Tag: European Union
The trick is to stay on course
Loyal readers will not be surprised by Libya’s smooth handover of power yesterday from its revolutionary Transitional National Council (NTC) to its General National Conference, the parliament elected in July. The July election went far better than many expected.
The Libyan revolution had many ways of going wrong. I wrote about them for the Council on Foreign Relations during the spring of 2010. My visit last September convinced me they had come down to just two: militias and Islamic extremism. Both have proved problematic, but they have not derailed a process that the NTC scoped out a year ago.
Why has Libya gone more right than wrong? There are many reasons. It is a geographically large but demographically small (6.4 million, more or less) country. It is rich. Even before the oil and gas started flowing, repatriated frozen assets provided ample resources. Libya is relatively homogeneous from an ethnic and sectarian perspective (compared to Iraq or Syria), though there are distinct groups, especially in the south, that have not yet fully accepted the revolution. The regional tensions are real, especially in the eastern province of Cyrenaica, but the revolution against Qaddafi gave Libyans a common cause, at least until now.
The role of the international community in Libya has been one of support, not direction. The United States and Europe, which were vital to the NATO operation that dislodged Qaddafi, had more important things on their minds once he was gone: Syria, Iran and the euro crisis. The United Nations and closely allied agencies (UNDP, IFES, etc.) provided assistance in organizing the July elections, but the Libyans were unequivocally in the lead. They have owned their revolution and its aftermath.
Now Libya faces its biggest challenges: deciding on how power is to be distributed and who will have it to start. A prime minister and new government is to be chosen within 30 days. When I left Libya last month, the clear intention of the biggest winner in the election, Mahmoud Jibril, was to form a broad, national unity government. If it can be done, this is smart. Bringing the Muslim Brotherhood and others with significant popular support in is a lot better than keeping them out.
The first and most important job of that new government is to decide how the committee to write the constitution is to be chosen. The original plan was for the GNC to somehow empower a committee. The TNC decided, in a last-minute move of dubious validity intended to encourage electoral participation in the east, that the committee should instead be elected on a regional basis.
However selected, the committee is to prepare a draft within 60 days that has to be submitted for approval by a 2/3 majority in a popular referendum. This is important: it guarantees that, however and by whomever written, the new constitution will have to have broad geographical and popular legitimacy. The time for preparation of the new constitution is far too short to allow serious public participation in the process. It would be wise for the GNC to give the process more time.
Once the constitution is approved, the GNC promulgates a new election law within 30 days and new elections are held with 180 days.
Many people are still worried about Libya’s once-revolutionary militias, which have not been fully demobilized or reintegrated, and about its Islamic extremists, who have been attacking the Red Cross (symbol of the crusaders of course) and trying to sow havoc. These are real and present dangers. Libya is still a long way from establishing law and order, even if the environment is already reasonably safe and secure most places most of the time.
Libya is on a good course. That is what counts. I am reminded of Zeno’s “dichotomy” paradox in its collegiate version: if you halve the distance between yourself and an attractive other at a constant rate, mathematicians say you’ll never arrive. But for all practical purposes, you do.
On its current course, Libya will arrive at something resembling a democracy, sooner or later. The trick is to stay on course.
PS: for another, well-informed, view see Christopher Blanchard’s Libya Transition and US Policy.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Farewell Pristina
I traveled back to the U.S. yesterday, leaving behind this interview in English, published by Pristina’s Daily Express in Albanian:
Q. Finally there is a government in place in Belgrade, a few months after the elections there. What are the chances now for a dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade, and the possibility of achieving eventual results?
A. It is too early to tell. The new prime minister Ivica Dacic has said some good things: he will give priority to Serbia’s economy, he is demoting the bureaucracy that is dedicated to Kosovo, and he says he will implement the agreements already reached with Pristina. But we have not only to hear what the new government says, but see what it does.
Q. On Friday there were contradictory signals in the Serbian Parliament during the government’s oath. Prime minister Ivica Dacic said that he will remain committed to keep Kosovo within the Serbian borders, but he appeared ready to continue the dialogue and to implement the agreements reached.
