Category: Daniel Serwer
The stab in the back that isn’t
The Biden Administration is portraying Saudi support for the OPEC+ reduction in oil production quotas as as betraying the Saudi-American alliance The Kingdom’s move also appears to align Riyadh with Moscow against Kyiv.
It doesn’t add up
There is a lot wrong with this perspective:
- The Saudis have never been US allies, either de jure or de facto. The relationship inaugurated in 1945 with a meeting between President Roosevelt and Saudi King Abdul Aziz has always been transactional. The US supplied security in exchange for moderate oil prices and reliable supplies. The relationship was not based on shared values or even common security concerns.
- Circumstances have changed. The US was once a major oil importer. It is now a modest net oil exporter. American hydrocarbon companies benefit handsomely from higher oil prices. Saudi Arabia in the 1970s and 1980s had trouble spending all of its oil revenue. It now requires prices of about $100/barrel in order to balance its national budget. Maintaining an absolute monarchy ruling over a much larger population is expensive.
- Saudi Arabia no longer maintains as much excess production capacity as once it did. It is down to perhaps 2 million barrels per day above current production levels. That is small compared to its previous excess capacity of 4 million barrels per day or more. This is in part due to the privatization of part of Aramco. That required the company to behave more like a profit-seeking enterprise rather than a a state-subsidized one.
- Oil around $100/barrel is required for the transition away from hydrocarbons. The many alternatives to oil and natural gas are far more competitive if the price of oil is high. You won’t be hearing this from the Green New Deal folks, but they know their interest in moving the US away from climate-changing carbon dioxide requires higher oil prices, not lower ones.
National interests prevail
What we are seeing is not a stab in the back, but a convergence of Saudi, Russian, and Iranian interests in higher oil prices. Riyadh, Moscow, and Tehran are all frightened that the impending slow-down in the world economy will lead to dramatic cuts in oil prices. Reducing production first serves their national interests.
The Americans are seeing all issues through Ukraine-tinted glasses. But others do not. Riyadh has made it clear it does not regard the Ukraine war as one in which it has a vital interest. This is not surprising. Even if the Kingdom did regard Ukraine as vital, why would an absolute monarchy with no regard for human rights favor Zelensky over Putin?
What is to be done?
The question is how the US should react. Proposals so far include continuing drawdown of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), allowing lawsuits against OPEC for price-fixing and cutting arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
Continuing drawdown of the SPR makes obvious sense. Its one million barrels per day have moderated oil prices since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The drawdown also returns substantial profits to the US Treasury (average acquisition price was about $30/barrel).
Cutting arms sales to the Kingdom doesn’t pass muster as a good idea. Riyadh will turn to others–read Russia or China or both–less fastidious about the conditions imposed. The Saudis like high tech American weapons. But they don’t really need them compete militarily with Iran, their only serious potential adversary in the region.
“NOPEC” legislation pending in Congress would allow lawsuits in the US against OPEC and OPEC+ for anti-competitive behavior. It is not clear that such lawsuits would be successful, or that they would lead to successful remedies. Nor would it likely improve relations with the Saudis. But at least this approach is consistent with US policy on monopolies and does not empower US adversaries.
Another approach, one politically less palatable, is to wait and see. If OPEC+ manages to maintain high oil prices, that will presumably incentivize alternatives worldwide. It won’t help the Democrats in the November election, but at least it is something the Biden Administration supports. If the world economy slows dramatically and prices either remain at current levels or fall, Biden will also have the last laugh.
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Stevenson’s army, October 12
– NYT says US cut sanctions on Cyprus to get it to transfer Russian weapons to Ukraine.
– Max Fisher says bombing capitals doesn’t win wars.
– SAIS prof Hal Brands warns against defeating Putin.
– Nate Cohn admits problems in polling.
Charlie later added these bonus items:
At long last, the Biden administration has released its required National Security Strategy Report. Here’s the text. And here’s is Jake Sullivan’s briefing on it.
Remember, these documents always sound good and reasonable. But some sentences will be quoted like scripture to win interagency debates.
There was a good history of these reports by Paul Lettow in TNSR last year. He served on the Bush 43 NSC.
A Brookings analyst warns we’re on the path to nuclear war.
WSJ says Ukraine is running circles around Russia.
Tom Ricks draws on his new book arguing that the civil rights movement used military tactics in this criticism of US generals. [I guess he wants them to read his book.]
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, October 11
– NYT says Biden is angry at Saudi Arabia.
– WSJ says Saudis “defied US warnings” about oil production cuts.
– RAND analyst says Putin’s successor likely to continue Ukraine war.
– Carl Bildt has suggestions for countering nuclear threat.
– Eliot Cohen assesses the next phase of the war.
– NYT warns of wider war between Tigray and Ethiopia.
– Lawfare analyzes little known authorization for counter-terror funding.
– WaPo has parade of horribles if Trump is reelected.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The one-trick pony and its master
I am unable to embed this, but it is worth watching: Alexander Vindman and Bill Taylor on CNN today.
I was correct day before yesterday when I suggested President Putin would resort to long-range fire, rather than tactical nukes, to retaliate for the attack on his favorite bridge. But I was wrong in suggesting he might not have many left. Today Moscow launched close to 100 missiles and drones against civilian targets in Ukraine. That’s what Vindman calls Putin’s one trick–making civilian life miserable in Ukraine.
Next
This is a patent violation of the laws of war, which prohibit targeting civilians. The Russians have violated that prohibition repeatedly not only in Ukraine but also in Syria. The West needs to respond. The United States and others should provide both air defense and longer-range missiles to Ukraine. These would enable Kyiv to hit all the Russian military targets inside Ukraine, including in Crimea. Hesitancy to provide these weapons has failed to convince Putin to restrain Russian attacks on civilian targets. There should be consequences.
