Author: Daniel Serwer
Russian “immunity”
Milana Pejic of the Belgrade daily Blic asked me yesterday about immunity for Russian troops stationed in Serbia, which President Putin has reportedly requested. I responded:
I’m not sure what “immunity” means. As the state sending soldiers, sailors or airmen to deploy in a foreign country, the US always requires that it retain jurisdiction over them. If they commit a crime, they get tried in the US, not in the state in which they are deployed, unless the US waives its right to exercise jurisdiction (which it occasionally does). There is no “immunity” in the sense of protection from prosecution. This is all regulated in what is called a “status of forces agreement.” I really don’t know what the Russians do, though I wouldn’t be entirely surprised if they insist on something closer to immunity.
Quite apart from the question of criminal jurisdiction, I can’t think of any EU countries that host Russian bases on their territory. Are there any?* If Serbia is serious about EU membership, I wonder if it wants to continue to host the Russians at all. If not, there would be no point in providing immunity (or even sending state jurisdiction). An easy way out might be to refuse the Russian request.
I see Prime Minister Vucic is talking in the press about the importance of NATO to the protection of Serbs in northern Kosovo. Belgrade needs to weigh carefully whether its present policy of hedging between NATO/EU and Russia is really in the Serbian interest.
Some day fairly soon all Serbia’s neighbors will be NATO members. What sense would it make then for Serbia to host a Russian base? What impact will that have on relations with the neighbors? Moscow may call it a humanitarian center, but we know from the recent intentional Russian bombing of hospitals in Syria how serious Moscow is about humanitarian issues.
*PS: the answer to this question is no.
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Will the hostilities cease?
The only real question about the cessation of hostilities supposedly agreed in Munich last week is when it will collapse. It may never go into effect or it may last a week or two, but it will be surprising if it lasts much longer than that. The Russians have made it clear enough the cessation of hostilities doesn’t apply to its efforts against ISIS, which have never really targeted ISIS but are instead directed mainly against any forces opposing the Assad regime. Assad has likewise indicated that his forces will not cease fighting whoever opposes them.
The US and its Coalition allies, who are focusing for now on ISIS forces in eastern Syria, also intend to continue their air attacks. Turkey is shelling Kurdish and allied Arab forces trying to take control of the relatively small part Syria’s northern border that they don’t yet own. Saudi Arabia is talking about deploying ground forces to Syria, but only as part of a US-led Coalition effort that has not real possibility of materializing.
If Damascus allows humanitarian aid convoys into some of the areas it is besieging, that will only be for fear of the consequences if they don’t. If no relief reaches the besieged areas, Secretary of State Kerry will want to make another run at President Obama to urge stronger military action, at the very least provision of antiaircraft weapons to the opposition forces the US has trained. Preventing this eventuality could be a good enough reason for Assad to allow the aid shipments to move forward for a while. Assad’s air force is already decimated, but loss of its remaining helicopters would constrain its ability to terrorize civilian areas with indiscriminate barrel bombs.
President Obama still shows no appetite for getting more deeply involved in Syria. He remains exclusively focused on the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS). None of his putative allies in the region share that single mindedness, though the Kurds are making a good show of it. Their real objective is to carve out part of Syria that they can claim to govern, and from which they can support Kurdish insurgents inside Turkey. The Turks are trying to prevent that. The moderate opposition, supported by the Gulf, is targeting Assad. Coalition warfare, which for the US is more the rule than the exception, is always difficult, but this Coalition is proving particularly unruly.
Russian air attacks have already devastated a large part of the area around Aleppo, where several hundred thousand people are at risk of being besieged. Idlib could be next. The costs of future reconstruction in Syria are already astronomical, with no sign of anyone willing or able to pay. The Russians and Iranians haven’t contributed even to the humanitarian relief effort. The Americans and the Gulf won’t be interested in reconstructing anything if Assad remains in power. The Europeans may want to provide some aid, if only to relieve the refugee pressure that is bearing down on them. The Syrian government is broke and will remain so–even if it regains control of its oil fields, they are now depleted and damaged.
So the war will continue sooner or later, despite the human and economic costs. And the post-war period will be no less challenging. Woe to Syria.
