Category: Daniel Serwer
Stevenson’s army, October 11
– NYT says Biden is angry at Saudi Arabia.
– WSJ says Saudis “defied US warnings” about oil production cuts.
– RAND analyst says Putin’s successor likely to continue Ukraine war.
– Carl Bildt has suggestions for countering nuclear threat.
– Eliot Cohen assesses the next phase of the war.
– NYT warns of wider war between Tigray and Ethiopia.
– Lawfare analyzes little known authorization for counter-terror funding.
– WaPo has parade of horribles if Trump is reelected.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The one-trick pony and its master
I am unable to embed this, but it is worth watching: Alexander Vindman and Bill Taylor on CNN today.
I was correct day before yesterday when I suggested President Putin would resort to long-range fire, rather than tactical nukes, to retaliate for the attack on his favorite bridge. But I was wrong in suggesting he might not have many left. Today Moscow launched close to 100 missiles and drones against civilian targets in Ukraine. That’s what Vindman calls Putin’s one trick–making civilian life miserable in Ukraine.
Next
This is a patent violation of the laws of war, which prohibit targeting civilians. The Russians have violated that prohibition repeatedly not only in Ukraine but also in Syria. The West needs to respond. The United States and others should provide both air defense and longer-range missiles to Ukraine. These would enable Kyiv to hit all the Russian military targets inside Ukraine, including in Crimea. Hesitancy to provide these weapons has failed to convince Putin to restrain Russian attacks on civilian targets. There should be consequences.
The only question is whether the West should seek Kyiv guarantees that longer-range weapons won’t be used against targets inside Russia proper. I would favor public ambiguity on this issue. Moscow should be left guessing whether it can anticipate attacks on its military infrastructure inside Russia’s sovereign borders. The day may come when such attacks will be necessary for successful prosecution of the war. We should not rule them out.
He’s down but not out
Putin is increasingly desperate. His milblogging extreme nationalists are unhappy with Russian army failure in Ukraine. Russia’s annexations of provinces in Ukraine have not stopped the loss of territory within those provinces. The Russian economy is facing recession or worse. Men of draft age are aggressively avoiding mobilization. It will take months even to begin training and equiping them for the exigencies of war in Ukraine. There is no longer any plausible scenario in which Russia wins the war in Ukraine. Moscow’s only option is to wreck more harm on Ukrainians, who have remained stalwart.
Washington’s weak knees
Some in Moscow however see hope on the American home front. Donald Trump is their ace in the hole:
Trump-echoing Republicans have become de facto supporters of Putin, along with a few of their usual ideological opponents on the left. But mainstream American opinion still favors arming the Ukrainians to defend themselves and to retake territory. Support is weakest among Republicans, but still stands at 50%.
If however things start going south in Moscow there will be many inside the Biden Administration who will argue against pressing Putin too hard. They will fear a breakup of the Russian Federation due to ethnic minority rebellion and civil wars that could lead to “loose nukes.” The Pentagon will want Russia’s thousands of nuclear weapons to remain under firm, centralized control.
The war ends when Putin is gone
But executive control overr the nukes should be no excuse for backing Vladimir Putin. There will be no peace in Ukraine so long as he remains in power. He has decided to sacrifice the Russian Army in what will prove a futile effort to defeat Ukraine. Any successor will want to rebuild the Russian military, revive Russia’s tattered friendships, and restore Russia’s economy. Hostility to Russia’s “brothers” in Ukraine may persist. But there will be a decade-long window of opportunity to consolidate Ukraine’s ties with the West and ensure that Ukraine can continue to defend itself. The one-trick pony and its master will be consigned to the ash heap of history.
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Stevenson’s army, October 8
– WaPo says Ukraine admits hitting Russian bridge to Crimea.
– Biden order tightens rules on drone strikes.
– Another order tries to limit Chinese access to US semiconductors.
– Also new sanctions on North Korea.
– And there’s now an official Arctic Strategy.
– Commerce has draft rule for new category of bad guys — Foreign Adversaries.
– New Yorker reviews new books on CIA with great headline, Has CIA done more harm than good?
-Fred Kaplan discusses nuclear options.
– UNC prof reminds that Hitler gained power legally.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Happy birthday Vladimir Vladimirovich!
Beginning of the end?
This could be the beginning of the end for Putin, but not necessarily the end of the war he began. The main complaint against him in regime circles in Moscow is his failure to prosecute the war successfully. Most in the regime don’t fault him for invading Ukraine. But Russia’s resources are limited. The Ukrainians have seized or interrupted many supply lines. Ammunition and supplies for the Russian Army in Ukraine are short. The military mobilization Putin declared won’t produce many soldiers for months. Even then, they will be poorly equipped, trained, and motivated.
Putin’s desperation has already led him to imply he might use tactical nuclear weapons, which Moscow has in abundance. The Americans however will have made it clear that their response would be massive, even if conventional. There likely wouldn’t be much left of the Russian Army in Ukraine if Moscow resorts to nukes. The better bet is long-range missile fire, but it is not clear how many cruise missiles Russia has left. Ukrainian President Zelensky claimed in July that Russia had already used 3000. There are indications since then that the Russians are using older missiles as well as anti-aircraft batteries against ground targets.
