Category: Uncategorized

Peace Picks | May July 05-09, 2021

  1. The Gaza Ceasefire: What’s Next? | July 06, 2021 |  10:00 AM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here

The Wilson Center’s Middle East Program invites you to this seminar on the recent conflict in the Gaza Strip and the tenuous ceasefire that continues to hold by a thread. The panel will discuss the perspectives from Egypt, the Biden administration, as well as those of Israel, Palestine, and the broader Middle East region.

Speakers:

Amb. Motaz Zahran
Ambassador of Egypt to the United States

Joey Hood
Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, US Department of State

David Makovsky
Ziegler Distinguished Fellow, The Washington Institute; Director, Koret Project on Arab-Israel Relations

James F. Jeffrey
Chair of the Middle East Program, Wilson Center; Former Ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS

Amb. Mark Green (introduction)
President, Director & CEO, Wilson Center

Merissa Khurma (moderator)
Program Director, Middle East Program, Wilson Center

2. The Future of U.S.-China Proxy War | July 06, 2021 |  3:00 PM ET | Foreign Policy Research Institute | Register Here

How will great power military competition between the U.S. and China evolve in the coming years? FPRI’s Aaron Stein and Dominic Tierney will address the possibility of Washington and Beijing aiding rival actors in an intrastate conflict and the future of Sino-U.S. competition.

Speakers:

Dominic Tierney
Senior Fellow, Program on National Security, Foreign Policy Research Institute; Associate Professor of Political Science, Swarthmore College

Aaron Stein
Director of Research, Director of the Middle East Program & Acting Director of the National Security Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute

3. Report launch: Reimagining the US-India trade relationship | July 07, 2021 |  9:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here

Despite the well-documented growth in commerce between the United States and India in the past decade, efforts to reach a bilateral trade agreement in the last three years have grown increasingly strained. Longstanding and new disagreements over market access, intellectual property protection, and India’s new data governance frameworks, among other issues, mar attempts to reach even a mini trade deal and highlight the need to find common ground amid an evolving strategic relationship and COVID-19 woes.

How has the US-India trade relationship evolved under the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations? What mechanisms can be implemented to move forward, whether a mini trade deal or FTA negotiations? What challenges still remain?

The Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center hosts a conversation on US-India trade and a path forward to mark the launch of the Center’s latest report, Reimagining the US-India trade relationship.

Speakers:

Amb. Robert Holleyman
Partner, President & CEO, Crowell & Moring LLP

Amb. Jeffrey Gerrish
Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP and Affiliates

Susan Ritchie
Vice President, Trade & Technology Policy, US-India Strategic Partnership Forum

Sahra English
Vice President, Global Public Policy, MasterCard]

Mark Linscott (moderator)
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center

Irfan Nooruddin (introduction)
Director, Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center

4. The Future of Humanitarian Operations: Aid and Politics in Syria | July 07, 2021 |  9:30 AM ET | CSIS | Register Here

While humanitarian access and sovereignty have clashed in other crises, the savviness of aid manipulation has been unprecedented in scale and scope in Syria. What are the larger implications of debates at the Security Council on humanitarian access? How can the aid community adhere to humanitarian principles and not do harm? Should there be red lines?

As we approach the expiration date of the UN mandate to provide cross-border assistance to Syria, our panel of experts will delve into these questions and assess the consequences of business as usual for the aid sector and for long-term stability.

Speakers:

Jake Kurtzer (introduction)
Humanitarian Agenda Director and Senior Fellow, CSIS

Dr. Jon B. Alterman (moderator)
Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Middle East Program Director, CSIS

Dr. Zaher Sahloul
President and Co-Founder, MedGlobal; Associate Professor in Clinical Medicine, University of Illinois

Charles Petrie OBE
Former Assistant Secretary-General, UN

Natasha Hall
Senior Fellow with the Middle East Program, CSIS

5. The Next Chapter in U.S.-Pakistan Relations | July 07, 2021 |  12:30 PM ET | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here

As U.S. troops leave Afghanistan, the regional landscape that has dominated the last two decades of U.S.-Pakistan relations is shifting significantly. The Biden administration’s focus on competition with China and increasing climate concerns — coupled with the Pakistani government’s desire to shift focus to geo-economic ties with the United States — offer potential new parameters for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Meanwhile, both countries remain vested in the outcome of the Afghan peace process and regional peace and security in South Asia. Can the United States and Pakistan move beyond the persistent challenges in the bilateral relationship to cooperate on the priorities they share?

