Tag: European Union
A new idea
I don’t often hear new ideas from the Balkans. Most of what passes for innovation there is rehashed from the detritus of failure and packaged in insincere compliments to the international community. So it was with real pleasure that I spent an hour Monday listening to Bosnian Federation President Živko Budimir, whom I knew in the aftermath of the Bosnian war as the deputy commander of the Federation armed forces.
The General had a commanding brief. He outlined the many weaknesses of the post-war transition in Bosnia, including:
- The structural asymmetry between the cantonalized Federation (the Croat and Muslim controlled 51% of the country) and Republika Srpska (the Serb controlled 49%).
- The ethnic homogenization down to the municipality level caused by the war and the failure to fulfill promises that displaced people and refugees could return to their homes (except for Serb returns along the Croatian border in Herzegovina).
- The continued strength of the entity (Federation and RS) level of governance, despite international efforts to beef up the “state” (i.e. central) government.
- Ethnic dominance of political parties, the civil service, interior ministries, police and the judiciary.
- Widespread corruption.
- The failure of economic recovery and consequent 40% unemployment.
- Determined and blatant RS efforts to precipitate the dissolution of the state.
This unflinching analysis already made the hour worthwhile. But Budimir offered solutions as well. Some of them were well known: protection of individual rights, redistribution of entity responsibilities to the central government and to the municipalities, tougher international attitudes, acceleration of the EU accession process.
But he surprised me with a new idea: he proposed that the relative success at Brčko, a northeastern Bosnian town where reintegration and economic revival worked well under American tutelage, be expanded by creating a “Posavina district” encompassing seven municipalities, including Brčko.
I don’t imagine this is going to happen tomorrow, but it is clever to build on the one place where reintegration has been successful. There can be no dissolution of Bosnia (or of the RS) so long as the Posavina corridor, which links the eastern wing of the RS with its more populous western wing, is under multi-ethnic control. This is why I have repeatedly suggested that the EUFOR troops in Bosnia be concentrated there. President Budimir’s idea is better: expand the area under multi-ethnic governance, keeping the populations of Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs more or less equal to ensure that no one group dominates the area.
How to get this done? Budimir insists on the international community playing a strong role, both with sticks (especially in opposing dissolution of the state) and carrots (in particular NATO and EU membership), in particular to block corruption and promote reconciliation. But he also proposes the founding of a new multiethnic political party in Bosnia to reinvent its politics. This would require a good deal of courage and commitment, of which the general showed ample supplies in bringing his idea to Washington. Now what he has to do is get them to fly at home.
PS: Here is Budimir’s text. Here is his powerpoint presentation.
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Good news, and bad
As world leaders meet in Doha for the climate change conference, IEA officials presented the World Energy Outlook 2012 at a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace event. Jessica Matthews, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, labelled the year “paradoxical.” Some of the fundamental facts of world energy are changing, especially in the United States, which is on track to becoming the largest oil producer in 2020, passing even Saudi Arabia. This development, brought on by the unconventional oil and gas revolution, in combination with recent improvements in efficiency, suggests a bright energy future for the U.S. But Matthews reminded the audience that the Outlook ultimately concludes the U.S. and the rest of the world are not on track for a sustainable energy future. If trends continue, the world will become 3 degrees Celsius warmer by mid century and 4-6 degrees Celsius warmer by 2100. Such warming will have catastrophic implications.
Daniel Poneman, the Deputy Secretary of Energy, seconded Matthews’ point that more oil and gas in the U.S., and in turn, more independence, is a result of higher production and decreased demand. Production of shale gas began slowly, but it now accounts for about 35% of annual gas production. If trends continue, the US will overtake Russia in 2015 as the largest natural gas producer. Increasing natural gas production in the U.S., Canada, and Australia will globalize the natural gas market, according Fatih Birol, chief economist of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and overseer of the World Energy Outlook. New producers will diversify the market and traditional gas exporters will face lower exports and prices.
At the same time, energy consumption is shifting from the West to the East. By 2035, OECD countries will use only about 30% of total energy production. Ninety percent of oil from the Middle East will go to Asia. This is partially due to rising standards of living in China, India, and the Middle East. About 20% of the global population (1.3 billion people) still have no access to electricity, however. Birol calls this an energy, economic and moral issue. Despite electricity generation growth in India, electricity consumption per capita in 2035 India will equal per capita consumption in 1947 America.
