So when is the right time to negotiate?

This question for Ukraine has aroused a good bit of interest. President Zelensky has made it clear that achieving his war aims will require a Russian defeat. Many others think that is impossible, as Russia has so much deeper manpower resources than Ukraine. Few are still considering President Putin’s preferred option. He would like a clear-cut Ukrainian defeat, but Kyiv’s stalwart defense and now successful offense has muted the likelihood of that outcome.

Ripeness

The canonical conflict management response to the question is “ripeness.” Negotiations have a chance for success when they meet two conditions:

  1. The parties are locked in a “mutually hurting stalemate” and are consequently looking for
  2. A “mutually enticing way out,” one at least as attractive as continuing the fight.

For the observer, judging ripeness is more difficult than feeling a piece of fruit at the grocery store, though it bears some resemblance. What is the feel of the conflict? Are both sides really hurting? What alternatives to a negotiated agreement do they still have that they have not pursued? What kind of “way out” would appeal to the warring parties? If the conditions are not fulfilled, are there outside forces prepared to create the necessary pressures? Or are there events that might do so?

Not now

I see little sign the current situation is ripe and even less that outside forces or events will force a serious negotiation. Ukraine is still advancing, albeit slowly. Its citizens still support the war effort. @PetroBurkovskyi reports:

This was asked befoe the successful offensives in Kharkiv and Kherson.

Russian public opinion is more equivocal and harder to measure. But it doesn’t matter as much because Putin gets to make all the important decisions. He is is gearing up for another manpower mobilization this winter, including more prisoner brigades enlisted to brutalize their opponents. Putin has been explicit that talks will require as a pre-condition recognition of his claim to annexed territories.

Russia’s air attacks are persistent. Ukraine’s air defenses are improving and its ability to strike deep inside Russia developing. Both sides are escalating, within the limited means at their disposal. Ukraine’s minimal objectives–pushing back Russia to the February 23 lines–are still far off. Russia’s minimal objective of occupying fully the four provinces it has “annexed” are also far off.

Talk and fight

Lack of ripeness does not mean the sides shouldn’t or don’t communicate and even negotiate. It only means ending the war by negotiation is unlikely. The UN and Turkey have successfully negotiated with Kyv and Moscow an agreement that allows some export of Ukrainian grain, which will help to stave off famine in the Middle East and Africa. The warring arties no doubt also meet to exchange prisoners and allow civilians with urgent needs to cross confrontation lines. There is also non-verbal communication. The successful Ukrainian drone strike on a big Russian air base is a clear signal to Moscow of ability to escalate further.

It is common to “talk and fight,” since doing so can provide vital information on the enemy and his intentions as well as communicate messages of one’s own. Putin’s hints about the use of tactical nuclear weapons were intended to frighten. They did that in some Europeaan capitals and Washington, though not in Kyiv. The Ukrainian fight is already existential. The Russian one is not, except for Putin personally. It is unlikely that negotiations can produce an end to this war with him still in power.

There are two big known unknowns

Two key factors in deciding how this war ends will be what happens in Moscow and what happens in Washington. Putin won’t likely give in, but his successors might. Biden seems solid, despite his conditional offer to talk with Putin if the latter wants to end the war. That’s a big if. But Biden will come under a lot of pressure from some European and American experts to allow Russia half a loaf, on the unproven theory that will satisfy him. Biden will also face resistance from the substantial pro-Russian wing of the Republican Party, but they are unlikely to prevail.

So we are in for more war, and more jaw. Serious negotiations to end the war are not on the horizon.

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