A. The Serbian constitution requires that Kosovo remain part of Serbia, so really Dacic has no choice about that. Serbia’s politicians created an enormous obstacle for themselves when in that the 2006 constitution. Continuation of the dialogue is not an end but a means. Let’s see if he fulfills the promise to implement the agreements already reached.
Q. What do you expect in the following phases as regards the relations Kosovo-Serbia? Can they be normalized soon?
A. I expect very little, but I do hope Serbia will recognize that its own interests are best served by normalization. Normalization means to me that Belgrade and Pristina should have representatives in each others’ capitals and accept each others’ territorial integrity. Belgrade is still far from that. I’m not sure Kosovo is quite ready for that either.
Q. How do you view the Kosovar diplomacy compared to the Serb one?
A. Serbian diplomacy is well-established and has been tactically very good: it has slowed recognitions and gained the presidency of the General Assembly. It has convinced too many countries that independent Kosovo is a threat to regional peace and security.
But I don’t really see what good any of that will do in the end. Recognitions are coming and will continue to come. The General Assembly presidency will end in a year, when I hope to see Kosovo with well over 100 recognitions.
Serbia lost its case at the International Court of Justice when it asked for an advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence, and its policies in northern Kosovo have created serious problems with organized crime and political violence that have already delayed the opening of Serbia’s negotiations for EU membership.
Slowing things down really doesn’t help Belgrade if it hurts Serbia’s EU prospects and the eventual outcome in Kosovo is the same.
Q. There was criticism that Kosovo diplomacy has not functioned properly. How do you see this?
A. You are up against a tough and experienced opponent with longstanding ties around the world and backing from Moscow. Kosovo’s diplomatic apparatus is still young and under construction–you are little known in many parts of the world. The European Union has split on Kosovo, with five members not recognizing. You have often had to rely a good deal on the Americans, especially in Latin America and Asia. You have made good progress in Africa lately. You are not going to win every battle. But ultimately Kosovo will be a UN member and well accepted in the international community. It already is in many places.
Q. Should Kosovo change something as regards diplomacy, in order to increase the number of recognitions, as well as improve the image of the country?
A. Kosovo needs to use every resource available to project its reality abroad. Its women are proving a particularly strong asset. Arta Dobroshin and Majlinda Kelmendi are helping you tell the world that Kosovo is a creative and talented country. Vlora Citaku is providing leadership in preparation for the European Union. The “Empowering Women” conference that President Jahjaga will sponsor in Pristina in early October is another good example.
My own family is surprised when I tell them how peaceful, safe and normal my visits to Pristina are. The end of international supervision gives you an excellent opportunity to tell the world that this is a country that meets its international obligations and will continue to do so even after formal international supervision comes to an end.
One of the most important things you need to do is project Kosovo’s reality to people in Serbia, where the press never ceases to portray circumstances here as chaotic, violent and unfriendly to Serbs. That image is also harmful to you in other countries.
Reaching out to ordinary Serbs and showing them that Kosovo knows how to treat people of all ethnic backgrounds fairly is a patriotic thing to do.
All countries in the democratic world are judged in part by how they treat their most disadvantaged minorities. America handicapped itself for many years on the world stage by not treating minorities correctly at home.
The human rights of Serbs, Roma and other citizens of Kosovo have to be fully protected if Kosovo is to be seen as a serious democracy worthy of international recognition. Implementation of the Ahtisaari plan has helped you a great deal. Continuing efforts in this direction will also pay off.
Q. You are in contact with Kosovo officials. Do you think that there are competent people in the Kosovo diplomacy?
A. Yes, I do believe your diplomatic officials are a wonderful, talented group of well-trained and highly committed people working under the strong leadership of Enver Hoxhaj. I am pleased to collaborate with them. The resources they have to work with are necessarily very limited, so they need to be clever and creative in generating opportunities to showcase Kosovo abroad and pursue its interests effectively. You are never going to have embassies like the American one I ran in Rome 20 years ago, which had 800 employees. But a few good Kosovars can work wonders if they are willing to work together and apply their limited resources in well-focused ways.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The zombie that haunts the Balkans
I promised yesterday a solution to Macedonia’s problems today, but to get there I am going to have to detour. The Macedonia “name” issue is unique. I can’t think of another situation, current or historical, in which a country wants a neighbor to change its name. It is also a zero sum problem: if Athens gains, Skopje loses, and vice versa.