The center of gravity is now in Moscow
Ukrainian advances both in Donbas and in the south near Kherson are important and likely to continue, but the center of gravity of this conflict is now moving to Moscow. Putin is in trouble, albeit primarily from his ultra-nationalist right wing. There is little the West can or should do about that. Anyone coming to power in Moscow tomorrow will want to save the Russian Army from its impending defeat in Ukraine. Whether or not Putin remains in power, we should expect soon a ceasefire proposal from Moscow.
Kyiv will reject it if it doesn’t include at least withdrawal to at least the February 23 lines. Even that might not be attractive to Zelensky, whose war objective is to chase Russia from every inch of Ukrainian territory, including Donbas and Crimea. Nothing less will end Moscow’s monkeying in Ukraine and its politics. Even an outright Ukrainian victory will leave the country with a neighbor that does not recognize its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Reversal of Putin’s fake annexations of Ukrainian provinces is unlikely even if Moscow is defeated.
The West needs to steel itself
As it becomes apparent that the Ukrainians have won, the temptation in Europe and the United States will be to restrain Ukraine and accommodate Russia. The Europeans will want Russia to ease its restrictions on selling natural gas. The coming winter will otherwise be a cold one. The Americans will not want to make Putin more desperate. Some will even argue that driving him from power would hurt the chances to make peace.
We should resist these temptations. Europe made a huge mistake to become so dependent on Russian gas. The Americans made a huge mistake not to react more vigorously to the 2014 Russian invasion of Donbas and Crimea. We need now to steel ourselves for the consequences of those mistakes. Ultimately, Russian defeat will be the best basis possible for future relations with Moscow.
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Stevenson’s army, October 7
– GOP promises China focus if they control House.
– China blocks UN criticism of its human rights policies.
– Josh Rogin wants limits on lobbying by foreign dictators.
– WaPo says US intelligence reported direct criticism of Putin.
– NYT reports abuses by Mexican military.
– Axios reports anarchy in Haiti.
– CNN reports criticism of Havana syndrome investigations.
– CNN notes infrastructure bill opponents who now want the money.
– Why would a sitting US Senator want to quit to be a university president?
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, sometimes adding videos. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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To JCPOA or not to JCPOA is the question
The Biden Administration in the runup to the November 8 election has hesitated to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA aka Iran nuclear deal). This is understandable. In domestic US politics, return to the JCPOA carries no political advantage and considerable political risk.
The post-election dilemma
This hesitation sets up a post-election dilemma. During the past month, a serious protest movement has again emerged in Iran. The main focus has been rules on wearing the hijab, which is a highly visible symbol of the theological dictatorship. The protests have been widespread and growing. No doubt if the protesters succeed in overthrowing the Islamic Republic, the nuclear question would be seen in a different light.
But there is no telling whether that will happen within a relevant time frame. Iran has seen repeated episodes of public protest that the Islamic Republic has repressed brutally. Any one of the protest movements might have succeeded. They did not.
So immediately after the US election, President Biden will confront a choice. He can go ahead with a return to the JCPOA, or he can wait to see if the protest movement will succeed at displacing the Islamic Republic. If he proceeds with the JCPOA, that will give the Islamic Republic massive resources as well as sanctions relief and diplomatic prestige, thus enabling it to repress and buy off opposition. If he continues to hesitate, a vital opportunity could be lost to back Iran away from nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons or return to the JCPOA?
This is a serious dilemma. Nuclear weapons aren’t so useful in wartime, as their non-use the past 77 years demonstrates. But Iran can see from North Korea’s experience that they make other nuclear powers hesitate to destabilize a country. They also enable increased power projection in the region, which others will try to counterbalance. Iranian nuclear weapons would thus precipitate a regional arms race, with Turkey and Saudi Arabia the main contestants. The United States would not welcome that.
But return to the JCPOA will give the Islamic Republic a new lease on life as well as the resources it requires to remain in power. The gain in pushing Iran back from nuclear weapons would be a few months, not years. Once you know how to enrich uranium, the remaining technological obstacles are not great. Certainly the billions the US and others will need to return to Iran will be sufficient to ensure that nuclear weapons are only a few months in the future.
Make lemonade?
Someone might ask, if you have lemons why not make lemonade? Why not insist that Iran stop the internal crackdown as part of the price of returning to the JCPOA? While I might want Washington to try, I doubt that gambit would succeed. The negotiations are already overloaded with lots of non-nuclear issues. These include American prisoners in Iran and Iranian prisoners in the US, Iranian power projection in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, and American encouragement of ethnic rebellion inside Iran. Getting back to the JCPOA will require ignoring most if not all of these. The main question is JCPOA or no JCPOA. And it isn’t an easy one to answer, even if like me you think Trump’s withdrawal was a stupid mistake.
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