Tag: Ethiopia
Stevenson’s army, November 5
– African militaries embrace coups.
– Leahy says GOP threatens year-long CR.
– Administration approves first, big arms sale to Saudi Arabia.
Misleading reporting: I noticed a lot of attention to the high “wrong track” polling numbers as explanations of political developments. Not significant any more, if they ever were. There have been only 3 times in the last 50 years when a majority DIDN’T say US was on the “wrong track.”
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Independence is relative and takes a long time
The Continental Congress voted a resolution of independence on July 2, 1776, the day John Adams thought should be celebrated, but the Declaration in its final form was not presented until July 4. Adams and his rival Thomas Jefferson both died on that day 50 years later, so I suppose Adams would have to be content with losing that round. July 4 is the date we celebrate, even if we do it by taking off from work July 5 when the 4th falls on a weekend.
But independence doesn’t come just because you declare it. The British Crown nominally accepted it 7 years later in the Treaty of Paris, but even then things weren’t settled. The war of 1812(-15) witnessed the British burning of Washington DC. During the Civil War (1861-65) the British, fearful of growing Union industrial might, remained formally neutral but sympathized with the Confederacy. After the war, the Brits and Americans quarreled over fishing and tariffs. It was only with the arbitration of a British Guyana/Venezuela (backed by America) boundary dispute in the 1890s that a more friendly relationship between Britain and America emerged, boosted by America’s growing naval power. The “special relationship” often referenced today was a product of World War II.
Post-World War II decolonization, which created dozens of newly independent states within a few decades, may appear an exception, but it isn’t. Many of Europe’s colonies had fought long and hard for independence, and few have entirely severed their ties to their former metropoles. At the very least, language and culture often remain strong links, as they did for the United States. German was the second most commonly spoken language in the thirteen colonies, but it was the pre-independence colonial power, not Berlin, that prevailed in the newly independent United States. Francophone and anglophone Africa show similar patterns: no matter the loathing towards the former imperial power, its culture and language often remain dominant.
So do other ties: education, trade, investment, politics, and diplomacy. Many former colonies export people and products to the former metropole, which provides investment and often diplomatic support. The export of people becomes a political factor: witness African francophones in France and South Asian anglophones in the United Kingdom. Latinx, Filipinos, and Vietnamese have likewise become political factors in the US, even if some of their countries of origin were not formally colonies. But there is no denying the close ties that come from prolonged US political involvement and military presence.
Here is where Kosovo differs substantially from other newly independent states. There is no risk of an influx of Kosovo Albanians into Serbia. Many young Kosovars are choosing to learn English rather than Serbian as a second language. While some aspects of Albanan and Serbian culture are similar (cuisine and music, in my view), Kosovo looks more to Tirana and the United States than it does to Belgrade for cultural and political guidance. This is not attributable a more general Albanian/Slavic divide. Albanians in Macedonia have made their peace with a Slavic majority and most speak Macedonian. In Albania, there are Orthodox Albanians.
The most important potentially independent state on earth today is Taiwan, which is a sovereign, democratic state that does not claim independence, fearing the consequences of China’s possible military response. Taiwan has intense economic relations with the People’s Republic and most Taiwanese speak Mandarin, but few Taiwanese would welcome the repressive treatment to which Beijing has subjected Hong Kong. China is ratcheting up the pressure on Taiwan and shows no sign whatsoever of willingness to accept its independence.
Another important potentially independent state is Tigray, which has successfully fought off the Ethiopian Army in recent weeks but still faces occupation of part of its territory by Eritrea and by fighters from the neighboring Ethiopian state of Amhara. It is unclear whether the Tigrayans are looking for independence. They say they want the violence to be ended with a political settlement consistent with the Ethiopian constitution, which however includes provisions for secession. The political leadership of Tigray is resentful of neighboring Eritrea, an autocracy with which Ethiopia fought a devastating boundary war 1998/2001. But the most widely spoken language in Eritrea and in Tigray is Tigrinya. If Tigray were to secede from Ethiopia, Eritrea could certainly be at risk. A state that includes both Tigray and Eritrea would have a far better chance of survival than either state on its own.
