Tag: European Union
No one should be fooled: Serbia is lost for now
Colleagues I know and respect think that Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic aims a) to get neighboring countries to treat their Serb populations correctly, and b) thereby avoid any mass migration of Serbs, as occurred in the 1990s when they left Croatia and Kosovo.
I beg to differ. I see no evidence of these two claims and lots of contrary indications.
Let us count them:
- In Kosovo, Vucic controls the Serbian List, which occupies all the Serb seats in the Kosovo Assembly. The Serbian List does not cooperate with other political parties to improve the lot of the Serbs but instead has conducted itself as a spoiler, boycotting parliament often. Belgrade has threatened and harassed Serbs who join Kosovo’s nascent army, and recently deployed army units, as well as the Russian ambassador, to the boundary/border with Kosovo in response to a dispute over license plates (sic).
- Vucic has toyed with the idea of trading Albanian-majority municipalities in Kosovo’s south for Kosovo’s Serb-majority municipalities in the north. But the majority of Serbs in Kosovo live south of the Ibar river. This “border correction” scheme would end the viability of those communities and lead to their eventual, if not immediate, abandonment.
- In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the now Vucic-allied Serb member of the tripartite presidency (Milorad Dodik) has tried to undermine the state institutions in preparation for secession and independence of Republika Srpska (RS), which occupies 49% of the country’s territory. Dodik objects to any strengthening of the state’s judiciary, police, army, and parliament.
- Vucic has taken up the cudgels in favor of a “Serbian Home,” that is a state that would annex the Serb populations of Bosnia, Kosovo, and Montenegro. The idea is indistinguishable from “Greater Serbia” and “all Serbs in one country,” the slogans that led Milosevic to four wars in the 1990s, all of which were lost and led to the mass migration of Serbs to Serbia.
- In Montenegro, a new Vucic-aligned government dominated by people who identify as Serbs is welcoming Russian and Serbian dominance and undermining the independence and sovereignty of NATO’s newest member, while also mistreating the country’s minorities.
It is hallucinatory to think that the Serbian Home and the behavior of Vucic-allied Serbs in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montnegro is intended to improve the lot of Serbs in neighboring countries or to avoid mass migration. This is no doubt a line Vucic uses with Westerners, as he knows what they want (and don’t want) to hear. But that doesn’t make it true.
In addition to threatening his neighbors, Vucic is taking Serbia in a definitively autocratic as well as Russia- and China-focused direction. Belgrade’s foreign policies are only 60% or so aligned with the European Union, the lowest ratio in the Western Balkans. Serbia has joined the free trade area of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, which is incompatible with EU membership. Belgrade has declared itself “neutral” with no intention of joining NATO (unlike all its neighbors). Its media are not free, its judiciary is not independent, and its economy is largely state-directed, with big investments from Russia and even bigger ones from China. Belgrade’s recent arms purchases are likewise largely from Moscow and Beijing.
Vucic faces an election, albeit not a free or fair one, next year. There is no viable liberal democratic alternative. The only current threat to his dominance comes from ethnic nationalists. He sees no hope of joining the European Union within his next five-year mandate and is behaving accordingly: grab what you can from Russia and China, promise to protect Serbs in other countries, look for opportunities to bring them and the land they occupy into Serbia, and stave off the the Europeans and Americans by telling them that you are anxious to avoid mass migration and improve the lot of Serbs in neighboring countries.
No one should be fooled. It is time for Washington and Brussels to wake up and smell the coffee. The geopolitical challenges from Russia and China have dashed hopes for early realization of a Europe “whole and free.” Serbia is lost to the liberal democratic world so long as this Vucic is president. He is a chameleon. For now, he has surrounded himself with autocrats and ethnic nationalists. Courting his favor won’t get us anywhere. Supporting serious liberal democrats inside Serbia and in the region might get us something. But we’ll still need to wait six years or more for a serious alternative.
