Eyes on the prize
Republika Srpska (RS)–the Serb-controlled 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina–is equipping its police with automatic rifles as well as reportedly initiating counter-terrorism training with Russia. Does this matter? Is it a threat to a cold Balkans peace that has lasted more than 22 years?
This news certainly illustrates the timidity of both the European Union and the United States. Brussels and Washington would not have allowed such things to happen for many of the years since the Dayton peace accords brought an end to the Bosnian war in 1995. Now they shrug it off, knowing that neither has the political will to confront RS President Dodik and hoping that it won’t really matter anyway. Some think the weapons more targeted against Dodik’s opposition in the RS, rather than posing a threat the Brcko District or the Bosnian Federation. The RS interior minister denies the Russians will provide training.
Were I a Bosniak or a Croat I would not be a happy camper. I might want to see the Federation police match the RS arms and up the ante a bit to ensure that nothing untoward occurs. In other words, what the RS has done could initiate an escalatory spiral, one that will certainly increase the likelihood of armed clashes sooner or later.
What should be done to stop this? The most important thing is to ensure that the Brcko District remains outside RS and Federation control. Without the Brcko District, the RS is split into two pieces. That’s why it was so ferociously fought over during the war and its disposition could not be decided at Dayton. Instead, an American arbitrator decided it belonged to both the RS and the Federation, which meant in essence it belonged to neither. Reintegration there has been more successful than in most of the rest of the country. That makes it the keystone that prevents Dayton Bosnia from collapsing.
The US no longer has deployed troops in Bosnia and it is doubtful Washington could be convinced to send them back. The EU does, but they are currently scattered around the country in militarily insignificant numbers, constituting a security presence (not a serious deterrent force). But if a war starts again in Bosnia, it won’t start all over the country, not least because of the ethnic separation the previous war caused. Brcko will be the center of gravity of the next war. The EU should move all of its six hundred or so troops there, making clear that neither the Federation nor RS will be permitted to take it and cause the Dayton edifice to collapse.
It’s not that I treasure that edifice. There are good arguments against the rigid ethnic power-sharing arrangements created at Dayton. But a violent collapse of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be catastrophic. What is needed is a peaceful renegotiation, one that enables the country to qualify as a candidate for EU membership.
As luck would have it, Sarajevo is planning to submit its replies to the initial Brussels questionnaire concerning Bosnia’s EU candidacy within the next few weeks. That is the right direction: the EU’s new Balkans strategy has opened the possibility of new accessions by 2025. Bosnia and Herzegovina is unlikely to qualify in time for that date, because it has been slow to adopt and implement the acquis communautaire (the EU’s accumulated legislation and regulations). But it should do everything it can to move as quickly as possible, before the window closes unpredictably.
Dodik’s automatic rifles are bad. But far worse would be failure of Bosnians to keep their eyes on the prize of EU membership.
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Iranian power projection
Throughout the past couple of years, Iran has obtained a significant strategic advantage in the Middle East. In Syria, the Islamic Republic was able to keep the Assad regime alive and has gained the upper hand in the country’s civil war. In Iraq, Tehran utilizes local political allies and Shi’a militias to wield substantial influence over domestic politics. In Lebanon, the Iranian proxy Hezbollah constitutes the country’s dominant political and military force. It appears that the Islamic Republic today controls a strategic corridor stretching from Tehran in the East to the Lebanese capital Beirut in the West.
On February 2, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy addressed the question of Tehran’s apparent rise in a policy forum titled “Rolling Back Iran’s Foreign Legions.” Hanin Ghaddar, a veteran Lebanese journalist who currently serves as the Friedman Visiting Fellow at the Washington Institute, presented the findings of her latest report “Iran’s Foreign Legion: The Impact of Shia Militias on U.S. Foreign Policy.” Phillip Smyth, who is the author of the blog “Hizballah Cavalcade” and a Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute, joined the discussion via Skype. (A full recording of the event is available online).
