Heading for Baghdad: the practical
I am getting ready for a trip to Baghdad next week and thought I might offer some insight into what that means.
There are the practical arrangements. Booking the flights is deceptively straightforward: the travel agent gets you to Amman, Beirut, Istanbul or Kuwait overnight. From Kuwait I go on a Gryphon charter into the military side of the Baghdad airport (Sather) the same evening, provided the weather cooperates. Sandstorms, not rainstorms, are the main cause of delay. But you can only do that if you have a “CAC” (common access card) provided by the Defense Department to government employees and contractors. Otherwise it is Royal Jordanian from Amman (or something similar from Beirut or Istanbul) the next morning into the civilian side of the airport.
Now the unusual part starts. The airport is only a few miles from the so-called Green Zone in the center of Baghdad, but Westerners are generally still traversing those miles with body armor and a personal security detail (PSD, as in guards or shooters). That costs somewhere between $850 and $2000. We used to do it in low-profile, armored cars (they looked like jalopies but were properly “up” armored, that is retrofitted). But the Iraqi authorities now require all PSDs to display a plaque on the front of the car, which scuttles the low-profile idea. I long for the day I’ll feel comfortable arriving on the civilian side and hailing a cab to downtown Baghdad. I hope it is not far off.
Once inside the checkpoints that more or less define the Green Zone, things are usually more relaxed. Most of the non-embassy people move around without PSDs, but cautiously and alertly. What difference would it make? Not much: when something happens, it usually happens very fast. My one close call in more or less a dozen trips into Iraq was a rocket that fell within a hundred yards. It was over before I knew it had happened (in fact, you hear the blast before the whistle of the rocket moving through the air, since it is moving faster than the speed of sound).
The Green Zone is many things, but not green. Mostly it is gray T-walls and fine beige dust, which hide just about everything these days from plain sight. I’ve got a pretty good sense of direction, but I get lost all the time because it all looks so much the same. In any event, I’m never alone–not smart to move around alone–so it doesn’t usually matter.
Behind the T-walls, there are sometimes very nice compounds, especially in the so-called “Lakes” or “Little Venice” district, where many of the Iraqi bigwig politicians live. US Institute of Peace had its first office there, in a former Republican Guard officer’s residence–check it out:
There is now some new construction–last time I was there (in June) the prime minister’s office had largely finished what people were saying was a guest house (more like a guest high rise). The American Embassy is of course new, but it looks more like a prison from the outside, and like an almost comically sterile American town inside.
But whatever I say today could now be wrong, since one of the lessons of my trips to Baghdad is that everything changes: where the T-walls are, who lives where, the procedures at the checkpoints, which ID will get you through quickly. For each and every appointment, I’ve got to make sure I know precisely where to go (which isn’t easy in a place with no street names or numbers) and what to say at each of the checkpoints. And there are many checkpoints at which a common language is hard to find: the twenty something Georgians who used to guard the UN compound not only didn’t speak Russian but also didn’t know they were guarding the UN. Go figure.
Checkpoints are in fact one of the real danger zones, though of course they are there for protection. But not protection for YOU. The guards are often inexperienced or nervous, sometimes mean and rarely well trained or informed. It wasn’t much better when the Americans were doing it, though the procedures were a bit more rigorous and standardized. They still are at the entrances to U.S. military facilities–which are guarded mainly by Ugandans working for security companies, not soldiers. The name of the game at checkpoints is to get through them quickly (suicide bombers sometimes strike checkpoints) without appearing to be rushing and without being brusque or impolite, which is a sure way to get slowed down.
Where to stay? I’ll be staying with one of the security companies, a number of which provide food, accommodations and internet access since there is no hotel in the Green Zone and last time I looked no real restaurants either, though there are a few places where you can get a quick bite to eat. The US military and diplomats have their own DFACs (dining facilities), where you eat only if you have a CAC card, or know someone who does. You’ve got to watch your intake at those–the nutritionists are trying to keep young guys who burn 5000 calories a day in good form. A couple of DFAC meals can put on more than a few pounds. I generally try to skip one meal a day, but if the Iraqis want to feed you you’d best be ready to eat.
Tomorrow: psychological preparations.
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Introduction: getting to community policing in Afghanistan
The issue of how to train police in a place like Afghanistan is fraught: should we be equipping and training them for a counter-insurgency fight, or encouraging them to establish strong relationships with a community they are expected to serve and protect?
David Bayley and Robert Perito argue in The Police In War that community policing is precisely what is needed during counter-insurgency operations, but implementing programs to improve police/community relations in a place like Afghanistan is not an easy sell, as US Army Captain A. Heather Coyne (no pun intended), with the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan, explains in this initial “from the field” account (click here for her text). We have met the enemy, she suggests, and they are us: our concepts, processes and programs are serious obstacles, which in this case have been happily surmounted.
