You won’t hear sorry from me, Mr. President

Courtesy of Kosovo Online and Googletranslate:

The president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, commented on the statement of Danijel Server, a professor of international law [sic], which he gave to the Voice of America, which is that he “expects that Serbia will refuse the introduction of sanctions against Russia, and that it is more realistic for Serbia to turn to China than to the West.”  

– Serbia is on the European road.  I believe that Serbia will go more strongly on that path and that’s why there are people there who are less tired than me, and they will have my support, to pull Serbia towards Europe.  As for our Chinese partners, we tell our Chinese friends that we are on the European path and we have no problem with that – said Vučić and added:

 – With that, he wanted to say: the Serbs might leave the Russians, but they might look for someone else just so they wouldn’t be in the West.  Well, this is the man who said that we are a danger in the region and that we are just waiting for someone to attack, on Putin’s order, but for 250 days now, that has not happened.  I listened to those senseless stories and lies about Serbia and read and saw them in many Western countries.  

But I’ve never heard the word “sorry” from anyone when none of that happens.  We are continuing our path, the European path, and we will try to preserve our traditionally good relations with China and principled positions in relation to the conflict in Ukraine.  In any case – Let Mr. Server do his job, we’ll do ours.  May God bless him, and above all, may he bless our beautiful Serbia.

https://www.kosovo-online.com/vesti/politika/vucic-odgovorio-serveru-srbija-nastavlja-svoj-evropski-put-28-10-2022

Note two things:

  1. He confirms that Serbia will continue to refuse to impose sanctions on Russia. That is its “principled position,” though what principle it maintains I am not sure.
  2. He confirms that Serbia will keep its good relations with China. That is crucial now that Russia is pursuing partition of a sovereign state inconsistent with Serbia’s claim to Kosovo.

In any event, China wants to use Serbia as a trade and investment route into the EU. Of course it doesn’t object to Serbia’s European ambitions.

Vucic will implement the acquis, but not the Copenhagen criteria

The question is whether you can do these things and still pursue membership in the EU. The answer is yes. I expect Serbia to do its best to implement the acquis communautaire, which is necessary but not sufficient for EU membership. Much of the acquis consists of technical requirements, down to curb cuts on city streets. Vucic should have no problem with allowing Brussels to decide things Serbia has little capacity to deal with on its own.

The harder part is meeting the Copenhagen criteria and aligning its foreign policy with the EU. The former require a democratic political system, an open economy, free media, an independent judiciary, and respect for human rights. This is the part Vucic ignores. Serbia’s media are not free, its economy is far from open, its judiciary is not independent, and the political system is semi-autocratic.

On all of these dimensions, Serbia has gotten worse, not better, since Vucic first became President in 2017. In addition, his affection for what his minions term the “Serbian world” threatens the territorial integrity of three of Serbia’s neighbors: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo, each of which have Serb populations advocates of the “Serbian world” want annexed to Serbia. Doing that is not “good neighborly relations.” The fact that it has not yet led to large-scale violence should be no comfort.

The crucial test

The crucial test is likely to come in Kosovo. The Europeans and Americans have backed off the demand for immediate diplomatic recognition. They are now toying with the idea of transitional steps short of that. These would include recognition by the five non-recognizing EU countries, Kosovo membership in international organizations as well as creation of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities inside Kosovo consistent with its constitution. This is sometimes referred to as a “two Germanies” scenario, but that is a misnomer. Both Germanies were members of the United Nations. Even without Belgrade’s opposition, Moscow and Beijing are certain to veto Kosovo’s UN membership.

Serbia is skilled at heaping blame for the lack of progress in the Pristina/Belgrade dialogue on Kosovo. The question is whether it will be prepared to go in a more accommodating direction. A clear indicator will be its response to Kosovo’s decision to phase in over three months the requirement that Serbs in Kosovo’s north start using Kosovo license plates rather than Serbian ones. The Americans wanted a longer delay–10 months. But Belgrade’s obligation to allow this long-delayed exertion of Pristina’s authority is clear.