Ghaddar argues that Iran has taken over power in Lebanon. Political balance in the country has ceased to exist. Hezbollah is not only the strongest military force but has also infiltrated the political system. The Iranian proxy controls public institutions and uses the state as vehicle to dominate Lebanon. Hezbollah is no longer a state within the Lebanese state as commonly believed. Rather, as Ghaddar emphasizes, “the Lebanese state has become part of the Hezbollah state.”
She stresses that Iran will emulate the Hezbollah model in both Syria and Iraq. In both countries, Tehran – through the Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) – commands a remarkable number of Shi’a militias which have so far mostly acted as the backbone of Iranian military endeavors. The Islamic Republic is eager to transform these irregular fighting forces into political actors which will take hold of state institutions. The participation of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) in the upcoming elections in Iraq is a clear sign of this approach. According to Ghaddar, the Hezbollah model will provide Tehran with substantial influence over Lebanese, Iraqi, and Syrian politics and hence enshrine Iran’s preponderance in the Middle East.
Ghaddar highlights that this potency manifests itself in the establishment of a strategic corridor between Tehran and Beirut. This land bridge constitutes a critical supply route that enables the cheap and steady transportation of arms. Moreover, the land bridge is of pivotal ideological importance. Located at the heart of the Shi’a crescent, it enables a transnational Shi’a identity. The consequence is a decline of national identities among Shiites and the erosion of the current state system, which will be replaced by an Iranian-dominated order.
Phillip Smyth expects that this new system will increase polarization in the region. For many Iranian proxies, the religious principles of the Islamic Republic have become subordinated to the mere struggle against the other, i.e. Sunni Muslims. Iran’s non-inclusive ideological project is therefore likely to cause a backlash among Sunnis. They will react in increasingly radical ways if they become convinced that all Shia are agents of Iran.
Ghaddar draws a bleak picture of the future of the Middle East. Iran’s creation of a Shi’a foreign legion that seeks military and political hegemony will escalate sectarian clashes. In the absence of an outside power preventing these conflicts, perpetual war is on the horizon.
Whether this Hobbesian doomsday scenario proves true remains to be seen, however. Indeed, Tehran’s perceived strength often does not reflect the situation on the ground. Headed by Ayatollah Sistani, Iraqi Shiites remain independent. In the Syrian theater, Iran depends greatly on Russian support. The upcoming parliamentary elections in Lebanon will show whether Hezbollah really controls the country. The actual strategic importance of the land bridge between Tehran and Beirut is debatable. Likewise, it is questionable whether the Islamic Republic could sustain a strategic corridor, considering military and economic overstretch. Domestic change within Iran could quickly alter the country’s positioning in the wider Middle East.
The United States should nevertheless be vigilant. Iran is seeking to increase its regional influence on many fronts, and Washington must be prepared to support local forces that stand up to Tehran’s ambition of creating a hegemonic order.
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Peace picks, February 12-18
- Geostrategic Flashpoint: The Eastern Mediterranean | Monday, February 12 | 9:00am – 10:00am | CSIS | Register here |
The Eastern Mediterranean forms a geostrategic seam between Europe and the Middle East, and for over seventy years, the region represented a strategic anchor for the United States. Today, Washington and its allies are struggling to adapt a coherent Eastern Mediterranean regional policy that acknowledges dramatically new economic, political, and security realities. As Syria enters its seventh year of conflict, Russia and Iran deepen their military footprints in the region, and NATO ally Turkey radically alters its domestic and external policies, the strategic importance of the region to the United States is growing while U.S. influence there appears to be waning. To assess regional security challenges and discuss NATO and U.S. Navy operational approaches to the Eastern Mediterranean, we are pleased to host Admiral James G. Foggo, III (commander, Allied Joint Force Command Naples; commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe; commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa) for a timely conversation. Jon Alterman (CSIS) and Heather Conley (CSIS) will offer reflections and observations on a recently concluded CSIS research project on the Eastern Mediterranean.