Iraq is another game changer. Right now it is the third largest oil producer. Its production is expected to increase as exploration discovers greater reserves. Iraq will produce 6 million barrels per day in 2020 and 8 million by 2035, noted Maria van der Hoeven, the IEA’s Executive Director. Iraq will account for 45% of growth in global oil production from now until 2035, passing Russia and becoming the second largest oil exporter in the mid 2030’s. By 2035 almost 50% of world oil production will come from OPEC countries. Iraq will be a significant contributor, with much of its oil going to China. Thirty percent of growth in Iraq’s oil exports will come from Chinese-owned oil fields in Iraq.
The prospects for climate change are sobering. Progress has been made on energy efficiency, but energy demand is growing due to many factors, including population increase and movement away from nuclear power in some countries. Fossil fuel subsidies, which Birol calls the greatest threat to climate change, are a serious problem. Fuel subsidies are up 30% to $523 billion in 2011, with the Middle East and North Africa in the lead.
According to Birol, the global goal of a 2 degree Celsius rise in temperature or less will not be met with current policies. For the first time a decline in renewables is expected in 2012. Much of past and future renewable growth is dependent on subsidies. If it were possible to halt building of new infrastructure for the next 20 years, we would still use up 80% of the emissions permitted to keep the global temperature change under 2 degrees Celsius. We are not remotely doing all we can to improve efficiency. Two-thirds of the economically viable potential for improving efficiency is not being used. We have until 2017 to make serious changes, which will likely require a legally binding international agreement. If we don’t make changes by then, there will be no way to keep the planet from warming two degrees Celsius or more. If we become more efficient now, we might have until 2022 to make serious changes. The longer we wait, the more costly changes will be, which will make striking an international agreement harder.
The Outlook forecasts good news on energy production, but still bad news for climate change.
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Normalization
Two recent meetings between prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo have opened a political-level dialogue aimed at “normalization.” What does that mean?
We know it does not mean what is really needed: mutual recognition and exchange of ambassadors. That is the “normal” relationship between sovereign states. Virtually all the problems between Kosovo and Serbia would be easier to solve if they accepted each other as such. But neither Belgrade nor Pristina would recognize the other tomorrow, Belgrade because it objects to what it terms Kosovo’s “unilaterally declared” (but in fact thoroughly coordinated) independence and Kosovo because Belgrade has designs on its territory, in particular the Serb-controlled north.
Diplomats deal with issues like this by starting a process, in this case a sui generis one called “normalization.” But it is not obvious what that really means. Where does it begin? What stages does it proceed through? How does it end? Here is my personal idea of what normalization might entail:
1. Belgrade and Pristina should resolve left-over issues from the war they fought in the late 1990s. Foremost among these is missing people. Neither side has given a full account of what it knows about people who were killed during and after the war. The latest figure I’ve seen is 1775 people unaccounted for. This is far too many 13 years later.
But there are other issues as well, including the difficult question of pensions Belgrade cut off in 1999, when the United Nations took over administration of Kosovo. The European Court of Human Rights has now ordered Serbia to pay these pensions, with interest. The total owed could be substantial. There are other property issues as well: state property and privately owned property for which owners have not received proper compensation.
2. Pristina and Belgrade should implement the agreements they have already reached. The most important of these is supposed to be implemented next month, with the start of “integrated border management” procedures on the boundary/border between Kosovo and Serbia, in accordance with EU standards. This is an important step, both because it will cut down on smuggling and because it will require serious cooperation between Kosovar and Serbian officials. Also largely unimplemented is the agreement for Belgrade to provide Pristina with copies of property (cadastral) records, taken from Kosovo at the end of the war to reinforce Belgrade’s claim to be the sovereign power even though its officials are no longer present on most of its territory.
If further agreements are reached on electricity and telecommunications, as is rumored, they should be implemented without the lengthy delays that characterized the earlier agreements. Normal relations means quick and cooperative implementation.
3. With the prime ministers meeting, it is time for others to meet as well. The political-level dialogue reached an agreement in principle to extend the Albania/Kosovo highway completed this year to its intended terminus near Nis. This won’t happen without Transport Ministers, Environment Ministers and Interior Ministers concerting their efforts to make it a reality. The road has tremendous potential to increase commerce and provide Serbia with an additional and possibly preferable outlet to the sea (the road to Thessaloniki is longer and lower quality).