The only question is whether the West should seek Kyiv guarantees that longer-range weapons won’t be used against targets inside Russia proper. I would favor public ambiguity on this issue. Moscow should be left guessing whether it can anticipate attacks on its military infrastructure inside Russia’s sovereign borders. The day may come when such attacks will be necessary for successful prosecution of the war. We should not rule them out.
He’s down but not out
Putin is increasingly desperate. His milblogging extreme nationalists are unhappy with Russian army failure in Ukraine. Russia’s annexations of provinces in Ukraine have not stopped the loss of territory within those provinces. The Russian economy is facing recession or worse. Men of draft age are aggressively avoiding mobilization. It will take months even to begin training and equiping them for the exigencies of war in Ukraine. There is no longer any plausible scenario in which Russia wins the war in Ukraine. Moscow’s only option is to wreck more harm on Ukrainians, who have remained stalwart.
Washington’s weak knees
Some in Moscow however see hope on the American home front. Donald Trump is their ace in the hole:
Trump-echoing Republicans have become de facto supporters of Putin, along with a few of their usual ideological opponents on the left. But mainstream American opinion still favors arming the Ukrainians to defend themselves and to retake territory. Support is weakest among Republicans, but still stands at 50%.
If however things start going south in Moscow there will be many inside the Biden Administration who will argue against pressing Putin too hard. They will fear a breakup of the Russian Federation due to ethnic minority rebellion and civil wars that could lead to “loose nukes.” The Pentagon will want Russia’s thousands of nuclear weapons to remain under firm, centralized control.
The war ends when Putin is gone
But executive control overr the nukes should be no excuse for backing Vladimir Putin. There will be no peace in Ukraine so long as he remains in power. He has decided to sacrifice the Russian Army in what will prove a futile effort to defeat Ukraine. Any successor will want to rebuild the Russian military, revive Russia’s tattered friendships, and restore Russia’s economy. Hostility to Russia’s “brothers” in Ukraine may persist. But there will be a decade-long window of opportunity to consolidate Ukraine’s ties with the West and ensure that Ukraine can continue to defend itself. The one-trick pony and its master will be consigned to the ash heap of history.
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Stevenson’s army, October 8
– WaPo says Ukraine admits hitting Russian bridge to Crimea.
– Biden order tightens rules on drone strikes.
– Another order tries to limit Chinese access to US semiconductors.
– Also new sanctions on North Korea.
– And there’s now an official Arctic Strategy.
– Commerce has draft rule for new category of bad guys — Foreign Adversaries.
– New Yorker reviews new books on CIA with great headline, Has CIA done more harm than good?
-Fred Kaplan discusses nuclear options.
– UNC prof reminds that Hitler gained power legally.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Happy birthday Vladimir Vladimirovich!
Beginning of the end?
This could be the beginning of the end for Putin, but not necessarily the end of the war he began. The main complaint against him in regime circles in Moscow is his failure to prosecute the war successfully. Most in the regime don’t fault him for invading Ukraine. But Russia’s resources are limited. The Ukrainians have seized or interrupted many supply lines. Ammunition and supplies for the Russian Army in Ukraine are short. The military mobilization Putin declared won’t produce many soldiers for months. Even then, they will be poorly equipped, trained, and motivated.
Putin’s desperation has already led him to imply he might use tactical nuclear weapons, which Moscow has in abundance. The Americans however will have made it clear that their response would be massive, even if conventional. There likely wouldn’t be much left of the Russian Army in Ukraine if Moscow resorts to nukes. The better bet is long-range missile fire, but it is not clear how many cruise missiles Russia has left. Ukrainian President Zelensky claimed in July that Russia had already used 3000. There are indications since then that the Russians are using older missiles as well as anti-aircraft batteries against ground targets.
The center of gravity is now in Moscow
Ukrainian advances both in Donbas and in the south near Kherson are important and likely to continue, but the center of gravity of this conflict is now moving to Moscow. Putin is in trouble, albeit primarily from his ultra-nationalist right wing. There is little the West can or should do about that. Anyone coming to power in Moscow tomorrow will want to save the Russian Army from its impending defeat in Ukraine. Whether or not Putin remains in power, we should expect soon a ceasefire proposal from Moscow.
Kyiv will reject it if it doesn’t include at least withdrawal to at least the February 23 lines. Even that might not be attractive to Zelensky, whose war objective is to chase Russia from every inch of Ukrainian territory, including Donbas and Crimea. Nothing less will end Moscow’s monkeying in Ukraine and its politics. Even an outright Ukrainian victory will leave the country with a neighbor that does not recognize its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Reversal of Putin’s fake annexations of Ukrainian provinces is unlikely even if Moscow is defeated.
The West needs to steel itself
As it becomes apparent that the Ukrainians have won, the temptation in Europe and the United States will be to restrain Ukraine and accommodate Russia. The Europeans will want Russia to ease its restrictions on selling natural gas. The coming winter will otherwise be a cold one. The Americans will not want to make Putin more desperate. Some will even argue that driving him from power would hurt the chances to make peace.
We should resist these temptations. Europe made a huge mistake to become so dependent on Russian gas. The Americans made a huge mistake not to react more vigorously to the 2014 Russian invasion of Donbas and Crimea. We need now to steel ourselves for the consequences of those mistakes. Ultimately, Russian defeat will be the best basis possible for future relations with Moscow.
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