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- Iran’s Political Future | Monday, February 12 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
The Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative invites you to a panel discussion on “Iran’s Political Future,” in the aftermath of recent protests. The demonstrations, which took place in more than 100 Iranian cities and towns in late December-early January, focused on poor economic conditions, Iran’s interventions abroad, and domestic political constraints. Analysts are divided over whether the Iranian system can profit from the protests to enact meaningful reforms or whether the system is too repressive and brittle to change through relatively peaceful evolution. Please join Nazila Fathi (Iranian journalist and author), Suzanne Maloney (Deputy Director, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution), and Alireza Nader (former Senior International Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation). Barbara Slavin (Director, Future of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council) will moderate.
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- Conflict Prevention and Resolution Forum: The New Landscape of CVE in Southeast Asia | Tuesday, February 13 | 9:30am – 11:00am | Johns Hopkins University SAIS | Register here |
The dynamics of international violent extremism are rapidly changing. Groups like ISIS are losing physical territory, and their ambition post-caliphate is uncertain. Former fighters are returning to their home countries, creating new security risks and raising important questions about how to effectively rehabilitate and reintegrate foreign fighters. Southeast Asian countries from Indonesia to the Philippines have experience preventing and countering violent extremism, but as the global dynamics change, what can be learned from long-standing efforts to prevent violent extremism in Southeast Asia? How is the landscape changing? What are the key risks emerging? Join a panel of experts to discuss the needs and opportunities for countering violent extremism in Southeast Asia. Featuring Sinisa Vukovic (Assistant Professor, Johns Hopkins University SAIS) and Luke Waggoner (Senior Governance Specialist, International Republican Institute). Kimberly Brody Hart (Senior Manager, Search for Common Ground) will moderate the discussion.
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- Managing Fragility for Peace, Security, and Sustainable Development | Tuesday, February 13 | 1:00pm – 2:30pm | CSIS | Register here |
Countries experiencing significant fragility, while amounting to about 20 percent of the world’s population, are projected to be home to 80 percent of the world’s extremely poor by 2035. Societies affected by poor governance, limited institutional capability, low social cohesion, and weak legitimacy tend to exhibit erosion of the social contract, diminished societal resilience, and low levels of economic and human development. Spillover effects of fragility include increased risks of armed conflicts, forced migration, spread of diseases, organized crime, and terrorism. Ambassador Michel’s report places these challenges to security and development posed by fragility in the context of centuries-long trends toward declining violence and increased prosperity and freedom. Featuring Joseph Hewitt (Vice President for Policy, Learning and Strategy, USIP), Laurel Patterson (Senior Policy Advisor, Crisis, Fragility, and Resilience, UNDP), Romina Bandura (CSIS), and James Michel (CSIS).
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- Colombia Peace Forum: Colombian Human Rights Defenders Navigate Post-Accord Challenges | Wednesday, February 14 | 10:00am – 12:00pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
The government’s peace accord with the former FARC rebels presents a historic opportunity to work towards the construction of a democratic Colombia. At the heart of this process are human rights defenders and civil society organizations, who play a vital role in addressing the underlying economic and social root causes of violence and holding stakeholders accountable to the commitments of the accords. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), and the Latin America Working Group Education Fund (LAWGEF) to hear from the leading Colombian human rights activists. They will discuss the challenges they face in their communities and the role they play in engaging regional institutions, local authorities and diverse social sectors to secure lasting peace in Colombia. Speakers include Carla Koppell (Vice President, Center for Applied Conflict Transformation, U.S. Institute of Peace), Enrique Chimonja (Comisión Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz), and Socorro Acero Bautista (Comité Permanente por la defensa de los Derechos Humanos en Colombia, CPDH), among others.
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- U.S. National Security and the Korean Peninsula: Perspectives from a Defector, a Russian, and an Analyst | Wednesday, February 14 | 1:00pm – 3:30pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
Join us for a discussion on U.S. national security and the Korean peninsula from the perspectives of a former senior ranking official of the Kim Jong-un regime, a professor of St Petersburg University, and a renowned author on issues related to North Korea at a conference hosted jointly with the Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS). Featuring Jong Ho Ri (Former head, Korea Daehung Trading Corp., North Korea), Sergei Kurbanov (Professor, St Petersburg State University), Tara O (Adjunct Fellow, Pacific Forum, CSIS), Abraham Denmark (Director, Asia Program, Wilson Center), Synja P Kim (President and Chairman, ICAS). Sang Joo Kim (Executive Vice President, ICAS) will moderate the discussion.
