Tag: Balkans
I call Macedonia Macedonia
A loyal reader writes: “Mr. Serwer is being quoted as the USA should pressure Greece in regards to fyrom ascension to NATO. I would really appreciate him to post something on his blog so we can discuss it.” This presumably refers to remarks I made by Skype Tuesday to a class on Macedonia at University College ISPE in Pristina. Here are my notes on the name question and NATO for that lecture, which was observed by a Macedonian journalist:
Macedonia’s external problem remains what it has been since independence: Greece’s unwillingness to accept its name.
Let me admit that I am not neutral on this subject. I advocated American recognition of Macedonia by its constitutional name (Republic of Macedonia) well before Washington did it.
I think any country has a right to call itself what it wants, so long as it does not harbor irredentist designs on its neighbors. This applies to the United States of Mexico, and to the US state of New Mexico, as much as it does to Macedonia and Greece.
In fact, Macedonia has already changed its constitution and flag to accommodate Greek concerns.
I am convinced that Macedonia does not have irredentist designs on Greece. Greek preoccupation with this issue is rooted in Athens’ own attitude towards minorities within Greece, as it denies they exist, and concern about Greek identity.
While claiming continuity with ancient Greece, Greek identity is much more clearly rooted in the early 19th century.
But whatever the origins, the result is a pernicious one. Greece’s current prime minister has gone as far as to say that he wants to see the dissolution of Macedonia and the formation of a Greater Albania, rather than accept a solution to the “name” issue.
This would be nothing more than comedic except for one thing: Greece’s attitude on the name issue is blocking Macedonian membership in NATO and holding up its progress towards negotiating EU membership.
The EU has been clever and invented a “high-level dialogue” that in essence substitutes for the EU accession negotiations, which in any event won’t be concluded during this decade.
The NATO issue is more urgent. Albanians in Macedonia regard NATO membership as vital to their own security, a kind of guarantee that the Macedonian state will continue in the direction of treating them properly.
Macedonia has met NATO’s criteria for membership. Its army has even fought under US command in Afghanistan and still protects NATO headquarters there.
I’ve spoken with the Vermont National Guard commander who integrated Macedonian troops with his own fighting in Afghanistan. He told me he relied on them as he would on American troops.
But Greece shows no sign of easing its veto on membership by the time of the next NATO summit in Cardiff, Wales in September.
Washington has unfortunately said that NATO membership for Macedonia depends on its resolving its problems with Greece, a position that essentially turns American leverage over to Athens.
This in my view is a serious mistake, but so far at least I’ve been unable to convince my American colleagues that they should take a more proactive role.
My own preference would be that Washington seek to end the UN mediation, which has produced nothing in almost 20 years of effort, and tell Athens that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will become a member of NATO in Cardiff, along with Montenegro, in the fall.
At the same time, Brussels should make clear to Skopje that it will need to reach a mutually acceptable accommodation with Greece before it can become an EU member.
Athens can of course still veto Macedonia’s membership in NATO, where decisions are taken by consensus.
But that would be a serious mistake if Brussels and Washington are prepared to press the issue at the highest levels. Cash-strapped Greece is in no position to annoy, much less anger, the Americans, Germans and other Europeans.
Nor is it wise for Greece to continue to ignore the 2011 decision of the International Court of Justice, which found by a 15 to 1 margin that Athens has breached the Interim Accord and rejected its allegations against the Skopje government.
While Greeks continue to claim that the Court failed to adopt any remedies, the decision was clearly a binding one that the ICJ expected Athens to implement. The court in fact has no power to enforce its decisions.
Let me be clear: the Macedonian government, while held not to have violated the Interim Accord, is not entirely without its own responsibility in this matter, especially in recent years.
Prime Minister Gruevski has played to his own constituency by emphasizing connections to ancient Macedonia that are even more far-fetched than those of Prime Minister Samaras, which is saying something.
What we’ve got here are two democratically elected leaders who each feed the beast of ethnic nationalism in ways that are destabilizing and dangerous.
