraq and Syria, as the Americans were carrying the biggest burden in confronting ISIS. The Iranians were claiming that they were resisting ISIS while they were building militias to control Iraq and to counter the Americans when ready. The Iranian direct escalation toward the US in Iraq started in October 2019, which may reflect that Iranian felt confident and strong enough to be in Iraq alone without other partners.

The real danger from ISIS will arise from Iranian pressure on the Iraqi government to get the American forces out of Iraq.

Many things can happen in the coming days/weeks that may affect Syria:

1.    The Iraqi government is yet to make a decision to withdraw US forces from Iraq. Does this mean withdrawal from Iraq as a whole or will the American forces remain in the Kurdistan Regional Government? If it is from the entire country, then the question will be what is the future of the American forces in Syria? From a legal and logistical point of view, will the Iraqi government allow the Americans to use airspace and crossings to transport forces to and from Syria?

2.     Legally, if the Iraqi parliament and the Iraqi government pass the decision to withdraw the American forces from Iraq, will this need a whole year from the minute the decision is made to be implemented?  If yes, then the Americans will have that period of time to maneuver and their leverage in Syria will be limited.

3.    If Iran and its militias attack US bases in northeastern Syria directly or indirectly –  will that change the US calculation and cause the Americans to leave Syria? Or will they fight back? How will the SDF forces behave? And the Russians? And Arab clans?

4.    The border between Syria and Iraq is another area that must be watch since the Popular Mobilization Forces are in control of most of the border areas, not only the crossings.

5.    If the United States leaves for any reason in the coming months, what forces will fill the void? Iran or Russia?

6.    Iran will be more stubborn in its positions regarding the Constitutional Committee, Idlib, and the countryside of Aleppo.

7.    If the US forces stay in KRG areas against Baghdad wishes, will that step separate the KRG from Iraq? And how will this affect with the Kurdish areas in Syria?

8.    A new understanding could be reached between Iran and the international community in which a process of negotiation on all files and concerns starts again, freezing the situation for a while.

9.    A new political crisis could occur in Iraq between pro-Iranian parties and both the Kurds and the Sunni, who see the American are the only guarantors to protect them physically as well as their interests in the state. This may delay any decision to have a new prime minister and increase tension inside Iraq.

10. The difficult economic and social situation in Iran and the popular anti-regime movements in both Lebanon and Iraq will make Iranian decisions weaker than they claim and the size of the Iranian adventure much less than now hoped. The Iranian goal is survival of the regime. Any direct military confrontation with the US will weaken the regime without gaining any real benefits.

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Iran is winning this round

The big news of the day is that Tehran will maintain its commitment to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections even though it will no longer be bound by the operational limits in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran nuclear deal). Why would it do that?

Because it is smart. There are several benefits:

  1. It will give the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese reason not to withdraw from the nuclear deal, thus keeping them split from the Americans;
  2. It will make it clear to the international community how far they are willing to go in preparing the materials needed for nuclear weapons, and at what point they are prepared to stop if given some sanctions relief;
  3. It will give them the moral high ground while possibly continuing clandestine nuclear weapons design, much of which can be done by computers without nuclear materials.

Washington meanwhile is losing on several fronts. It has had to suspend anti-ISIS operations in Iraq and Syria, its claims of an imminent attack on US targets are less than credible, there are credible claims that Soleimani was carrying in Baghdad a peace overture to Saudi Arabia, and pressure to remove US forces from Iraq, or at least from Arab-controlled Iraq, is growing. The assassination of Soleimani has tamped down the anti-Iranian demonstrations in Iraq and has quieted the demonstrations against the Islamic Republic inside Iran as well. Even Riyadh is asking Washington to tone it down.

The Republican wizkids like Senator Rubio are speculating about US support for Kurdistan’s secession from Iraq, so that the American troops could stay there. But he forgets: Kurdistan has lost control of Kirkuk, without which its oil revenue is nowhere near sufficient to maintain it as an independent state, not to mention Turkey’s, Syria’s, and Iran’s reactions as well as China’s and Russia’s. Does Marco want the US to go to war to restore Kirkuk to Kurdistan’s control?

Donald Trump likes to upset the apple cart and create crisis, then pretend to resolve it, as he has done with the trade wars. This one won’t be an easy pretense. He has made Americans far less safe not only from Iranian attacks but also from ISIS and Al Qaeda, which are no doubt enjoying the relief. The only Iranians endangered so far other than Soleimani are Iranian-Americans, who are reportedly being stopped at our borders in droves and sent to secondary interrogation. I’ve been there and done that–it is not fatal–but it helps our enemies to claim that America only believes in equal rights for non-immigrant white people, which is pretty much the case for this Administration.

Hillary Clinton was correct when she said Donald Trump did not have the temperament to be president. Republicans in the Senate know that as well as anyone else. There is a good chance killing Soleimani will hurt Trump’s chances for re-election as well as Republican hopes of maintaining their majority in the Senate. It is high time they step up and provide the conditions for a serious and fair trial on the impeachment charges. John Bolton’s new-found willingness to testify if subpoened provides a golden opportunity. It would be truly ironic if Bolton and the Iranians were to be the causes of Trump’s undoing.

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Stevenson’s army, January 6

-WaPo says SecState Pompeo has been pushing for months to escalate against Iran and kill Suleimani.
-SecDef Esper drastically limited group involved in Suleimani planning.
– US military has halted counter-ISIS operations.
– Speaker Pelsoi says House will vote on war powers measure on Iran similar to one offered by Sen. Tim Kaine [D-Va].
– Iran has announced end of compliance with Iran nuclear deal but will allow IAEA inspections to continue.
Maduro seized control of national assembly by blocking entry of pro-Guaido members.
– Yahoo News has long story on intelligence community’s problems protecting its spies in a digital age.
– WaPo’s media columnist, Margaret Sullivan, has suggestions for those not already in the far-right echo chamber to follow what matters there. Among other sites she recommends The RIghting and RightRichter.  Surf away.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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