Speakers:

H.E. Dr. Asad Majeed Khan
Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States

Amb. Richard Olson (moderator)
Senior Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace

6. The U.S. Legacy in Afghanistan: Past, Present, and Future | July 07, 2021 |  13:00 PM ET | CSIS | Register Here

Two decades after the 9/11 attacks and the overthrow of the Taliban regime, the United States is withdrawing its military forces from Afghanistan. But the war is far from over. Please join the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Transnational Threats Project on Wednesday, July 7 for a conversation on the U.S. legacy in Afghanistan, the current U.S. withdrawal, and the future trajectory of the war. 

Speakers:

Carter Malkasian
Former Special Assistant, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Author of The American Way of War in Afghanistan

Gina Bennett
Senior Counterterrorism Advisor, National Counterterrorism Center

Seth G. Jones (moderator)
Senior Vice President, Harold Brown Chair, and Director of the International Security Program, CSIS

7. Rising Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean | July 08, 2021 |  4:00 AM ET | International Crisis Group | Watch the seminar here

The Eastern Mediterranean has always been an important political and cultural region. The most recent additions include the findings of natural gas and the internationalization of the Libyan civil war. In combination with political shifts, these developments sparked a new escalation between Turkey and its neighbors, namely Greece and Cyprus. After reaching a peak in 2020, the tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean have most recently decreased and international actors hope to return to a more constructive partnership.

The panel will discuss the tensions between Turkey and Greece, the roles of the EU and the US in the region, and the regional dimensions of energy competition and disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Speakers:

Tareq Baconi
Senior Analyst for Economics of Conflict, International Crisis Group

Alissa De Carbonnel
Deputy Program Director for Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group

Charles Ellinas
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council

Ioannis Grigoriadis
Senior Research Fellow, Head of Turkey Programme, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy

Berkay Mandıracı
Analyst for Turkey, International Crisis Group

8. Reconstruction in Gaza: Between Israel’s Siege and the Politics of International Funding | July 08, 2021 |  9:30 AM ET | Arab Center Washington DC | Register Here

This webinar will focus on the current situation in Gaza and reconstruction efforts following the recent Israeli attacks. Speakers will discuss the continuous cycle of destruction and reconstruction in Gaza, the challenges to rebuilding and development programs, the effects of the 14-year Israeli blockade, and the politics of international funding.

Speakers:

Yara M. Asi
Non-Resident Fellow, Arab Center Washington DC; Post-Doctoral Scholar, University of Central Florida

Sean Carroll
President and CEO, American Near East Refugee Aid (Anera)

Joseph P. Saba
Senior Adviser, Fragile and Conflict States, The World Bank; Adjunct Professor, Rule of Law for Development Program, Loyola University Chicago

Khalil E. Jahshan (moderator)
Executive Director, Arab Center Washington DC

9. Paper launch: How Hezbollah holds sway over the Lebanese state | July 08, 2021 |  10:30 AM ET | Chatham House | Register Here

Hezbollah is a hybrid actor, enjoying state legitimacy in Lebanon and operating both within and outside the state without being accountable to the state.

A new Chatham House paper on How Hezbollah Holds Sway over the Lebanese State provides insight into Hezbollah’s journey to power and argues that it has achieved this by consolidating control through elite pacts and by taking advantage of weaknesses in the Lebanese state system and infrastructure.

At this webinar, panellists explore the paper’s findings and consider what the future may hold for Hezbollah, particularly in the context of rapid deterioration in Lebanon and the renewed drive by Western policymakers to achieve reform in the country.

Speakers:

Joseph Daher
Visiting Professor, University of Lausanne

Lina Khatib
Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House

Mona Yacoubian
Senior Adviser, U.S. Institute for Peace

Emile Hokayem (moderator)
Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies, IISS

10. Rural/urban divide: A call for action | July 09, 2021 |  9:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here

Panel discussion on the economic divide between rural and urban populations. If the post COVID-19 recovery is to be truly inclusive, then it is critical to understand the geographical distribution of growth, an issue which still receives less attention than other dimensions of inequality. Economists, international financial institutions, governments, and think tanks all need to devote more resources to identifying policies that lift the fortunes of “forgotten” places. These panelists will discuss policy options to address this critical global issue. 

Speakers:

Timothy J. Bartik
Senior Economist, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

Era Dabla-Norris
Division Chief, Asia and Pacific Department, International Monetary Fund

Martin Mühleisen
Special Advisor to the Managing Director, International Monetary Fund

Andrés Rodriguez-Pose
Princesa de Asturias Chair and Professor of Economic Geography, London School of Economics

Dr. Nicole Goldin (moderator)
Managing Principal, NRG Advisory; Nonresident Senior Fellow at the GeoEconomics Center, Atlantic Council

Stevenson’s army, June 29

FP explains Iran’s growing drone threat.