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Reciprocity is right, and making it stick is vital
Kosovo in recent days has imposed on cars coming from Serbia a requirement to use Kosovo license plates. This mirrors a Serbian requirement that cars coming from Kosovo use Serbian plates. Serb residents of northern Kosovo are protesting by blocking roads. Kosovo police have so far not cleared them.
Reciprocity is correct from the Pristina perspective. It is a basic principle of relations between sovereign states. That is also precisely why Serbia rejects it. Belgrade regards Kosovo as Serbian sovereign territory. Reciprocity is not a principle that governs relations between a sovereign and part of its own territory, even if that part has its own goverrnment, police, and in this case security forces.
From my perspective, Kosovo is a sovereign state: its declaration of independence breached no international law, Serbia has recognized the validity of Kosovo’s constitution on its entire territory, and it has its own democratically validated parliament, prime minister, and president. Serbia does not contest this and claims the territory but not 90% of the people. But if Kosovo Albanians are not citizens of Serbia, then they must be citizens of something else, which is the Republic of Kosovo for all practical and legal purposes.
So demanding reciprocity is consistent with Kosovo’s sovereignty, but that doesn’t mean applying that principle to license plates is smart. Once you do that, you need to anticipate what Belgrade will do in response, like blocking the roads. If you can leave them blocked without any serious economic harm, or if you can clear them without creating a mess, you could come out on top, but only if Belgrade yields. You have to also think about what else Belgrade might do next: create trouble in the Serb communities south of Ibar, complain to the European Union and the Americans, or make a show of military force on its side of the border, which is what it has done in addition to the complaints. It doesn’t suffice to be right about reciprocity; you have to make it stick.
There are other areas where the principle of reciprocity might be invoked, perhaps with greater effect. Certainly Kosovo should ask of Serbia, which wants an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities in Kosovo, an Association of Albanian-majority municipalities in Serbia, with equivalent functions and powers. It could also ask for guaranteed Albanian seats in Serbia’s parliament, as 10 seats in Kosovo’s are reserved to Serbs. It was a mistake not to insist that the Specialist Chambers now prosecuting Kosovo Liberation Army leaders in The Hague also be able to prosecute crimes committed on the territory of Serbia, not just Kosovo.
But to do these things successfully, Pristina needs to line up unequivocal international support in Washington and Brussels. Both have instead adopted an attitude of impartiality. This is a mistake. Serbia is no long “sitting on two stools.” It has committed itself to Russia and China, which have reciprocated with arms and investment. The EU and US need to open their eyes and realize that the current geopolitical competition requires a much firmer commitment to pro-Western forces throughout the Balkans, not only in Kosovo but also in Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
President Biden, who has expressed unequivocal support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the countries of the Balkans, needs now to put his thumb of the scale in favor of democracy throughout the region. That will mean favoring some over others, rather than retreating to a “Europe whole and free” mantra that was appropriate for the unipolar moment but now faces concerted Russian troublemaking and Chinese influence-peddling throughout the continent. Serbia has made itself handmaiden to those efforts.
Kosovo is America’s most loyal friend in the region. It is time for Washington to recognize it as a strategic partner in countering Russian and Chinese influence and to support unequivocally its sovereign equality with Serbia. With that support, reciprocity will stick.
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Parsing the Afghanistan quandary: humanitarian aid now, nothing more
The UN is anticipating that virtually the entire population of Afghanistan will soon require humanitarian assistance. The country’s economy is imploding. The new Taliban government is broke. The neighbors currying favor with the new authorities in Kabul are not traditional sources of aid: Pakistan, Iran, China, and Russia, not to mention Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekhistan, and Tajikistan. The UN and non-governmental relief organizations will be willing, but they depend on financing from the usual suspects: the US, the EU, Japan, and other developed countries. The one willing Gulf donor is presumably Qatar, which played a role in the negotiations between the US and the Taliban and now runs Kabul airport.
