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Bosnia’s fate

Milan Marinkovic writes from Nis:

What is to be done about Bosnia?  The divided country seems unlikely to survive without life support from the international community.

The half of Bosnia’s territory called Republika Srpska (RS) is dominated by ethnic Serbs. An overwhelming majority of them do not regard Bosnia as their homeland; rather, they are dreaming of secession. The number of non-Serbs in RS is too small to affect this prevailing political trend.

The other half, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), is shared between Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and Croats. A still undetermined percentage of the latter are hoping for the creation of their own separate entity along the lines of Republika Srpska.

Bosniaks are the only among Bosnia’s so-called “constituent peoples” who are united in thinking of Bosnia as their beloved country. Unlike Serbs and Croats, Bosniaks do not have a reserve motherland. But given that Bosniaks are thought to account for less than a half of the overall population, they constitute only a relative, not the absolute majority.

Another reason why Bosniaks appear unlikely to decide the future of Bosnia on their own is that they are deeply divided among themselves on how the country’s political system should be organized. Although Bosnian Muslims are traditionally considered moderate and secular, the war and its consequences have radicalized some of them.

Bosniak nationalist political parties are increasingly flirting with Islamic clericalism, much to the liking of Bosnia’s Islamic community.  Its leader, Reis Effendi Mustafa Cerić, recently gave an interview to the Radio Free Europe complaining that Bosniaks are the only people in the region who do not have their exclusive nation-state.

That’s obviously true, but there is no feasible way to make Bosnia the nation-state of Bosniaks except by allowing Republika Srpska to secede.  Even if Bosniak political and religious leaders might accept  secession of RS, most ordinary Bosniaks relentlessly oppose any possibilty of changing Bosnia’s existing national border.

Major EU powers also would not like to see Bosnia divided into two independent states. The secession of Republika Srpska would make an already problematic Serbia all the more difficult to manage, while at the same time increasing the likelihood that the rest of Bosnia turns into an Islamic state.

The fates of Bosnia and Serbia are in many ways interconnected. Albeit rhetorically aggressive, President of RS Milorad Dodik is wise enough not to make any hasty move that could undermine his position. Dodik will therefore refrain from either declaring or holding a referendum on independence until he receives a green light from Belgrade.

While the potential unification with RS would undoubtedly help Serbia materialize an old dream of growing into the dominant power in the region, Belgrade is aware that it cannot afford to be deprived of continual financial support from the EU without which its economy would become virtually unsustainable. Serbia is looking to use both RS and (northern) Kosovo as trump cards to get as many concessions from Brussels as possible on the path toward EU membership. So long as the West can keep Serbia part of the European integration process, the threat of secession by RS is going to remain just a threat.

Saving Bosnia from dissolution is the easier part of the job. Helping the country overcome its internal malaise is a much tougher challenge. While the EU may be able to maintain the current status quo in Bosnia for some time, the Europeans do not seem capable of improving the situation. A more serious engagement on the part of Washington would be more than welcome, but is unlikely to take place in the foreseeable future, due to priorities elsewhere.

Turkey could play a significant role in Bosnia. As a rising economic power seeking to expand its influence in the Balkans through strategic investment and close cooperation with local governments, Turkey has an interest in contributing to stabilization of the region. Turkey especially wants to see progress in Bosnia, with which it has strong historical, cultural and religious ties.

A problem for Ankara is that many South Slavs – particularly those of Christian denominations – are suspicious of Turkey’s action in the Balkans because of its imperial Ottoman past. The Turks need to convince Christian Slavs that their intentions today are different. If they succeed, it would not immediately solve the Bosnian puzzle, but would probably move it closer to a solution.

The worst thing to happen is that Serbia at some point reverts to retrograde nationalism and decides to ultimately withdraw from all European projects. Then it would be just a matter of time before Dodik – or whoever is in charge of RS at the time – is given the green light to declare independence.

The question remains whether Sandjak, a Bosniak/Muslim-dominated sub-region in southwestern Serbia, constitutes a trump card that could be used to counter a potential attempt by Banja Luka and Belgrade to divide Bosnia.  The answer is:  not likely.

Sandjak is incomparable to Republika Srpska for a variety of reasons. RS occupies a far larger territory than Sandjak – both in terms of total size and relative to Bosnia’s and Serbia’s respective areas. Serbs account for almost ninety percent of Republika Srpska’s population and about one-third of Bosnia’s; Bosniaks, though the majority ethnic group in Sandjak, make up only between two and three percent of Serbia’s overall population.