No apologies

President Vucic is correct to call on me to do my job. What is it? To analyze the parts of the world I know well in realistic terms and to suggest ways of improving their prospects. That is what I did in the interview. The question is whether he is doing his. Is he taking Serbia in the direction of liberal democracy? Or is he hoping the EU will relax its standards and allow Serbia to accede without meeting the Cophenhagen criteria?

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Stevenson’s army, October 28 and 29

– Fed Kaplan critiques the nuclear posture review.

– Atlantic Council team has good menu of options related to Russian nukes in Ukraine.

– Robert Draper worries about the GOP.

– WaPo says Russians are undermining Moldova.

– National Security Archive has more on how JFK lied to keep Cuban missile deal secret.

I failed to post yesterday’s edition:

– DOD released its new National Defense Strategy.  Here’s NYT analysis. The Guardian notes the nuclear posture section.

– National Security Archive has JCS documents during Cuban missile crisis.

– House Veterans Affairs Committee warns of extremists in the military.

– House GOP plans tough China policy.

Somalia wants more US drone strikes.

– Army strategist has good ideas for defense innovation.

NYT has good background on micro-targeting of political ads.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Where the line is drawn matters

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682

I am going to go out on a limb. Broadly speaking, the Ukraine war can end with three outcomes:

  1. Complete Russian withdrawal from the 2013 borders of Ukraine.
  2. Partition of Ukraine, with Crimea and perhaps some other slices of the south and east annexed by Russia.
  3. Russian victory.

Note that these are outcomes. They say nothing about the path, which could include war, political change in Moscow or Kyiv, or negotiations. Outcome 2. looks much more likely today than 1. or 3., but there really is no telling. Let’s assume for current purposes that Russia remains under the control of Putin, or someone with similar territorial ambitions. Let’s also assume that a pro-EU government remains in Kyiv. What are the implications from the American perspective of these possible outcomes?

Complete Russian withdrawal

Complete Russian withdrawal would leave Ukraine still at risk. It would want to join the EU, for which it has already applied, and NATO. The former is a real possibility, provided Ukraine reforms its politics and economy to qualify. But the latter is unlikely. It would require all NATO members to agree. Several will be reluctant.

This circle can be squared, as it has been during wartime. NATO would need to provide security guarantees to Ukraine ensuring the kind of support Ukraine has received since February. This would ideally include not just ammunition and equipment, but also training, intelligence, logistics, funding, and political solidarity. A Ukrainian win will not be cost free.

Partition

The costs will be higher if Ukraine is partitioned. Putin would claim victory. Russia would be an even greater continuing military threat. NATO would need to arm “rump” Ukraine to repel another potential Russian invasion and repress the kind of “hybrid warfare” Moscow would continue to conduct inside Kyiv-controlled territory. NATO would also need to counter Moscow’s intensified hybrid warfare campaigns in member state Hungary or non-member state Moldova.

Partition of Ukraine would also encourage Moscow to expand its support for partition elsewhere, especially the Balkans. There Serbian President Vucic would welcome expanded Russian support for his “Serbian world” efforts, which entail de facto or de jure partition of Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Kazakhstan, where there is a large Russian population, might also be at risk.

Russian victory

Russian victory, achieved by either military or political means, would entail the incorporation of all of Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence. Kyiv would be, like Minsk, subject to Moscow’s suzerainty. It would loyally follow Moscow’s foreign policy directives. Russia would likely garrison troops in Ukraine, which would be mostly disarmed.

Ukraine’s subjagation would put not just Hungary and Moldova at risk from hybrid warfare but also Poland, the Baltics, and other NATO members (possibly Romania and Slovakia) from Russian conventional as well as unconventional attack. Maintaining NATO solidarity would become more difficult as Moscow threatens these newer neighbors while leaving the older NATO members untouched.

