peacefare.net

May 9 will mark defeat, not victory

An esteemed colleague brought these (anonymous but well-versed) lectures to my attention:

The presentations are worth your while, but (spoiler alert) I’ll state the bottom lines here:

• Ukraine is outgunned and outmanned in the short and medium run, but
• If the war lasts, the economic and defense industrial depth of NATO’s support (assuming it endures) will lead to Russia’s defeat.

Will the Ukrainians endure?

The first question then is whether the Ukrainians can endure. So far, they shown ever sign of doing so. They mobilized quickly, with apparently few men trying to escape while their families fled. They fight in small units that have proven stalwart. Their battle plans appear largely successful. The Ukrainians have pushed the Russians away from their capital and their second largest (Russian-speaking) city, Kharkiv. Ukrainian forces are holding the line, more or less, in the east.

Kiev lost significant territory in the south early in the war and one major city (Kherson), but a few Ukrainians are still holding on in Mariupol. That prevents the Russians from solidifying the link between Donbas and Crimea. Others are blocking the Russians from moving west at Mykolaiv. A Ukrainian missile sunk the Russian flagship in the Black Sea and yesterday Ukrainian drones destroyed two smaller boats.

But these are still early days. Will the will to fight wither in six months, a year, two years?

Will the US and NATO endure?

Past experience suggests US and hence NATO support may wither before the Ukrainians do. That is what happened in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Washington has a lot of issues to deal with besides Ukraine. It could well decide to settle for a Russian pullback to pre-February 24 positions even if the Ukrainians want to expel the Russians entirely from Ukrainian territory. Or Russia could decide to widen the war to Moldova (not a US ally) or Poland (a US ally). The latter especially would present President Biden with a difficult situation. So far, the Ukrainians have been a NATO proxy in the war with Russia. Direct engagement would put the Baltic allies as well as Poland at risk.

The nuclear threat is not the big issue

The ultimate Russian move would be to follow through on Moscow’s threats to use a nuclear weapon. But it is hard to see how that would profit the perpetrator. The Ukrainian forces are not massed in a way that would make using a nuclear weapon militarily useful. Destroying Kiev or another Ukrainian city would be catastrophic, but counterproductive if you want to take over the country, not to mention the global reputational cost. Besides, the Americans will have made it clear that the response will be at least as destructive to Russian assets as the initial salvo is to the Ukrainians.

Small beans

By now, it should be clear to Vladimir Putin that his army’s days are numbered, so he will double down in the short run and try for something he can proudly announce on May 9 to correspond with the celebration of Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. The very least will be annexation of Luhansk and Donetsk provinces by Russia.

But that precarious and still not fully realized territorial acquisition represents small beans compared to the big commitment Moscow has made. It has lost something like one-quarter of its invasion force to death or casualties, strengthened and united NATO, weakened Russia’s economy, and ruined Russia’s prospects for future growth and connectivity with the West. Sanctions have not yet had a devastating effect, but they will remain in place so long as Russia occupies part of Ukraine. To boot: war crimes and crimes against humanity are sullying any gains Russia has made.

May 9 will mark defeat, not victory.