There is a real risk that they have unleashed sentiments that will be difficult to put back in Pandora’s box, which is an appropriate label given the context.
Neither Greece nor Macedonia can cause the kind of military damage that Milosevic’s Serbia did, but they can certainly cause political instability, especially if their dispute unleashes a third ethnic nationalism: the Albanian one.
I inserted as well a few remarks based on my experience in Italy, where I met only one person (in 10 years of living there) who claimed descent from the ancient Romans. Italians know that the Romans were conquered by various “barbarians”–Goths, Vandals, and the like–so that modern-day Italians are thoroughly mixed genetically. Rome at one point had a population of only 85,000 people (at the peak of the Empire and today it has more like 3 million). How could any but a handful of Italians claim genetic descent from ancient Rome? How much better, or worse, is the Greek claim to descent from the ancient Greeks?
Even in the US we claim descent from Greco-Roman culture. Washington DC was designed to be the “New Rome.” Such claims deprive Italy and Greece of nothing. Pride in one’s heritage should mean pride in seeing others attach themselves to it.
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Putin’s playbook
I wouldn’t want to impugn Russian President Putin’s originality, but his playbook does seem borrowed from Slobodan Milosevic. Ukraine is not really a country. Nor was Bosnia to Milosevic. The threat to Russian-speakers in Ukraine (and Georgia and Moldova) requires that they be protected. So too the Serbs in Croatia, Kosovo and Bosnia. Russia did not start what is happening in Ukraine–it was the West that chased President Yanukovich from Kiev. So, too, for Milosevic it was Croatian President Tudjman who precipitated things in Zagreb, Bosnian President Izetbegovic in Bosnia and of course rioting Albanians in Kosovo: “no one should dare to beat you again!”
There is of course some degree of truth–I won’t go into how much–in each of these allegations. In revolutionary situations, there are bound to be bad moments, bad actors, bad provocations. The playbook requires that you overreact: mobilize paramilitaries, occupy territory, saturate the airwaves with justification and crush any hint of violent response on the part of a far weaker enemy. This is Machiavelli, suggesting ways to seize control of territory as quickly and inexpensively as possible and ensuring by whatever means you can get away with that it remains yours.
There is one play missing, so far: ethnic cleansing. So far as I am aware, the Russians are not, yet, expelling Tatars or Ukrainian speakers from Crimea. For the moment they are reported to be taking the soft power approach, trying to convince the Tatars to support them and arresting relatively few Ukrainian speakers and oppositionists, even as they box in or take over Ukrainian military installations. But that may change. With what I anticipate will be an overwhelming victory of the independence referendum in Crimea Sunday, Moscow may see the development of some real resistance to its plan to absorb Crimea into Russia as well as clashes in other parts of Ukraine between Russian and Ukrainian speakers. If it doesn’t happen spontaneously, Moscow can of course make it happen.
That’s when I would expect the next play. It is still early in the Ukraine saga. Things can get much worse and likely will. Crimea is more philo-Russian than other provinces in eastern and southern Ukraine. It already had autonomy and governed itself in many ways. It is not a great leap to independence, or to returning to the Russia from which it originated. The contestants will be more evenly matched in other provinces, requiring removal at least some of those who won’t cooperate.
Russian troops are said today to be massing and exercising near Ukraine’s eastern border. Success in Crimea could well embolden Putin further, tempting him to take a few more provinces piecemeal. If he does, his need to expel Ukrainian speakers and others who oppose Moscow’s rule will be greater than in Ukraine. We are far from the worst that can happen.
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Election results count
Tarik Lazović, editor in chief of the Bosnian News Agency Patria, asked a few questions yesterday. He published today. Here are the Q and A in English.
Q: Would you like to comment on a statement of Bakir Izetbegović, chief of the Bosnian presidency, who said that US will intensify engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the election. He said that this was confirmed to him in direct contact with US officials.