The humanitarian imperative is clear: provide the aid to those in need, no matter what the politics. Life with dignity is everyone’s right. But this is an odd situation: the Taliban just ousted the internationally recognized government, they have not fulfilled the minimal requirements the UN Security Council has levied, and the countries now expected to provide aid are those the Taliban spent twenty years fighting. American taxpayers, having just witnessed the humiliation of the US withdrawal, are now expected to ante up in ways that will make the Taliban regime sustainable?
The problem extends beyond humanitarian assistance. At least that can be done without putting cash in Taliban pockets. The Taliban will still benefit, as otherwise the burden of feeding the population would fall to them. But assistance with government expenditures, including so-called “early-recovery” and reconstruction, will directly help the Taliban to hold on to the power they gained by force, as will unfreezing of Afghanistan’s foreign currency reserves and allowing the Taliban to cash in the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights. The Taliban will be no less clever than the previous government in skimming off some percentage.
American interests in this situation need to be parsed. Collapse of Taliban rule and the likely subsequent civil war would be awful from Washington’s perspective. An Islamic State (Khorasan) takeover would be worse. The Americans want what the UNSC resolution specified: exit of those US citizens and supporters who want to leave, access for humanitarian relief, respect for human rights (especially those of women and girls), and an inclusive transitional government. The Taliban have already disappointed by naming a government of their own militants, including people linked to Al Qaeda. While it is early days, they have not demonstrated respect for human rights. Nor have they allowed the exit of more than a minimal number of people.
So do we discount the Taliban failures so far and go ahead with humanitarian relief? I’m afraid we don’t have a lot of choice, both as a matter of principle and pragmatic policy. Humanitarian relief may not save the Taliban government from collapse, but it is the right thing to do and could help to stave off civil war or an IS takeover. We should provide the funds with eyes wide open, trying to verify that access is unhindered and that food and other assistance flows to those in need and is not monetized or otherwise pocketed by Taliban-connected warlords.
There is an argument for at least partially unfreezing reconstruction assistance and Afghanistan’s hard currency assets, because that too could help prevent civil war or worse. Certainly the Taliban will try to extract hard currency with promises to fight the Islamic State. The Pentagon may be sympathetic to this argument. Here I would be far more cautious. The Islamic State is a rival of the Taliban: a jihadi group that wants to govern Afghanistan (and more). The Taliban have their own reasons for wanting to crush IS (Khorasan). I’d prefer to see them doing it for their own good reasons.
As for Al Qaeda, it is clear from inclusion of the Haqqani network, an Al Qaeda affiliate, in their government that the Taliban are not prepared to treat it as an enemy. There is still a question whether a government that includes Sirajuddin Haqqani as “interim” Interior Minister will allow the use of Afghan territory to plot or organize attacks on the US. It is arguable that it is better to have Al Qaeda in the tent pissing out than outside the tent pissing in. I wouldn’t buy it though: it really doesn’t matter that much where Al Qaeda plots its next attack against the US–9/11 may have been conceived while Osama bin Laden was in Afghanistan, but most of the plot was organized and conducted elsewhere. Wherever the Haqqani network helps Al Qaeda, the US interest is clear: weaken both.
Bottom line: Humanitarian assistance yes, but nothing more until it is clearer how the Taliban will govern and whether they will cooperate with those who target, or allow others to target, the United States. Hoisting their flag over the presidential palace in Kabul on 9/11 was not a good omen.
PS: What Ahmed Rashid has to say is always interesting:
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Sanctioning Syria might work, but not the way it’s done now
The Assad regime and the Syrian economy at large have been under Western sanctions for years, but they have yet to lead to serious concessions. This has caused some analysts and policy makers to favor lifting most sanctions altogether, fearing that their only effect currently is to harm the Syrian civilian population. However, concessions from the Assad regime remain elusive, making this option difficult to realize. In response to these issues and considerations, the Middle East Institute’s Wael Alalwani and Karam Shaar published a paper reviewing US and EU sanctions on Syria earlier this month. On August 24, MEI convened a panel to discuss the report and the issue in general. The discussants agreed that the West lacks focus on the Syrian conflict. Western sanctions regimes lack thought and dedication, causing them to fail at bringing about regime change, while disproportionately harming the Syrian civilian population. Sanctions have a definite function in the fight against injustice in Syria, but their types and application need to be seriously reviewed for them to fulfil it efficiently.