President Biden defended his retaliatory strikes.

Sen. WIcker [R-MS] is using a hold to try to get more ships built in MS.

Members of Congress are spending much more in personal security.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Between Father’s Day and 76: lifetime lessons learned

I’m at a fine moment: on the verge of celebrating my 76th birthday, both elder son Jared and younger son Adam are enjoying professional and personal success. I thought I might take the moment to reflect, not so much on them as on what I learned from them over the past 45 years. I hope they’ll excuse the indulgence.

Both sons chose markedly different but competitive professions. Architects either win contracts or they don’t. Journalists either get recognized or they don’t. Jared works now in Atlanta for Perkins and Will, a big international architectural firm, mainly designing academic buildings. Here is the Camp Southern Ground dining hall he designed outside Atlanta:

Exterior Front outside view of the dining hall

Here is Adam, who works at The Atlantic, yesterday afternoon on NPR’s All Things Considered, two days before his first book, The Cruelty Is the Point: the Past, Present, and Future of Trump’s America, is published:

Jackie and I are enormously proud of them both. I suppose we contributed, if only by setting an example of working hard for long hours.

But they both achieved their successes despite me. I was a middle child who thought he always had to strive for equal treatment with an older brother and a younger one. So when I became a father I thought I could do better than my parents and cure the world by treating my two sons the same way.

That was a big mistake. Different children have different needs, not only because of their placement in the family order but also because of their dramatically different talents and preferences. This has been a big challenge in my teaching life as well: I need to treat all the students fairly, but what that means can differ because of their diverse backgrounds and preparation, not to mention intellect, career amibitions, ideology, maturity, and the rest.

Jared has a terrific visual and spatial imagination. He can picture how things will look before drawing them, the way a composer can hear how things will sound even before writing down the notes. Adam has a literary and theatrical imagination. He started beating us all at Scrabble around the age of 14. He knows how to use written and spoken words eloquently and dramatically to make a point. I had no idea when they were growing up that two people who shared the same genetic origins could be so different.

Adam got the shorter stick, as my habits were formed first with his brother. I expected that Adam would behave and think like Jared. I saw any deviance from the established pattern as potentially problematic. He naturally rebelled, causing no end of friction as a teenager that I had not experienced with his elder brother, who was much more careful to hide his divergence from expectations. I didn’t learn until recently about Jared’s teenage excursions with friends in Rome on their motor scooters, despite a (well-founded) parental prohibition. Adam made sure I knew he was smoking as a teen, despite an even stronger (and equally well-founded) parental prohibition.

There are silver linings: Adam’s willingness to defy and critique authority has been an important aspect of his journalistic career. Jared’s ability to maintain his unique perspective while working within an established system has allowed his creative impulses to find expression in glorious buildings.

Now both Jared and Adam have strikingly accomplished wives and delicious children. Jared’s two boys are rambunctious. I’ve learned not to try to squeeze either of them into a pre-determined shape. Adam’s less than two-year-old daughter is less rowdy, at least for now, but definitely knows her own mind. I hope she will remain that way. It is difficult to know where to draw lines: should she be free, as her parents prefer, to choose whatever snacks she pleases from the pantry, or should there be some limits? The former might develop some self-discipline, while I imagine the latter encourages challenging restrictions. Which is better?

I don’t know is the short answer. All I know is that how we deal with others has a lot to do with our own treatment growing up. It’s best to be aware of the internal impulses, but to react mainly to the external stimuli. Right now that means enjoying my small but precious family and trying not to impose my preferences on their thriving lives. They are all looking good to me right now, as I approach old age. That is a great satisfaction. I hope it stays that way, even though I know there are challenges ahead. No one escapes those.

Stevenson’s army, June 19

Politico says WH froze aid to Ukraine just before the summit.  WH denies story. You decide.
WSJ says US is withdrawing significant military assets from Middle East. No denials yet.
Iranian ships no longer heading to Venezuela.
Hard-liner wins Iran presidency.
FP says France & US differ over Sahel policy.
Lawfare writer discusses legal aspects of US China sanctions.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Two does not a trend make, but there is hope

Two so-called populist, definitely corrupt, would-be autocrats have fallen: Trump and Netanyahu. What are the prospects for others of their ilk?

