Tag: European Union
Footnote to a footnote
Some of my readers will remember **********************************************, as well as a follow-up post on the question of how Kosovo is to be identified at international meetings in Europe when Serbia is present. I am pleased to note that Belgrade reportedly has seen the light on this one and no longer insists that the entire footnote be reproduced on Kosovo’s nameplate, but rather in documentation following the meeting.
The footnote references UN Security Council resolution 1244, which foresees a political process leading to a decision on Kosovo’s final status, as well as the International Court of Justice decision advising that Kosovo’s declaration of independence breached no international law. As these items condition Serbia’s sovereignty more than Kosovo’s, I see no particular harm in them, even if Belgrade continues to assert that the footnote distinguishes Kosovo from other sovereign states. The asterisk really belongs to Serbia*.
Kosovo is however different from other sovereign states, because it has lived under a regime of limited sovereignty imposed as a condition of its independence by the internationally supported Comprehensive Settlement Proposal (the Ahtisaari plan). An important component of the limitations is to be lifted September 10/11, when the International Civilian Office (ICO) in Kosovo terminates its work supervising the implementation of the Ahtisaari plan. This is one of those rare moments when an international mission manages to work itself out of a job, completing what it set out to do. Credit is due to Pieter Feith, the Dutch head of the ICO, who is repeating: he also completed an EU mission in Aceh, Indonesia, some years ago. I’ll be interested in seeing which mission he gets to close next.
Some of my friends think the ICO’s termination is not a good thing, since it is the one international organization in Kosovo clearly associated with the country’s independence. I, too, would rather see some of the other organizations, especially UNMIK, disappear, but that isn’t going to happen without Belgrade’s concurrence. The best that can be hoped for is that it withers away, which is pretty much what is happening.
The state-building process in Kosovo is not finished once ICO disappears and UNMIK withers. Only the formal international supervision of Ahtisaari plan implementation has reached an end. There are many other ways in which Kosovo remains without the full attributes of sovereignty. It still lacks security forces that can defend its territory. This restriction is scheduled for reevaluation in 2013. It has international prosecutors and judges in its court system. These I understand Kosovo will extend, along with the EU rule of law mission EULEX, until 2014. While my friends at KIPRED have catalogued the many ways in which Kosovo remains under international constraints, in my view a new state does well to move cautiously in claiming its sovereign powers, if only because that will enable it to attract significant support from the international community.
The day is coming though when the five EU members that have not yet recognized Pristina (even if they all I believe maintain diplomatic representation there) should drop their reluctance and accept Kosovo as sovereign and independent. Their failure to do so has prolonged Belgrade’s resistance and given some there to hope for partition, which would encourage similar moves in Bosnia and Cyprus.
The EU needs to insist that Belgrade give up its de facto domination of northern Kosovo in favor of the decentralized governance guaranteed by the Ahtissari plan. That can be done by a single EU member acting alone to block a date for Serbia’s accession talks to begin. I expect Germany will do that if necessary. But the EU would do much better to act as 27. That would be no footnote. It would deserve an ! rather than a *.
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Autopilot to a crash landing
Kurt Bassuener of the Democratization Policy Council, who lives and works in Sarajevo, reacted to my latest on Bosnia with a letter too detailed and interesting to hide in a comment, but stop reading here if you are not interested in the Balkans:
Hi Dan,
Bosnia and Herzegovina is at risk. I stand by my conclusion that any dissolution will be violent. My colleague Bodo Weber and the Atlantic Initiative’s Vlado Azinović, as you know, enumerated the potential conflict factors last October in our security risk analysis. The situation has worsened since.
You’re dead right to note Sandžak as a factor. I am certain that the distinct minority who espouse a Bosniak {Muslim} national state have it in mind as part of the equation. Republika Srpska President Dodik wouldn’t care because
a) it wouldn’t come out of the territory he controls,
b) it would strengthen his position vis-a-vis Belgrade.
But a Bosniak state would be exceedingly hard to sell – it would have to be presented as a fait accompli, saving what could be saved. The last time it was tried, in 1993 with the besieged Republic of BiH fighting both the Serb Republic Army and the Croat Defense Force, the Bosniaks still refused, despite the adverse conditions.
Were I good at detachment, I could almost enjoy watching the political circus here. It looks as if Dodik has assembled the votes to oust Social Democratic Party (SDP) leader Zlatko Lagumdžija from his post as foreign minister. For the past seven months, Lagumdžija has effectively acted as an unwitting agent of Dodik’s agenda. Now that total political chaos reigns in the Federation, Dodik is demonstrating who’s boss by demanding his ministry back.