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Applying
A Facebook friend wondered over the weekend whether I was being skeptical or just superficial when I tweeted:
The one thing on which #Bosnia‘ns agree is that the country is not qualified for EU membership. So what do they do? Apply.
Skeptical was more like it. All you have to do to understand in depth why is take a glance at last year’s European Commission progress report on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Guess what? It shows little progress.
Brussels reads its own reports, so we can be sure the Europeans know that. The European Union remedy has been to push a “Reform Agenda” that starts with labor market reform. The reasoning is that only by lowering labor costs and increasing labor flexibility will Bosnian companies be able to compete effectively and expand in the future.
So far so good, but that is an indirect way of attacking Bosnia’s problems, which lie in a political economy that enriches politicians and impoverishes most of the population. I don’t say labor market reform won’t help, in particular if it reduces costs, increases competition and makes it harder for politicians to exploit patronage, but it is far from sufficient.
Bosnia needs prosecutions. The rip-offs are well-documented. It seems to me inconceivable that professional prosecutors would not have sufficient evidence. The international community should be able to help by tracing the tycoons’ finances and freezing ill-gotten gains. Precious little of that has been done.
The only really high-level prosecution these days is directed at an upstart politician, Fahrudin Radoncic, not for ripping off the state but rather for witness tampering in a Kosovo drug investigation. I don’t have any idea whether Radoncic is guilty or innocent (and he should be presumed the latter of course), but I am pretty sure that case will not do much to undermine the web of corruption and misappropriation of state assets that plagues Bosnia. The prosecutors’ use of wiretaps, however, demonstrates unequivocally that the judicial system in Bosnia has the means, but not the will, to attack other high-level corruption.
I’d be the first to admit that the United States suffers from high-level corrupt practices as well. A year doesn’t go by without charges against a governor here, a couple of members of Congress there, and dozens of state legislators, including in states far larger and with bigger economies than Bosnia. You need to be worried not when such cases are pursued but when they aren’t.
That’s the situation in Bosnia today. Despite a newly inked anti-corruption plan, the European Commission reports:
Organized crime cases in 2015 led to the confiscation of 550,000 euros. That’s peanuts. Hundreds of millions if not billions would be more like it.
If Bosnia and Herzegovina is serious about getting into the EU, it will need to skip confiscating the peanuts and trap the elephants. If the application for membership helps to mobilize the political will required, it’s all for the better. But it is far more likely to amount to nothing more than a maneuver to convince an already disheartened electorate that progress is being made.
Bosnia needs not only to apply to the EU, but also to apply itself to qualifying for membership.
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The Yemen quagmire
Christina Ma, a SAIS student, reports:
The panelists of the MEI- and SAIS- sponsored “Yemen Quagmire,” held Friday, featured Charles Schmitz (Middle East Institute), Amat Alsoswa (former Yemeni Cabinet Member), Leslie Campbell (National Democratic Institute), and Andrew Plitt (USAID). Kate Seelye (Middle East Institute) moderated the discussion on the conflict in Yemen, the humanitarian crisis, and prospects for peace talks.
Schmitz underlined that the grievances generating the conflict are not just between the Houthis and the state, but more broadly between the Northerners and the central government. No political force on either side of the conflict has a coherent vision or ability to settle the war. Yemen may be in for a “long, slow grind.” Poverty is a huge issue; the groups that can pay their forces will be more likely to attract supporters.
Regarding international involvement, Schmitz said the Saudi air campaign has been a disaster. The blockade has also greatly affected the population. Insurgent forces are still capturing strategic cities and becoming involved with oil smuggling, despite efforts by the Coalition. The role of Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda could further complicate the conflict.
Alsoswa described the escalation of the conflict since “Operation Restoring Hope” began ten months ago in April 2015. She illustrated the gravity of the humanitarian crisis using recent UN statistics. For example, 82% of the population is estimated to seek aid, there is an absence of medical and other basic necessities, and 33% of people have not been able to receive any aid. Humanitarian actors on the ground (for example, MSF) have been limited in their ability to serve the population due to the insecure environment, in some cases, even being targets of violence. Many southerners have been fleeing to the north, especially Sana’a. In addition, there are threats from Islamist groups such as Daesh and Al-Qaeda seeking inroads, as well as the threat of spillover to nearby countries Saudi Arabia and Oman.