The speakers were:
Natasha Hall
Senior Fellow, Middle East Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Jomana Qaddour
Nonresident Senior Fellow & Head of Syria
Atlantic Council
Member
Syrian Constitutional Committee
Karam Shaar
Research Director,
Operations Policy Center (OPC)
Nonresident Scholar,
MEI
Senior Lecturer
Massey University
Andrew Tabler
Matin J. Gross Fellow, Geduld Program on Arab Politics
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
former Senior Advisor to the U.S. Special Envoy for Syria Engagement
Charles Lister (moderator)
Senior Fellow and Director, Syria and Countering Terrorism and Extremism programs
MEI
The report
Karam Shaar summarized the findings of the report:
- Lift certain sanctions and rely more on others. All country or sector-wide sanctions should be lifted, as they hurt civilians the most and can’t be maintained in the long run. These should be lifted in exchange for concessions as soon as possible. On the other hand, targeted sanctions such as travel bans, asset freezes and secondary sanctions should be expanded.
- Implement a more proactive, all-of-Syria policy and focus on it. The current policy lacks focus and dedication.
- Pursue Syrian officials by using universal jurisdiction legislation in Western countries. Only small steps have been taken in this direction.
- Improve the effectiveness of sanctions. This can be done by targeting the deep cadres of the regime, not the tip of the iceberg (e.g. target known security chiefs who aren’t currently sanctioned, rather than a cabinet minister with little actual importance to the regime). The US and EU should also expand their use of secondary sanctions that target third parties who cooperate with or aid sanctioned individuals, even in activities that aren’t technically under sanctions.
- Make realistic demands. It is completely unrealistic for Assad to agree to the current demand, namely a political transition which will inevitably lead to his downfall and possibly even his death. Regime allies will also never favor this option. If this is the aim, far more pressure would be necessary than is currently applied.
Shaar considers the current sanctions policy a lazy attempt by the US and EU to feign an interest in the fate of the Syrian people, while allowing the situation to fester.
In response, Tabler, who was part of designing Syrian sanctions in the US government until recently, emphasized that mistakes are inevitable. However, it is also important to remember that certain decisions might be made based on classified information that the public isn’t privy to. He also considered scrapping all sector-based sanctions unrealistic. Certain sectors must remain sanctioned, although he does admit that there are sanctions that disproportionately harm citizens.
Bypassing sanctions
Natasha Hall turned the panel’s attention to regime efforts to bypass sanctions. North Korea’s ‘Room 39’ works on ways to access hard currency for Pyongyang through drug trafficking, ransomware, etc. The Assad regime’s ‘Room 39’ activities are perhaps more advanced than that already. It gains currency through the expropriation of IDP assets, as well as UN food aid. Qaddour added that the Syrian regime has become a major exporter of the illegal drug Captagon. The value of only the seized Captagon in the Gulf in 2020 was five times that of the legitimate exports of Syria.
Tabler described sanctions as good for the long haul. The threat of military action has a limited shelf life and diminishing deterrent value. However, when challenged by Shaar and Hall, he acknowledged that sanctions are a cat-and-mouse game. They must continuously be updated as those under sanctions discover loopholes to avoid them. Shaar criticized the Biden administration’s decision not to review and update sanctions, but rather continue to implement the Trump administration’s existing package. This has allowed such loopholes to expand.
