Tag: Balkans
Stevenson’s army, January 9
– Fred Kaplan says SecDef Austin should go. [I’m more concerned to know his medical condition. Presidents and certainly officials in the military chain of command for combat operations should not be afforded the same privacy regarding health as ordinary citizens.]
– Politico says Netanyahu is losing control.
– WSJ tells how Macron bungled French relations in Africa.
– NBC tells what AMLO wants from the US
– Intercept says CNN vets Mideast stories with Jerusalem bureau.
– SAIS prof Ed Joseph discusses Serbia’s election.
– Politico’s China Watcher backgrounds Taiwan’s coming elections
War on the rocks has good think pieces — on Iraq lessons for Gaza and on Army special operations forces.
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My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Vucic got what he wanted and then some
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s Progressive Party won an absolute majority in national parliamentary elections, with double the vote of the main opposition coalition yesterday. His party also won a plurality in the Belgrade city council. The election was “free” in the sense that all registered citizens could vote, but far from “fair.” The government exploited media control, pressure on voters, abuse of institutions and public functions as well as forged signatures and phantom voters. Elections in Serbia are stolen before election day. Elected autocrats are all the rage these days.
Stronger and more recalcitrant
The new parliament replaces one in which Vučić’s party had only a plurality. He gained that in an election that much of the opposition boycotted. The election thus strengthens his hold on power, which is going eleven years. If it sticks together, the one-quarter of the parliament that the main opposition coalition, Serbia Against Violence, gained will give it a platform for its anti-violence, anti-corruption, anti-inflation messages. But it will not be able to block legislation or exert substantial influence on foreign and defense policy, which is the prerogative of the president.
We can expect ontinuation of Serbia’s current strong lean towards befriending fellow autocrats in Russia, China, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Hungary. While the Progressives ran on a nominally pro-Europe ticket, they have done little to move Serbia closer to the European Union. Instead they have successfully straddled the East/West divide. Vučić pursues a “non-aligned” hedging policy that flirts with both in order to extract valuable concessions from Moscow, Beijing, Brussels, and Washington.
Some might hope Vučić would use his victory to settle Serbia’s conflict with Kosovo and move definitively in the Western direction. That isn’t going to happen. He has locked himself into intransigient opposition. He refuses even to acknowledge Kosovo’s de facto independence. This would be easy to do. He could turn Milan Radoicic, who led a failed terrorist rebellion in northern Kosovo September 24, over to the Pristina authorities. Serbia recognized the validity of their judiciary in the 2013 Brussels agreement that Vučić has been trying to get Pristina to respect. But he won’t do that. Or anything else to make amends for sponsoring a well-equipped armed rebellion intended to lead on to a Serbian military invasion.
Europe and the US will do nothing
The US, UK, and EU could in the aftermath of this flawed election their pressure on Vučić. They say they want Serbia solve its problems with Kosovo, adhere to Ukraine sanctions against Russia, and speed reforms required for EU accession. But the five EU member states that don’t recognize Kosovo will prevent any push on Kosovo issues. Hungary will block any pressure on Russia questions. The EU as a whole is much more concerned with Ukraine and will let Serbia slide.
The Americans are still claiming that they’ve convinced Serbia to embrace the West. This is laughable but no one in Washington these days wants to tell the would-be emperors they have no clothes. They prefer to pretend that agreements Serbia has renounced in writing are legally binding. “They are being written into the requirements for accession” State Department officials like to explain. That is fine with Belgrade, which knows full well accession is a distant horizon, at best.
I might have some hope for the UK, which isn’t committed to the American pipedreams and isn’t constrained any longer by the EU. But London hasn’t been vocal in denouncing Serbia’s current behavior. It is likely shy of offending Brussels and Washington and anxious to protect its own equities in Belgrade.
What’s the then some?
Vučić’s party wasn’t the only one to do well in yesterday’s elections. Some ultra-nationalists and outright pro-Russian parties did too. That gives Vučić an “Après moi, le déluge” argument. If you are not nice to me, look what might come next!
Some in Kosovo might hope that now at least Pristina can be relieved of the “consequences” the EU mistakenly levied in response to its deployment of mayors to municipal buildings and police to northern Kosovo, where they blocked an armed rebellion. We’ll have to wait and see, but I doubt Pristina will get satisfaction. The EU has developed a habit of favoring Serbia that is going to be hard to break. The US is not far behind.
President Vučić has won his cake. Now he’ll eat it. That’s not good news.