With European integration the common goal of the two countries, there is every reason for the people responsible for preparing for EU accession to meet and compare notes. And there is good reason for ordinary citizens to meet and discuss mutual interests: commerce, professional cooperation, anti-corruption efforts, health and environmental standards–there is no lack of grist for the mill. The best way to ensure this kind of dialogue would be liaison offices in each others’ capitals. I am hearing that the plan is liaison offices in Brussels. That would at best be a step in the right direction, but insufficient to ensure the kind of continuous communication needed.
4. Belgrade should end its diplomatic campaign against Kosovo. Serbia has conducted a concerted campaign to prevent Kosovo from entering international organizations and block other states from recognizing it. This is unseemly at best, self-defeating at worst. More or less half the UN General Assembly now recognizes Kosovo. More will gradually do so. The five non-recognizers in the European Union are beginning to understand that non-recognition encourages partition proposals that are anathema to them. Some are accepting Kosovo passports and developing strong bilateral relations with Pristina. Serbia lost its battle Friday to prevent Kosovo entry into the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Does it really want to lose many more battles, or would it be preferable to accept the inevitable?
Still, the Serbian campaign, which Belgrade has conducted with unwarranted intelligence and vigor, has prevented Kosovo from participating in the Olympics (one of its athletes also had an Albanian passport and joined its team), the Fédération Internationale de Football Association and the Eurovision Song Contest. This is inat, which is best defined by a joke all Balkans ethnicities tell about others. A farmer, offered three wishes by a genie, says his first is that his neighbor’s cow should die. “What good will that do you,” the genie asks? None, the farmer says, but it will make my neighbor really unhappy. Kosovo’s participation in international fora of all sorts should be an important part of normalization. It cannot be constructed on a foundation of inat, which has a way of becoming mutual.
5. Northern Kosovo needs to be reintegrated with the rest. At the end of the NATO/Yugoslavia war of 1999, Serbian security forces were supposed to be removed from all of Kosovo. They remained in the territory north of the Ibar river, where the population is majority Serb. It is difficult to say who really controls that territory now: certainly not Pristina or the internationals, but even the Serbian police and secret services are not in full control of an area that is tainted with smuggling and organized crime (with the police and secret services implicated but not necessarily in full control).
Belgrade and Pristina will need to cooperate intensively on reintegrating this territory back into Kosovo, with a large measure of self-governance provided by the internationally sanctioned Ahtisaari plan. This will involve some movement of former non-Serb residents of the north back to their homes. Some Serbs will be unlikely to want to stay in the north, even under the Ahtisaari plan provisions. Where they go and how they are accommodated are important issues on which Belgrade’s cooperation will be vital. Whatever happens with the north will be taken as a precedent for Serbs south of the Ibar and for Albanians in the Presevo area of southern Serbia. It will take wisdom and care to ensure that the reintegration conditions do not destabilize these areas.
6. Defense ministers and chiefs of staff should meet to consider how they can maintain the kind of transparency and mutual confidence that will ensure peace and stability. NATO-led (KFOR) forces have protected Kosovo since the 1999 war. It is unlikely they will still stick around in another five years. Both the U.S. and Europe want to move their troops to higher priorities. Kosovo will begin to arm its still largely unarmed “security forces” beginning in July.
Neither Kosovo nor Serbia should want to get into an arms race, which would be costly to their budgets and destabilizing to the neighborhood. But no democratically elected politician can hope to stay in office if he or she is unable to defend the population and territorial integrity of the state. If an arms race is to be avoided, Belgrade and Pristina have to give each other mutual assurances. The EU has asked that Serbia accept Kosovo’s territorial integrity. If Belgrade fails to do that, Pristina will have to find ways to protect itself from the threat of a Serbian armored incursion. NATO may also need to provide guarantees.
Bottom line: This is already a big agenda, and I’m sure I’ve missed some things. It would all be far easier if recognition and exchange of ambassadors came first. I trust that will become apparent as Pristina and Belgrade make their way through it. But if they prefer to do it ass backwards, “normalizing” a relationship between two capitals that do not accept each others’ sovereign authority, so be it. There is a lot of hard work ahead.
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Serbia and Kosovo have a unique opportunity
In less than a month, Serbian prime minister Ivica Dačić and his Kosovo counterpart Hashim Thaci have met twice in Brussels. The meetings are mediated by Baroness Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the EU for foreign affairs and security policy. According to Dačić, the dialogue has been constructive. The two sides have agreed to put Integrated Border Management (IBM) of two disputed checkpoints into effect by December 10. Even the possibility of Serbia and Kosovo jointly constructing a highway connecting Priština and Niš, a town in southeastern Serbia, has been discussed.