There are other potentially independent states out there: Western Sahara (claimed and partially occupied by Morocco), northern Mali (scene of rebellions by several different groups), Israeli-occupied Palestine of course, Balochistan, Kurdistan in one form or another, and others I’ve missed. All have seen longstanding struggles that, even if they succeed, will entail continuing interaction with their current rulers, if only because the geography dictates it. Independence is relative and takes a long time.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace Picks | May 17 – May 21
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream
1. Migration and Displacement in Libya: Converging Challenges and Pathways Forward | May 18, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Speakers
Mohamed Abu Araba: Program Manager, Bawader Foundation
Malak Edoudi: Livelihoods officer, Danish Refugee Council
Mohamed Hmouma: Program manager, Almotawaset Organization for Migration and Relief
Mohamed Saad: Lecturer, faculty in Chemical Engineering, University of Sirte
Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux (moderator): Director and co-founder, NAPI
This event will feature several of NAPI’s Young Policy Leaders and NAPI affiliates, who will discuss their research on the impact of migration and forced displacement in Libya. There are currently an estimated 12.4 million displaced people across the MENA region: a tremendous humanitarian emergency that is compounded by various environmental and governance factors. In Libya, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) accounted for 245,000 IDPs in February 2021, and over 620,000 returnees since 2016. Together, they make up close to 900,000 displaced Libyans in five years, which is approximately 14% of the Libyan population. In addition to IDPs, IOM tracked 576,000 migrants in Libya in February 2021, although these do not include migrants in movement and those in the hands of people traffickers. The speakers’ research spans intersections such as the economic recovery of people impacted by conflict, the state of migrant detention centers, the rights of migrant workers, the experiences of IDPs in establishing livelihoods, and the connection between climate change and displacement.
2. The Marine Corps and the future of warfare | May 18, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Speakers
Gen. David H. Berger: Commandant, Marine Corps
Michael E. O’Hanlon (moderator): Director of Research, Foreign Policy
The Marine Corps is pursuing significant changes to address the realities of great power competition, including implementing a new force design. Evolving technology, uncertainty about the budgetary and fiscal environment, and accelerating innovation by America’s emerging competitors have forced the Marine Corps to adapt by reconfiguring itself to better address the nation’s future defense outlook. Much work, though, remains to be done. On May 18, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host Commandant of the Marine Corps General David H. Berger to discuss Marine Corps modernization, the budgetary environment, and the challenges of great power competition.
3. After the pandemic: Health security and multilateralism at work | May 19, 2021 | 8:00 AM – 9:30 AM ET | European Council on Foreign Relations | Register Here
Speakers
Werner Baumann: CEO, Bayer
Gunilla Carlsson: Vice-Chair, Global Fund Strategy Committee
Sergio Dompé: President of Dompé Farmaceutici
Anthony Dworkin: Research Director and Senior Policy Fellow, ECFR
Alessandro Speciale (moderator): Rome Bureau Chief, Bloomberg
The covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the vulnerabilities of an interconnected world, but it has also created a new sense of urgency behind the need for multilateral action, which has been shown to be directly connected to the health and well-being of individuals in every country.
4. What is the road ahead for Colombia? | May 19, 2021 | 9:30 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Speakers
Adriana Mejía Hernández: Vice Minister of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Colombia
Jason Marczak (moderator): Director, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council
Amid the third peak of the pandemic, over 400,000 people took to the streets in Colombia to protest a now-withdrawn tax-reform bill proposed by the government to address the country’s economic crisis. In some cities, protests were permeated by criminal acts, vandalism, and blockades. What steps is the Colombian government taking to address social and political tensions? How will Colombia stabilize its fiscal deficit and public debt? How can the United States support its longstanding ally at this critical moment?
