Peace picks, February 12-18
- Geostrategic Flashpoint: The Eastern Mediterranean | Monday, February 12 | 9:00am – 10:00am | CSIS | Register here |
The Eastern Mediterranean forms a geostrategic seam between Europe and the Middle East, and for over seventy years, the region represented a strategic anchor for the United States. Today, Washington and its allies are struggling to adapt a coherent Eastern Mediterranean regional policy that acknowledges dramatically new economic, political, and security realities. As Syria enters its seventh year of conflict, Russia and Iran deepen their military footprints in the region, and NATO ally Turkey radically alters its domestic and external policies, the strategic importance of the region to the United States is growing while U.S. influence there appears to be waning. To assess regional security challenges and discuss NATO and U.S. Navy operational approaches to the Eastern Mediterranean, we are pleased to host Admiral James G. Foggo, III (commander, Allied Joint Force Command Naples; commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe; commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa) for a timely conversation. Jon Alterman (CSIS) and Heather Conley (CSIS) will offer reflections and observations on a recently concluded CSIS research project on the Eastern Mediterranean.
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- Iran’s Political Future | Monday, February 12 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
The Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative invites you to a panel discussion on “Iran’s Political Future,” in the aftermath of recent protests. The demonstrations, which took place in more than 100 Iranian cities and towns in late December-early January, focused on poor economic conditions, Iran’s interventions abroad, and domestic political constraints. Analysts are divided over whether the Iranian system can profit from the protests to enact meaningful reforms or whether the system is too repressive and brittle to change through relatively peaceful evolution. Please join Nazila Fathi (Iranian journalist and author), Suzanne Maloney (Deputy Director, Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution), and Alireza Nader (former Senior International Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation). Barbara Slavin (Director, Future of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council) will moderate.
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- Conflict Prevention and Resolution Forum: The New Landscape of CVE in Southeast Asia | Tuesday, February 13 | 9:30am – 11:00am | Johns Hopkins University SAIS | Register here |
The dynamics of international violent extremism are rapidly changing. Groups like ISIS are losing physical territory, and their ambition post-caliphate is uncertain. Former fighters are returning to their home countries, creating new security risks and raising important questions about how to effectively rehabilitate and reintegrate foreign fighters. Southeast Asian countries from Indonesia to the Philippines have experience preventing and countering violent extremism, but as the global dynamics change, what can be learned from long-standing efforts to prevent violent extremism in Southeast Asia? How is the landscape changing? What are the key risks emerging? Join a panel of experts to discuss the needs and opportunities for countering violent extremism in Southeast Asia. Featuring Sinisa Vukovic (Assistant Professor, Johns Hopkins University SAIS) and Luke Waggoner (Senior Governance Specialist, International Republican Institute). Kimberly Brody Hart (Senior Manager, Search for Common Ground) will moderate the discussion.
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- Managing Fragility for Peace, Security, and Sustainable Development | Tuesday, February 13 | 1:00pm – 2:30pm | CSIS | Register here |
Countries experiencing significant fragility, while amounting to about 20 percent of the world’s population, are projected to be home to 80 percent of the world’s extremely poor by 2035. Societies affected by poor governance, limited institutional capability, low social cohesion, and weak legitimacy tend to exhibit erosion of the social contract, diminished societal resilience, and low levels of economic and human development. Spillover effects of fragility include increased risks of armed conflicts, forced migration, spread of diseases, organized crime, and terrorism. Ambassador Michel’s report places these challenges to security and development posed by fragility in the context of centuries-long trends toward declining violence and increased prosperity and freedom. Featuring Joseph Hewitt (Vice President for Policy, Learning and Strategy, USIP), Laurel Patterson (Senior Policy Advisor, Crisis, Fragility, and Resilience, UNDP), Romina Bandura (CSIS), and James Michel (CSIS).
