Blunter would be better

In a tweet this morning, I called these words about the Western Balkan non-EU members harsh but true:

…they do not fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, despite an accession process that has lasted around 20 years: They have neither stable democratic institutions nor functioning market econo­mies….Another factor…against early accession to the EU: their unwillingness to establish good neighbourly relations…German European policy should change course here and make it clearer that these states have no place in the EU without mak­ing efforts towards peaceful coexistence.

https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/german-foreign-policy-in-transition#fn-d57704e4133

Of course there are nuances. Here I’ll try to explore some of them.

None of the Balkan states, even the current EU members, has achieved a truly independent, honest, judiciary. I’m hard put to distinguish among them, as is the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index. But there Kosovo and North Macedonia are headed in the right direction and Serbia in the wrong direction, which jibes with my own impression. Montenegro isn’t rated, but wouldn’t depart much from the regional average. Albania is worse than that average, despite decades of reform efforts.

When it comes to freedom and democracy, I depart from Freedom House’s rating of Kosovo as less free and democratic than the other non-EU members, which are all clustered together. Kosovo has perhaps the freest press in the region, has repeatedly seen alternation in power (unfortunately viewed as instability by many outside observers), and has a relatively free economy. Corruption is a big problem (one the current government is targeting) but it is also a big problem in the other countries.

As for the other countries, Serbia lacks a free press and power is concentrated in the hands of its current president, who has drifted towards autocracy rather than democracy. The most significant institutional governance issues are in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which at Dayton was given a constitution that makes democratic governance impossible. One person one vote is inconsistent with the group rights that the warring parties insisted on at Dayton and afterwards. Montenegro and Macedonia have both struggled with alternation in power, but both have managed it, with some violence. Albania has improved its electoral performance and has a vigorous political competition between government and opposition.

As for good neighborly relations, the main issue is between Serbia and Kosovo, since the former does not recognize the latter and has even recently menaced the use of military force. Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo (the first three NATO members and the last defended by NATO-led forces) are for now getting along pretty well, partly because they are all feeling the heat from Serbia’s Russian-sponsored re-armament. Kosovo has issues also with Bosnia and Herzegovina, but those are entirely derivative of Belgrade’s non-recognition. SWP would have done better to point the finger towards culpability rather than resort to generalities.

All that said, the SWP basically has it right. The Western Balkan countries are all looking for easy ways into the EU, but even those that have adopted and implemented much of the acquis communautaire do not completely meet the Copenhagen criteria. Besides, the EU member states have gotten more particular about accession, due in part to their own domestic politics (and economics) and in part to the poor performance of some of the more recent members, especially Bulgaria and Romania. The reforms the EU wants should be the reforms aspiring members want as well. The benefits of EU membership largely precede accession for aspirants who are serious. Germany and the EU should indeed get blunter about this.