It would be really nice if Athens came to the conclusion that rule of law requires it to give in on NATO membership for The FYROM (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), even if it believes the December 2011 International Court of Justice decision finding it in violation of a 1995 agreement is wrong. A few potential investors might even be favorably impressed and open their wallets.
But I am not holding my breath for that. Zero sum problems without solutions require reframing. Why is the “name” issue important? Because it prevents Macedonia from entering NATO and getting a date to begin its EU negotiations. Why is that important? Because those are the paths on which Macedonia has to make progress to avoid aggravating its inter-ethnic tensions, which in their most extreme form might lead to claims of exclusive territorial control over parts of the country or calls for Greater Albania or Greater Kosovo.
Ah! That is a problem I recognize from elsewhere in the Balkans. It exists almost everywhere: Serbs and Croats in Bosnia want to govern themselves on their own territory, Albanians in Kosovo feel the same way (as do Serbs in the north), some Macedonians would like to establish exclusive control over a homeland. We’ve had analogous problems in Croatia in the past (Serbs in the krajina, or borderlands) and there are latent problems inside Serbia (Bosniaks in Sandjak and Albanians in Presevo, not to mention Hungarians, Slovaks and Croats in Vojvodina).
Many of the ethnic problems of the Balkans boil down to this: why should I live as a minority in your territory, when you can live as a minority in mine?
This question could lead to an unending series of partitions along ethnic lines, something some of my colleagues in Washington do not fear. I do. Ethnic partition is a proven formula for precipitating violence, death and destruction on a grand scale. All those folks who agree on governing themselves find it difficult to decide where to draw the territorial lines, which is what leads to ethnic cleansing and war. The question is how to stop it, because once it starts it will spread from Kosovo and Macedonia at least as far as Bosnia and even Cyprus, with de jure division of the northern Turkish Republic from the rest of the island.
That is what Greeks should be worrying about, not the name of its northern neighbor.
The international community has been wise to use existing boundaries in the Balkans and try to avoid drawing new ones. While some would like to portray the independence of Kosovo as an ethnic partition of Serbia, it was not. No ethnic adjustment of Kosovo’s boundary was made when it was upgraded to a border. The same is true throughout the Balkans: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Montenegro all gained independence within well-established lines. There is no reason to depart from this course.
We’ve reached the point that a concerted and explicit international campaign to stop ethno-territorial division of the Balkans is in order. Rather than each country fighting these battles on its own, I’d like to see Europeans and Americans joining with partners in the Balkans to declare unequivocally that no territorial adjustments in the Balkans will be made on an ethnic basis, that the widely known and accepted borders are permanent and will be demarcated bilaterally, and that all concerned will join in an effort to take the measures necessary to prevent any changes.
These measures should be explicit and far-reaching, including:
- implementation of the Ahtisaari plan in northern Kosovo, with additional details required worked out in talks between Pristina and Belgrade
- admission of Macedonia into NATO as “The FYROM” in accordance with the 1995 interim accord, with explicit guarantees to Greece on its border if Athens wants them
- negotiation of EU membership only within a framework determined by central governments (in particular in Bosnia and Kosovo),
- a fixed time frame for a negotiated end to the de facto division of Cyprus,
- a region-wide agreement that each state will ensure the highest human rights standards for its minorities, with periodic verification by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
It is time that Macedonia and Bosnia as well as their friends in Albania, Montenegro and Croatia (that group is known in diplomatic parlance as the Adriatic 5) as well as Kosovo make common cause against ethnic partition in the Balkans, instead of struggling against it each country on its own.
The A5 and Kosovo will need some strong European allies against ethnic partition. The best bets are Germany, whose chancellor has been vigorous in her opposition to Serbian state structures in northern Kosovo, and the United Kingdom, where the idea of ethnic partition of Bosnia is rightly despised. If Greece joins the effort, to inoculate itself against irredentist claims from Macedonia, so much the better. A vigorous diplomatic initiative that engages the United States in addition would stand a chance of driving a wooden stake through the ethnic partition zombie that still haunts too much of the Balkans.
