Tag: Balkans
Bosnia: heal thyself
I did this interview yesterday for Edita Gorinjac of Klix.ba, who published it today in whatever you want to call the language of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
1) What is your general opinion on recent protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were the biggest since after the war?
A: I certainly understand why citizens in Bosnia are disappointed in the services they are getting from their many governments. Protesting seems to me a healthy reaction, so long as it remains nonviolent.
2) Parallel to the protests, during which citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, mostly of BiH Federation, asked for government’s more responsible approach to solving of their issues, additional political questions arose, such as more serious approach to constitutional reforms, even territorial reorganization of the state. How realistic is it to expect such changes? And are Bosnia and Herzegovina and international community ready for this? What is, in your opinion, the best solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina? Read more
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Putin speaks
President Putin today finally addressed some of the issues Russian behavior in Ukraine has raised. I can find neither video nor transcript so far,* so I am relying on the RT account, which is ample but certainly not complete.
Putin’s main point is that Russia has the right to protect ethnic Russians in Ukraine’s east:
If we see this lawlessness starting in eastern regions, if the people ask us for help – in addition to a plea from a legitimate president, which we already have – then we reserve the right to use all the means we possess to protect those citizens. And we consider it quite legitimate.
Putin makes clear his distaste for deposed Ukrainian President Yanukovich and shows no inclination to restore him to power, but at the same time he thinks his removal was not legitimate:
I strictly object to this form [of transition of power] in Ukraine, and anywhere in the post-Soviet space. This does not help nurturing a culture of law. If someone is allowed to act this way, then everyone is allowed to. And this means chaos. That’s the worst thing that can happen to a country with an unstable economy and an unestablished political system.
So what we’ve got here is a claim to legitimacy based on protection of ethnic Russians and rejection of the overthrow of an elected president. Putin would have us believe that he is at least as justified as the United States was in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Read more
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Happy and dull
I did this hangout with RFE’s Gordana Knezevic and Dzenana Halimovic, moderated by Brian Whitmore, Wednesday and forgot to post it:
I also forgot to post this interview with Elton Trota of the Pristina-based Independent Balkans News Agency:
IBNA: How do you assess the negotiation process between Kosovo-Serbia? What are the negative and positive aspects of the talks between Prime Minister Thaci and his Serbian Counterpart, Ivica Daciq?
Serwer: I think the dialogue process has been successful in limited but important ways. I’d like to see it move faster towards what ultimately has to happen: diplomatic recognition and exchange of ambassadors. But Serbia has now accepted the territorial integrity of Kosovo and the applicability of the Kosovo constitution on that whole territory. It has also exchanged liaison officers, under a thin EU cover. Those are steps in the right direction.
IBNA: Is it possible for reconciliation to happen between Balkan nations in the near future, taking into account that it’s a demand that comes from Brussels for good neighboring relations in the region?
Serwer: Reconciliation is different from good neighborly relations. Reconciliation will take a generation, or two. Good neighborly relations are a question of political will. The governing institutions can make that happen whenever they decide to do it.
IBNA: How is Kosovo moving toward the Euro-Atlantic integration? Is this going to be a long journey for the new state?
Serwer: It will be a long journey to the EU, whose requirements are much more elaborate and demanding than NATO’s. Kosovo has the advantage of being able to build its security forces from the ground up to meet NATO requirements. It has already done that for the Kosovo Security Force that exists. It will need to continue in that direction as that is converted into an armed force. Once it has real armed forces, entry into NATO should be quick if Kosovo meets the requirements. The only political obstacle is the non-recognizers, who will need to be convinced that Kosovo in the Alliance is a much better idea than Kosovo outside the Alliance.
IBNA: How is FYR Macedonia moving toward the Euro-Atlantic integration? Will the disputes of this country with its neighboring country make the journey of this country toward EU and NATO accession any longer?
Serwer: The only real hindrance for Macedonia is the “name” dispute with Greece, which is really about Greek and Macedonian identity, not the name. Macedonia’s armed forces have served with distinction in Afghanistan and its governing structures meet NATO requirements, if I understand correctly. I would like to see Macedonia enter NATO sooner rather than later under the interim agreement as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. That won’t be possible for the EU, which is still a long way off in any event.
IBNA: Riots and protests took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the government and the current political class, is the same is expected to happen in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia?
Serwer: I’m not in the riot/protest prediction business, but neither Kosovo nor Macedonia has suffered the stagnation that Bosnia and Herzegovina has suffered for the past eight years or so. Kosovo’s agreement on the north with Belgrade removes one possible source of instability. In Macedonia, I think NATO membership would contribute a good deal to the sense that the country is moving in the right direction. The normal political process in both Kosovo and Macedonia is in much better shape than it is in Bosnia, which is handicapped with a constitution that enshrines nationalists in power and leaves little room for issue-based politics. But the citizens of Kosovo and Macedonia should watch Bosnia with interest, because it is certainly a model to avoid.
IBNA: What will be the fate of northern Kosovo?
Serwer: Northern Kosovo consists of four Serb-majority municipalities that will now govern themselves in many respects, under the overall constitutional framework of the Republic of Kosovo. Its courts and police will be integrated with the system in the rest of Kosovo, and its municipal authorities will participate in an association of Serb municipalities formed under Pristina’s aegis. With any luck, it will prosper a bit more than in the past and become a happy and dull place.