5. Yezidis in Iraq & Syria: Genocide, Recovery & Geopolitical Challenges | May 19, 2021 | 1:00 PM – 2:30 PM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
Speakers
James F. Jeffrey: Chair, Middle East Program
Amy Austin Holmes: Public policy fellow, Harvard University
Pari Ibrahim: Executive Director, Free Yazidi Foundation
Murad Ismael: President, Sinjar Academy
Nadine Maenza: Commissioner, US Commission on International Religious Freedom
Merissa Khurma (moderator): Program Director, Middle East Program
The Biden Administration must develop policies for Iraq and Syria that prioritize Yezidi and minority rights and must ensure that Yezidis do not suffer persecution and further marginalization even after the military defeat of ISIS. This panel will discuss the challenges and opportunities for Yezidis, the geopolitical terrain, and possible paths forward for the United States.
6. Economic Security of the Black Sea Region: Internal and External Challenges | May 19, 2021 | 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Speakers
Altay Atli: Founder, Atli Global
The emerging market economies of the Black Sea – including Turkey, Ukraine, and Georgia – are facing significant economic challenges, amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic. Such challenges are impacting the overall security of these countries, and the security of the wider region. The Middle East Institute’s (MEI) Frontier Europe Initiative is pleased to host a panel event to explore these challenges. What are the internal economic dynamics of Turkey, Ukraine, and Georgia? How can they adequately manage a post-pandemic recovery, both as individual states and through cooperation with regional neighbors?
7. Calibrated Resistance: The Political Dynamics of Iran’s Nuclear Policymaking under Trump | May 20, 2021 | 12:15 PM – 2:00 PM ET | Belfer Center | Register Here
Speakers
Abolghasem Bayyenat: Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow
Drawing parallel with domestic and international conditions leading to the successful conclusion of the JCPOA in 2015, this research seeks to put Iran’s nuclear policymaking during the Trump administration into perspective and explain why Iran pursued the strategy of calibrated resistance, how this strategy became possible, and why alternative policies became unthinkable or impossible.
8. Elections and crises in Somalia and Ethiopia | May 20, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Speakers
Abdirahmen Aynte: Co-Founder, Laasfort Consulting Group
Bronwen Morrison: Senior Director, Dexis Consulting Group
Lidet Tadesse: Policy Officer, European Centre for Development Policy Management
Vanda Felbab-Brown (moderator): Director, Initiative on Non-State Actors
For over a year, Somalia and Ethiopia have faced severe crises in governance and security. As Ethiopia heads into elections in early June, the Tigray insurrection against the central government has metamorphosed into an entrenched insurgency, even as external powers such as Eritrea have reinforced the Ethiopian military. Dangerous tensions have also escalated between Ethiopia and Sudan. In Somalia, an effort by President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed to delay presidential and parliamentary elections and extend his rule has brought the country to the edge of a civil war. Intersecting with complex rivalries in the Red Sea region and the Middle East, tensions between Somalia’s federal government and federal member states risk wiping out a decade of stabilization efforts. Meanwhile, the terrorist group al-Shabab has been growing stronger over the past four years. On May 20, Foreign Policy at Brookings will convene a panel to discuss these internal crises, their regional complexities and repercussions, and June elections in Ethiopia and Somaliland — a state within Somalia. After their remarks, panelists will take questions from the audience.
9. The Role of Integrated Air and Missile Defense for Strategic Deterrence | May 21, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:15 AM ET | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here
Speakers
LTG Daniel Karbler: Commander, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
Tom Karako: Senior Fellow, International Security Program and Director, Missile Defense Project
Please join the CSIS Missile Defense Project on Friday, May 21 for a conversation on the U.S. Army’s space and air and missile defense plans with Lieutenant General Daniel Karbler, Commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command.