They taught me in school that if I didn’t know the answer to a question, I should ask a better one and answer that. Killing the ethnic partition zombie that haunts the Balkans seems to me far more important than finding a name Athens and Skopje can agree on.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Whose glory?
I took a quick jaunt to Skopje from Pristina this morning. It was an easy hour and a quarter on the way down before 8 am. Considerably longer on the way back, with interminable lines of less than 50 kph traffic crawling past equally interminable stores selling construction materials, bathroom fixtures, appliances and ceramic tile. Not to mention the ubiquitous (but all too obviously futile) auto larje, car wash.
I hadn’t seen Skopje since its still incomplete facelift, which installed a grand pedestrian plaza along the Vardar River, where ruined asphalt and weeds used to preside. It’s a dramatic improvement, marred by the grotesquely outsized equestrian statue of we guess Alexander the Great (as well as several other grand luminaries), not to mention a triumphal arch.
It is hard not laugh at the pretention. I imagine the Brits giggled when they captured (and burned down) Washington in 1812. What were the colonists thinking when they built such a grand Capitol and President’s House in the midst of a swamp? Pretencious dolts like Thomas Jefferson and George Washington thought they were building “New Rome.”
The Greeks aren’t laughing. They view Macedonia as expropriating their cultural heritage and have hardened their opposition to their northern neighbor calling itself “the Republic Macedonia,” the name by which most countries (including the United States) recognize it.
The political entity that boasts Skopje as its capital (but was not independent until 1991) has had that name in one form or another since before the end of World War II, which is longer than the living memory of most of its residents. The Greek objection is more or less the equivalent of the United States of America contesting Mexico’s right to call itself the United Mexican States, which happens to be the country’s formal name in English, or vice versa.
No one would, or should, take this issue seriously, were it not for the fact that Greece is blocking Skopje’s entry into NATO and the formal start of its negotiations for EU membership.
That’s no laughing matter, not least because of Macedonia’s ethnic composition. The one quarter of the population that is ethnic Albanian is a lot less attached to claims of ancient glory than many of their ethnic Macedonian fellow citizens. While they are not above claiming to be the descendants of the ancient Dardanians, Albanians have little use for the grand statues of the new downtown Skopje and wonder out loud how much they cost. They are far more interested in the small, relatively new, museum and chapel dedicated to Gonxha Agnes Bojaxhiu, aka Mother Therese (who was born nearby):
Many Albanians in Macedonia regard NATO membership as vital: it is the ultimate guarantee of Macedonia’s territorial integrity and their own security. It is something their politicians have promised, and are now finding it impossible to deliver. They would gladly compromise on the “name” issue if it gave them entry into the Alliance, whose headquarters in Kabul are, ironically, guarded by the Macedonian army.
Macedonia’s name has been an issue under negotiation for the past 20 years. A settlement is nowhere in sight. The new Greek prime minister, Antonis Samaras, built his career by opening the issue in the early 1990s, when he was foreign minister. The current Macedonian prime minister, Nikola Gruevski, has likewise built his career on claiming Macedonian glory for Skopje.
So what can be done to resolve the issue?
Skopje has wisely offered Athens a broad cooperative arrangement, with the Greeks entitled to pick and choose among many menu items. This is intended to enlarge the pie, always a good idea when faced with a zero sum negotiation. But Macedonia is far from being able to offer what Greeks might really want: many billions to bail them out of their debit.
Tomorrow I’ll consider a more realistic way forward.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The proof is in the pudding
Belgrade finally has a new government, formed more than two and a half months after the May 6 election. It is an unabashedly nationalist government, with Interior Minister Ivica Dačić at the helm. The governing coalition will include his “socialists,” President Nikolic’s “progressives” as well as Mlađan Dinkić’s United Regions of Serbia.
Initial signals are that this will be a “Serbia first” government that aims for economic revival above all else. Dačić, who will hold on to the Interior Ministry, told parliament:
The new government’s priority is the economic recovery of the country. All other key goals of this government, such as Serbia’s European future, the solving of the Kosovo issue, regional cooperation, combating crime and corruption, heath care, education, and others, will depend on whether or not we will be able to secure our country’s economic survival.