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A cold shoulder might get more results
This is one of those moments in the Balkans when what is not said is more important than what is said. The Americans and Europeans have so far failed to publish the results of their announced investigations of the September 24 failed Serb uprising in northern Kosovo. On that occasion, Serbia sent a well-armed group to ambush the Kosovo police, killing one officer. The Serbs also tried to draw the police into a firefight at a monastery compound. The perpetrators intended this incident to provide an excuse for Serbian military intervention. Presumbly the goal was to seize the four Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo.
No doubt
There is really no doubt about what happened and why. The only real question is who authorized this terrorist plot. It was either Serbian President Vučić or not. I have no evidence on that issue. But we know that Vučić usually makes all the really important decisions in Belgrade. If he did not make this one, that is only a marginally better reflection on his rule than if he did.
Ever since the failed plot, Vučić has cozied up even more than usual to anti-democratic forces in the region and beyond. His besties lately have included Bosnian secessionist Dodik, Hungarian would-be autocrat Orban, illegitimate Belarusian chief of state Lukashenko, Azerbaijani dictator Aliyev, as well as Russian and Chinese autocrats Putin and Xi. Here is Vučić siding with Putin in Ukraine.
He intends to follow Aliyev’s lead in taking Nagorno-Karabakh back by force. When geopolitical circumstances permit, he will do likewise with Kosovo.
Vučić did belatedly fire his security and information agency chief Vulin. But he did it in response to US sanctions, not the September 24 events. Milan Radojičić, a close political ally of Vučić as well as Kosovo political and criminal kingpin, has taken responsibility for the plot. The authorities arrested but quickly freed him. The courts will take their time getting around to a trial.
Nor should Serbia try him, since his September 24 crimes were committed in Kosovo. He should be handed over to the Pristina authorities.
So why the silence?
Some diplomats will attribute the silence to preoccupation in Washington and Brussels with the Gaza war. That certainly merits priority and slows high-level decisions on other issues. But the State Department and the EU foreign policy apparatus are both geared to deal with problems worldwide, not just today’s top issues.
More likely they have hesitated because of the Serbian parliamentary elections this Sunday, which won’t bring big surprises. President Vučić would not have called an early poll if he thought he would lose it. There is ample evidence he is using the government’s media dominance, state institutions, patronage, and largesse to ensure a friendly outcome. But no one in Washington or Brussels at this point should want to help him.
The EU has another handicap. It requires consensus for any serious reaction. Most of its 27 members might be ready to do something. But Hungary and perhaps now Slovakia will be prepared to block consensus on sanctions on Serbia.
I might also hope that the State Department is re-evaluating its policy in the Balkans and needs a bit more time to get it right. It has officials devoted to the notion that he has succeeded in getting Serbia to embrace the West. It is sometimes easier at State to change personnel than minds, but it takes time.
Here are three nudges
Maybe Brussels and Washington need a nudge in the right direction. They no doubt have this Kosovo government preliminary report on the September 24 plot. But to my knowledge no one has published it outside Kosovo.
I offered a summary more than a month ago. It is high time that someone make it widely available. Along with the investigation the EU has promised. Read please, and tell me whether Serbia has embraced the West.
Or try this statement from Serbia’s Prime Minister reneging on commitments the US and EU say are legally binding:
Meanwhile, the EU has levied “consequences” on Kosovo that are long past their sell by date. Some Europeans are anxious to say so:
Note that it is the same police who foiled the September 24 plot that the US and EU have wanted withdrawn from northern Kosovo. That would have been a big mistake.
Hedging only works if we play the game
Serbia’s foreign policy relies on hedging between East and West, in the tradition of the non-aligned movement founded in Belgrade in 1961. This makes sense for Serbia, which thereby extracts value from both directions. The game is to lean hard one way and see how much the other side will ante up for you. Vučić has been leaning hard towards the East and collecting bounty from the West. Don’t take it only from me–read what people in Moscow are saying.
But if the West refuses to play the game, the hedging fails, and Serbia lands in the arms of Putin and Xi. That is no great loss to the West, which hasn’t gained much for all the goodies it has rained on Belgrade. Let’s assume though that Vučić is sincerely committed to hedging. A cold shoulder would then make him do a bit more to please the West. Wouldn’t that be nice?
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The good, the bad and the unwritten
The EU-proposed draft of the statute for the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities in Kosovo is now widely available. Is it good, or is it bad? The answer of course is complicated and depends not only on what is in the proposed text but also what is not in it. So here is my preliminary assessment:
The good
- The text calls Kosovo the “Republic of Kosovo,” which in my view is the right appellation (in English). I suspect this is a deal-breaker for Serbia, but we’ll have to wait and see.
