Confrontation intensifies
On September 12, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) hosted a panel discussion entitled, “As Maximum Pressure and Maximum Resistance Max Out, Where’s the Confrontation with Iran Headed?”. The panel consisted of Ali Alfoneh, Senior Fellow at AGSIW, Dina Esfandiary, International Security Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, and Kirsten Fontenrose, Director for Regional Security, Middle East at the Atlantic Council. The discussion was moderated by Hussein Ibish, Senior Resident Scholar at AGSIW.
Since President Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, Washington has pursued a strategy of “maximum pressure,” largely through intensifying economic sanctions. Iran has responded with “maximum resistance,” mostly with low-intensity, and sometimes deniable, military provocations. Signs are growing that both strategies have maxed out and further escalation could lead to consequences unwanted by either side. Where do both parties go from here and can these strategies work?
Fontenrose argued that theoretically, the US policy of maximum pressure can work. The rationale beyond this is that every country has a finite amount of resources to dedicate to defense and domestic needs. The use of sanctions squeezes Iran and forces them to make difficult decisions. The US has a limited number of coercive tools. By maxing out sanctions, the Washington avoids using kinetic activities that could escalate potential conflict. Alfoneh and Esfandiary agreed that the US has not set clear goals for their use of sanctions. If the US established clear goals, Iran might respond in kind.
President Trump will benefit electorally if he is able to have a summit with Supreme Leader Khamenei. Alfoneh predicted that Trump will use increased tensions with Tehran to negotiate a deal that mirrors the JCPOA. By doing so, Trump would signal to his supporters that he can resolve global conflict. Esfandiary responded that Iran has no reason to trust the US. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that Iran was abiding by the JCPOA, but the Trump Administration tore it up. Fontenrose agreed that trust building will be required before acceptable concessions can be made by either side.
Iran has few choices aside from continuing its low-level provocations. Alfoneh brought up an article published in an Iranian economic newspaper a month after the US left the JCPOA. The Supreme National Security Council outlined its strategy to counteract US sanctions. First, the impact of the sanctions will not be palpable because of trade deals with European countries and China. Second, Iran will limit the level of their obligations in the JCPOA. Third, if nothing works and Iran’s economy continues to fail, Tehran will provoke a crisis in the Persian Gulf. Iran clearly and publicly announced its plans and has followed through with the strategy.
The panel discussed the significance of John Bolton’s dismissal as the national security adviser. Fontenrose said that the Republicans will not allow Trump to choose someone who will threaten the election. Bolton’s hawkish tendencies could scare off voters. Brian Hook, the State Department’s point man on Iran, is on the short list of potential replacements. Hook is a known as a hawk in the international community and his appointment would signal to Iran that the US will continue to squeeze its economy.
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Stevenson’s army, September 13
NYT has a list of forreign policy problems for which the president wants to do deals and is surprisingly optimistic about the chances.
One reason an Iran deal might be possible is if this Daily Beast report is true. Is Trump really considering a $15 billion line of credit for Iran?
Meanwhile, Congress got its way as Ukraine aid was released.
But Senate appropriators want to cut and change US military aid.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Restraint and its challenges
Last night’s debate among Democratic presidential candidates spent relatively little time on foreign policy, maybe 10-12 minutes out of the two hours. But on some issues there appeared to a wide consensus:
- Bring the troops home, in particular from Afghanistan, sooner rather than later.
- Avoid using military instruments whenever possible and obtain Congressional authorization when it is necessary.
- Give more emphasis to civilian instruments of foreign policy, especially diplomacy and development.
- Enhance cooperation with other countries to deal with places like Venezuela and global issues like climate change and terrorism.
- Refocus attention on domestic welfare, including support for veterans.
This amounts to a policy of military restraint and diplomatic lead. The military restraint might appear close to what Donald Trump promised in his campaign, but it was always clear he would favor big increases in the Defense Department’s budget, little emphasis on diplomacy, and even less on development.
That is where the Democrats differ from Trump. The question is not whether they are sincere but rather whether it is practical. The US has led with its military in foreign policy for so long it is difficult for American diplomats to imagine anything else. And we are so thoroughly exposed militarily in so many places that it is difficult even to know where to start.