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- Colombia Peace Forum: Colombian Human Rights Defenders Navigate Post-Accord Challenges | Wednesday, February 14 | 10:00am – 12:00pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
The government’s peace accord with the former FARC rebels presents a historic opportunity to work towards the construction of a democratic Colombia. At the heart of this process are human rights defenders and civil society organizations, who play a vital role in addressing the underlying economic and social root causes of violence and holding stakeholders accountable to the commitments of the accords. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), and the Latin America Working Group Education Fund (LAWGEF) to hear from the leading Colombian human rights activists. They will discuss the challenges they face in their communities and the role they play in engaging regional institutions, local authorities and diverse social sectors to secure lasting peace in Colombia. Speakers include Carla Koppell (Vice President, Center for Applied Conflict Transformation, U.S. Institute of Peace), Enrique Chimonja (Comisión Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz), and Socorro Acero Bautista (Comité Permanente por la defensa de los Derechos Humanos en Colombia, CPDH), among others.
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- U.S. National Security and the Korean Peninsula: Perspectives from a Defector, a Russian, and an Analyst | Wednesday, February 14 | 1:00pm – 3:30pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
Join us for a discussion on U.S. national security and the Korean peninsula from the perspectives of a former senior ranking official of the Kim Jong-un regime, a professor of St Petersburg University, and a renowned author on issues related to North Korea at a conference hosted jointly with the Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS). Featuring Jong Ho Ri (Former head, Korea Daehung Trading Corp., North Korea), Sergei Kurbanov (Professor, St Petersburg State University), Tara O (Adjunct Fellow, Pacific Forum, CSIS), Abraham Denmark (Director, Asia Program, Wilson Center), Synja P Kim (President and Chairman, ICAS). Sang Joo Kim (Executive Vice President, ICAS) will moderate the discussion.
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- American Peacemaking Experience in the Balkans: Lessons for Ukraine | Thursday, February 15 | 10:00am – 12:00pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
The United States played a leading role in ending wars that gripped the Balkans more than 20 years ago. Amid growing interest in the possibility of a peacekeeping mission in eastern Ukraine, a fresh look at American efforts in the former Yugoslavia is timely: What can be learned from the U.S. diplomatic experience in the Balkans that might be applied in the Ukrainian conflict? Ambassador James Pardew, former member of Richard Holbrooke’s negotiating team on the Balkans, will discuss insights captured in his new book, Peacemakers: American Leadership and the End of Genocide in the Balkans. Panelists include Michael Haltzel (Foreign Policy Institute Senior Fellow, John Hopkins SAIS), John Herbst (Director, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council), and Boris Ruge (Deputy Head of Mission, German Embassy to the U.S), among others.
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- Vietnam’s Relations with China and the U.S.: A Delicate Internal and External Balancing Act | Thursday, February 15 | 9:30am – 11:00am | Stimson Center | Register here |
In recent years, Vietnam’s foreign alignment strategy has raised broad attention from the region. Vietnam has a long and complicated history with China. Particularly in light of the 1979 Sino-Vietnam war and the existing maritime disputes, there exists profound distrust. In contrast, against the history of the Vietnam War, US’ relations with Vietnam has made steady progress in the past decade. Secretary of Defense Mattis just completed his trip to Vietnam in late January 2018, opening channels for more conversations and defense ties that are widely interpreted to assist Vietnam to counter China’s growing strength and ambition in the region. Although the alignment choice for Hanoi appears clear, the picture is significantly complicated by Vietnam’s domestic politics. The power struggles among different political factions within the party play an innate role in determining and influencing the country’s foreign policy. The Stimson Center is pleased to host the top Vietnam specialists from China and the U.S., Dr. Pan Jin’e (China Academy of Social Sciences) and Murray Hiebert (Deputy Director of the Southeast Asia Program, CSIS) to discuss the current state of Vietnam’s relations with the two great powers, the triangular relationship and the factors influencing their future.
