peacefare.net

It isn’t going to be easy to choose what to do

Tony Cordesman offers a set of “negative” policy options for the US in dealing with the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan:

• Threaten to attack any terrorist groups that launch attacks outside Afghanistan.
• Withhold recognition of the new government.
• Pressure other states, including Afghanistan’s neighbors.
• Cut off the aid that funded some 80% of the former government’s operations and security efforts.
• Introduce yet another mix of sanctions to exert maximum pressure.

But he thinks incorporating in addition a more “positive,” conditional approach would be more effective. These boil down to “carefully planned and executed” diplomatic recognition and economic aid. Peter Galbraith likewise argued on BBC today that diplomatic recognition should be considered, not because the US approves of the Taliban takeover but because it could enable more rescue of people who want to leave. Without consular officers in Kabul, getting people out is going to be difficult, mainly because of US bureaucratic requirements. An embassy might also be able to exert some influence on Taliban behavior, provided of course that Washington gets iron-clad security guarantees for the Americans returning to Kabul.

The financial cut-off has already begun. Taliban access to Afghanistan government accounts in the United States has been blocked and scheduled dollar cash transfers suspended. The next big move may be suspension of IMF and World Bank activities. The kind of targeted sanctions in fashion these days–focused on the personal finances and travel of miscreants–is mostly ineffective with the Taliban, since they presumably are too smart to keep their savings in dollars and uninterested in international travel.

The threat to attack international terrorist groups hardly needs reiteration. The problem will be identifying and locating them. Past cruise missile attacks on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan had little real impact. Even the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan did not destroy Al Qaeda, which has burrowed in to many different countries even if it hasn’t been able to mount attacks on the US for most of the last two decades.

Afghanistan’s neighbors are likely beyond pressuring: Pakistan because it is delighted with the Taliban victory and Iran because it is already profoundly unhappy with it. Russia will suck up to the Taliban until they either support terrorists inside Russia or in the stans that are its northern neighbors. China will likely be a bit more cautious, fearing the Taliban might just care about the treatment of the Uygurs, or even support tererorist attacks, from across the short border with Xinjiang. The commercial temptation for the Chinese will be great, as Afghanistan has appetizing mineral deposits, but the risks will loom large.

So the diplomatic option starts to look good when you realize how limited the other options are. But its feasibility depends on how the Taliban treat the Afghan population, especially women, minorities, journalists, and people who supported the effort to build a democratic states for the past twenty years, either directly or indirectly. There is a reason the Taliban are making friendly noises about women’s rights and amnesty for those who fought against them. They are savvy enough to know that surviving this time around depends on not offending international sensibilities too dramatically.

But the Taliban are not pluralists. They will not tolerate competition for power, even in the limited forms it existed under Presidents Karzai and Ghani. The Taliban are totalitarians who intend to govern by their own, fundamentalist, interpretation of Sharia. We know well what that meant 25 years ago: little or no education for women, abuse of minorities, no elections, no press (much less freedom of), catastrophically poor health care, and heavy reliance on drug trafficking for income. It is difficult to picture any organized opposition to Taliban authority, which they claim comes not from the people but from God.

There is a hint of insurgency in the Panjshir valley, the majority-Tajik center of resistance to the Soviets and the Taliban in the 1990s. You can expect the Taliban to be merciless in cracking down there, when the time comes. Taliban forces have already fired on demonstrators in Herat and Jalalabad. We’ve seen in Hong Kong and Belarus how autocracies can succeed against popular, nonviolent rebellion. The Taliban are likely to make the Chinese and Belarusians look like softies.

The Taliban are still allowing the evacuation of thousands of people from the Kabul airport. No one should be fooled: this is ridding them of many of their most capable, internationally well-connected, opponents. At some point, they will decide enough is enough and either start blocking access–there are reports that is already happening, especially to women trying to get to the airport–or demand the US and other Western powers start paying for the privilege.

Our options are limited. Diplomatic recognition could bring an onslaught of domestic US criticism. It isn’t going to be easy to choose what to do.