DPS: The Americans have made it known they are searching for a new approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is reasonable that they would wait until after the election to implement whatever it is they decide. And of course the results of the election will have an impact on what is feasible.
Q: What do you think about the impact of Serbian elections on Bosnia?
DPS: The Serbian election will strengthen the position of Aleksandar Vucic, who is likely to become prime minister. He and President Nikolic are no friends of Milorad Dodik, who backed the losing horse in Serbia’s last presidential election.
But there is nothing permanent about friendships in the Balkans. I expect Dodik to try to ingratiate himself with Vucic, who however needs to do everything he can to avoid slowing Serbia’s progress towards the EU. Telling Dodik to stop talking about independence for RS and to start cooperating with the government in Sarajevo so that it can take on the responsibility of negotiating and implementing the obligations of EU membership would be one way to facilitate Serbia’s own accession process.
Q: What do you think about the demonstrations and plenums in Bosnia?
DPS: I think it perfectly reasonable for citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina to complain about corruption, nepotism, unemployment, social conditions and abuses of privilege by government officials. So long as the demonstrations are non-violent, they are likely to attract large crowds—because the grievances are real. But it is unclear how this popular discontent will be translated into political change. The nationalist political parties are trying hard to repress and hijack the discontent to promote their own agendas by warning of danger to their respective ethnic groups and offering protection from imaginary threats. The authorities are also trying to frighten people away from the streets by bringing terrorist charges against some of the more rowdy demonstrators.
Someone has to figure out how to translate discontent and manifestations of direct democracy into a program of reform that can win votes and legislate change. Bosnia may not be an idyllic democracy, but election results count [Bosnia’s next election is scheduled for October 5.]
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Everything uncertain, except the winner
After less than two years, Serbia is about to hold new parliamentary elections March 16. Even though the voting is just a week away, most people show little interest in the campaign, but turnout is still expected to be relatively high. The upcoming election is unique in that it is not about who will win, as the winner is already known. It is the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) of Aleksandar Vučić, the incumbent first deputy prime minister.
The election race is rather for Vučić’s junior coalition partner in the government. It won’t necessarily be the winner of the second place. It can be any party that will manage to meet the threshold (5% of all voters who participate in voting, including invalid ballots) and thus enter the parliament.
Prime Minister Dačić’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) is currently the second in terms of popular support according to most relevant opinion polls. The former ruling Democratic Party (DS), now led by former Belgrade Mayor Đilas, and former President Tadić’s new party are struggling for the third place. The contest seems to be extremely tight (in some polls Tadić has a little more votes, in others Đilas). And in addition to Dačić, Tadić and Đilas’ parties, it is only the Liberal-democratic Party and Vojislav Koštunica’s nationalist Democratic Party of Serbia that are expected to win some seats in parliament, though barely exceeding the threshold.
According to opinion polls, Vučić’s popularity is so high that his party might even win an absolute majority, so he might not need a partner at all. Unless Vučić intends to change the constitution, which will require approval by two thirds of MPs.
While there is no doubt as to who will lead the government, everything else is uncertain.The campaign is full of populist messages and unrealistic promises. Interestingly, Kosovo and other “big national topics” have been rarely mentioned, except by minor nationalist and Russophile parties. The focus is almost entirely on the economy. All candidates agree on the need for deep structural reform, but differ on the type of measures and methodology of implementation. Some, including Vučić, are proposing a shift toward a more liberal, market-oriented model. Others, like Prime minister Dačić, are calling for even more state intervention.
Top priorities for whoever is in power after the elections will be rationalization and reorganization of an oversized public sector and creation of a more attractive environment for direct long-term investment. The outgoing government has taken some steps in that direction, but that’s a small part of what has to be done if Serbia is to avoid financial collapse.
Vučić’s frequently repeated insistence that he will not give up on sweeping economic reforms, however painful they are, has not degraded his popularity thus far. The secret of Vučić’s success lies in his bold action against high-level corruption and organized crime. Delivering on his promises, Vučić has revived at least a portion of people’s lost hope. That’s an encouraging sign.