American withdrawal can create real problems, especially in the Middle East. Iraq is a classic case in point, but not the only one. Military withdrawal requires major diplomatic efforts to ensure that US interests are served and adversaries blocked from taking advantage. After 2.5 years of President Trump, the State Department is in terrible shape: many experienced officers have left, and those who remain are demoralized. While Secretary Pompeo has influence with the President, the organization is weaker than ever, which is saying something.
So restraint is the name of the game, but the ways and means of achieving it are not so clear.
Here is the bulk of the debate transcript on foreign policy.
PS: I realized after hitting the “publish” button that I ignored what the candidates said about China. None of it was enlightening. They mostly support the Administration–without every saying as much–on getting the Chinese to yield on trade. Some even said they would keep the Trump tariffs in place initially to help make that happen. Mostly they oppose Trump’s tariffs on our allies, which is good to hear, but still they aren’t far off his thinking on squeezing the Chinese.
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Stevenson’s army, September 12
– I agree with Thomas Wright of Brookings that Bolton’s ouster presages a pivot to diplomacy for the elections. I wonder how Democratic presidential candidates will respond.
-SecDef Esper has approved active duty border deployments through 2020.
-Israelis accused of planting spy devices near White House
– Congress mobilizes to fight Trump’s denial of military aid to Ukraine.
– Broken norms. A lot of legislative business depends on civility and cooperation and following normal practices. This North Carolina action is just too outrageous to overlook.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Bolton and Trump unleashed
John Bolton and Donald Trump were always an odd couple: the one a consistent hawkish interventionist and bureaucratic operator in mustachioed professorial guise, the other an erratic big-talking little-stick narcissistic braggart. They found common cause on withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) maximum pressure against Iran, thus trading the 10-year delay in Tehran’s ability to build a nuclear weapons for less than one year, but as soon as the President started looking for negotiated settlements with Tehran, Pyongyang, and the Taliban, Bolton resorted to undermining Trump’s efforts. Ironically, Bolton was fired only a few days after he won his battle against the Afghanistan agreement.
Zal Khalilzad was trying to do the right thing: exchange the withdrawal of US troops Trump wants before the November 2020 election in exchange for Taliban promises
a) to negotiate a political settlement with the Kabul government and
b) not to harbor international terrorists.
The reported deal involved withdrawal only to the number of Americans in Afghanistan at the end of the Obama Administration, and the Taliban promises would have been hard to enforce. But it was a start.
Bolton didn’t want the withdrawal at all. But that’s not what blew up the agreement. It was Trump: he apparently decided he wanted a meeting with the Taliban at Camp David, with the president himself trying for a better deal in the role of closer. This was a terrible idea, in particular a few days before 9/11. The Taliban however never agreed to come to the US, so Trump cancelled the non-existent meeting, supposedly because of the death of an American soldier. That isn’t credible, since more than a dozen Americans died during Zal’s negotiations without any dramatic American reaction. Negotiating in the absence of a ceasefire is always a dubious proposition.
Poor Zal is left holding the bag. We’ll know when he abandons hope: he’ll resign. In the meanwhile, Afghan President Ghani, who is competing in a presidential election September 27, is breathing a sigh of relief–he wants the US troops to stay–and Bolton has the satisfaction of watching the US re-escalate the air war, even as he looks for a tell-all book deal and a cushy spot in the private sector. Unleashed, he will also no doubt become a cheer leader for military action against Iran and support for Israel’s annexations.
The President is also unleashed. He is desperate for some sort of international triumph before the election only 14 months hence. The Chinese are holding their own in the tariff war, the Middle East “deal of the century” has evaporated, the North Koreans are thumbing their noses, and Iran is demanding sanctions relief in exchange for deigning to talk with Washington. Trump is left with little alternative in Afghanistan but escalation and unilateral withdrawal, unless Zal succeeds in putting Humpty Dumpty back together again.
Everyone wants to know how US foreign policy will change as a result of Bolton’s firing. I focus mainly on the Balkans and the Middle East. On the latter, it is clear enough that Trump will back the Jewish state to the hilt, no matter who the next national security adviser is. He will also likely try to complete the US withdrawal from Syria, over Pentagon objections. He’ll continue to support the war in Yemen, unless the UAE and Saudi Arabia fall out so catastrophically that there is nothing left to support.