10. After Navalny’s Arrest: Whither the Russian Opposition | May 21, 2021 | 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
Speakers
Leonid Volkov: Head, Network of Regional Headquarters for Alexei Navalny
Matthew Rojansky (moderator): Director, Kennan Institute
The return to Russia and subsequent imprisonment of Alexei Navalny represents a possible turning point in Russian domestic politics. Navalny’s reappearance on the Russian stage sparked a series of large protests and a predictable sharp reaction from authorities. Can the opposition remain organized and united in light of this crackdown, or will Putin’s authoritarian turn be sufficient to maintain his grip on power?
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Watch this space: 10 challenges Biden wishes he didn’t have
President Biden is preoccupied with domestic issues: the economy, COVID-19, race and inequality. But of course foreign policy waits for no president.
The current picture is gloomy:
- Russia has been threatening renewed hostilities against Ukraine. Moscow is claiming it is all Kiev’s faulty, but I suspect Putin is getting nervous about improved performance of the Ukrainian Army. Perhaps he thinks it will be easier and less costly to up the ante now. Besides a new offensive would distract from his domestic problems, including that pesky political prisoner and hunger striker Alexei Navalny.
- Iran and Israel are making it difficult for the US to get back into the nuclear deal. Israel has somehow crashed the electrical supply to Iran’s uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. Tehran has amped up the IRGC/Supeme Leader criticism of President Rouhani, making it harder for him to ease conditions for Washington’s return to the nuclear deal. A vigorous Iranian reaction to the Israeli sabotage would make the Americans hesitate.
- Peace talks between Afghanistan and the Taliban for a transitional power-sharing government are not going well. How could they? The Taliban want an Afghanistan in which President Ghani would have no place. Ghani wants an Afghanistan in which the Taliban would have no place. Powersharing requires a minimum of mutual tolerance that appears lacking.
- North Korea is renewing its missile and nuclear threats. President Trump pretty much poisoned the diplomatic well with Pyongyang by meeting three times with Kim Jong-un without reaching a serious agreement. Kim seems to have decided he can manage without one, so long as his nuclear weapons and missiles threaten South Korea, Japan, and even the continental United States.
- China is menacing Taiwan. I doubt Beijing wants to face the kind of military defense and popular resistance an invasion would entail, but ratcheting up the threat forces Taipei to divert resources and puts an additional issue on the negotiating table with Washington, which doesn’t want to have to come to Taipei’s defense.
- Syria’s Assad is consolidating control and preparing for further pushes into Idlib or the northeast. While unquestionably stretched thin militarily and economically, Damascus no longer faces any clear and present threat to Assad’s hold on power. He hasn’t really won, but the relatively liberal opposition has definitely lost, both to him and to Islamist extremists.
- Central Americans are challenging American capacity to manage its southern border. The increase of asylum seekers, especially children, presents a quandary to the Biden Administration: shut them out as President Trump did, or let them in and suffer the domestic political consequences. Biden has put Vice President Harris in charge, but it will be some time before she can resurrect processing of asylum seekers in their home countries and also get the kind of aid flowing to them that will cut back on the economic motives for migration.
- The Houthis aren’t playing nice. America’s cut in military and intelligence support for Saudi Arabia and the UAE is giving their Yemeni adversaries a chance to advance on the last remaining major population center in the north still nominally held by President Hadi’s shambolic government. If the Houthis take Marib, the consequences will be catastrophic.
- Addis Ababa isn’t either. Africa’s second most populous country, Ethiopia, has gone to war against its own Tigray region, which had defied Addis’ authority on control of the military and holding elections. The Americans want Addis to ease up and allow humanitarian assistance and media in. Ethiopia’s reforming Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy is playing rope-a-dope with the Americans and keeping up the pressure on the Tigrayans.
- You haven’t heard much about it lately, but nothing good is happening in Venezuela, where President Maduro has survived efforts to oust him and now is enjoying one of what must be at least 9 lives.