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- The Best Way Forward in Afghanistan | Friday, February 16 | 12:00pm– 1:30pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
The war in Afghanistan, the longest in U.S. history, shows little sign of winding down. Despite hundreds of billions of dollars in military aid and state support, Afghanistan still struggles with resilient Taliban and Islamic State insurgencies. Increasingly, questions are being asked as to why the United States maintains a presence in Afghanistan. How is a U.S. presence serving American security interests? The Trump administration has pledged an indefinite commitment to victory in Afghanistan, but what does success look like and what would have to change to achieve it? Does the U.S. have a clear and coherent strategy going forward and what, if any, are the alternatives? The Middle East Institute is pleased to host an expert panel to discuss these and other questions about the US mission in Afghanistan. MEI’s Director of Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies, Marvin G. Weinbaum, will moderate the discussion with Vanda Felbab-Brown (senior fellow, Brookings), Christopher Kolenda, (adjunct senior fellow, Center for a New American Security), Ahmad Khalid Majidyar (fellow and director of the IranObserved Project, MEI) and Amb. (ret.) Ronald Neumann (President, American Academy of Diplomacy; former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan).
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Syria worsens
Alarm bells are ringing loud in Syria:
- Israel has shot down an Iranian drone launched from a Syrian base at which Russians were present;
- Syria has shot down an Israeli F16 with a missile system supplied by Russia, opening what Hizbollah has termed a new phase in the conflict;
- The Israelis responded by trying to destroy a good part of the Syrian air defense system;
- Turkish troops have crossed into a Kurdish-controlled Afrin in western Syria, where they lost a helicopter yesterday, and President Erdogan is threatening to send them also to Manbij farther east, where US troops are still deployed and cooperating with the Kurds;
- US forces and local allies last week defended themselves aggressively against a Syrian/Iranian attack in eastern Syria;*
- Syrian, Iranian, and Russian forces are pushing north through Idlib province, the north of which Turkey controls.
There is now a real risk of Turkish/US clashes, conflict between Israel and Syria, Iran or Russia, as well as between Turkey and its erstwhile Russian and Iranian partners and between the US and Syria or Iran, not to mention Russia. The geopolitical takeover of what we have been thinking of as a civil war seems inevitable, as Mara Karlin suggested in Congress last week it was becoming. This is the kind of multi-sided mess in which miscalculation, miscommunication, escalation, and confusion are far more likely to prevail than reason or self-interest.
The US is in a particularly vulnerable position. It depends on Turkish bases for the air cover it gives its own, Kurdish and allied Arab troops in eastern Syria, but Washington has been unwilling to enforce Vice President Biden’s promise to Turkey that the Kurds would leave Manbij and remain east of the Euphrates. Turkey sees America’s Kurdish allies as a terrorist threat, because they are allied with Kurdish insurgents inside Turkey. While the Turks might like to see Washington stay in Syria and restrain the Kurds, Ankara is not yet satisfied that the Americans are doing that. Damascus, Tehran, and Moscow want the US out. The US has been saying it would stay, mainly to prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State and counter Iranian expansionism in the region, but how its few thousand soldiers can do that isn’t clear, especially as they are losing some Kurds to the fight in Afrin.
What are Washington’s options?
It seems to me there are basically three:
- Sit tight, continuing to cooperate with the Kurds and to repel forcefully any Syria, Iranian, or Russian attacks, with the attendant risks.
- Get out, letting the Turks and Kurds go at it and yielding Syria to uncontested Iranian and/or Russian hegemony, perhaps hoping they will end up at each others’ throats.
- Negotiate deals that would allow the Kurds autonomy within Syria (as in Iraqi Kurdistan) in exchange for restraint in acting against Turkey and require the Russians to push the Iranians (and affiliated militias) away from the Israeli border in exchange for US withdrawal.
None of these options is attractive, but better ones are just not available. It is too late to revive the moderate opposition or push Assad out. The US does not have the kind of vital interests in Syria that would justify expanding its military footprint there, though that may of course happen if we sit tight. Force protection may require it, and mission creep would likely ensue.
I’m inclined towards Option 3, not least because it would restore relations with Turkey and get the Iranians and their proxies away from the Israeli border. But it admittedly involves a high wire act without much of a safety net. The Russians might like the Iranians out of their way, but they may not have the clout to make it happen. US withdrawal could vitiate any promises the Syrian Kurds make to Turkey.