- It provides for prior Kosovo Constitutional Court review, including of any amendments to the statute, which is vital.
- The procedures for establishment strike me as reasonable and include a role for the Kosovo government’s Ministry of Local Government Administration.
- Joining the Association is voluntary for the Serb-majority municipalities. Non-Serb communities are to be represented, albeit in some undefined way.
- The EU will provide oversight for 5 years, renewable for another 5.
The not so good
- The statute says the purpose is to enable Serbs in Kosovo to take advantage of already existing rights without adding executive competencies beyond those already existing in the municipalities. That isn’t good, as it admits the possibility of executive competences in areas of already existing municipal responsibility.
- It allows the Serbian government to provide financial support without requiring that it flow through the Kosovo government, which has only auditing powers. It also provides for duty and tax-free imports for the Association, which is a giant loophole.
- The Association can adopt regulations, decisions, declarations, rules of procedure and instructions. This provision clearly anticipates executive powers.
- The Serbian government can provide through the Association health and educational services. This essentially makes permanent the current arrangement, which infringes on Kosovo sovereignty. I don’t see a clear provision for Republic oversight of the curriculum offered in the Serbia-provided educational institutions.
- The Serb-majority municipalities get carte blanche in areas of municipal responsibility, including culture, economic development, urban and rural planning, and research and development. I wonder if the Association decided cars should drive on the left whether that might be covered.
What is not said
- There is no quid pro quo. The statute itself does not require Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo or even refer back to the 2013 agreement on which it is based, which had clear provisions implying Kosovo’s sovereignty and recognizing the validity of Kosovo’s constitution on its entire territory. These issues should be fixed before any formal adoption of the statute.
- There are a lot of provisions in the statute that Serbia would not countenance for the Albanian-majority municipalities in Serbia. Reciprocity is among the first rules of diplomacy. Anything Serbia wouldn’t agree to, Kosovo should not agree to unless it serves the Republic’s interest.
- There is no constraint on agenda items the Assembly could discuss. Would it be permissible for it to discuss rejecting the Kosovo judicial system, as the Assembly in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska has done, or declaring independence? Could it issue a regulation prohibiting display of Albanian cultural artefacts within the municipalities of the Association?
- There is no provision requiring that public meetings of the Association and its executive Board, or even public announcement of their decisions.
- The EU and US no doubt intend to cram this proposal down Albin Kurti’s throat. That would be a mistake.
I’m sure many of these points are debatable and that I haven’t got everything right. There may well be other points needing clarification. I’ll be glad to see wide discussion of this draft.
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До свидания [Dasvidaniya] Vulin!
Iva Gajić of Radio Free Europe asked some questions about the resignation of Serbian Security Information Agency head Aleksandar Vulin. He was put on the US sanctions list in July. I answered:
Q: What do you think, why did Vulin resign?
A: He resigned under pressure from the Europeans and Americans. But the fact that it took 3 months rather than 3 days tells you that there was real resistance from President Vucic, who shares Vulin’s view of the world and Serbia’s ambition for political control of Serb populations in neighboring countries.
No shift in Serbian policy
Q: He said that the USA and the EU asked for his resignation in order not to impose sanctions on Serbia. How do you comment on his statement about sanctions against Serbia?
A: I think he is telling the truth. His resignation does not signal a shift in Serbian policy away from support for Russia but rather a defensive effort to avoid more sanctions.
Q: What new demands, after Vulin’s resignation, could be placed on Serbia?
A: Serbia attempted an insurrection in Kosovo on September 24 that was intended to create conditions for a Serbian military intervention. In my view, it should take public responsibility for this plot, apologize for it, and pledge that it will never happen in the future. It should also turn the perpetrators over to the Kosovo authorities for prosecution.
Serbia has also rejected the February and March agreements on normalization with Kosovo. Washington and Brussels should be requiring President Vucic to sign them, but of course he won’t do that before the December 17 election (and probably not afterwards either).
Vulin is not the only problem
Q: Do you think Serbia would fulfill them now, after Vulin’s resignation?
A: No. Vulin is not the only problem in Serbia or in its intelligence services. And President Vucic has shown no sign of regretting the September 24 plot.
The simple fact is that Serbia has embraced not the West but the East. Moscow and Beijing support Belgrade’s refusal to normalize with Kosovo and also the turn towards autocracy inside Serbia. Serbia is lost to the West for now.
Q: How much damage was done by putting him in charge of the Security Information Agency?
A: I don’t think we should assign to him personally the damage done. My understanding is that the Agency is deeply penetrated by the Russians. He allowed and cultivated the Moscow connection, but so too did others in the Agency who are still there.