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Citizens are the place to start
My friends are in a tizzy about Bosnia. Ed Joseph wants urgent international action. So do Bodo Weber and Kurt Bassuener. All fear that Bosnia’s social unrest in recent days may degenerate into ethnic conflict. They want the United States and the European Union to step in with clear ideas for reform and strict conditionality to force their adoption.
I am a bit more cautious. I agree entirely with Bodo and Kurt that the current situation is in part the result of bankrupt and ineffective EU policies. I agree with them and Ed that a different approach is required, including stronger American diplomatic engagement and strengthening of Europe’s military presence. But I am suspicious of the notion that the right formula to untie the Bosnian knot can be devised in Washington and Brussels. We tried that at Dayton. It worked to end the war, but not to make Bosnia a functional state.
We need to hear more from the Bosnians, who are busily organizing themselves into plenums that will formulate grassroots demands for reform. Tim Judah describes what is going on: Read more
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Small states and the power of pragmatism
Kosovo Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj has kindly provided a copy of his remarks prepared for SAIS last week. They seem to me to merit publication in their entirety. I’ll of course be glad to publish the remarks of others as well on the dialogue process between Pristina and Belgrade.
Small States and the Power of Pragmatism: Kosovo’s Approach to the Dialogue with Serbia
ENVER HOXHAJ
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo
A small state like Kosovo is obliged to think how to define its role in international affairs and how to conduct its foreign affairs in a way it can advance its vital interests. For small states that have limited military, economic, and demographic resources, it is essential to adapt a smart and pragmatic foreign policy. Being smart for small states means undertaking actions that increase the likelihood for success, utilize the available resources and capacities. In this context, pragmatism means a combination of realist and practical approaches to foreign affairs with strategic reliance on idealism. Pragmatism is not about being strong or weak, but it is about taking the right decisions in right time. Pragmatism is to adapt but maintain strategic vision and policy coherence. It is about making short-term compromises for long-term triumphs. It is about getting what you want, while also addressing other parties concerns. The current dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia under the EU facilitation is a quintessential example of the pragmatic and smart approach of a small state like Kosovo. The normalization dialogue has been considered historic and a breakthrough achievement. It has been considered a success of EU foreign policy, and a merit of constructive approach of both Kosovo and Serbia.
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Pragmatic Kosovo!
I enjoyed a conversation at SAIS yesterday with two of Kosovo’s finest: Deputy Prime Minister Slobodan Petrovic and Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj. Slobodan has led Serb participation in Kosovo’s government for the past three years, holding also the portfolio for local governance. Enver, a political science professor, has participated in many of the international negotiations that Kosovo has undergone over the past twenty years.
The watchword was “pragmatic.” Both speakers are clear about their goals. Slobodan wants improvement in the lives of Serbs who live in Kosovo. Enver wants the Kosovo state to have a well-recognized place in the international community. They have worked together to achieve these goals, but both are ready to compromise along the way, so long as things keep moving in the right direction.
Enver thinks normalization of relations between Pristina and Belgrade means eventual mutual recognition and exchange of ambassadors, but for the moment Kosovo has taken what it could get: an April agreement that recognized its constitution should govern in all of Kosovo and exchange of liaison officers located in the respective capitals’ European Union missions. Belgrade won’t accept Kosovo passports, but it has accepted its identity cards. The other “technical” agreements are also steps in the right direction.
Slobodan thinks the municipal elections held for the first time under Pristina’s authority in Serb-majority northern Kosovo were far from perfect: intimidation and even assassination determined the outcome, which favored a Belgrade-sponsored Serb list. But Petrovic’s Liberals got more votes than ever before and captured what seats they could. The international community should have taken a stronger stand against irregularities and supported those who have been committed to the political process. Next time, he hopes.
In the foreign minister’s view, Kosovo faces some difficult issues in 2014. It wants to get into NATO’s Partnership for Peace but needs to overcome resistance from the Alliance’s non-recognizing members. Kosovo also needs to decide the size, composition label for its security forces. It has passed the halfway mark in gaining recognitions from members of the UN General Assembly and hopes to make it to the two-thirds mark, but it will still face a veto by Russia in the Security Council. Kosovo hosts too many international missions. The UN has been superfluous for some time; the OSCE is overstaffed and undertasked.
The EU rule of law mission is still necessary to handle sensitive cases like that of the recently arrested mayoral candidate Oliver Ivanovic, but the deputy foreign minister thought it important that the remaining cases of this sort be settled expeditiously. In his view, 2014 will be important for the fall parliamentary elections. A gentleman’s agreement to maintain reserved seats for Serbs and other minorities, which were to be phased out after two election cycles, should be respected, not abrogated.
Asked whether the Pristina/Belgrade agreement and recent election results might presage “Bosnia-ization” of Kosovo into two ethnically identified entities, both Slobodan and Enver think not. The already functioning Serb municipalities south of the Ibar will not want to give up what they’ve gained. The northern municipalities are beginning to see clearly that they will gain from operating under Pristina’s authority, as they will retain a good deal of local control as well as substantial resources. If the agreement is implemented in good faith as written and the EU remains the guarantor, the risks are minimal.
I remember a time when I could not have imagined such a conversation. Enver reminded our audience that the war was fought between the Serbian state and the Albanian population of Kosovo. That may be true, but there were long periods when it seemed you could count on one hand the number of Albanians and Serbs willing to have a civilized conversation with each other. Now more than a handful are using democratic institutions to govern together. I know the challenges are still great, but pragmatic can go a long way with time.
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