  1. Indian President Narendra Modi has declined markedly in popularity, mainly due to COVID-19. The epidemic is beginning to ebb in India and he doesn’t face an election until 2024, so it is impossible to predict his fate.
  2. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is in a less comfortable spot. The epidemic has hit Hungary hard and tanked its economy, but he is offering lots of goodies in advance of next year’s parliamentary elections. His party is still strong, but the opposition is more united than in the past.
  3. Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro is in worse shape, due to the virus and the economy. If former President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva returns to the hustings, Bolsonaro could be in big trouble come next year’s presidential election.
  4. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is not in much better condition. Turkey was already in economic trouble before the epidemic, which has hit hard. The opposition, not fully unified, is gaining on him but the presidential election is still far off: June 2023.
  5. And for the sake of my Balkan readers, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic looks to be in good shape for next year’s presidential election, as the opposition is fragmented and he moved quickly to secure Chinese and Russian vaccines. Nor is there much hope of seeing the back of Bosnia’s Serb President Milorad Dodik, who has lost some traction but likely still has enough grip to hold on in next year’s polls. Both are enjoying lots of Russian financing and protection while Europe and the US twiddle their thumbs, uncertain what to do.

The already autocrats are in better shape:

  1. Chinese President Xi Jinping has done likewise and has no limit on how long he can serve.
  2. Russian President Vladimr Putin is holding his own, despite COVID-19. In any event, he is already eliminating any serious opposition to his hold on power in the next presidential election, which isn’t due until 2024.
  3. Iranian Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini is firmly in charge. The presidential election Friday includes no “opposition” or even bona fide moderates. Repression and cooptation have won the day.
  4. Syrian President Bashar al Assad has survived a decade of both moderate and extremist rebellion. He is now nominally in charge of perhaps 40% of Syria, but his regime is tattered and in desperate need of rebuilding.
  5. Belarusan President Alexander Lukashenko is weathering massive demonstrations and depends for his survival on Putin, whose efforts to jail or otherwise eliminate any serious opposition Lukashenko imitates.
  6. Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar’s coup leader, is trying to do likewise, despite persistent demonstrations.

President Biden has devoted his week in Europe to rallying the G7 to the cause of demonstrating that they can deliver for citizens better than the autocracies. Next week he’ll do the same with the broader audience of NATO allies before confronting Putin. The American economy is reviving rapidly if somewhat sporadically. The G7 has committed itself to a billion vaccine doses for poorer countries, improved public health preparations, and worldwide infrastructure efforts to counter China’s Belt and Road.

I don’t really have much hope that the autocrats will fall, even if Biden demonstrates unequivocally the superiority of liberal democracy. That’s not how the world works. Autocrats are autocrats in order to prevent that outcome. But the fall of a few more populist and corrupt would-be autocrats is certainly not out of the question. The world would be a lot better off if their citizens opted for true democracy. Two does not a trend make, but there is hope.

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Conservative will likely win, but foreign policy will change little

Candidates in Iran’s presidential election scheduled for June 18 were vetted more heavily than before. Only seven were allowed to run out of some 500 applicants. Most are prominent conservatives. Judiciary chief Ibrahim Raisi is likely a shoe-in. If and how will these elections affect the negotiations in Vienna and Iran’s regional activities? How do Iranians view this process and what should we make of the predicted record low turnout?

A Chatham House panel convened June 9 agreed the election will consolidate the regime in a conservative direction. However, foreign policy and Iran’s activities in Syria, will change little, as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) have long been in firm control of those projects. The domestic implications of the elections are significant, not due to the results but rather to the vetting process and the public’s increasing apathy.

The speakers were:

Nazila Fathi
Independent journalist;
Non-resident scholar

Middle East Institute

Kenneth Katzman
Senior analyst in Iran and Persian Gulf affairs
Congressional Research Service

Vali Nasr
Majid Kadduri Professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at the School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University
Non-resident senior fellow
Atlantic Council

Raz Zimmt
Research fellow
Institute for National Security Studies

Sanam Vakil (moderator)
Deputy director and senior research fellow at the Middle East and North Africa Programme
Chatham House

A predictable outcome, but nonetheless significant

The panel agreed that Rais is the likely winner, though Nasr warned that surprises are possible, as the 1997 and 2005 elections demonstrate. Nazila Fathi also pointed out that the greater freedom to criticize one another that exists among the candidates could hurt Raisi.