This was an Icarus experience for Lagumdžija. He apparently thought he could lead the Federation in such a way as to compete with the RS and exercise equal influence in the state. Haris Silajdžić, albeit from a different post, held similar pretensions in the last government. But given the diffusion of power in the Federation, as well as the view from Banja Luka that state competences inherently infringe on entity competences, whoever rules the RS effectively rules the state by default. The SDP is likely to get hammered in the local elections. The sense of betrayal among its voter base is massive.
In a conversation with a friend recently, I remarked that Lagumdžija had served Dodik’s agenda, albeit I doubt he saw it that way. My friend’s retort was that he thought that Croat political leader Čović had done that. But Čović at least recognized he was getting into a subservient relationship with Dodik, in the hope that he’ll get the crumbs of a divided BiH – de jure or de facto.
I knew when this state-level government was formed that nothing could be done, given its configuration – at least nothing real. Lagumdžija is pushing for anything that will allow for BiH to apply for EU candidacy, however hopeless that application would be at present on both sides of the equation. Hence the ridiculous deal on how to implement the Sejdić-Finci European Court of Human Rights ruling of December 2009. While it might not put wind in his sails politically, I suspect the EU would jump at the chance to take any Sejdić-Finci arrangement to declare progress.
The fun part of all of this is that Dodik can be forgiven for banking on intra-Bosniak political fratricide as a force multiplier for his playing the long game toward independence – delegitimizing the state, “proving” it’s impossible (with dependable help from within the Bosnian Federation) to the EU (with a lot of uptake among the continentals – especially the European Commission). But it probably won’t be the Federation’s party leaders who literally call the shots when it boils over – and it will if this continues. It’s more likely to be veterans’ organizations or other parallel structures.
So while you’re probably right that there is little interest in recognizing an independent RS, at least in most Western capitals, there is also no will to shift out of the bureaucratic autopilot we’re in, which ultimately ends in violence. That would make this that much worse. Only external actors are in a position to arrest this trajectory. They’re just not willing to do so. The bill will still land on their doorstep, whether they want to admit that to themselves or not. Total myopia…
Germany recently laid down two markers in rapid succession – the Ambassador said OHR has a negative effect in BiH and Germany announced its withdrawal from EUFOR. The number of troops is insignificant – three, as I understand. But the point was to make clear that the time for executive mandates is past. The Chapter 7 mandate comes up for renewal by the Security Council in November. Significantly, Dodik has embraced ending the EUFOR mandate for the first time. Previously, the RS had been for keeping EUFOR while closing OHR. The Russians are all for booting both OHR and EUFOR. In Banja Luka last month, the Russian Ambassador mooted BiH/RS joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Cheers,
Kurt
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Bear hug
Milan Marinković of Niš continues his series on the new government in Belgrade:
Last week Serbian defense minister Aleksandar Vučić spent a few days in his first official visit to Russia. After meeting with Russian deputy prime minister Dmitry Rogozin, who previously served as ambassador to NATO, Vučić told media the two sides agreed to engage in defense industry cooperation. The project would involve joint participation in the international market. In relation to this, Vučić announced that Serbia was going to open a factory for manufacturing complex military systems.
The agreement is currently in the preliminary stage. An expert team should be formed soon to work out specific details. In Serbia analysts are divided on potential effects of the cooperation. Some believe it could benefit Serbia’s defense industry, which is already a successful exporter of military equipment to third-world countries. Others are more cautious due to insufficient information and fear that Russia will obtain too much influence in Serbia.
The likely strengthening of military ties between Russia and Serbia is not a surprise. Shortly after becoming defense minister, Aleksandar Vučić said that Serbia, as a “militarily neutral“ country, will not join NATO or any other military alliance, but remains free to develop bilateral relationships with anyone. He praised good cooperation of the Serbian army with the Ohio National Guard, but criticized his predecessor for neglecting “other parts of the world” – notably Russia. Although Vučić’s narrative suggests that Belgrade is planning to keep on walking a thin line between East and West, for the moment it appears to be tacking East.
It is not only in defense affairs that Russo-Serbian relations are on the increase, but also in the economy. Russia says it is seriously interested to take part in vital infrastructure projects in Serbia as a major investor. The Serbian government has admitted it may have to sell several state-owned monopolies in order to reduce the ever growing budget deficit and public debt. Instead of private companies – either foreign or domestic – the most likely candidate to buy some of these is the Russian state. Russia is also frequently mentioned as a potential buyer of the steel factory in the town of Smederevo, which Serbia recently re-nationalized following the withdrawal of U.S. Steel from ownership of the factory.