The first and most immediate challenge to peace is overcoming the humanitarian crisis, Alsoswa said. Poverty has been exacerbated, governance has collapsed, private economic activity has broken down due to the insecure environment and the blockade, and oil production has halted. In Sana’a, looting and destruction of cultural heritage sites is increasingly problematic.
Plitt described the Yemeni humanitarian crisis as one of the more dire that has flown under the radar. Many parts of the country were already food insecure before the war. After the conflict escalated, the south and west have entered emergency states and are one step away from famine. The economic outlook is grim. The government is facing a budget crisis—foreign reserves are nearly depleted. Government salaries and social service payments have not been dispersed. One relatively positive note is that around 70% of schools in areas less affected by the conflict have been able to remain open. A major impediment to peace is that even if a ceasefire is achieved, can it be enforced on the ground?
Campbell said that many of the political fault lines and competitions for power prior to the conflict remain the same. The Iranian and Saudi interference masks the pressures driving the conflict, but they should not be overlooked. Northerners have historically tried to win more autonomy, power-sharing, and resource sharing. The center opposes these demands. The South also has had secession movements and critically possesses the country’s oil resources.
Alluding to a “fatal flaw” in the 2013 National Dialogue, Campbell noted that the conference discussed many of the simpler issues but the bigger issues that underlay the conflict, such as federalism, were evaded. The President picked the southern delegates, who did not truly represent the interests of the South. While the outcome suited the agenda of the people in the center, groups vying for devolution, such as the Houthis, were dissatisfied with the outcome and furthermore perceived that the agreement would be imposed on them by the international community. Former President Saleh remains a troublemaker and spoiler.
Campbell recommends that dialogues and negotiations must be broader and keep the core issues are on the table. Otherwise, the groups have no incentive to negotiate and will continue fighting. Alsoswa adds that one cannot just rely on the parties of war to create peace. Third parties play an important role by enforcing peace on the ground.
In the Q&A, Campbell noted that Saleh is a skilled politician but escaped punishment. The international community has not yet found a way to deal with impunity. Schmitz suggested that the comparison of the Houthis to Hezbollah is inaccurate because Iran has less control over the Houthis, who presented an opportunity for Iran to play on the regional narrative of “oppressed Shiites.” But Iran does not direct their actions.
On the role of the US, the panelists noted that Washington has been reluctant to get involved because of its alliance with Riyadh, but recently has strengthened messages. Saudi and US interests are not necessarily aligned. Refugees are a big issue because Yemenis cannot seek refuge in neighboring countries. Businesses could potentially play a critical role in post-conflict reconstruction by helping revive the economy.
The underlying issues related to economic, resource, and political inequality that are not being resolved. The economic and humanitarian situation in Yemen is dire. Overall, the outlook on Yemen remains grim.
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Russia’s new spheres of influence?
For the past 25 years, the main efforts deployed by the US and the West European allies aimed at supporting the democratization process in the fragile post-Soviet space. Adopting a balanced and efficient policy towards Russia was challenging and in many areas problematic. But never before has this ‘constructive engagement’ in the region been so strained, limited and difficult as it is today.
Russia’s ambitions in the ‘near abroad’ space, its recent violations of the international norms with regard to Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty and its air campaign in Syria are threatening the transatlantic democratic architecture. Recalibration of Washington’s relationship with Moscow shifts the entire geopolitical landscape of the region and beyond. The growing autocratic environment in Russia and its undemocratic, uncertain and offensive build-up to create a new spheres of influence requires a Western response.
By isolating, countering and blocking the Kremlin’s gains in the neighborhood we might affect its calculations and create momentum for a trajectory change. But by treating the symptoms we might forget to ultimately understand and address the underlying causes of this new crisis: Russian national identity and great-power ambitions in a multi-polar world.