Others with field perspective: please contact me (daniel@peacefare.net) if you would like to publish here.
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Iran’s hyperactive president
President Ahmedinejad may have fired a lot of advisors, but someone is working overtime in Tehran. Today there is news of Iran’s invitation to Russia, China, the European Union and others in the Arab and developing world to tour its nuclear sites, before the late January meeting with the P5+1 in Turkey.
There is no real, substantive significance in a visit by non-technicians to a nuclear facility. Even a well-trained and equipped physicist can be led around by the nose and shown geegaws of all sorts that may or may not have the significance attributed to them by the tour guide. And of course the Iranians will show their visitors whatever they want, and not show them whatever they don’t want.
But you’ve got to admire the pace and daring. Here is Ahmedinejad seemingly locked in a power struggle with the Supreme Leader (what about that appellation does he not get?), firing the foreign minister and a baker’s dozen or more advisers, removing oil product price subsidies, executing supposed miscreants and still able to stage a show visit to Iranian nuclear facilities for gullible foreigners. Can he get away with all this in an Iran that is resistant to newcomers and change? Or is comeuppance around the next corner? Are we seeing the emergence of a much stronger president, or his last hurrah?
Before answering, let’s remind ourselves that Ahmedinejad is a millenarian who believes the twelfth imam is not far (and probably regards himself as a deputy empowered to help make his return possible). No need to watch all of this, the millenarian vision gets really clear about 5:15:
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Healthier and wealthier, maybe not wiser
This may seem off the topic of war and peace to some, but it really isn’t. It demonstrates phenomenal progress, and the Swedish optimist who presents it does a fine job.
The question is whether we are wise enough to keep it up. Or will we suffer another one of those big dips associated with war?
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Ready or not, here comes independent South Sudan
Michael Abramowitz this morning in the Washington Post suggests that despite ample warning and extensive preparations South Sudan’s independence may not be an entirely peaceful process, especially in the six months following next Sunday’s referendum. Abyei is a possible locus of problems: there is still no agreement on holding the separate referendum there provided for in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
Inspired by Michael’s piece, I spent a bit of time today trying to get up to date on Sudan. Making Sense of Sudan checked out in October. Sudan Peace Watch is still on vacation, and the much ballyhooed Satellite Sentinel Project seems to be not much more active, despite George Clooney. The UN Mission in Sudan is only marginally more up to date. The Sudan Times is lacking on-the-ground perspectives. Even the usually anticipatory Economist has not seen fit to look forward to the referendum and the problems that may ensue.
Of course we can hope that this lack of attention foreshadows a peaceful and uncomplicated process. But hope is not a policy, much as it substitutes for one when political events follow so quickly on Christmas and New Year’s. Expectations for quick and positive change in Southern Sudan are high, judging from the few interviews I’ve seen broadcast here (hats off to the PBS Newhour and Bob Loftis, who heads the State Department’s Reconstruction and Stabilization Office–PBS coverage of his listening tour was brief but informative). Can these expectations be met, even in part? Are preparations for the referendum adequate? Will the referendum be orderly? How are the talks going on post-referendum, pre-independence issues?
I would very much like to hear from those on the ground in Southern Sudan, internationals or Sudanese. Post comments here, or send to daniel@peacefare.net Or publish elsewhere and let me know where to find the material.
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The end is nigh…
Not really, but 2010 is coming to a close. Never easy to look ahead a year, but let me give it a try. It’ll make for a nice mea culpa post a year from now. And if I cherry pick a bit maybe I’ll be able to claim clairvoyance!
- Iran: the biggest headache of the year to come. If its nuclear program is not slowed or stopped, things are going to get tense. Both Israel and the U.S. have preferred sanctions, covert action and diplomatic pressure to military action. If no agreement is reached on enrichment, that might change by the end of 2011. No Green Revolution, the clerics hang on, using the Revolutionary Guards to defend the revolution (duh).
- Pakistan: it isn’t getting better and it could well get worse. The security forces don’t like the way the civilians aren’t handling things, and the civilians are in perpetual crisis. Look for increased internal tension, but no Army takeover, and some success in American efforts to get more action against AQ and the Taliban inside Pakistan. Judging from a report in the New York Times, we may not always be pleased with the methods the Pakistanis use.
- North Korea: no migraine, but pesky nonetheless, and South Korea is a lot less quiescent than it used to be. Pretty good odds on some sort of military action during the year, but the South and the Americans will try to avoid the nightmare of a devastating artillery barrage against Seoul.
- Afghanistan: sure there will be military progress, enough to allow at least a minimal withdrawal from a handful of provinces by July. But it is hard to see how Karzai becomes much more legitimate or effective. There is a lot of heavy lifting to do before provincial government is improved, but by the end of the year we might see some serious progress in that direction, again in a handful of provinces.