The real shock in this election cycle was the vetting process, according to Zimmt. The regime prevented any serious moderate or reformist candidates from running. Fathi pointed out that the reformists (such as former president Khatami) have been isolated and persecuted since the protest movement that followed Ahmadinejad’s fraudulent re-election in 2009. Rouhani was not considered part of the reformist camp. His transition towards more moderate viewpoints is what caused the regime to remove moderate and even some conservative candidates from the roster this year. A particular surprise was the exclusion of the conservative former speaker of the parliament Larijani, who the regime considered to be at risk of moderating, according to Fathi.

Rather than the winner, voter turnout might be an indicator of public sentiment. Vakil cited a recent poll that indicates turnout could be as low as 38%. This would be a record low for Iran, where turnout has never fallen below 50%. Fathi affirmed that disillusionment within Iran is high. Due to the impact of COVID and economic hardships, there were calls to boycott the election even before the vetting process was completed. The 2019 parliamentary elections also contributed, as the stringent vetting process then led to harshly repression of protests.

Nasr warned that voter turnout is a bigger issue to Western observers than to the Iranian regime. Engineering an election can be done after the vote (as in 2009), but this led to major resistance. This is why the regime used the vetting process this time, after testing the waters with the parliamentary elections of 2019. The deep state understands that a low-turnout election is advantageous to conservative candidates. Its primary goal is to end up with a reliable, and controllable president. Raisi is the ideal candidate for this purpose. He has few connections, as Rouhani had within the religious establishment in Qom and even within the IRGC.

The core issues for Iranians are economic. Runaway inflation and price hikes on primary goods force people to work multiple jobs. This hit the middle classes as much as the poor. According to Fathi Iranians only care about the JCPOA to the extent that it contributes to economic improvements. The candidates have failed to put forward any clear plans for solving these issues.

The role of the new president

As for the new president’s role and significance, the panel saw a clear divergence between domestic and foreign affairs. Nasr suggested Iran is on the cusp of a ‘Third Islamic Republic’ for three reasons:

  • Supreme Leader Khamenei’s advanced age indicates that his decades-long rule might soon be over, potentially leading to a constitutional overhaul, as after Khomeini’s death.
  • Iran is moving to relieve maximum pressure, which will lead to major changes in its economic and foreign outlook.
  • The deep state is increasingly strengthening its grip on the country.

The IRGC is starting to look more like the Pakistani military, controlling key foreign policy agendas and exerting major influences on the political process. They are positioning themselves for the post-Khamenei era.

A new president will have little influence on Iran’s foreign policy. As Katzman warns “these elections are not for the ‘leader’ of Iran.” The real leader, Khamenei, has indicated that Iran will recommit to the JCPOA if the US does so. The negotiations in Vienna are not at risk. Nasr indicated that the key foreign policy dossiers are all in the hands of the IRGC. Iran’s regional activities in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen fall under IRGC control. The same is true for the Saudi-Iranian negotiations now underway in Baghdad, where the Saudis are talking with top IRGC brass, rather than the Foreign Ministry.

The view from Israel and Washington

According to Zimmt, the outcome of these elections matter little to Israel, which viewed Ahmadinejad as a wolf in wolf’s clothing, while Rouhani was a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Israel is mainly concerned with the nuclear program, Iran’s regional activities (particularly in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza), and its long-range missile capabilities. None of these issues are controlled by the government or president, but rather by the deep state.

For Israel a controversial, conservative president is preferable because it makes it easier to rally support against Iran. Ahmadinejad was Israel’s biggest asset, because he openly denied the Holocaust and the existence of homosexuals in Iran. Raisi’s controversial viewpoints and his involvement in the 1988 prison massacres could serve a similar purpose. Nasr also thought that a post-JCPOA Iran seeking to establish trade relations with the world might be served poorly by a controversial president.

The Biden administration does follow these elections with interest according to Katzman, who spoke in an official capacity. According to him, Iran is becoming a major regional and even supra-regional power. Its missile and drone capacities are extensive and sophisticated, and Tehran has extended them to allies and used them itself. The attacks on Saudi oil in Abqaiq, as well as the strike on the American al-Asad base in Iraq, were examples. Katzman called the strike on al-Asad “the most significant missile strike on American troops in American history.”

Iran’s serious capacities mean that they should be taken seriously by the US. Meanwhile, US sanctions have had no effect on Iran’s regional strategy or Iran’s regional influence. In 2014 Iran was under sanctions but became more involved in Syria and Yemen. When sanctions were lifted these policies continued. Iran’s regional activities are extremely inexpensive and sanctions don’t affect them significantly.

The key is to get some resolution to regional conflicts. Iran has expressed an interest in doing so. Iran won’t project power if there are no opportunities or interests that require it.

Watch the recording of the event here:
https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=197859625537872&ref=watch_permalink

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