On Monday, 22 Feb, the Conflict Management Department of SAIS, together with the Center for Transatlantic Relations and the Transatlantic Academy, will organize a half day conference in Kenney Auditorium (SAIS, Johns Hopkins) on Russia’s Foreign Policy: New Spheres of Influence?. Two panels, one on Europe and the other one on Middle East, will discuss the regional implications of Russia’s more assertive positioning.
The first panel, from 9:30 am to 11:00 am, will discuss Russian influence in Europe, and feature former US Ambassador John Herbst, EU Deputy Head of Delegation Caroline Vicini, German Marshall Fund Vice President Ivan Vejvoda and Dan Hamilton, CTR Executive Director. It will be moderated by Buzzfeed World editor Miriam Elder.
The second panel, from 11:30 am to 1:00 pm, will discuss the Middle East and feature Washington Institute for Near East Policy Fellow Anna Borshchevskaya, Transatlantic Academy Senior Fellow Marie Mendras, George Mason Professor Mark Katz and SAIS Conflict Management Program Director Daniel Serwer. It will be moderated by Christian Caryl, contributing editor of Foreign Policy magazine.
If you are interested to attend, please register at Russia’s Foreign Policy: New Spheres of Influence? Tickets, Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 9:00 AM | Eventbrite
The conference is on the record. You will be able to follow the talk on Twitter: #CMRussiaFP.
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Kosovo’s glass half full
Kosovo daily Koha Ditore asked questions. I responded, more or less on the even of the country’s February 17 independence day:
Q: How do you see the journey of Kosovo eight years after independence? Which are the achievements and failures of the state?
A: Kosovo has built a state with wide but not universal recognition that seeks to govern as a parliamentary democracy and interacts effectively with other countries, including those that don’t recognize its sovereignty and territorial integrity. I’ll leave to Kosovo’s citizens the privilege of judging the adequacy or inadequacy of the state in managing domestic affairs at the next election, but it seems to me internal security and the economy are vastly improved since 1999 and even since 2008.
Q: Kosovo independence continues to be challenged not only from abroad but also from within. Seven years after independence, Kosovo is not part of the UN and is not recognized by all EU members, while constitutionality is not yet extended to northern Kosovo, where the Serbs are the majority. Do you see improvement related these issues, in the near future?
A: I hope for improvements on these issues, but I really don’t know if it will happen in the near future. It is important to note that Belgrade has acknowledged the validity of the Kosovo constitution on its entire territory and will have to accept implementation of the Association of Serb Municipalities, for example, in accordance with the decision of the Kosovo constitutional court.
A main challenge from within are the political formations that don’t accept Kosovo’s constitution and statehood. They exist both among the Serbs and among the Albanians. The Kosovo state would be far strong if they abandon their hopes that Kosovo be taken over by Belgrade or Tirana.
The big international recognition issue in my view is Serbia’s non-recognition and blocking of Kosovo from UN membership. The Europeans have made it clear to Belgrade that its progress towards accession will depend on completely normalizing relations with Kosovo, which means at the very least UN membership and some sort of exchange of diplomatic representatives beyond liaison officers. I expect the next Serbian government to have to make some difficult decisions.
Q: After independence, the international community has assisted Kosovo in strengthening institutions by sending a mission responsible for Justice–EULEX. But this mission has been heavily criticized for no progress in fighting corruption and organized crime, as well in war crimes prosecutions. How do you evaluate the work of EULEX?
A: I don’t feel confident to evaluate EULEX, but I’ve long been convinced that success in fighting corruption and organized crime will require Kosovo’s citizens to take up the cudgels. Your press, civil society organizations, prosecutors, judges and government officials need to find the courage to confront those who are ripping off the country.
War crimes are different. It seems to me there the international community has a stronger role to play, through the Special Court once it is created. No Balkans country has yet found the capacity to deal adequately with its own war-time criminals, because they fought in a cause that most of the citizens supported. I won’t claim the US does a great job of prosecuting its own soldiers either. But for Kosovo bringing people to justice who committed atrocities against Serbs, Albanians and likely others is a necessary step in the state-formation process. I’d like to see parliament create a court that can get on with the job.
I also commend to interested readers Congressman Engel’s well-crafted piece on Keeping Kosova on the Path Toward Democracy.
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