The UN has also become a threat to the effectiveness of sanctions. Hall mentioned that the UN doesn’t have to adhere to US or EU sanctions and does work with regime insiders to deliver aid. Qaddour pointed out that this year’s UNSC discussion on aid provision led to the inclusion of early recovery assistance for the first time. Such efforts need to be viewed skeptically. If we can ensure strong conditions and follow-up for where this aid goes, it can benefit ordinary Syrians through the reconstruction of hospitals and schools. Otherwise, it is likely to flow into the pockets of companies owned by regime insiders.
Civilian wellbeing
Qaddour emphasized the need to balance the regime and the welfare of normal Syrians. We shouldn’t maintain a philosophy of ‘down with Assad or we burn the country’. Hall also warned that a failure to engage in sanctions as part of a broader strategy would lead to a North Korea on the Mediterranean: a heavily sanctioned regime that perseveres while its population suffers.
However, Qaddour thinks that Syrian citizens opposed to Assad are aware of the good intentions behind the current sanctions. This is particularly true for the Kurdish-held areas, which don’t bear the brunt of the sanctions and where Assad’s propaganda isn’t a factor. Also in regime areas, people tend to have a nuanced perspective. They can see firsthand that whatever wealth does enter the country flows to those in the regime. Their suffering is starkly contrasted with the wealth of regime insiders.
Re-engaging the West
The panel was unanimous in thinking that the West isn’t engaged enough with the Syrian conflict and that its actions reflect that. Hall made clear that there is much more at stake for the West than humanitarian considerations. The war and the Syrian regime cause arms trafficking, drug (Captagon) smuggling, and potentially the trafficking of foreign fighters. Especially if the regime captures Kurdish-held areas, thousands of foreign fighters would come under its jurisdiction. Tabler also feared that the West underprioritizes Syria.
There are those in Washington who favor ending sanctions. Not for love of the Assad regime, but for fear of the effects. Particularly the experience of Iraq in the 1990s and the suffering caused by US sanctions without tangible results inform this idea, according to Hall and Tabler. However, Qaddour pointed out that lifting sanctions without receiving concessions is impossible. It would devastate US and EU credibility in the future, and vindicate authoritarians claiming that the West will lose interest after a while.
Hall also indicated that ending sanctions won’t solve the suffering of the Syrian people. They would still be under the stress of the demographic engineering the Assad regime is engaging in. The expropriations of IDP and regime opponents property while investing reconstruction efforts in loyal areas that aren’t the most in need makes it impossible for many refugees to return to the country. Under these conditions reconstruction won’t succeed: it will lack the human capital that must also be rebuilt. If we lift sanctions now, we would just allow the entrenchment of a system of injustice. Shaar suggested there is no reason at all to lift targeted personal sanctions such as asset freezes. These don’t hurt Syrian civilians.
The panel came to a number of immediate recommendations:
- They agreed that establishing a high-ranking special envoy for Syria would serve to signal US seriousness and allow the sanctions system to be applied in earnest.
- Hall also recommended a comprehensive review of the effects and effectiveness of our current sanctions regimes.
- Shaar was pessimistic about the prospect of enticing European or American governments to take a genuine interest. He believed the best bet is to focus on what Syrians and those that do care about Syrian interests can do without their help.
Watch the recording of the event below:
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I hope we’ve learned unilateral withdrawal is a bad idea
Judging from my inbox, a lot of people around the world are thinking the US withdrawal from Afghanistan could be prelude to withdrawal elsewhere. I think the opposite is true. The Afghanistan debacle will make it difficult to discuss withdrawal almost anywhere for at least two and likely three years.
President Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan completely, thus fulfilling (four months late) the terms of President Trump’s agreement with the Taliban, has strong support across the political spectrum in Washington. But the way it was done was shambolic. Biden failed to ensure either a negotiated “decent interval” from the Taliban or a commitment of the Afghan security forces to defend the country’s government. There appears to have been no serious transition plan. The Americans literally withdrew from Bagram air base, the biggest in Afghanistan, in the dark of night, without consulting or informing the local Afghan commander.