Biden deserves a lot of credit for what he is doing domestically, and he is the best versed president on foreign affairs in decades. But the international pressures are building. It is only a matter of time before one or more of these ten issues, or a half dozen others, climb to the top of his to-do list. None of them are going to be easy to handle. Watch this space.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace Picks | March 1 – March 5, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream
- Breaking the Tie: Security and Stability in Belarus | March 1, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council| Register Here
For the past six months, Belarusians protesting for free and fair elections across the country have faced growing repression as strongman Alyaksandr Lukashenka attempts to cling to power. The opposition has demonstrated staying power and growing political capital, but the army and the security services remain loyal to Lukashenka. This domestic stalemate also presents a strategic problem for the Kremlin, which seems to have no new ideas beyond some monetary support for Lukashenka’s regime. Meanwhile the US and Europe have responded with modest financial sanctions against the discredited president and his cronies.
Do Lukashenka or Moscow have any new cards to play? Does the opposition? How will the situation in Belarus end and how will Washington, Brussels, and Moscow react?
Speakers:
Dr. Pavel Felgenhauer
Columnist with Novaya Gazeta,
David Kramer
Senior Fellow at Florida International University’s Vaclav Havel Program for Human Rights and Diplomacy
Valery Kavaleuski
Foreign Affairs Adviser to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya
Dr. Marie Mendras
Professor at Sciences Po’s Paris School of International Affairs
Ambassador John Herbst (Moderator)
Director of the Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
2. Red Flags Report Launch | March 2, 2021 | 1:00 PM ET | Center for Strategic International Studies | Register Here
China’s political and economic influence in the Western Balkans is on the rise, fueled in part by a regional demand for infrastructure which is satisfied by opaque deals in the ICT, energy, and transportation sectors. These projects present risks to good governance, economic growth, environmental sustainability, and digital security. Join CSIS for a virtual discussion of a new CSIS report which describes tools and actions critical for stakeholders to objectively evaluate and respond to these risks. The report concludes a three-part series which examined the nature and impact of Chinese economic influence in the Western Balkans and its implications for the region’s stability and Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
Speakers:
Matthew D. Steinhelfer (Keynote)
Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, U.S. Department of State
Heather A. Conley
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, CSIS
Jonathan E. Hillman, Senior Fellow and Director of the Reconnecting Asia Project, CSIS
Valerie Hopkins (Moderator)
South-East Europe Correspondent, The Financial Times
3. Lebanon: Challenges and Future Prospects| March 3, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Middle East Institute| Register Here
The Middle East Institute is pleased to invite you to a panel to launch its Lebanon Program, focusing on Lebanon’s current state of affairs and potential US foreign policy options going forward. The months-long political stalemate and the unaddressed financial crisis keep pushing Lebanon further into chaos and uncertainty. In parallel, the new Biden administration is redefining the US stance vis-à-vis Iran and reassessing some of its bilateral relations in the region. Many of these changes will have direct implications for Lebanon. This distinguished panel will address these local and regional developments, think through ways US foreign policy towards Lebanon can be more nuanced and constructive, and highlight themes and signals that are worth paying attention to in the coming months.
Speakers:
Amb. (ret.) Edward M. Gabriel
President and CEO, American Task Force on Lebanon
May Nasrallah
Chairwoman, Lebanese International Finance Executives
Paul Salem
President, MEI
Mona Yacoubian
Senior Advisor to the Vice President of Middle East and North Africa, United States Institute of Peace
Christophe Abi-Nassif (Moderator)
Lebanon Program Director, MEI
4. Agent Sonya: Moscow’s Most Daring Wartime Spy | March 3, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Middle East Institute| Register Here
Please join the Intelligence Project for a discussion with Ben MacIntyre on his latest book, Agent Sonya. This true-life spy story is a masterpiece about the Soviet intelligence officer code-named “Sonya.” Over the course of her career, she was hunted by the Chinese, the Japanese, the Nazis, MI5, MI6, and the FBI—and she evaded them all. Her story reflects the great ideological clash of the twentieth century—between Communism, Fascism, and Western democracy—and casts new light on the spy battles and shifting allegiances of our own times.