The ongoing round of talks between Belgrade and Priština was preceded by a few weeks of aggressive, at moments even anti-European, rhetoric on the part of Dačić and Serbian president Tomislav Nikolić, leading a number of domestic observers to assume that the new Serbian government was about to renounce the process of European integration. Now that the negotiations have resumed, the contentious statements apparently served as a tactic to pacify hardline nationalists before taking bolder steps towards normalization of the relationship with Kosovo.
This time there is more reason for optimism. The elevation of the negotiations to a higher political level raises hope that more concrete results will be achieved. Besides, without tangible improvement in its relations with Kosovo, Serbia will no doubt fail to get a date for accession talks with EU. And without the date, the government in Belgrade cannot count on money from European pre-accession funds, which it badly needs in order to put its struggling economy and public finances in order. Russia might provide a temporary lifeline, but that by no means would suffice.
It is too early to speculate on how far is Serbia prepared to go in these negotiations, except that it will not officially recognize Kosovo’s independence. But beyond the formal recognition, there is plenty of room for Belgrade to operate within. Dačić’s government is at the beginning of its term, which is an opportune moment to take on most challenging issues. As proven nationalists, Dačić and his coalition partners from the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) are generally in a more favorable position to make substantial concessions to Priština than former president Boris Tadić was. A relatively weak opposition in parliament could also prove beneficial to the government.
Even more encouraging is the impression that Dačić has finally abandoned his idea of ethnic-based territorial partition of Kosovo. Instead, Belgrade will likely try to secure special autonomy for the Serb-dominated area north of the Ibar river, which basically comes down to some sort of “Ahtisaari plus.” Such a solution is far from ideal, not least because it would disfavor other Kosovo Serbs. But in situations like this, no solution is ideal. For that matter, Priština would do a great job if it managed to improve the safety of local Serbs from enclaves. It would help Kosovo not only refute Serbia’s accusations of deliberately failing to protect the Serb minority, but also earn credibility among countries that have not yet recognized its statehood, including the five EU members. A long history of inter-ethnic violence certainly makes things difficult for Kosovo authorities, but not impossible, provided that independent professional institutions, as well as instruments of civilian control, are strengthened.
Serbia, for its part, needs to dismantle parallel Serb institutions in four municipalities of northern Kosovo, as a sine qua non for the beginning of accession talks with EU. It will be anything but easy to do. To what extent hese parallel institutions’ activities are actually under control of the Serbian government is unclear. Theoretically, Belgrade might consider a total cutoff of financial support to the disobedient Serb leaders, but there is a danger that such an effort would be blocked by more nationalist elements within the ruling coalition. Serbia’s efforts to rein in the north could be further undermined by intra-governmental competition between Dačić and his first deputy Aleksandar Vučić for control over the security sector, which already, earlier than was expected, seems to be under way.
Meanwhile, public sentiment in Serbia has significantly changed regarding Kosovo, at least in one respect. Today, unlike a few years ago, most of the population does not count the former province even among top five political priorities. But while a majority of the Serbian people admit that Kosovo is a de facto independent state, they nonetheless insist that the government should never recognize it. A recent opinon poll, conducted by Ipsos Strategic Marketing and B92, has shown that two thirds of those surveyed would choose Kosovo over Serbia’s EU membership in a potential referendum. This attitude is obviously a result of defiance rather than rationality. Even if Serbia withdrew from European integration, Kosovo would still remain its neighbor.
Most important for Dačić’s government is that whatever it eventually decides to do about Kosovo, including even formal recognition, is unlikely to spark major protest. Oddly, people in Serbia have become largely indifferent to their government’s Kosovo policy. While obstacles to the establishment of neighborly relations still exist, they are getting both fewer and smaller going forward. After years of seemingly insolvable dispute, Serbia and Kosovo have a unique opportunity to make a huge step forward. It is now up to the two governments to do the right thing for the sake of their people’s brighter future.
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Balkan lessons
I spoke at a European Council on Foreign Relations/Ministry of Foreign Affairs conference last week here in Pristina, Kosovo about lessons learned in the Balkans interventions. Bosnia and Kosovo were by no means model efforts, and the first lesson of intervention is that context matters. It would be a mistake to think what worked and did not would necessarily be the same in, say Syria, as in the Balkans.