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- American Peacemaking Experience in the Balkans: Lessons for Ukraine | Thursday, February 15 | 10:00am – 12:00pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
The United States played a leading role in ending wars that gripped the Balkans more than 20 years ago. Amid growing interest in the possibility of a peacekeeping mission in eastern Ukraine, a fresh look at American efforts in the former Yugoslavia is timely: What can be learned from the U.S. diplomatic experience in the Balkans that might be applied in the Ukrainian conflict? Ambassador James Pardew, former member of Richard Holbrooke’s negotiating team on the Balkans, will discuss insights captured in his new book, Peacemakers: American Leadership and the End of Genocide in the Balkans. Panelists include Michael Haltzel (Foreign Policy Institute Senior Fellow, John Hopkins SAIS), John Herbst (Director, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council), and Boris Ruge (Deputy Head of Mission, German Embassy to the U.S), among others.
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- Vietnam’s Relations with China and the U.S.: A Delicate Internal and External Balancing Act | Thursday, February 15 | 9:30am – 11:00am | Stimson Center | Register here |
In recent years, Vietnam’s foreign alignment strategy has raised broad attention from the region. Vietnam has a long and complicated history with China. Particularly in light of the 1979 Sino-Vietnam war and the existing maritime disputes, there exists profound distrust. In contrast, against the history of the Vietnam War, US’ relations with Vietnam has made steady progress in the past decade. Secretary of Defense Mattis just completed his trip to Vietnam in late January 2018, opening channels for more conversations and defense ties that are widely interpreted to assist Vietnam to counter China’s growing strength and ambition in the region. Although the alignment choice for Hanoi appears clear, the picture is significantly complicated by Vietnam’s domestic politics. The power struggles among different political factions within the party play an innate role in determining and influencing the country’s foreign policy. The Stimson Center is pleased to host the top Vietnam specialists from China and the U.S., Dr. Pan Jin’e (China Academy of Social Sciences) and Murray Hiebert (Deputy Director of the Southeast Asia Program, CSIS) to discuss the current state of Vietnam’s relations with the two great powers, the triangular relationship and the factors influencing their future.
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- The Best Way Forward in Afghanistan | Friday, February 16 | 12:00pm– 1:30pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
The war in Afghanistan, the longest in U.S. history, shows little sign of winding down. Despite hundreds of billions of dollars in military aid and state support, Afghanistan still struggles with resilient Taliban and Islamic State insurgencies. Increasingly, questions are being asked as to why the United States maintains a presence in Afghanistan. How is a U.S. presence serving American security interests? The Trump administration has pledged an indefinite commitment to victory in Afghanistan, but what does success look like and what would have to change to achieve it? Does the U.S. have a clear and coherent strategy going forward and what, if any, are the alternatives? The Middle East Institute is pleased to host an expert panel to discuss these and other questions about the US mission in Afghanistan. MEI’s Director of Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies, Marvin G. Weinbaum, will moderate the discussion with Vanda Felbab-Brown (senior fellow, Brookings), Christopher Kolenda, (adjunct senior fellow, Center for a New American Security), Ahmad Khalid Majidyar (fellow and director of the IranObserved Project, MEI) and Amb. (ret.) Ronald Neumann (President, American Academy of Diplomacy; former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan).
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Syria worsens
Alarm bells are ringing loud in Syria:
- Israel has shot down an Iranian drone launched from a Syrian base at which Russians were present;
- Syria has shot down an Israeli F16 with a missile system supplied by Russia, opening what Hizbollah has termed a new phase in the conflict;
- The Israelis responded by trying to destroy a good part of the Syrian air defense system;
- Turkish troops have crossed into a Kurdish-controlled Afrin in western Syria, where they lost a helicopter yesterday, and President Erdogan is threatening to send them also to Manbij farther east, where US troops are still deployed and cooperating with the Kurds;
- US forces and local allies last week defended themselves aggressively against a Syrian/Iranian attack in eastern Syria;*
- Syrian, Iranian, and Russian forces are pushing north through Idlib province, the north of which Turkey controls.