With unparalleled access to Sonya’s diaries and correspondence and never-before-seen information on her clandestine activities, Macintyre has conjured a page-turning history of a legendary secret agent, a woman who influenced the course of the Cold War and helped plunge the world into a decades-long standoff between nuclear superpowers.
Speakers:
Ben Macintyre
Author and Journalist, The Times
5. Insanity Defense: Why Our Failure to Confront Hard National Security Problems Makes Us Less Safe | March 3, 2021 | 1:00 PM ET | Wilson Center| Register Here
In the wake of unprecedented domestic terror and national security threats in the form of mass shootings and insurrection in the nation’s capital, former Congresswoman & Wilson Center Director, President, and CEO Jane Harman offers her new book Insanity Defense: Why Our Failure to Confront Hard National Security Problems Makes Us Less Safe (St. Martin’s Press; May 18, 2021), which chronicles how four consecutive administrations have failed to confront some of the toughest national security issues and suggests achievable fixes that can move us toward a safer future.
Please join Congresswoman Harman and New York Times national security correspondent and senior writer David Sanger for an in-depth conversation on the book and a discussion on better processes and more sound policy for the next generation of elected officials and the new administration.
Speakers:
Jane Harman
Director, President and CEO, Wilson Center
David Sanger
Former Distinguished Fellow, National Security Correspondent and Writer, the New York Times; Author, The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage and Fear in the Cyber Age
6. Religion, Ethnicity, and Charges Of Extremism: The Dynamics Of Inter-Communal Violence In Ethiopia| March 4, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | European Institute of Peace| Register Here
In recent months, the conflict in Tigray has dominated most analyses of Ethiopian politics. The scale of the Tigray crisis makes this understandable, but in its shadow, inter-communal tensions and conflicts have persisted across Ethiopia. In recent years there were numerous violent incidents, such as the Amhara regional ‘coup’ attempt of June 2019, the violence across Oromia in October 2019, and incidents around Timkat in Dire Dawa and Harar in January 2020.
A team of Ethiopian and international researchers – Terje Østebø, Jörg Haustein, Fasika Gedif, Kedir Jemal Kadir, Muhammed Jemal, and Yihenew Alemu Tesfaye – studied two incidents of inter-communal violence: the attacks on mosques and (mostly) Muslim properties in Mota, Amhara region in December 2019 and the violence and destruction of properties in Shashemene and other towns in Oromia in July 2020. They will present their findings in this event, followed by discussion and Q&A.
Their research shows that in Ethiopia religion and ethnic violence overlap and interact with one another in complex ways. Given the current emphasis on ethnicity in Ethiopian politics, the role of religious affiliation is often overlooked, yet it is here that the accusation of “extremism” is most frequently and most consequentially raised: the mere expectation or accusation of extremism has sufficed to generate inter-communal violence and deepened a climate of mistrust.
Speakers:
Terje Østebø
University of Florida
Jörg Haustein
University of Cambridge
Sandy Wade (Moderator)
Senior Advisor, European Institute of Peace
7. COVID-19 and Cooperation in Libya | March 4, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | United States Institute of Peace| Register Here
Libya is at a turning point after the U.N.-sponsored Libyan Political Dialogue Forum elected a temporary executive authority in February to unify the country and move toward elections by year’s end. However, sustainable peace cannot be achieved with only an agreement at the national level. And the COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated economic challenges, strained the country’s health infrastructure, and added a new layer of complexity to the country’s conflict. Local-level cooperation—and linking these efforts to the national-level peace process—is of utmost importance to achieve a cohesive and peaceful country.
And despite a difficult year, there have been bright spots for Libya on this front. The COVID-19 pandemic yielded many examples of local-level initiatives where Libyans came together in challenging conditions to cooperate for a common goal. The hope is that these successes can lead to longer and more enduring areas of cooperation.