Option 1 risks a disastrous attack on the few thousand US troops in Syria, not only by Iran or Syria but also by Turkey. Option 2 risks Iran taking over Syria and using it to launch attacks against Israel, with or without Russian connivance. Option 3 could of course devolve into 1 or 2, as circumstances dictate, but it keeps those options open in the meanwhile.
Let’s hope someone in a White House rocked wife abuse scandals and national security issues or someone in a State Department shedding its most experienced officers can spare a few moments for Syria as it worsens.
*PS (February 13): It now appears the Americans and allied Kurds killed about one hundred Russian “contractors” fighting with the Assad forces in their attack on the Americans in eastern Syria. While Washington worries about a budget and an infrastructure plan that are going nowhere as well as spousal abuse among White House employees, the war in Syria is definitely worsening.
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What you can do
Brian Klaas is a first-class, fact-based Twitter critic of Donald Trump, whose TEDx talk has great virtues even if I think systemic reform is still needed to enable democracies to survive the current wave of populist attacks:
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The window for diplomacy is closing
Since the beginning of the year Iran has seen a wave of nationwide protests. They are the largest the country has witnessed since the Green Movement of 2009, which represented a political challenge to the Iranian government. The more recent outbreak is more diffuse, leaderless, and radical – with some chants demanding overthrow of the entire system. Meanwhile, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiated between Presidents Obama and Rouhani in 2015 has stalled, with a change in attitude from the White House on the deal. As the foment of demonstrations simmers down, what does national opinion portend for Iran’s government in coming days?
On February 2, the Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative presented the results of a survey of popular opinion across Iran, conducted by the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). Results of the survey, taken in the aftermath of the recent protests across Iran, were presented by Dr. Ebrahim Mohseni of CISSM. Joining him were Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, and Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, founder and publisher of Bourse & Bazaar, an online magazine covering Iranian business affairs. Barbara Slavin, director of the Future of Iran Initiative, joined as moderator. (A full recording of the event can be seen here.)
Dr. Mohseni presented the findings of the 103-question survey, compiling the results of 1,002 phone interviews conducted across Iran. Carried out between January 16 and 24, the survey was meant to get a sense of Iranian opinion on politics. CISSM has been conducting a similar survey since 2015. This year’s poll was postponed by a few weeks in order to capture a sense of public opinion on recent protests.
Mohseni’s survey not unexpectedly found increasing levels of discontent with the economy, with a strong majority of Iranians saying the economy is bad (68%, up from 63% in June 2017) and over half saying it is getting worse (58%, up from 50% in June). Iranians are dissatisfied with their government’s handling of the economy, with majorities saying the government should do more to help the poor (73%), control food prices (95%), and compensate victims of failed financial institutions (81%). The highest level of agreement goes to the issue of corruption – Iranians believe nearly unanimously (96%) that the government needs to do more to fight financial and bureaucratic corruption, which is widely understood as a crucial issue for the Iranian economy.
What does this economic dissatisfaction mean for opinion toward the government? Despite their economic woes, the survey reveals that Iranians generally stand with the government of the Islamic Republic. Large majorities (77%) reject demands for a fundamental change in the system or that Iran should be less involved in Iraq and Syria (61%). Iranians are split when it comes to aims in the Middle East: nearly half (49%) say Iran should work toward mutually acceptable solutions to regional problems, while slightly fewer (46%) think Iran should use its power to dominate the region. A strong majority (65%) believes that peaceful protesters should be released from prison, but similar majorities support severe punishment for those who attacked the police (64%) or damaged private property (60%).
The survey elicited detailed information on perception of the JCPOA. Esfandyar Batmanghelidj (present over Skype) cited a number of worrying trends. The data reveal increasing disappointment with the results of the JCPOA agreement, which, despite general approval (55%, down 12 points since June 2017) is widely seen as unfulfilled (93%) because of American blocking of economic opportunities for Iran. Batmanghelidj warned of the “economic roots of new anti-Americanism,” with the data showing rising negative opinion toward the American people (from 26.2% “very unfavorable” in January 2016 to 36.6% today).