The problem is, however, that people tend to support changes only so long as their personal lives remain unaffected. The main challenge to the next government will be how to mitigate social consequences of reforms, especially in the early stages of implementation. This will require extraordinary effort, but it is the price that has to be paid for lack of courage and decisiveness on the part of previous administrations.
And what about the opposition? Once powerful, the DS is in steep decline and a deep crisis of identity after suffering defeat in the 2012 elections. It is no longer even the second strongest political force, pushed out of that position by Dačić’s SPS. The latest in a series of blows came when former Serbian president and DS leader Boris Tadić left the party and formed his own following a period of heavy infighting with his successor at the party’s helm, Dragan Đilas. Both DS and Tadić’s new party should be happy if each of them gets between 5 and 10 percent of votes.
DS is desperate to attract parts of the electorate that are bitterly opposed to Aleksandar Vučić. High party official Borko Stefanović recently went so far as to warn that Vučić’s victory is likely to lead to the “Ukrainian scenario” in Serbia, but his statement immediately backfired on his party’s rating. The strategy of DS in the campaign basically boils down to claiming they are the only party that is not going to form a post-election coalition with Vučić’s “Progressives.” Unfortunately for DS, Vučić obviously has no intention of calling them into a coalition, either.
Meanwhile, the Democrats and other critics of Vučić have been accusing him of establishing a “soft dictatorship.” Their fear is that Vučić’s nearly unprecedented popular support, coupled with too much power in his hands, could seriously undermine the already fragile democracy Serbia has achieved. But there is little difference between Vučić and most of his predecessors when it comes to authoritarian tendencies. Not to mention that the reforms awaiting the next government will require a firm hand on the tiller.
After all, it is not bad for a country to have a highly popular mainstream politician at a time when many countries, including a number of developed Western democracies, are experiencing a crisis of representation and democratic legitimacy, with extremist parties and fringe movements gaining ground. But that’s another story.
Vis-a-vis European integration, Belgrade will look to trade any progress in normalization of relations with Kosovo for concessions from Brussels on various chapters of accession talks. Such an approach carries a clear risk. If Brussels demonstrates too much leniency, Serbia could be allowed to proceed without satisfying all the criteria, particularly in areas such as human rights, media freedoms and the rule of law. They will demand a lot of attention in the years ahead.
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Kosovo, the US, the EU, Serbia and Facebook
Pristina-based Zeri has kindly given me permission to publish in English this interview with Kosovo Deputy Foreign Minister Petrit Selimi:
Zeri: At the last Hearing of the US Helsinki Commission, Congressman Eliot Engel stated Kosovo to be the most pro-Western and pro-American. He also added that Kosovo was left unfairly isolated in the Balkans. How do you assess the continued support of US officials to Kosovo ?
Petrit Selimi: The US has remained the main pillar of support for Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic integration. The US vision for Kosovo for several decades has been stable and unchanging. Independent, civic , secular, enjoying friendly relations with neighbors – including Serbia – a member of EU and NATO, a country with a small but dynamic economy, based on full human rights for all. Read more
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Kosovo’s army
Hoyt Yee, the Deputy Assistant Secretary who covers the Balkans at the State Department, testified Wednesday at the Congressional Helsinki Commission. In answer to a question, he said the United States strongly supports Kosovo’s goal of joining NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and eventually NATO, a precondition for which is having an army. Washington will also continue to provide assistance to Kosovo to reach the goal of NATO membership. This in my book is exactly the right thing to be saying and doing.
It comes on the heels of Kosovo government approval of transforming its Kosovo Protection Force, a largely unarmed but uniformed corps, into the Kosovo Armed Forces, which will function as an army. Belgrade has asked for a discussion of this issue at the United Nations Security Council. My guess is the powers that be in New York will decide the UNSC has more important things to do right now. Read more
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