Unlike a great majority of the Serbs in RS, most Bosniaks from Sandjak are loyal citizens of their country – Serbia. Bosniaks and Serbs in Sandjak in most cases have good and mutual relations, completely different from those between Bosniaks and Serbs in Bosnia – and especially different from those between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo.

Some of the Bosniaks from Sandjak feel dissatisfied due to Belgrade’s institutional discrimination against them, but their displeasure is directed at Serbian authorities rather than their Serb neighbors. Even among the young, who are more prone to extreme ideologies and behaviors, interethnic incidents are minor and infrequent.

While some political tensions do exist in Sandjak, they are low intensity and not ethnically motivated. Serbian intelligence services and security forces maintain a relatively strong presence, primarily because of Sandjak’s geographic location and terrain, which have made the area a traditional smuggling route. Another reason for the increased security measures is that the Wahhabist movement has its local cell in Sandjak.

But most importantly, unlike Republika Srpska, which shares by far the longest section of its eastern border with Serbia, Sandjak is not contiguous with Bosnia’s Muslim-dominated entity, from which it is separated,  ironically, by Republika Srpska.

The bottom line:  Sandjak could at best serve to put additional pressure on Serbia if everything else proved ineffective, but probably nothing more than that.  That is the trouble with frozen conflicts such as the one in Bosnia. When you leave them in limbo for too long, new carrots and sticks are less and less likely to work.

Careful what you wish for

My friend in Niš, Milan Marinković, has been watching north Kosovo from a perch not far away.  He writes:

Last summer Serbian Interior minister Ivica Dačić proposed that the problem of Kosovo should be solved by dividing its territory between Serbia and Albania. Dačić argued that there was no point in forcing Serbs and Albanians to live together when history had shown they could not coexist peacefully.

Minister Dačić should have been careful what he wished for.  A few days ago, political representatives of Albanians from a region in southern Serbia adjacent to Kosovo adopted a declaration in which they expressed dissatisfaction with the way Serbian authorities treated the ethnic Albanians and demanded the incorporation of the region into Kosovo. The idea of territorial division is thus threatening to turn into one of a territorial swap.

Such ideas are not only unacceptable from the perspective of European integration that both Belgrade and Priština aspire to. They also put at risk both Serbs and Albanians in areas where they are in the minority.  In Kosovo, for example, the Albanians are the majority south of the Ibar, but the minority in the north; the opposite is true for the Serbs.  Any ethnic-based attempt at either territorial division or swap is certain to instill fear into members of the local ethnic minorities, increasing the risk of mass migrations reminiscent of those in 1990s.

There is also a security concern. The Serb-dominated area in northern Kosovo is a no-man’s land ideal for smuggling and other illegal activities. Priština virtually wields no authority there, while Belgrade has only a limited impact. The local Serb politicians appear to be more loyal to nationalist opposition parties than to the Serbian government, as demonstrated by the referendum they held last month despite Belgrade’s strong disapproval.

The Ahtisaari plan, which provides for a wide degree of municipal autonomy for Serbs in Kosovo, is increasingly proving to be a feasible solution for the Serbs from the enclaves. Nevertheless, those in the north refuse to give it even a thought, and Belgrade also continues to claim that the plan is unacceptable, even if it were supplemented to allow a special status for the northern Serbs.

Still, some positive signs are emerging. Belgrade and Priština finally reached the agreement on conditions under which Kosovo can be represented at regional conferences. This progress in the negotiations contributed decisively to EU candidate status for Serbia. More importantly, it provides hope that, with assistance of the international community, the two sides might find common ground on the issue of the north sooner than many would expect.

The Serbian elections in May will pose a critical test for Belgrade. Should Serbia abstain from holding the elections on the territory of Kosovo, it will be a clear indication of the country’s willingness to substantially change its policy toward the former province. In that event, the northern Kosovo Serbs would find themselves under unprecedented pressure to soften their position and become part of the solution rather than part of the problem.

At the moment, all options remain open. In just a few months Serbia will get a new government. A new government at the beginning of its mandate is usually in a more comfortable position to take bold steps on sensitive issues than an outgoing one. If these bold steps happen to be the right steps, Serbia could be rewarded with a date for accession talks as early as in December.

A right step, to begin with, could be to explain to the Serbs from northern Kosovo that anything can be possible if you want to make it possible. When Mr. Dačić invoked historical experience to defend the assertion that they could not live together with Albanians, he apparently forgot the example of Germans and French. The formerly fiercest enemies jointly laid the foundation for what eventually would become the European Union.

Not only Serbia and Kosovo but all countries in the region share the same underlying problem which most of their troubles stem from. That problem is called – the economy.  If they are to recover economically, they will have to cooperate closely rather than confront one another.  The sooner we grasp this simple fact, the better.