There is now a real risk of Turkish/US clashes, conflict between Israel and Syria, Iran or Russia, as well as between Turkey and its erstwhile Russian and Iranian partners and between the US and Syria or Iran, not to mention Russia. The geopolitical takeover of what we have been thinking of as a civil war seems inevitable, as Mara Karlin suggested in Congress last week it was becoming. This is the kind of multi-sided mess in which miscalculation, miscommunication, escalation, and confusion are far more likely to prevail than reason or self-interest.
The US is in a particularly vulnerable position. It depends on Turkish bases for the air cover it gives its own, Kurdish and allied Arab troops in eastern Syria, but Washington has been unwilling to enforce Vice President Biden’s promise to Turkey that the Kurds would leave Manbij and remain east of the Euphrates. Turkey sees America’s Kurdish allies as a terrorist threat, because they are allied with Kurdish insurgents inside Turkey. While the Turks might like to see Washington stay in Syria and restrain the Kurds, Ankara is not yet satisfied that the Americans are doing that. Damascus, Tehran, and Moscow want the US out. The US has been saying it would stay, mainly to prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State and counter Iranian expansionism in the region, but how its few thousand soldiers can do that isn’t clear, especially as they are losing some Kurds to the fight in Afrin.
What are Washington’s options?
It seems to me there are basically three:
- Sit tight, continuing to cooperate with the Kurds and to repel forcefully any Syria, Iranian, or Russian attacks, with the attendant risks.
- Get out, letting the Turks and Kurds go at it and yielding Syria to uncontested Iranian and/or Russian hegemony, perhaps hoping they will end up at each others’ throats.
- Negotiate deals that would allow the Kurds autonomy within Syria (as in Iraqi Kurdistan) in exchange for restraint in acting against Turkey and require the Russians to push the Iranians (and affiliated militias) away from the Israeli border in exchange for US withdrawal.
None of these options is attractive, but better ones are just not available. It is too late to revive the moderate opposition or push Assad out. The US does not have the kind of vital interests in Syria that would justify expanding its military footprint there, though that may of course happen if we sit tight. Force protection may require it, and mission creep would likely ensue.
I’m inclined towards Option 3, not least because it would restore relations with Turkey and get the Iranians and their proxies away from the Israeli border. But it admittedly involves a high wire act without much of a safety net. The Russians might like the Iranians out of their way, but they may not have the clout to make it happen. US withdrawal could vitiate any promises the Syrian Kurds make to Turkey.
Option 1 risks a disastrous attack on the few thousand US troops in Syria, not only by Iran or Syria but also by Turkey. Option 2 risks Iran taking over Syria and using it to launch attacks against Israel, with or without Russian connivance. Option 3 could of course devolve into 1 or 2, as circumstances dictate, but it keeps those options open in the meanwhile.
Let’s hope someone in a White House rocked wife abuse scandals and national security issues or someone in a State Department shedding its most experienced officers can spare a few moments for Syria as it worsens.
*PS (February 13): It now appears the Americans and allied Kurds killed about one hundred Russian “contractors” fighting with the Assad forces in their attack on the Americans in eastern Syria. While Washington worries about a budget and an infrastructure plan that are going nowhere as well as spousal abuse among White House employees, the war in Syria is definitely worsening.
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What you can do
Brian Klaas is a first-class, fact-based Twitter critic of Donald Trump, whose TEDx talk has great virtues even if I think systemic reform is still needed to enable democracies to survive the current wave of populist attacks:
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The window for diplomacy is closing
Since the beginning of the year Iran has seen a wave of nationwide protests. They are the largest the country has witnessed since the Green Movement of 2009, which represented a political challenge to the Iranian government. The more recent outbreak is more diffuse, leaderless, and radical – with some chants demanding overthrow of the entire system. Meanwhile, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiated between Presidents Obama and Rouhani in 2015 has stalled, with a change in attitude from the White House on the deal. As the foment of demonstrations simmers down, what does national opinion portend for Iran’s government in coming days?