Where the line is drawn matters

American diplomacy since the end of the Cold War has aimed for a Europe “whole and free.” That isn’t happening. The Ukraine war is drawing a new line. The question is whether that new line will go through or encompass Ukraine. If it does, NATO will pay a higher price. The cost will be lower, but still substantial, if Ukraine as a whole can complete its Western ambitions.

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Stevenson’s Army, October 27

Xi elevated wolf warriors for foreign policy

-Last week I sent Politico’s analysis of US failing diplomacy. In rebuttal, Dan Drezner offers a different picture.

– I really liked Derek Leebaert’s book on postwar foreign policy, but strongly disagree with his new Politico piece arguing against non-career foreign policy officials. Still, I want you to read it.

– Kevin Drum has a list of Democratic bragging points. Pollster Stan Greenberg says they don’t work this year.

– International Crisis Group calls for tighter congressional oversight of use of force.

– Barton Gellman previews GOP Congress.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Kosovo under pressure needs a strategy

Arbnore Zhushi of Bota Sot asked questions. I replied:

Q: Recently, we have seen frequent visits by people of the most important allies of Kosovo (emissaries and government officials) whose main message was the progress of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. How do you see their visits?

A: Kosovo’s friends are trying to encourage progress in the dialogue. That’s their job and I wish them success. It is not clear however that they are producing the kinds of responses in Belgrade that would enable Pristina to reciprocate. Both capitals seem to me unready for compromise.

Q: The US and the EU have asked Kosovo to postpone the deadline for the re-registration of vehicle license plates for a period of 10 months. Prime Minister Kurti said today that the deadline for this is October 31. Do you think that Kurti is wrong with this decision? Should he postpone the deadline?

A: Kurti is exercising Kosovo’s sovereignty. I hope he is prepared to deal with the consequences. I certainly understand his impatience–I’ve even suggested that 10 minutes is too long. But being right works only if the move you make does not create bigger problems.

Q: EU envoy Lajcak mentioned 2024 as the last time Kosovo and Serbia should sign a comprehensive agreement. When do you think an agreement will be reached based on recent developments, when do you think an agreement will be reached?

A: Whenever Pristina and Belgrade decide it is in their interests. They are not there yet. I have no idea whether they will be ready in 2024.

Q: Should Kosovo accept a non-recognition agreement?

A: I can imagine lots of agreements short of recognition that would be advantageous for Kosovo. Even with recognition, there will be a need for many other agreements. I see no reason to wait for recognition to get things done that will improve the lives of citizens in both countries. That was the philosophy behind the “technical” phase of the dialogue. While many of those agreements have not been fully implemented, some did result in real benefits.

An idea: why don’t the US and EU constitute a commission for implementation of dialogue agreements (like the International Civilian Office that supervised implementation of the Ahtisaari plan after independence). With assistance from knowledgeable NGOs in both Kosovo and Serbia as well as the two governments, such a commission could make real progress in implementing the agreements and improving relations between Belgrade and Pristina.

Q: In Kosovo, there is also talk of a possible fall of the Government. Do you think that the Kurti Government can fall under pressure to sign the agreement with Serbia?

A: In a parliamentary system it is always possible for the government to fall. In this instance, that would require a break in the governing coalition, either within Vetevendosje or with the other coalition partners. You know better than I do whether such a break is likely. Those who would like to engineer the fall of the government should remember however that last time they did it Albin returned to parliament strengthened.

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Stevenson’s army, October 24

– Axios notes there are two quite separate campaigns going on, with few common media events.

– Chicago Council finds encouraging news on US public opinion.

– NYT finds that GOP members who voted against certifying Biden’s election tend to come from districts with sharply decreasing white populations compared with other GOP members.

– NYT has explainer on speech and debate clause.

– WSJ sees deep split between US and Saudi Arabia.

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