Serbia is thus slowly but surely getting sucked into Russia’s sphere of influence. Being almost devastated economically, Serbia is in no position – and generally has no reason – to antagonize any country, and certainly not one like Russia, which is a force to be reckoned with even when at its weakest. Serbia needs good relations with Moscow. But having a good relationship is quite different from building a strategic partnership. If Serbia is still committed to European integration, as its government claims, then it must seek major allies among leading EU states as much as in the Kremlin.
A big part of the orientation towards Russia is based on populism. Serbs love Russia, including many who also support the country’s bid for EU membership. Vladimir Putin would no doubt win presidential elections in Serbia by a large margin if he were eligible to run. At the same time, the ongoing economic crisis is making the EU look less attractive in the eyes of the Serbian public – as evidenced by latest opinion polls.
Russia’s deep pockets may help save Serbia in the short-term. The question is whether Serb affection for Russia will be good or bad for Serbia and its European ambitions in the long run.
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The trick is to stay on course
Loyal readers will not be surprised by Libya’s smooth handover of power yesterday from its revolutionary Transitional National Council (NTC) to its General National Conference, the parliament elected in July. The July election went far better than many expected.
The Libyan revolution had many ways of going wrong. I wrote about them for the Council on Foreign Relations during the spring of 2010. My visit last September convinced me they had come down to just two: militias and Islamic extremism. Both have proved problematic, but they have not derailed a process that the NTC scoped out a year ago.
Why has Libya gone more right than wrong? There are many reasons. It is a geographically large but demographically small (6.4 million, more or less) country. It is rich. Even before the oil and gas started flowing, repatriated frozen assets provided ample resources. Libya is relatively homogeneous from an ethnic and sectarian perspective (compared to Iraq or Syria), though there are distinct groups, especially in the south, that have not yet fully accepted the revolution. The regional tensions are real, especially in the eastern province of Cyrenaica, but the revolution against Qaddafi gave Libyans a common cause, at least until now.
The role of the international community in Libya has been one of support, not direction. The United States and Europe, which were vital to the NATO operation that dislodged Qaddafi, had more important things on their minds once he was gone: Syria, Iran and the euro crisis. The United Nations and closely allied agencies (UNDP, IFES, etc.) provided assistance in organizing the July elections, but the Libyans were unequivocally in the lead. They have owned their revolution and its aftermath.
Now Libya faces its biggest challenges: deciding on how power is to be distributed and who will have it to start. A prime minister and new government is to be chosen within 30 days. When I left Libya last month, the clear intention of the biggest winner in the election, Mahmoud Jibril, was to form a broad, national unity government. If it can be done, this is smart. Bringing the Muslim Brotherhood and others with significant popular support in is a lot better than keeping them out.
The first and most important job of that new government is to decide how the committee to write the constitution is to be chosen. The original plan was for the GNC to somehow empower a committee. The TNC decided, in a last-minute move of dubious validity intended to encourage electoral participation in the east, that the committee should instead be elected on a regional basis.
However selected, the committee is to prepare a draft within 60 days that has to be submitted for approval by a 2/3 majority in a popular referendum. This is important: it guarantees that, however and by whomever written, the new constitution will have to have broad geographical and popular legitimacy. The time for preparation of the new constitution is far too short to allow serious public participation in the process. It would be wise for the GNC to give the process more time.
Once the constitution is approved, the GNC promulgates a new election law within 30 days and new elections are held with 180 days.
Many people are still worried about Libya’s once-revolutionary militias, which have not been fully demobilized or reintegrated, and about its Islamic extremists, who have been attacking the Red Cross (symbol of the crusaders of course) and trying to sow havoc. These are real and present dangers. Libya is still a long way from establishing law and order, even if the environment is already reasonably safe and secure most places most of the time.
Libya is on a good course. That is what counts. I am reminded of Zeno’s “dichotomy” paradox in its collegiate version: if you halve the distance between yourself and an attractive other at a constant rate, mathematicians say you’ll never arrive. But for all practical purposes, you do.
On its current course, Libya will arrive at something resembling a democracy, sooner or later. The trick is to stay on course.
PS: for another, well-informed, view see Christopher Blanchard’s Libya Transition and US Policy.
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Farewell Pristina
I traveled back to the U.S. yesterday, leaving behind this interview in English, published by Pristina’s Daily Express in Albanian:
Q. Finally there is a government in place in Belgrade, a few months after the elections there. What are the chances now for a dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade, and the possibility of achieving eventual results?