The Balkans is a bit harder to predict, as the Administration has been less than clear about its approach. Bolton was open to a land swap between Serbia and Kosovo that would have destabilized the entire region, likely killing two Clinton birds with one stone: rump Kosovo might have become the eastern province of Albania and Bosnia might have descended into chaos as Republika Srpska tried to secede. But there is no guarantee Bolton’s successor won’t take a similar approach. Ethnonationalists of a feather flock together. An American serving a white nationalist president is always going to give Balkan nationalists a hearing.
Here is the podcast I did with Mark Goldberg shortly after writing this piece.
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Ends and means after the caliphate
On September 10 the Brookings Institution hosted a panel discussion entitled “The Counter-ISIS Coalition: Diplomacy and Security in Action.” The panel featured two former special presidential envoys to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL: General John Allen, current President of Brookings, and Brett McGurk, a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Lise Grande, who served as Deputy Special Representative of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq during the height of the campaign against ISIS, joined the panel through a video link from Amman. The New Yorker’s Susan B. Glasser moderated.
Allen emphasized that ISIS remains a threat through its residual forces in Syria, the presence of its affiliates in countries like Nigeria, Libya, and the Philippines, and its online influence. McGurk also pointed to the danger of the next generation of jihadi fighters coming from Syria’s al-Hol camp, where 73,000 ISIS women and children are held. Neither the Syrian Democratic Forces who administer the camp nor the US have sufficient resources to manage the threat.
America’s objectives in Syria have broadened under the Trump administration to include countering the remaining ISIS threat, promoting regime change, and removing Iranian forces from the country. Simultaneously, America has reduced the number US troops to around 1000. McGurk stressed that this widening gap between America’s goals in Syria and the resources it has in the country will make it hard to respond to the next crisis. The Turkish-US joint patrols of the safe zone in northern Syria that began last weekend will further draw these limited resources away from managing critical threats like al-Hol.
Both McGurk and Allen attributed the coalition’s successes to three factors: strong American leadership, commitment from an unusually large number of allies, and working by, with, and through local partners that America had previously developed in Iraq. Both argued that in the event of a crisis it would be harder to create a coalition now due to some allies’ loss of trust in American leadership. McGurk also speculated that John Bolton’s departure from the White House will not change these conditions, stating that the Trump administration lacked a functional communication process between the President and the national security adviser prior to Bolton’s tenure.
Grande noted that while UN stabilization usually begins by trying to fixing entire systems, in Iraq they took a bottom-up approach to repairing electricity, water, and sanitation grids. During the stabilization of Ramadi, UN workers coordinated with Iraqi forces to enter cities as soon as they were liberated and set up mobile electricity grids consisting of generators on trucks. They hired local engineers to connect each house to the generators as families returned to them. While past stabilization programs have taken 2 years to reconnect electricity grids, in Ramadi families had power within 2 hours of returning home. Grande described this as both the largest and most successful stabilization effort in the UN’s history, which she said was possible due to the strength of the Iraqi government’s commitment, an Iraqi private sector with great engineering capabilities, and support from the coalition and the United States.
Grande also credits the success the UN had in stabilizing these cities to the premium Iraqi forces placed on protecting civilians and keeping them in their homes when possible. Each morning during the liberation of Mosul, the UN sent the number of empty beds available in their camps to the Iraqi commanders, who structured their battle plan to ensure only that number of civilians were evacuated from their homes. The Iraqi security forces escorted these families across the front lines, checked them for weapons, and delivered them to aid workers, who got them into temporary housing by nightfall.
Grande contrasted this to the average of four weeks it takes civilians to get humanitarian assistance in most active conflict zones. The Iraqi security forces were also able to protect 90% of the residents of East Mosul in their homes, limiting the number of evacuees needing immediate assistance. She concluded that the commitment of the Iraqi government to protecting civilians, support from the Iraqi private sector, and the strength of America’s coalition leadership were critical to the UN’s success in stabilizing newly liberated cities. Without those conditions the UN will not be able to recreate this success in stabilizing future conflict zones.
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