Join USIP as we host Libya’s ambassador to the United States and Libyan civil society leaders for a look at stories of positive community cooperation during the current crisis—as well as a discussion on how Libyan and international organizations can build off these successes to navigate Libya’s complex conflict and ensure a peaceful future for the country.
Speakers:
Wafa Bughaighis (Keynote speaker)
Libyan Ambassador to the United States
Ahmed Albibas
Director, Moomken Organization for Awareness and Media
Abdulrahman A. S. Elgheriani
President and CEO, Tanmia 360
Craig Browne
Program Policy Officer, World Food Programme
Nate Wilson (Moderator)
Libya Country Manager, U.S. Institute of Peace
8. Unraveling the Conflict in Syria March 4, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
In 2012, as the conflict in Syria continued to smolder, then-president Barack Obama made clear that any use of chemical weapons by the Bashar al-Assad regime would constitute a “red line” for U.S. engagement. Yet in the aftermath of a sarin attack outside Damascus just a year later, the Obama administration seized the opportunity to work with Russia on an ambitious plan to hunt down and remove chemical weapons rather than go to war. A decade later, the tangle of “heroes and villains” involved in that particular scenario is clearer.
Speakers:
Joby Warrick
Author of Red Line
Maha Yahya
Director of the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
9. The Future of ISIS March 4, 2021 | 11:30 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
On October 27, 2019, then-US President Donald Trump announced that the leader of the so-called Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was killed in Syria in an American special operation, striking a blow against an already weakened organization.
What ISIS accomplished during the period of its rise and growth represents a “quantum leap” in the ideology, strategies, and operating theories of terrorist groups, and requires deep analysis of the organization’s expected future trajectory. The Politics and Society Institute in Amman, Jordan, and the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in Washington, DC, are pleased to co-host this expert discussion. This panel will shed light on what opportunities exist for policymakers to deal with the legacy of ISIS detainees and returnees, as well as on strategies against a potential resurgence in Iraq and Syria.
Speakers:
Mohammed Abu Rumman
Expert, Politics and Society Institute
Former Jordanian Minister of Youth and Culture
Borzou Daragahi
Journalist and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Andrew Peek
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Former US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iran and Iraq
Mara Revkin
National Security Law Fellow, Georgetown University Law Center
Banan Malkawi (Moderator)
Jordanian-American Researcher and Lecturer
10. Strategic nuclear modernization in the United States| March 4, 2021 | 2:00 PM ET | Brookings Institutions| Register Here
What: As with prior administrations before it, the Biden administration is preparing to undertake a major review of the U.S. strategic nuclear modernization program. Though the U.S. arsenal has decreased in accordance with the New START treaty, new delivery systems are still being developed.
Supporters of the current program argue that implementation is critical for the United States’ ability to deter adversaries and reassure allies. Opponents argue that the current program is well in excess of deterrence requirements and is not affordable over the long term. During the review period, Congress will examine the current program as well as requested funding for these systems.
On Thursday, March 4, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings will host a panel to discuss how the Biden administration will – and should – approach negotiations regarding the future of the strategic modernization program.
Speakers:
Tom Collina
Director of Policy, Ploughshares Fund
Madelyn R. Creedon
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Center for Security, Strategy and Technology
Franklin Miller
Principal, The Scowcroft Group
Amy Woolf
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, Congressional Research Service
Frank A Rose
Co-Director and Foreign Policy Fellow, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Restore humanitarian access in Ethiopia!
Michael Thomas Knaak, a first-year Conflict Management master’s student at Johns Hopkins/SAIS, writes:
CSIS February 22 convened a discussion of restoring humanitarian access in Ethiopia’s Tigray province, the scene of recent fighting between local forces and the Federal government. Panelists included:
Judd Devermont, Director of the CSIS Africa Program
Daniel Bekele – Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, Chief Commissioner
Catherine Wiesner – Head of External Engagement at the UNHCR Regional Bureau for East Africa, Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes
Jan Egeland – Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council
Jacob Kurtzer – Director of the Humanitarian Agenda at CSIS, who moderated
Key Points
- The humanitarian crisis in the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia is substantial, chaotic, and unlikely to improve without increased access for humanitarian personnel.