While Iranian opinion toward the US government has long been poor (rating 85.4% “very unfavorable” today), Batmanghelidj noted that this negative opinion typically did not affect the largely positive perception in Iran of the American people as distinct from their government. After 2016, that pattern may have shifted. The Iranian public may be in process of turning away from the openness that Rouhani championed back toward an Ahmedinejad-era focus on economic isolationism.
Kelsey Davenport interpreted general support for Iran’s missile program (74% calling it “very important” and 57% insisting it is “not negotiable”) and nuclear development following the JCPOA (75% rating it “very important”) as proof that there is no public support in Iran for further concessions. The international community, she recommended, should focus on enforcing what is restricted under the JCPOA (such as shipping missile components to Houthi fighters in Yemen) rather than looking for larger capitulations (like the full-scale abandonment of the missile program).
Davenport also noted the continuing acceptance of the JCPOA despite lack of faith in American promises (with 64% “not confident at all” that the U.S. would live up to its obligations), recommending that European parties to the deal push forward with their promises to Iran (as 60% of Iranians are “somewhat” or “very confident” they will).
Extrapolating, these numbers portend trouble for both the Iranian and American governments moving forward. The successful negotiation of the JCPOA in 2015 reflected a rare moment when Iranian fatigue with the “resistance economy” overlapped with an American willingness to accept the post-revolution regime. Today that window of overlap may be shrinking. As Mohseni suggested, the philosophy that made the JCPOA possible is in jeopardy, with Iranians taking the message that diplomacy has not brought them the results they were promised. Without a change in stance from the international community soon, we risk watching Iran’s moment of openness pass by.
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One courageous Russian
I don’t usually deal with Russian politics, but this video (all 25 minutes or so) merits watching and marveling. Alexei Anatolievich Navalny is one courageous Russian:
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Kosovo’s travail
I’ve already expressed my enthusiasm for the EU’s re-opening of the window for enlargement in the Western Balkans. I don’t take any of it back. But my friends in Kosovo are upset: the final text of the plan apparently erases explicit references to Kosovo, due to Spain’s concern that it represents a model for Catalonia.
I wish that hadn’t happened, but it is far from incurable. It is still clear that the EU is opening the window and that Serbia will have to settle its issues with Kosovo completely–“normalizing relations” is the euphemism–before acceding. The Union is not willing to bring in any new members that have problems with their neighbors. That means recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations between Pristina and Belgrade. I am assured on good authority that Madrid has made it clear that once Kosovo and Serbia settle their issues Spain will go along.
What Spain has done is nevertheless a diplomatic auto-goal. By implicitly accepting the analogy between Catalonia and Kosovo, Madrid makes itself analogous to Milosevic’s Belgrade. Objectively, that is not the case. I may think some of what Madrid is doing to fight the Catalan independence movement is unwise and counterproductive, but it is nowhere near the criminal abuse that Milosevic indulged in. Spain has not chased hundreds of thousands of Catalans from their homes, and the international community has not had to intervene to stop war crimes and crimes against humanity. Nor has Catalonia been governed for the better part of a decade by an international administration entrusted by the UN Security Council with developing self-governing institutions with a view to an eventual decision on final status. Worrying about Kosovo as if it is Catalonia in disguise is foolish.
Kosovars are also partly responsible for their own fate. They have spent years now refusing to ratify a border agreement with Montenegro and months threatening to undo their agreement to a special, internationally staffed tribunal to try accusations of war-time and post-war crimes. Small countries need lots of friends. The border issue is not worth 15 minutes of high quality diplomatic time, never mind years. The special tribunal was tough for Kosovo’s politicians to swallow, but regurgitating it would be no less painful. Had Pristina proceeded with the border demarcation and avoided a new debate over the special tribunal, it would no doubt have had more time, energy, and international credit to ensure better treatment in the EU strategy.
The opening of a Balkan window for enlargement by 2025 is an extraordinary thing for Brussels to do. There is no telling when the window will close again. The only productive response is to get ready as quickly as possible by meeting the entry requirements. For Kosovo, that means border demarcation (not only with Montenegro but also with Serbia) as well as complying with whatever the special tribunal decides. The alternative is decades in purgatory, where friends are few. Kosovo’s citizens would do well to avoid that.
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