This is strikingly sensible and responsive to the views of Serbia’s voters. Dinkić will play the key role as economy and finance minister. Suzana Grubješić, whom I guess I know as Suzana Mrgic, will be in charge of EU integration and a deputy prime minister.
Kosovo has been demoted from ministerial rank to a mere office. The new government is pledging to implement agreements already reached with Pristina, which is a good thing and if carried out a big change. Aleksandar Vučić is a deputy prime minister in charge of defense, security, combat against corruption and crime, and defense minister. This will make him, in addition to the prime minister, an important player in dealing with the thorny issues arising in northern Kosovo, where Serbian security structures, passionate rejection of Pristina’s authority and illegal trafficking of many different sorts make a combustible mix.
The new Foreign Minister, Ivan Mrkić, is a professional foreign service officer (formerly state secretary) who served the Milosevic regime in the 1990s as ambassador to Cyprus. Whatever his role in serving Milosevic’s requirements, this should give him a very good idea of why partition of Kosovo is a really bad idea.
So what do I think about all this? I think it is about as good as could be expected: a newish government that reflects the election results, which defeated a somewhat less nationalist and more liberal government that also had good economic intentions but found it difficult to deliver.
The proof is in the pudding, which the American way of saying that we have to wait to see the results. Serbs will be most interested in the economic results. Internationals like me will be interested in what all this means for peace and stability in the Balkans. A quick move to establish the integrated boundary/border management foreseen in one of the agreements with Pristina would be a good step in the right direction. If they don’t like that one, there are several other agreements whose implementation awaits a willing Belgrade government.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
A letter to Bill Burns
People sometimes ask what I say to my colleagues in the State Department about Balkans issues. It’s often difficult to answer, since I usually talk with them, though a lot less often than some people may imagine. But a queasy feeling of things coming apart moved me last week to write a note to Bill Burns, the deputy secretary. Here is what I said:
While I realize the Balkans are not anywhere near the top of your “do” list, even within Europe, I fear things could come apart there. Washington needs to ensure that does not happen. With the likely formation of a new, more nationalist governing coalition in Belgrade, forceful steps are needed that only Washington can inspire. At stake are achievements that have protected the lives and well being of people who regard the United States as their friend and ally.
There are three places action is needed:
- Bosnia: I won’t urge you to get involved in Bosnia’s constitutional issues, as there have already been three U.S.-sponsored failures. Only the Bosnians working together are going to be able to modify the Dayton state so that it can qualify for European Union membership. But we need to ensure in the meanwhile that Bosnia does not come apart. The EU should end its growing inclination to negotiate membership separately with Republika Srpska and move its remaining troops in the country to Brcko, which is the linchpin that holds Bosnia together.
- Kosovo: The de facto partition of Kosovo at the Ibar River is a threat to stability not only inside Kosovo but also in Macedonia, Bosnia, Serbia and Cyprus. A small spark could set off a region-wide conflagration and a series of ethnic partitions. Key agreements reached in the talks on practical issues remain unimplemented. We need a concerted US and EU effort to establish Kosovo’s sovereignty in the north in accordance with the Ahtisaari peace plan. This will require a serious U.S. effort to convince the five remaining EU members who have not yet done so to recognize Kosovo.
- Serbia: The end of the Tadic presidency frees Brussels and Washington to press Belgrade for more definitive resolution of issues in Bosnia and Kosovo. At the same time, both the EU and the US should try to preserve in Serbia a vigorous pro-EU political opposition and civil society committed to maintaining Serbia’s Western ties and blocking Russia’s already outsized influence in Belgrade.
Washington has too many other problems on its plate to do a lot of heavy lifting in the Balkans, where the Europeans should carry most of the burden. I am not asking much:
- Get the Europeans to deal more with the government in Sarajevo on accession and move their troops to where they will signal serious intent of holding Bosnia together,
- Convince five EU members to recognize Pristina’s sovereignty and implement the Ahtisaari plan in northern Kosovo,
- Maintain a vigorous democratic opposition in Belgrade.
These are steps well within the capability of your able diplomats without major new resources.
With respect and appreciation for your many efforts,
RSS - Posts