On February 2, the Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative presented the results of a survey of popular opinion across Iran, conducted by the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). Results of the survey, taken in the aftermath of the recent protests across Iran, were presented by Dr. Ebrahim Mohseni of CISSM. Joining him were Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, and Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, founder and publisher of Bourse & Bazaar, an online magazine covering Iranian business affairs. Barbara Slavin, director of the Future of Iran Initiative, joined as moderator. (A full recording of the event can be seen here.)
Dr. Mohseni presented the findings of the 103-question survey, compiling the results of 1,002 phone interviews conducted across Iran. Carried out between January 16 and 24, the survey was meant to get a sense of Iranian opinion on politics. CISSM has been conducting a similar survey since 2015. This year’s poll was postponed by a few weeks in order to capture a sense of public opinion on recent protests.
Mohseni’s survey not unexpectedly found increasing levels of discontent with the economy, with a strong majority of Iranians saying the economy is bad (68%, up from 63% in June 2017) and over half saying it is getting worse (58%, up from 50% in June). Iranians are dissatisfied with their government’s handling of the economy, with majorities saying the government should do more to help the poor (73%), control food prices (95%), and compensate victims of failed financial institutions (81%). The highest level of agreement goes to the issue of corruption – Iranians believe nearly unanimously (96%) that the government needs to do more to fight financial and bureaucratic corruption, which is widely understood as a crucial issue for the Iranian economy.
What does this economic dissatisfaction mean for opinion toward the government? Despite their economic woes, the survey reveals that Iranians generally stand with the government of the Islamic Republic. Large majorities (77%) reject demands for a fundamental change in the system or that Iran should be less involved in Iraq and Syria (61%). Iranians are split when it comes to aims in the Middle East: nearly half (49%) say Iran should work toward mutually acceptable solutions to regional problems, while slightly fewer (46%) think Iran should use its power to dominate the region. A strong majority (65%) believes that peaceful protesters should be released from prison, but similar majorities support severe punishment for those who attacked the police (64%) or damaged private property (60%).
The survey elicited detailed information on perception of the JCPOA. Esfandyar Batmanghelidj (present over Skype) cited a number of worrying trends. The data reveal increasing disappointment with the results of the JCPOA agreement, which, despite general approval (55%, down 12 points since June 2017) is widely seen as unfulfilled (93%) because of American blocking of economic opportunities for Iran. Batmanghelidj warned of the “economic roots of new anti-Americanism,” with the data showing rising negative opinion toward the American people (from 26.2% “very unfavorable” in January 2016 to 36.6% today).
While Iranian opinion toward the US government has long been poor (rating 85.4% “very unfavorable” today), Batmanghelidj noted that this negative opinion typically did not affect the largely positive perception in Iran of the American people as distinct from their government. After 2016, that pattern may have shifted. The Iranian public may be in process of turning away from the openness that Rouhani championed back toward an Ahmedinejad-era focus on economic isolationism.
Kelsey Davenport interpreted general support for Iran’s missile program (74% calling it “very important” and 57% insisting it is “not negotiable”) and nuclear development following the JCPOA (75% rating it “very important”) as proof that there is no public support in Iran for further concessions. The international community, she recommended, should focus on enforcing what is restricted under the JCPOA (such as shipping missile components to Houthi fighters in Yemen) rather than looking for larger capitulations (like the full-scale abandonment of the missile program).
Davenport also noted the continuing acceptance of the JCPOA despite lack of faith in American promises (with 64% “not confident at all” that the U.S. would live up to its obligations), recommending that European parties to the deal push forward with their promises to Iran (as 60% of Iranians are “somewhat” or “very confident” they will).
Extrapolating, these numbers portend trouble for both the Iranian and American governments moving forward. The successful negotiation of the JCPOA in 2015 reflected a rare moment when Iranian fatigue with the “resistance economy” overlapped with an American willingness to accept the post-revolution regime. Today that window of overlap may be shrinking. As Mohseni suggested, the philosophy that made the JCPOA possible is in jeopardy, with Iranians taking the message that diplomacy has not brought them the results they were promised. Without a change in stance from the international community soon, we risk watching Iran’s moment of openness pass by.
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