Washington will be happy, but Russia has other assets
Q: In your opinion, how will Vulin’s resignation be received in Washington, and how in Moscow?
A: Washington will welcome the resignation. Moscow will be unhappy. But the Russians and Americans both know that Vulin was not the only Russian proxy in the Agency.
Q: Did Vulin’s resignation eliminate the possible Russian influence on the secret service in Serbia?
A: No, obviously not.
I should have added this:
Of course Vulin will remain a figure in Serbian politics and do his best to steer Belgrade in Moscow’s direction. I expect him to continue to be successful.
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A failed terrorist provocation
A month ago, the Kosovo police foiled an attempted insurrection near a Serb Orthodox monastery Banjska, in the northern part of the country. A 51-page preliminary investigative report by the Republic of Kosovo is now circulating in the US government. Here is my plagiaristic summary. The original is better.
Conclusions first
- A paramilitary group of about 80 cadres recruited, trained and specifically designated for the purpose carried out the attack, with heavy arms Serbia provided.
- Belgrade’s goal was to instigate a Kosovo police response to firing from the Banjska monastery that could be used to justify a Serbian military intervention, allegedly to save endangered Serb citizens of Kosovo and pilgrims from Serbia.
- The plan entailed challenging, threatening, and potentially killing members of KFOR as well as Kosovo police, who lost one officer to a land mine.
- The chain of command included the Serbian state, whose President and security structures are culpable legally and morally.
- Dozens of perpetrators who escaped to Serbia are now protected from justice by Belgrade.
- There is a risk of repetition , as evidenced by the continued offensive posture of Serbian security forces surrounding Kosovo as well as the intense pro-invasion propaganda campaign still ongoing inside Serbia.
A few details of the investigation
The Serbian Armed Forces trained the paramilitary perpetrators over a period of two years at army and Interior Ministry bases. US-donated Humvees were used in the training. The Kosovo authorities have captured detailed plans based on military-supplied maps for the paramilitaries to open routes into Kosovo for weapons and supplies from Serbia. Serbian special forces and drones entered into Kosovo in the leadup to the insurrection, and medical ambulances transported weapons into the country.
The operation was led by Milan Radoicic, then deputy leader of the Belgrade-sponsored political party in Kosovo, a close associate of Serbian security officials, and a political ally of President Vucic. The paramilitaries used vehicles disguised with KFOR labels and false license plates. The plan included attracting the Kosovo Police by blocking roads, firing on them from the Banjska monastery, and provoking an attack that would serve as a pretext for Serbian military intervention.
The paramilitaries were well-equipped with military-grade weapons almost entirely made in Serbia. This included 66 AK-47s, 9 machine guns, 6 sniper rifles, 41 anti-tank rocket launchers, 2 automatic grenade launchers, 8 anti-tank mines, and 122 hand grenades, along with the appropriate ammunition and over 350 units of explosives. Documentation that some of these weapons were definitely supplied by Serbia is available.
Serbia continues to promote violence against Kosovo
Since September 24, Serbia has continued to threaten violence against Kosovo. It has celebrated the paramilitaries involved in the foiled plot and declared a day of mourning for the three terrorists who were killed. High production value graffiti in Serbia, including in soccer stadiums, and in the four northern municipalities in Kosovo with Serb majorities, has promoted the idea that Serbian forces will soon return to Kosovo. Serbian armed forces are still on high alert.
President Vucic and media he controls uses hate speech in referring to Kosovo, its political leaders, and Albanians in general. Ambitions to create the “Serbian world,” a pale copy of Putin’s “Russian world” that includes Ukraine, are rife. Serbia has dramatically increased its military exercises with Russia. Belgrade intimidation of Serbs in northern Kosovo to prevent cooperation with Pristina continues, as do covert operations against Kosovo institutions.
It didn’t start on September 24 and it didn’t end then
There were four prior attacks in northern Kosovo since December 2022. The same units and some of the same personnel were involved, including in the attack on KFOR troops in May. None of the perpetrators have been returned to Kosovo to face charges. They are sheltered by the Serbian state and remain available to conduct future violent operations. So far, there has been no diplomatic action taken against Belgrade by either the US or EU, which will encourage Vucic to pursue future destabilization efforts in order to justify Serbian military intervention in Kosovo.
The precise Russian role in the September 24 plot is still unclear, but Russian backing for escalating Serbian efforts to challenge Western resolve in the Balkans is apparent. The Russians will not have failed to notice the lack of Western response. Moscow and Belgrade will amplify their efforts.
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