It may well be that this was done to prevent panic, as President Biden has implied. But that was an ill-considered plan. Did anyone really think things would go more smoothly without Afghan cooperation?
The “Saigon in Kabul” scenes will inoculate the Administration against any further withdrawals, at least until a second Biden term. There will of course be force adjustments for operational reasons, some of them potentially major, like getting the American aircraft out of Al Udeid in Qatar. They are exposed to Iranian missiles and will need to be moved if there are going to be hostilities, or even the threat of hostilities, with Tehran. I wouldn’t mind seeing fewer US troops committed in autocracies like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, but those would need to be carefully considered and well-executed. We may not like their style of governance, but replacements could be worse. I would expect no major drawdowns in places like Iraq, Kosovo, Cuba (Guantanamo), Japan, South Korea, or Europe, unless they are negotiated and agreed with the local authorities.
The only major US commitment under discussion in Washington these days is to Taiwan. China is growing in military strength. Taiwanese, watching Hong Kong and Xinjiang, are less interested in reunification and increasingly interested in independence. It is no longer as clear as it once was that the US has both the means and the will to defend against a Chinese attack, even if it is eminently clear the Taiwanese would make a takeover difficult for Beijing. But there are no deployed American ground forces in Taiwan, so no question of withdrawal. I assume the US Navy will continue to make its presence felt in Western Pacific and seek to improve its posture in defending the first island chain.
It has been clear for two decades that the US does not want to be the world’s policeman, patroling worldwide. I doubt Americans even want to serve as the world’s fireman, reacting to conflagrations as a first responder. The arguments for retrenchment are strong. But the consequences of withdrawal, especially when unilateral, can be catastrophic. I hope we’ve learned that much.
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Stevenson’s army, August 9
– Global warming is accelerating, IPCC says.
– Interagency meeting on “Havana Syndrome” finds more questions than answers.
– Senate glides toward infrastructure passage.
– Biden names critic to oversee NordStream2 deal.
Book note: I’ve just read the policy sections of Carter Malkasian’s book,The American War in Afghanistan. [He also has detailed chapters on US military operations.] My reaction:
Who lost Afghanistan? is the wrong question. It assumes agency, when few complex events are monocausal, and it seeks to assign blame, where responsibilities are widely shared. Better to ask, why did things turn out that way?
In his wide-ranging and detailed study of the conflict in Afghanistan during 2001-2021, The American War in Afghanistan [Oxford University Press],Carter Malkasian finds many moments of missed opportunities for peace and many questionable decisions that made things worse. A Pashto-speaking civilian working in Afghanistan who later served as a special assistant to CJCS General Dunford, Malkasian knows both American and Taliban officials as well as the territory and culture of Afghanistan.
The war brought benefits to many Afghans, but it also built resistance to outsiders that has long been a feature of Afghan history. “Afghanistan cleaved into an urban democracy and a rural Islamic order,” Malkasian writes. He mentions the impact of government incompetence and corruption and the role of Pakistan support for the Taliban, but ultimately concludes that the Taliban fighters had a greater willingness to kill and to be killed than their opponents. [He notes that one Taliban leader proudly sent his own son as a suicide bomber.]
“[T]he Taliban stood for what it meant to be Afghan.…Tainted by its alignment with the United States, the [Kabul] government had a much weaker claim to these values and thus a much harder time motivating supporters to go to the same lengths.”
Malkasian documents many consequential choices made by the Americans:
– refusing to allow any power sharing with the Taliban;
– failing to do much to build up the Afghan army and police during 2001-5 [in part of course, because of the U.S. turn to fight a war in Iraq];
– U.S. military tactics that killed many civilians and alienated others;
– overly optimistic U.S. generals that their ways would work;
– insufficient U.S. air strikes in 2014-15;
– ruptured relations with the Karzai government;
– mishandled peace talks in 2019-20 that rewarded the Taliban while leaving many crucial issues unsettled.
Maybe we need to revise the adage and conclude that defeat, not victory, has 100 fathers in this case.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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