- There is a general dearth of detailed information on the situation in Tigray, as access to humanitarian personnel and journalists is severely restricted.
- Such access is currently being denied due to a lack of political will in the Ethiopian government and in international state-level or higher actors.
- Significant civil-military and Federal-regional governance coordination problems are further hindering access by humanitarian assistance personnel.
Judd Devermont
The humanitarian crises is one of many problems afflicting Ethiopia, but is the most acute flashpoint at this time. Other sources of conflict include the significant governance reforms ongoing within the Federal government, the government’s apparent mistreatment of dissidents, the contentious redrawing of political borders, and the formation and growth of unregulated militias. The continuation of the humanitarian crises complicates the overall political landscape within Tigray and across states.
In addressing the crises, the main difficulty is political will, rather than technical issues or capacity. Rectifying the limited accessibility to the region by humanitarian aid workers is critical. One idea towards this end might be appointment of a US special envoy. The envoy would need to have a close relationship with the State Department and have access to real power and resources, enabling her or him to own the process and act as a main driver for US action in the region.
Daniel Bekele
There are three key points that need immediate attention. First, local governance and administration must be reestablished to secure the restoration of critical services within the region. Second, restrictions on media access must be removed to allow for a free flow of valuable information reported in a timely manner. Third, the bureaucratic and political hurdles delaying humanitarian assistance must be overcome.
On this third point there is at least engagement between the Ethiopian government and aid organizations on the need for civilian protection and the applicability of international humanitarian law. However, they disagree on implementation of civilian-military coordination. The government lacks the will to permit regional access to assistance personnel.
Increased United Nations access and involvement through a special rapporteur has been floated as an idea for addressing the crisis. While such a step might be viewed positively, it would be important for the international community to recognize that the international process should complement rather than displace existing national processes, institutions, and efforts. A “fly-in and fly-out” type effort could fail to be coherent with the domestic Ethiopian led response.
Catherine Wiesner
Scattered reports and satellite imagery confirm that two refugee camps were assaulted by armed militants, and many thousands of refugees and IDPs are now unaccounted for. Migration from the destroyed camps to new ones has strained capacity in safe spaces. Other priority needs are unaccompanied children, restoration of basic services, and food aid.
Civil-military coordination is lacking, and the threat of violence against aid workers limits their efforts. Sudan and Djibouti have helped ease the crisis by keeping their borders open to refugees, though particularly in Sudan the border area is remote and suffers from poor infrastructure, complicating the process of moving aid staff and materiel.
Early financial appeals to address the crisis were 70% funded, but the original plan was limited in size and scope. The revised plan addresses the whole of Ethiopia in 2021 rather than just the Tigray region, and is 50% funded ($150 million), which is enough to continue operations through June. But aid efforts will have limited effectiveness without access to the areas worst hit by the crisis.
Jan Egeland
Impeding the humanitarian response is surprising coming from Ethiopia, which has a long history of generosity towards refugees. With the sudden restriction of access, agencies lost contact with numerous staff members. The trickle of information coming out of the region describes massacres and populations fleeing for their lives. Additional information remains scarce, but firsthand accounts remain horrific.
More international pressure is required to convince the Federal government to allow humanitarian workers access to the restricted areas. There are hundreds of volunteer workers prepared, with significant quantities of resources warehoused and ready for deployment. It would be helpful if the UN, US, or the African Union could secure the needed access to get aid where it is needed most, including to opposition-held areas. Federal and regional governance coordination needs improvement, as aid organizations find permission to intervene from Federal authorities can be blocked by local authorities, and vice versa.
RSS - Posts