A. It is too early to tell. The new prime minister Ivica Dacic has said some good things: he will give priority to Serbia’s economy, he is demoting the bureaucracy that is dedicated to Kosovo, and he says he will implement the agreements already reached with Pristina. But we have not only to hear what the new government says, but see what it does.
Q. On Friday there were contradictory signals in the Serbian Parliament during the government’s oath. Prime minister Ivica Dacic said that he will remain committed to keep Kosovo within the Serbian borders, but he appeared ready to continue the dialogue and to implement the agreements reached.
A. The Serbian constitution requires that Kosovo remain part of Serbia, so really Dacic has no choice about that. Serbia’s politicians created an enormous obstacle for themselves when in that the 2006 constitution. Continuation of the dialogue is not an end but a means. Let’s see if he fulfills the promise to implement the agreements already reached.
Q. What do you expect in the following phases as regards the relations Kosovo-Serbia? Can they be normalized soon?
A. I expect very little, but I do hope Serbia will recognize that its own interests are best served by normalization. Normalization means to me that Belgrade and Pristina should have representatives in each others’ capitals and accept each others’ territorial integrity. Belgrade is still far from that. I’m not sure Kosovo is quite ready for that either.
Q. How do you view the Kosovar diplomacy compared to the Serb one?
A. Serbian diplomacy is well-established and has been tactically very good: it has slowed recognitions and gained the presidency of the General Assembly. It has convinced too many countries that independent Kosovo is a threat to regional peace and security.
But I don’t really see what good any of that will do in the end. Recognitions are coming and will continue to come. The General Assembly presidency will end in a year, when I hope to see Kosovo with well over 100 recognitions.
Serbia lost its case at the International Court of Justice when it asked for an advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence, and its policies in northern Kosovo have created serious problems with organized crime and political violence that have already delayed the opening of Serbia’s negotiations for EU membership.
Slowing things down really doesn’t help Belgrade if it hurts Serbia’s EU prospects and the eventual outcome in Kosovo is the same.
Q. There was criticism that Kosovo diplomacy has not functioned properly. How do you see this?
A. You are up against a tough and experienced opponent with longstanding ties around the world and backing from Moscow. Kosovo’s diplomatic apparatus is still young and under construction–you are little known in many parts of the world. The European Union has split on Kosovo, with five members not recognizing. You have often had to rely a good deal on the Americans, especially in Latin America and Asia. You have made good progress in Africa lately. You are not going to win every battle. But ultimately Kosovo will be a UN member and well accepted in the international community. It already is in many places.
Q. Should Kosovo change something as regards diplomacy, in order to increase the number of recognitions, as well as improve the image of the country?
A. Kosovo needs to use every resource available to project its reality abroad. Its women are proving a particularly strong asset. Arta Dobroshin and Majlinda Kelmendi are helping you tell the world that Kosovo is a creative and talented country. Vlora Citaku is providing leadership in preparation for the European Union. The “Empowering Women” conference that President Jahjaga will sponsor in Pristina in early October is another good example.
My own family is surprised when I tell them how peaceful, safe and normal my visits to Pristina are. The end of international supervision gives you an excellent opportunity to tell the world that this is a country that meets its international obligations and will continue to do so even after formal international supervision comes to an end.
One of the most important things you need to do is project Kosovo’s reality to people in Serbia, where the press never ceases to portray circumstances here as chaotic, violent and unfriendly to Serbs. That image is also harmful to you in other countries.
Reaching out to ordinary Serbs and showing them that Kosovo knows how to treat people of all ethnic backgrounds fairly is a patriotic thing to do.
All countries in the democratic world are judged in part by how they treat their most disadvantaged minorities. America handicapped itself for many years on the world stage by not treating minorities correctly at home.
The human rights of Serbs, Roma and other citizens of Kosovo have to be fully protected if Kosovo is to be seen as a serious democracy worthy of international recognition. Implementation of the Ahtisaari plan has helped you a great deal. Continuing efforts in this direction will also pay off.
Q. You are in contact with Kosovo officials. Do you think that there are competent people in the Kosovo diplomacy?
A. Yes, I do believe your diplomatic officials are a wonderful, talented group of well-trained and highly committed people working under the strong leadership of Enver Hoxhaj. I am pleased to collaborate with them. The resources they have to work with are necessarily very limited, so they need to be clever and creative in generating opportunities to showcase Kosovo abroad and pursue its interests effectively. You are never going to have embassies like the American one I ran in Rome 20 years ago, which had 800 employees. But a few good Kosovars can work wonders if they are willing to work together and apply their limited resources in well-focused ways.