But I do think there are some things worth thinking about when contemplating intervention in other parts of the world. There are three at the top of my list:
1. Act together. When the United States and Europe, which are the major players in Balkans interventions, act together, things often go better. Note that this is not a matter of shared values, which is what diplomats often emphasize, but rather common enterprise.
Europe and the U.S. in fact do not always share values that are relevant to the Balkans. Europe believes in group (minority) rights that do not exist in the U.S. and are in fact antithetical to American (and French) thinking. But this did not prevent the U.S. and Europe from cooperating in implementation of the Dayton agreements (based on group rights principles). There was also good cooperation in negotiating the Ohrid agreement that saved Macedonia from an interethnic war in 2001. Most recently, the joint trip of Lady Ashton and Secretary of State Clinton to the Balkans sent strong messages to Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo.
2. Do the right things. It is not enough to act together with other major intervenors. You also have to be doing the right things.
The U.S. and Europe acted together to allow Greece to block Macedonia’s entry into NATO, which is a bad thing to have done together. Likewise, the EU and the U.S. ganged up together to push badly formulated amendments to the Bosnian constitution (the Butmir process, as it was known) in 2009. By the same token, if the five EU countries that have not recognized Kosovo would do so, thus joining the 22 that have (as well as the U.S.), it would make an enormous difference to eliminating the remaining risks to peace and stability in the Balkans. The EU’s recent “progress report” on Bosnia’s accession prospects aligns the Union more closely with the U.S. view that the central government in Bosnia is not strong enough to implement the obligations of EU membership. That could change the calculus of Bosnian politicians in important ways.
3. Use all the instruments, civilian and military. If you are going to bother intervening, it would seem natural to use all the instruments of national power pointing in the same directions, but that is in fact the exception rather than the rule.
This is where Dick Holbrooke made his real contribution in the Balkans, because he gained control of all the levers of American power and pointed them in the same direction. The EU is particularly inept at this: witness the distribution of its troops in militarily meaningless small units all over Bosnia, and the lackadaisical use of its massive rule of law mission in northern Kosovo, with European troops more interested preventing trouble than in clamping down on organized crime there. Admittedly, getting 27 countries to agree to use civilian and military instruments with vigor to achieve clear and compelling goals is not easy. But it is what is needed if Europe is to pretend to be a serious international intervenor in the future. It isn’t easy to get the State Department and the Defense Department to point in the same direction at the same time either.
These to me are useful lessons for future international intervention, if there is to be any. Both Europe and the U.S. are trying assiduously to avoid it if possible. But every president of the United States since the fall of the Berlin wall has tried to avoid state-building missions. Each has found he cannot without leaving behind a mess that is inimical to American interests. I have no reason to believe the pattern will change, so a few lessons are in order.
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No patriot
I enjoyed a pleasant Sunday afternoon walk through Pristina yesterday. Its alleys are crowded. But it also boasts vistas. Variety is one of the things that makes a place interesting. And with variety comes the unexpected, both good and bad.
Normally I wouldn’t comment on what amounts to an individual criminal act. The bad is inevitable. But the wounding Saturday evening of a Serb traveling south of the Ibar river just a few miles from where I am spending a couple of days merits a blog post, because it has broader significance.
The country I am enjoying on my third visit this year is a peaceful one that has established institutions rating a positive EU report suggesting it is ready to negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement. This is a big deal, not only for the benefits that will accrue to Kosovo once the agreement is signed but also for the seal of approval “contractual relations” (i.e. signing an agreement) with the EU will give to Pristina’s still young institutions, which are now more or less at the half-way point of recognition as sovereign by other UN member states.
The safety of Serbs is one of the key ingredients in determining EU attitudes on contractual relations. Brussels wants to know that the Pristina institutions are committed to protecting everyone who lives in or visits the territory under their control, without regard to ethnicity.
Of course 100% security is not possible, and I’ll admit that I am a bit surprised that a former Serb police chief felt free to travel after dark in Kosovo. And there is of course no knowing the ethnicity of his attacker, who was reportedly masked. We’ll have to await the results of the police investigation.
But that is just the point. There should be a serious police investigation and some results, which are far too infrequent in such cases in Kosovo. Too many crimes against Serbs and other minorities go unsolved.
Whoever perpetrated the attack Saturday evening is putting at risk Kosovo’s claim to be ready to negotiate an important first step in its eventual accession to the EU. I don’t know the person’s identity or ethnicity, but this much I do know: he is no Kosovo patriot.
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