- Iraq: no one expects much good of this government, which is large, unwieldy and fragmented. But just for this reason, I expect Maliki to get away with continuing to govern more or less on his own, relying on different parts of his awkward coalition on different issues. The big unknown: can Baghdad settle, or finesse, the disputes over territory with Erbil (Kurdistan)?
- Palestine/Israel (no meaning in the order–I try to alternate): Palestine gets more recognitions, Israel builds more settlements, the Americans offer a detailed settlement, both sides resist but agree to go to high level talks where the Americans try to impose. That fails and Israel continues in the direction of establishing a one-state solution with Arabs as second class citizens. My secular Zionist ancestors turn in their graves.
- Egypt: trouble. Succession plans founder as the legitimacy of the parliament is challenged in the streets and courts. Mubarak hangs on, but the uncertainties grow.
- Haiti: Not clear whether the presidential runoff will be held January 16, but things are going to improve, at least until next summer’s hurricanes. Just for that reason there will be more instability as Haitians begin to tussle over the improvements.
- Al Qaeda: the franchise model is working well, so no need to recentralize. They will keep on trying for a score in the U.S. and will likely succeed at some, I hope non-spectacular, level.
- Yemen/Somalia: Yemen is on the brink and will likely go over it, if not in 2011 soon thereafter. Somalia will start back from hell, with increasing stability in some regions and continuing conflict in others.
- Sudan: the independence referendum passes. Khartoum and Juba reach enough of an agreement on outstanding issues to allow implementation in July, but border problems (including Abyei) and South/South violence grow into a real threat. Darfur deteriorates as the rebels emulate the South and Khartoum takes its frustrations out on the poor souls.
- Lebanon: the Special Tribunal finally delivers its indictments. Everyone yawns and stretches, having agreed to ignore them.
- Syria: Damascus finally realizes that it is time to reach an agreement with Israel. The Israelis decide to go ahead with it, thus relieving pressure to stop settlements and deal seriously with the Palestinians.
- Ivory Coast: the French finally find the first class tickets for Gbagbo and his entourage, who go to some place that does not recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (no, not the U.S.!).
- Zimbabwe: Mugabe is pressing for quick adoption of his new constitution and elections in 2011, catching the opposition off balance. If he succeeds, the place continues to go to hell in a handbasket. If he fails, it will still be some time before it heads in the other direction.
- Balkans: Bosnians still stuck on constitutional reform, but Kosovo gets a visa waiver from the EU despite ongoing investigations of organ trafficking.
If the year turns out this way, it won’t be disastrous, just a bumpy downhill slide. Hard to see it getting much better than that, but I could have made it much worse:
- Iran: weaponizes and deploys nukes.
- Pakistan: finally admits it can’t find two of its weapons, which have likely fallen into AQ hands.
- North Korea: goes bananas in response to some provocation, launches artillery barrage on Seoul.
- Afghanistan: spring Taliban offensive sweeps away Coalition-installed local institutions; Kandahar falls.
- Iraq: Kurds and Arabs fight, without a clear outcome.
- Israel/Palestine: Israel attacks Hizbollah in Lebanon, third intifada begins with Hamas suicide bombings inside Israel.
- Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood challenges Mubarak in the streets, prevents orderly succession process.
- Haiti: hurricanes, food riots, political strife, reconstruction blocked.
- Al Qaeda: big hit inside the U.S., thousands die.
- Yemen/Somalia: both go south, with AQ establishing itself firmly on both sides of the Bab al Mandab.
- Sudan: post-referendum negotiations fail, fighting on North/South border, chaos in Southern Sudan.
- Lebanon: Hizbollah reacts with violence to the Special Tribunal indictments, taking over large parts of Lebanon. Hizbollah/Israel war wrecks havoc.
- Syria: succeeds in surreptitiously building nuclear facilities on commission from Iran, Israeli effort to destroy them fails.
- Ivory Coast: Gbagbo tries to hold on to office, imitating Mugabe’s successful effort. Ouattara plays ball and accepts the prime ministry, pressured by internationals who don’t want to do what is necessary to airlift Gbagbo out of there. A real opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of international solidarity is squandered.
- Zimbabwe: Mugabe succeeds, Tsvangirai is out, state in virtual collapse.
- Balkans: the EU unwisely begins implementing the acquis communitaire in Republika Srpska due to delays in formation of a national Bosnian government, investigations in Kosovo drag on and make progress towards the visa waiver and other EU goodies impossible.
There are of course other places where we might see bad things happen: Venezuela, Burma, Nigeria, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia, Russia–but I’ll leave the imagining to you.
Happy New Year!
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