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The zombie that haunts the Balkans
I promised yesterday a solution to Macedonia’s problems today, but to get there I am going to have to detour. The Macedonia “name” issue is unique. I can’t think of another situation, current or historical, in which a country wants a neighbor to change its name. It is also a zero sum problem: if Athens gains, Skopje loses, and vice versa.
It would be really nice if Athens came to the conclusion that rule of law requires it to give in on NATO membership for The FYROM (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), even if it believes the December 2011 International Court of Justice decision finding it in violation of a 1995 agreement is wrong. A few potential investors might even be favorably impressed and open their wallets.
But I am not holding my breath for that. Zero sum problems without solutions require reframing. Why is the “name” issue important? Because it prevents Macedonia from entering NATO and getting a date to begin its EU negotiations. Why is that important? Because those are the paths on which Macedonia has to make progress to avoid aggravating its inter-ethnic tensions, which in their most extreme form might lead to claims of exclusive territorial control over parts of the country or calls for Greater Albania or Greater Kosovo.
Ah! That is a problem I recognize from elsewhere in the Balkans. It exists almost everywhere: Serbs and Croats in Bosnia want to govern themselves on their own territory, Albanians in Kosovo feel the same way (as do Serbs in the north), some Macedonians would like to establish exclusive control over a homeland. We’ve had analogous problems in Croatia in the past (Serbs in the krajina, or borderlands) and there are latent problems inside Serbia (Bosniaks in Sandjak and Albanians in Presevo, not to mention Hungarians, Slovaks and Croats in Vojvodina).
Many of the ethnic problems of the Balkans boil down to this: why should I live as a minority in your territory, when you can live as a minority in mine?
This question could lead to an unending series of partitions along ethnic lines, something some of my colleagues in Washington do not fear. I do. Ethnic partition is a proven formula for precipitating violence, death and destruction on a grand scale. All those folks who agree on governing themselves find it difficult to decide where to draw the territorial lines, which is what leads to ethnic cleansing and war. The question is how to stop it, because once it starts it will spread from Kosovo and Macedonia at least as far as Bosnia and even Cyprus, with de jure division of the northern Turkish Republic from the rest of the island.
That is what Greeks should be worrying about, not the name of its northern neighbor.
The international community has been wise to use existing boundaries in the Balkans and try to avoid drawing new ones. While some would like to portray the independence of Kosovo as an ethnic partition of Serbia, it was not. No ethnic adjustment of Kosovo’s boundary was made when it was upgraded to a border. The same is true throughout the Balkans: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Montenegro all gained independence within well-established lines. There is no reason to depart from this course.
We’ve reached the point that a concerted and explicit international campaign to stop ethno-territorial division of the Balkans is in order. Rather than each country fighting these battles on its own, I’d like to see Europeans and Americans joining with partners in the Balkans to declare unequivocally that no territorial adjustments in the Balkans will be made on an ethnic basis, that the widely known and accepted borders are permanent and will be demarcated bilaterally, and that all concerned will join in an effort to take the measures necessary to prevent any changes.
These measures should be explicit and far-reaching, including:
- implementation of the Ahtisaari plan in northern Kosovo, with additional details required worked out in talks between Pristina and Belgrade
- admission of Macedonia into NATO as “The FYROM” in accordance with the 1995 interim accord, with explicit guarantees to Greece on its border if Athens wants them
- negotiation of EU membership only within a framework determined by central governments (in particular in Bosnia and Kosovo),
- a fixed time frame for a negotiated end to the de facto division of Cyprus,
- a region-wide agreement that each state will ensure the highest human rights standards for its minorities, with periodic verification by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
It is time that Macedonia and Bosnia as well as their friends in Albania, Montenegro and Croatia (that group is known in diplomatic parlance as the Adriatic 5) as well as Kosovo make common cause against ethnic partition in the Balkans, instead of struggling against it each country on its own.
The A5 and Kosovo will need some strong European allies against ethnic partition. The best bets are Germany, whose chancellor has been vigorous in her opposition to Serbian state structures in northern Kosovo, and the United Kingdom, where the idea of ethnic partition of Bosnia is rightly despised. If Greece joins the effort, to inoculate itself against irredentist claims from Macedonia, so much the better. A vigorous diplomatic initiative that engages the United States in addition would stand a chance of driving a wooden stake through the ethnic partition zombie that still haunts too much of the Balkans.
They taught me in school that if I didn’t know the answer to a question, I should ask a better one and answer that. Killing the ethnic partition zombie that haunts the Balkans seems to me far more important than finding a name Athens and Skopje can agree on.
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